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‘This is an important, original, diverse collection of studies that 
broach the boundaries and intersections between the private and 
the public, between grieving and governing, and between nature, 
humanity and the state.’
Ben Kiernan, Director, Genocide Studies Program, Yale University, and 
author of Blood and Soil
In most of the world, the transition from life to death is a time 
when states and other forms of authority are intensely present. 
Focusing on the relationship between bodies and sovereignty, 
Governing the dead explores how, by whom and with what effects 
dead bodies are governed in conflict and non-conflict contexts 
across the world, including an analysis of the struggles over ‘proper 
burials’; the repatriation of dead migrants; abandoned cemeteries; 
exhumations; ‘feminicide’; the protection of dead drug-lords; and 
the disappeared dead. Mapping theoretical and empirical terrains, 
this volume suggests that the management of dead bodies is 
related to the constitution and membership of states and non-state 
entities that claim autonomy and impunity.
This volume is a significant contribution to studies of death, 
power and politics. It will be useful at both undergraduate and 
postgraduate levels in anthropology, sociology, law, criminology, 
political science, international relations, genocide studies, history, 
cultural studies and philosophy.
Finn Stepputat is a Senior Researcher in Peace, Risk and Violence at the 
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 Series editors’ foreword 
 Th e birth of a series is an editorial, intellectual and human 
adventure. 
 We took the initiative of creating the ‘Human Remains and 
Violence’ series following our encounters with researchers work-
ing in genocide and Holocaust studies, as well as those in the fi eld 
of forensic science, having in common with them an interest in the 
twentieth century’s legacy of extreme violence. We share their aston-
ishment at the lack of attention paid to the fate of the dead bodies 
and human remains within these unique contexts, given that this 
fate reveals political, ethical, religious, social and legal issues, an 
understanding of which is fundamental to these societies’ survival. 
 Governing the Dead is the second volume in this series, suitably 
capturing the scope and vigour of these research aims and ambi-
tions. It is the result of a workshop organised in December 2010 
by Finn Stepputat at the Danish Institute for International Studies 
(DIIS) in Copenhagen, which brought together political scientists, 
philosophers, social anthropologists and historians to address the 
issue of the governance of dead bodies. Th e event’s dynamic success 
means that it is quite right and proper for  Governing the Dead to fi nd 
its place within the ‘Human Remains and Violence’ collection. 
 Th e Copenhagen workshop was indeed one of the fi rst intel-
lectual points of contact for us, followed by several others, fi rst in 
Paris in 2011 and 2012, and then in Manchester in 2013 and 2014. 
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Each of these meetings contributed to conceptually strengthening 
our research and establishing an academic community on an inter-
national level that continues to grow. 
 From an intellectual perspective, there is no doubt that the con-
tribution made by  Governing the Dead to understanding the salient 
biopolitics at play in the governance and handling of bodies, both 
within democratic regimes and in extreme contexts, is an essential 
one. In studies on extreme violence it will no longer be possible to 
eschew an examination of the actors, the rationale behind the actions 
and the ideologies that shaped the practices applied in the handling 
of dead bodies. 
 And on a human level, the truly interdisciplinary character and 
spirit of integrity, openness and intellectual rigour that presided over 
the workshop in Copenhagen are also qualities that we wish to instil 
in our collection. We are therefore more than happy to include Finn 
Stepputat’s  Governing the Dead , convinced that there could be no 
better ambassador for both our research enquiries and approach. 
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 Finn  Stepputat 
 Sovereignty and dead bodies 
 When my wife suddenly died some years ago, our home was soon 
fl ooded with paramedics and police offi  cers, including a photog-
rapher and a social worker-cum-police offi  cer. I asked the criminal 
investigator who interviewed me about the circumstances of the 
death if they could postpone taking my wife’s body to the hospital 
morgue. A few hours would allow us to say goodbye to her and to 
try to realise that she was no longer alive. I guess I was inspired by 
an experience from my youth when I spent time at the wake of an 
older woman who died in the refugee settlement where I did fi eld-
work at the time. At the age of thirty-one I had never seen a dead 
body  live before, and the mellow ambience among the family and 
friends surrounding the dead body made a lasting impression. In the 
case of my wife, the criminal investigator told me that my request 
was a very unusual one and that the body would have to be removed 
since it was, in principle, a criminal case. He nevertheless allowed 
me twenty minutes alone with my wife before they all left  the house, 
taking her body away in the ambulance. 
 Th is event seemed to confi rm an infl uential idea which holds that 
modern Western society is ‘denying’, ‘silencing’ or even ‘ignoring’ 
death, for example, by removing dead bodies from the gaze of the liv-
ing, with the exception of the gazes of a few professionals in charge of 
containing the dead bodies in designated sites and forms. 1 Yet, even 
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in Western societies dead bodies are constantly breaking through 
the surfaces of containment, not least through media coverage of 
violent confl ict, everyday crime, disasters and prominent deaths. 
Examples are legion: the elaborate and emotional  lit-de-parade of 
North Korea’s Kim Jong-Il; the slain body of Moamar Ghaddafi  in 
a cold store by the market in Misrata before he was returned to his 
tribe; the debated disposal of Osama Bin Laden’s corpse in open sea; 
the mutilated bodies of victims of state terror in Syria, oft en fi lmed 
and circulated in trophy videos; the sometimes equally mutilated 
victims of drug cartels, paramilitaries and petty criminals in Latin 
America; the dead bodies of unidentifi ed fl ood victims piling up 
outside the overfi lled morgues in the Philippines … this is to men-
tion just some of the images that have circulated in international 
media in recent years, testifying to the power and spectral qualities 
of dead bodies. 
 Th e event of my wife’s death and its aft ermath made me realise 
the force with which the state is articulated at the transition from life 
to death, a realisation that related to my previous academic engage-
ment with ethnographies of state and sovereignty. States tend to 
establish a range of laws, institutions and practices to take control 
of the transition from life to death, including the whereabouts of 
dead bodies. In many cases state apparatuses have limited reach, so 
either families are left  to deal with their dead on their own, or they 
have to negotiate regulation with other forms of authority. But even 
though state entities, at will or by default, delegate specifi c respon-
sibilities and faculties to private, social and religious entities, they 
usually claim the ultimate authority to defi ne and govern the dead 
within their jurisdiction through legislation and institutionalised 
procedures. 
 Pertaining to issues such as civil registers, public health, criminal 
law, il-/legitimate violence, property, inheritance and citizenship, the 
legislation and procedures around dead bodies are clearly related to 
the sovereignty of the state. Nevertheless, the relationship between 
dead bodies and sovereignty becomes a lot richer as a ground for 
political analysis if we denaturalise the concept of sovereignty and 
go beyond its legal defi nition as (only) a formal attribute of an inter-
nationally recognised territorial state (Hansen and Stepputat  2005 ). 
Focusing on  de facto rather than  de jure sovereignty, the authors in 
this volume understand sovereignty as an eff ect of practices that are 
fundamentally related to the body and to issues of life and death. 
 In this prism, the death of a person represents an occasion for the 
performance of sovereignty, not only for territorial states but also 
Introduction  5
for a range of sub-, trans- and supra-national entities that seek to 
claim or produce autonomous domains of power: religious commu-
nities, nations (not always coinciding with states), village and ethnic 
communities, drug cartels and gangs, insurgents, vigilantes, private 
security companies, international peace missions and others who 
manage dead bodies in ways that overlap or confl ict with legally 
institutionalised state practices. Th us, in general terms, the aim of 
this volume is to explore how the management of dead bodies is 
related to the constitution, territorialisation and membership of pol-
itical and moral communities that enframe lives in various parts of 
the world. 
 Unlike a previous wave of interest in the history of death  2 which 
during the 1980s focused on societal attitudes towards death and 
the eff ects of death in terms of interpersonal relations, the past 
decade or two have seen a developing interest in dead bodies and 
human remains as objects of political analysis. How death and dead 
bodies are dealt with is far from a homogenous, uncontested fi eld 
of social practice, as the literature of the 1980s could lead us to 
believe (Lomnitz  2005 ). As Lomnitz argues, death relates to deep 
issues of power. Th us a political study of death will have to take into 
account contradictions between friends and enemies, citizens and 
their others, or the ‘particular and species-general points of view’ 
(Lomnitz  2005 : 17). 
 Th is volume looks at sovereignty as a particular form of power 
and politics, hopefully showing that the fate of bodies in the tran-
sition from life to death can provide a key to understanding funda-
mental ways in which sovereignty is claimed and performed. Th e 
contributions analyse (post-)confl ict as well as non-confl ict contexts, 
which too oft en are studied in isolation from one another. Focusing 
on contemporary issues rather than the equally important historical 
dimensions, they all grapple with the questions of who governs the 
dead bodies, how, why and with what eff ects. With a broad set of 
analytical approaches and geographical contexts, the chapters ana-
lyse how dead bodies are placed and dealt with in spaces between 
competing, overlapping and nested sovereign orders, under normal 
as well as exceptional conditions. 
 The chapters 
 In the following chapter ( Chapter 2 ) I give an overview of the the-
oretical approaches that the chapter authors draw upon to explore 
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the terrain where dead bodies and sovereign practice intersect. Here 
I look at contributions that draw on psychoanalysis (‘the fear of 
death’), critical theory (‘between bio- and necropolitics’), the struc-
turalist-functionalist anthropology of burial rituals (‘rites of separ-
ation and the sacralisation of authority’) and recent ideas of agency 
and materiality (‘dead agency’). Despite their diff erences, the various 
approaches point towards an excess of meaning and aff ect relating 
to dead bodies and human remains, something that evokes the mys-
tical, the sacred, the liminal and the transgressive, which, in the end, 
escapes explanation. 
 Th e following nine chapters are organised in two parts. Th e fi rst, 
‘Containment and negotiation’ takes us from the – oft en incom-
plete – eff orts of states to contain and separate out dead bodies in 
particular sites to the ways in which such eff orts of containment are 
negotiated and contested in struggles between diff erent entities that 
claim the dead bodies. Th e second part, ‘Transgression’, gives four 
examples of how entities that claim sovereignty – including the state 
itself – produce eff ects of sovereignty by challenging and transgress-
ing the laws regarding the legitimate use of violence and how dead 
bodies should be treated with dignity. 
 Part I. Whereas the cemetery looms large as the site where modern 
(biopolitical) states have sought to contain dead bodies and separ-
ate them eff ectively from the living, this part opens with a counter-
image to the (double) containment of dead bodies in the soil of the 
cemetery. Benedikte M ø ller Kristensen writes about ideas and prac-
tices of ‘open-air burials’ among the Duha in Mongolia that involve 
the opposite of containment, namely the dispersal of the dead body 
as it is left  to be eaten by animals in the wilderness; a sort of nomadic 
territorialisation as it were. Framed by the rise and fall of Soviet state 
regulation of dead bodies, this chapter analyses how the Duha have 
perceived and dealt with the state’s claims on their dead bodies and 
the implied nationalisation of a landscape that was animated and 
managed through the Duha’s open-air burials. Families have had to 
navigate between the moral claims of the state, the shamans and the 
(agentive) corpses in a post-Soviet context where the Duha see their 
lives as increasingly marginalised and unprotected, as evidenced by 
the rising number of unnatural deaths. 
 Christophe Robert explores the notion of ‘dead zones’ as zones in 
which the cemetery is losing its character of a container that sepa-
rates the dead from the living. In Saigon ‘dead zones’ denote mar-
ginal, poor and polluted urban areas with partly abandoned and 
formerly peri-urban cemeteries. Th e image of the leaking cemeteries 
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as well as of leaking corpses – notably of soldiers and subjects of 
the slain ‘old regime’ – is deeply connected to the perception of dis-
order, amorality and pollution. State authorities, blamed for the neg-
lect and abandonment of the cemeteries and the dead, plan to solve 
the problem by eradicating the cemeteries and thereby the images of 
the past that the graves and cemeteries help keep alive. Th e chapter 
looks into how these processes are interpreted and shows how the 
‘debt to the dead’ turns cemeteries into sites of mobilisation challen-
ging the sovereign authorities. 
 Th e next three chapters all look into situations in which the 
association between dead bodies and the notion of national soil 
is manifest and where dead bodies become a centre of negotiation 
and contestation between diff erent, partially sovereign entities 
within the nation-state. Lars Ove Trans follows the repatriation of 
the corpse of a dead Mexican migrant worker from his home in the 
USA to his community of origin in the state of Oaxaca. As a recent 
phenomenon, the federal Mexican state supports the repatriation 
of corpses for burial in Mexican soil, once more showing how 
burial may be taken as the ‘ultimate test of belonging’ (Geshiere 
 2005 ). However, migrants have multiple sites of belonging and 
oft en uphold partial membership of several political communi-
ties. Th erefore the repatriation of the migrant corpse is negotiated 
with the authorities of various political communities – including 
the nation, local and transnational communities, states and federal 
states – which make claims to decide on the whereabouts of the 
corpse. 
 Th e chapters by Myrttinen and Fontein both deal with the theme 
of exhumations in the formation of independent nation-states. 
Whereas Lomnitz ( 2005 ) authoritatively asserts that nations are 
founded on dead bodies and human remains, these two chapters 
show the contested and negotiated process of selection of the par-
ticular remains that underpin the foundational myth of the nation. 
Henri Myrttinen looks at the place of the dead in narratives and com-
memorations of the struggle for the independence of East Timor. He 
notes that some dead bodies – in particular those of dead fi ghters of 
the war of independence – are more important than others, and that 
the hierarchy of dead bodies mirrors the political hierarchy of the 
independent state. However, marginalised ex-combatants, signifi -
cantly organised in martial and cultural arts groups that occasion-
ally recur to threats of violence to enhance their infl uence, challenge 
this hierarchy and the monopoly of the state in managing the dead. 
Th ey do so by engaging in unauthorised exhumations and collecting 
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remains of dead fi ghters in order to claim a more prominent place 
for themselves in the current political order. 
 Joost Fontein analyses the exhumation of a mass grave with dead 
bodies in varied degrees of decomposition in the northern part of con-
temporary Zimbabwe. Mugabe’s party, ZANU-FP, seeks to categorise 
the remains as victims and testimony of the cruelty of the colonial 
regime, but along the way the exhumation becomes a site of polit-
ical contestation as the human remains are not easily incorporated 
into the state-authorised narrative of their history. Th is, he argues, 
relates to the indeterminacy of the human remains, which demand 
yet defy their categorisation into particular types of ‘dead’. Th e rul-
ing party seeks to govern these dead and capitalise on the uncertainty 
and ambiguous meanings they produce, including the allusion to the 
transgressive powers of ZANU-FP. But in the end the party gives up 
on controlling the dead and opts for the recontainment of the human 
remains and sealing off  of the mass grave. 
 Part II presents various cases in which necro-political aspects of 
sovereignty take precedence over the bio-political in practices that 
work through dead bodies, notably by transgressing the limits set 
out in state law. As Antonius Robben shows, representatives can, 
in the name of the state, establish a state of emergency that allows 
the transgression of laws that regulate the life and death of subject-
citizens. X-raying the necro-political military regime in Argentina 
in the late 1970s, he describes how the state tried to produce its ‘cul-
tural sovereignty’ by imposing a particular cultural project on the 
political community. Robben shows how the regime used abduc-
tions and torture to produce bodies that were neither dead nor alive. 
He suggests that practices were not only informed by necro-political 
logics but also by bio-political logics of re-forming and resocialis-
ing subjects under torture that could serve to prove the feasibility of 
establishing cultural sovereignty. Th ose who became disappeared-
dead were denied proper burial and reincorporation as dead or mar-
tyrs in society; but as recent history shows, these restless dead have 
kept infl uencing the politics of the living. 
 Regnar Kristensen also gives an example of how state representa-
tives themselves transgress laws and norms regarding dead bodies. 
Kristensen follows the dead body of Mexican drug lord Beltr á n Leyva 
from the site of the killing to the site of Leyva’s burial in order to ana-
lyse the relationship between state and corpse, state and Church, and 
Church and soul. On the way, state offi  cials engage in acts of trans-
gression by humiliating and ridiculing the corpse, a show of excess 
that also characterises the protection of the corpse on its journey, a 
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protection worthy of a head of state. Linking up with Fontein’s focus 
on the materiality of dead bodies and human remains and discuss-
ing the common interpretations emerging in the press coverage of 
the events, Kristensen relates these excesses to certain ideas in popu-
lar Catholicism regarding the spirit of dead bodies, a restless, terror-
ising force that is ready to attack people. 
 Richard Kernaghan takes as his point of departure the ways in 
which the Maoist Shining Path movement exploited the ‘transgres-
sive potential’ of human remains by leaving dead bodies to decom-
pose on the road, using them as a crude ‘political pedagogy’ in their 
attempt to craft  new political subjectivities and introduce a new law 
in the Peruvian Huallaga valley. While the corpses-as-things are long 
gone, the images and meanings of corpses on the road linger in the 
post-war era when Kernaghan, through his method of ethnographic 
writing, seeks to understand how that past time of ‘foul weather’ 
coexists alongside the more steady weather situation of the present. 
In particular he is interested in how these images of past and present 
inform ideas of property relations and the social relations embedded 
therein. 
 Ninna Nyberg S ø rensen adds an explicit gender perspective to 
the analysis of sovereignty and dead bodies as she explores the phe-
nomenon of ‘femicide’ or ‘feminicide’ in the context of post-war 
Guatemala. Describing the development of the killing of women 
and the sites and state in which their dead bodies were found, the 
analysis generates an interpretation of feminicide as linked to the 
increasing infl uence of parallel, ‘corporate’ powers and their forma-
tion and territorialisation of moral/political communities or frater-
nities. In this interpretation, the mutilated dead bodies are central to 
the spectral qualities of violence and hence to the governance eff ect 
of violence. S ø rensen furthermore emphasises the complicity of the 
patriarchal state and the ways in which feminicide and the impunity 
associated with this practice produce notions of public and domestic 
space and in particular the place of women in these spaces. 
 In the postscript, John Borneman polemically turns the volume’s 
question – how the living are governing the dead – on its head, ask-
ing why we believe that we are in a position to govern the dead. We 
seek to govern the dead through ritual, but we are oft en not very 
successful. Borneman uses the case of communist leaders and the 
Marxist ideology that sought to govern the dead away from the pre-
sent. As Marx wrote, ‘the tradition of the dead generations weighs 
like a nightmare on the brain of the living’, which is why we should 
‘let the dead bury their dead’, as he famously quoted from the Bible. 
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But the communist leaders were unable to govern the dead. Rather 
they placed themselves inside the nightmare of the dead generations 
by disappearing the dead imperial family, mummifying the body of 
Lenin and cremating and offi  cially deeming as ungrievable – even in 
the private sphere – the millions who suff ered death because of the 
regime. Borneman argues that the dead produce eff ects in terms of 
displaced aggressions, repetition compulsion, the compulsive mov-
ing around of dead bodies and even the belief that the dead can, and 
indeed should, be governed. 
 Notes 
 1  See for example Ari è s  1981 ; Becker  1973 ; and Illich  1976 . 
 2  Ari è s  1981 and Le Goff   1984 are prominent examples. 
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 Governing the dead?  Theoretical 
approaches 
 Finn  Stepputat 
 Following a trend of emerging interest in carnal fetishism 1 and the 
politics of dead bodies (Verdery  1999 ), this volume focuses on the 
particular relationship between sovereignty on the one hand and 
(dead) bodies and human remains on the other, arguing that this 
analysis can help us understand fundamental ways in which sover-
eignty is claimed and performed. We see sovereignty as an eff ect of 
practices that are fundamentally related to the body and to issues of 
life and death, and pertaining to the state as well as other political 
and moral communities. 
 Th is chapter sets out the theoretical terrain that the authors of 
the volume navigate in their analyses, a terrain where dead bodies 
and sovereign practice intersect. More specifi cally it looks at four 
diff erent approaches, including psychoanalysis (‘fear of death’), crit-
ical theory (‘between bio- and necropolitics’), the anthropology of 
rituals (‘sacralisation of authority’) and lastly more recent ideas of 
materiality and alterity (‘dead agency’). 
 Fear of death 
 Th e point seems rather banal and commonsensical: the encounter 
with a dead body articulates our fear of death by reminding us that 
we are all going to die, that our social world can always be shattered 
by the death of somebody close or important to us, including for 
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example presidents of totalitarian regimes, as the volume  Death of 
the Father describes so well (Borneman  2004 ). In all political and 
moral communities, however, practices, discourses and institutions 
have developed that prescribe and guide how dead bodies should be 
taken care of, thus mitigating the fear of death and defending soci-
ety against the ravages of death and the potential meaninglessness of 
life. By fulfi lling these functions, the practices help forge the author-
ity of the institutions that take responsibility for the transition from 
life to death. 
 While not explaining how sovereignty comes into the picture, 
this is, in a very simple form, the point that a range of theories from 
Hobbes to psychoanalysis make regarding the linkage between 
power and the fear of death. Hobbes himself makes an explicit con-
nection between sovereignty and the fear of (pain and) death. Noting 
that human beings are naturally repulsed by pain and death – which 
slows down the ‘vital motions’ around the heart – he suggests that it 
is the fear of pain and death that ‘entices the subjects to yield certain 
freedoms and power to a sovereign being, through a social covenant 
in return for civil peace’. 2 
 We fi nd a much more detailed elaboration of the relationship 
between power and the fear of death in Hertz’s seminal 1907 essay 
on death and reburial in Borneo. Hertz pointed out that the corpse 
is ‘an object of horror and dread’, not only because of the process 
of decomposition but also because ‘when a man dies, society loses 
in him much more than a unit; it is stricken in the very principle 
of its life, in the faith it has in itself ’ ( 1960 : 37, 78). It seems as if 
the moment of crisis caused by the death belies society’s investment 
in terms of ritual consecration of its members and hence the tran-
scendental and sacred quality of society. In Hertz’s study these senti-
ments are expressed through the fear of spiritual contagion. Due to 
this fear, the possessions and closest relatives of the dead are subject 
to taboo and set apart during the ‘wet state’ of the dead body. In this 
Durkheimian interpretation, the degree of emotion and ritualisa-
tion around the dead body refl ects society’s investment. Th us, some 
corpses, such as those of strangers, do not inspire any emotion or 
ritualisation at all ( 1960 : 76). 
 In psychoanalysis the fear – or ‘terror’ – of death is taken as an 
indisputable, universal fact: 3 nobody is immune to the all-consum-
ing fear of death, a fear that infl uences all other fears (Becker  1973 ). 
Death, in other words, is the mother of all fears. In order to live with 
this fear, we tend to repress the feeling of fear by diff erent means, 
ensuring that it emerges only in particular ruptures and chocks 
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such as those provoked by the encounter with dead bodies. Looking 
into this encounter and borrowing Bataille’s concept of ‘the abject’, 
Kristeva ( 1982 ) characterises the corpse as the paradigmatic form of 
the abject, understood as something nauseating and repulsing that 
causes us to turn away, and from which we seek to distance ourselves: 
‘Th e corpse, seen without God and outside of science, is the utmost 
of abjection. It is death infecting life. Abject. It is something rejected 
from which one does not part, from which one does not protect one-
self as from an object’ ( 1982 : 4). Th e abject is radically excluded as 
an object of loathing, but since it is also part of our own life, as in 
the case of human waste or death, the abject collapses the distinction 
between subject and object. It invades or even expels the subject, 
doing away with the fundamental boundaries that mark subject-
ivity. Drawing upon Mary Douglas, Kristeva sustains that it is ‘not 
lack of cleanliness or health that causes abjection but what disturbs 
identity, system, order. What does not respect borders, positions, 
rules’ ( 1982 : 4). Against biological explanations of the repulsion that 
dead bodies produce, Kristeva holds that the abject and abjection 
are ‘primers of culture’ that draw us ‘toward the place where mean-
ing collapses’, a place beyond discourse. Th e abject does not  signify 
death: ‘No, as in true theatre … refuse and corpses  show me what I 
permanently thrust aside in order to live’ ( 1982 : 2). In Kernaghan’s 
interpretation ( 2009 ; this volume), the Peruvian Shining Path move-
ment used these powers of abjection as a kind of ‘political pedagogy’ 
aimed at opening up and changing political subjectivities when leav-
ing corpses to rot on the roads. 
 Bataille ( 1991 ) gives the fear of death and the abject powers of 
the dead body a key role in his conceptualisation of sovereignty. He 
shares Hertz’s image of the dead body as an object of horror and 
dread. Th us, the dead body partakes of ‘a whole sticky horror’ that 
cannot be assimilated into ‘the order of things’ ( 1991 : 215–16). But 
for Bataille, analysing modern, secularised society, the horror is not 
related to the fear of  spiritual contagion as in Hertz’s case, but rather 
to the fear of contagious  violence . Obsessed as he is with ‘the fi ne line 
between repulsion and desire’ (Posel and Gupta  2009 ), Bataille notes 
that the violence of death constitutes ‘a supernatural peril which can 
be “caught” from the dead body’ and that the ‘desire to kill may take 
hold of us’ (Bataille  2006 : 46–7). Th erefore the dead body is sub-
jected to taboo. Within the community, but less so when the dead 
body belongs to a stranger, the ‘taboo which lays hold on the others 
at the sight of a corpse is the distance that they put between them-
selves and violence’ ( 2006 : 44). 
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 For Bataille ( 1991 ) the constant containment or repression of the 
fear of death and the sentiments that death produces characterises 
the profane domain of everyday life. Th is includes in particular the 
taboo against killing, while its transgression characterises the sacred 
domain of sovereignty, what Mbembe ( 2003 ) calls the domain of 
death. In Bataille’s interpretation, sovereignty is intrinsically embed-
ded in the body and in life as a biological force, expressed either 
in the will to take life or in the willingness to disregard one’s body 
and one’s own life. Like other manifestations of sovereignty, the dis-
play of will, sacrifi ce and disregard of death appears both frightening 
and awe-inspiring as it thematises the almost sacred character of life 
itself. Th us, the emaciated body of the hunger striker (Aretxaga  2001 ) 
or the blood of the jihadist martyr (Devji  2005 ) remains a powerful 
weapon in what we may call ‘necropolitics’ (Mbembe  2003 ), a con-
cept to which we will return in the next section. 
 In a certain sense, Bataille points to the fear of death and the 
attempts of authorities to ameliorate and control the powers of 
abjection of dead bodies as constitutive elements in relation to pol-
itical communities. Unlike many other attempts at identifying the 
defi ning traits of sovereignty, Bataille understands sovereignty as an 
eff ect of practice rather than seeing a sovereign will as the source of 
sovereignty. He may easily be criticised for the unmistakably vitalist 
tenor of his fascination with the decision, excess and (disregard of) 
death, and his corresponding critique of the dull, bureaucratised and 
fainthearted everyday life under modern capitalism. Nevertheless, 
his focus on the body at the centre of sovereignty has inspired vari-
ous later elaborations of the concept of sovereignty, as we will see 
below. 
 Dead bodies between bio- and necropolitics 
 Given the theoretical links established above between sovereignty 
and dead bodies, it would be no surprise if shift s in the ways author-
ities claim to govern dead bodies coincide with shift s in the ways in 
which sovereignty is claimed. In this regard, and focusing on Western 
modernities, it is instructive to look at the correspondence between 
the shift s that took place from the late eighteenth century onwards, 
when the modern cemetery was generalised as a concept for dis-
posal of dead bodies and the general relationship to death changed, 
as Ari è s (1981) and others have documented vividly. Regarding sov-
ereignty, an infl uential narrative holds that modern forms of power, 
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the power of life, in this period began to displace the power of death, 
understood as the right of the sovereign to kill and to let persons 
sentenced to death live. Th e power of death is associated with clas-
sical accounts of sovereignty and manifested for example in medi-
eval spectacles of executions as described by Foucault ( 1977 ). In 
Dean’s words, sovereignty 
 is the most ancient of powers, the most mysterious, the darkest, the most 
allied with the sacred, the mythical, the divine and the demonic. It is the 
power of powers. Its symbols are blood, the sword and the executioner. 
Its mechanisms are the ceremonials of public execution and rituals of 
torture, with their motifs of confrontation, revenge, terror and what 
Foucault called ‘atrocity’.  (Dean  2004 : 18) 
 Against this, modern forms of power rely on the development and 
refi nement of the power over life, as manifested in improved pub-
lic health systems, decreasing mortality rates, elaborate regimes of 
discipline and new forms of subjectivity. With the bourgeois revolu-
tions and the emergence of the nation form, the locus of sovereignty 
changed from the sovereign to the people or the nation, whereas the 
right of the sovereign to take life became increasingly limited by the 
assumption that the life of every citizen had a value. In the modern 
state, lives could be taken or sacrifi ced only in the name of the future 
of the people, the nation, society or the species (Borneman  2004 ). 
 In fact, the sovereignty of the modern state was theorised – fam-
ously by Hobbes – against versions of the state of nature, in particular 
characterised by the proximity to death (and exaggerated sex-drive) 
(Lomnitz  2005 : 36). Th is general idea of a movement ‘away from 
death’ (Fabian  1973 : 55) has been also evident in anthropological 
studies of death. As Fabian noted in the 1970s, anthropologists since 
the late nineteenth century had had very little to say about death in 
modern society; they did not study death in the singular but tended 
to forward a parochial vision of death-related behaviours, customs or 
‘folklores’ of death in diff erent cultures, thus ‘relegating reactions to 
death to “the others”, or at least the other that has survived in us’ in 
archaic forms ( 1973 : 53). In a similar, critical fashion, other scholars 
have depicted death in modern Western society as being pushed back, 
marginalised, suppressed, silenced or even denied. 4 Turning Hobbes’ 
vision of ‘the State of Warre’ on its head, the critics have sometimes 
tended to romanticise the relation to death in pre- modern societies 
as in the case of Ari è s’ ( 1981 ) notion of ‘tamed death’. 
 Foucault also wrote, at the end of the 1970s, about the ‘grad-
ual disqualifi cation of death’ that had taken place since the late 
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eighteenth century. Th en death was a spectacular ceremony mani-
festing the transition from one power to another, from ‘the sovereign 
of this world’ to ‘the sovereign of the next world’. Now, in contrast, 
death has become ‘something to be hidden away’ ( 2003 : 247). Th e 
reason is the shift  from the power of death (or of ‘sovereignty’) to 
the ‘power of life’. Th e shift  coincided with the emergence of clinical 
medicine and bio-medicine, which permitted the constitution of life 
and death as biological processes (Rose  1999 ). Th us, in Foucault’s 
words ( 2003 : 247–8), bio-power, the power of life, emerged ‘beneath’ 
the power to take life:
 Now that power is decreasingly the power of the right to take life, and 
increasingly the right to intervene to make live … death becomes, insofar 
as it is the end of life, the term, the limit, or the end of power too. Death 
is outside the power relationship. In the right of sovereignty, death was 
the moment of the most obvious and most spectacular manifestation of 
the absolute power of the sovereign; death now becomes, in contrast, the 
moment when the individual escapes all power, falls back on himself and 
retreats, so to speak, into his own privacy. Power no longer recognizes 
death. Power literally ignores death.  (Foucault  2003 : 248) 
 Th is analysis gives material for at least three refl ections. Firstly, since 
the late eighteenth century dead bodies have increasingly become 
objects of biopolitics, with profound implications for how the 
dead have been governed in and beyond the Western hemisphere. 
Developments in biomedical science were articulated in states’ pro-
gressive introduction of the ‘concept of the cemetery’ and prohib-
itions against ‘intra-mural burial’, as the Spanish king wrote in a 
decree in 1789. 5 Authorities justifi ed the new measures with refer-
ence to public health and the danger of disease and infection stem-
ming from decomposing and uncontained dead bodies buried in and 
around overcrowded churches, and during the nineteenth century 
medical doctors were involved in campaigns for the construction 
of extramural cemeteries. 6 However, many people in nineteenth-
century Latin America violently opposed the separation of the dead 
and the living, which they saw as an abandonment of the dead, who, 
in very practical terms, were left  alone in distant cemeteries with-
out the protection and ceremonial attention they had received when 
buried in and next to the churches. As Wilson ( 2004 ) shows in the 
case of nineteenth-century provincial Peru, the new regulations 
contributed to producing and sanitising a bourgeois notion of public 
space by banning and displacing the lively indigenous burial proces-
sions from the cities with reference to the risks they represented for 
public health. 
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 Th e birth of clinical and bio-medicine was also the precondition 
for other developments in the governance of dead bodies. One was 
the systematic registration and standardisation of causes of death that 
developed with the death certifi cate during the nineteenth century 
(Trostle  2005 ), generating information that fed into the production 
of knowledge and policies of public health. Another development 
was the emergence of forensic medicine, which – with great dispar-
ities – became part and parcel of the state procedures surrounding 
dead bodies, with particular importance for the enforcement of state 
criminal law. In regard to (necro-political aspects of) sovereignty, 
forensic medicine and the associated state laws and procedures are 
essential to upholding the state’s claim to a monopoly of legitimate 
force and the elimination of killing with impunity. 
 Th us, on this background it is not entirely true that death is the 
limit of modern (bio-)power. Th e dead are subjected to public health 
considerations at least until they reach the ‘dry state’ aft er a num-
ber of years, 7 and as an Italian friend who wanted to keep a little of 
his mother’s ashes had to realise, states can be very fi rm in holding 
on to the human remains. In Italy it is illegal to remove ashes from 
the sealed urn, and the cemetery attendant doing it risked his job. 
Whereas there is no rationality involved in forming the subjectivity 
of the dead as such, we may see the way in which the dead are gov-
erned as a disciplining – or a stabilisation as Fontein argues in this 
volume – of the leaking, putrefying bodies. 8 
 Furthermore, reading the justifi cation for the new nineteenth-
century regulations, it is obvious that the public health rational-
ity was linked to considerations of the human dignity of the dead, 
including their individuality, as Ari è s ( 1981 ) also shows. Whereas 
many states left  questions of the soul to religious institutions, they 
tended towards establishing a direct relationship to every dead citi-
zen within the territory by taking responsibility for the disposal of 
the body, irrespective of the religious creed of the citizen. Unlike 
older forms of sovereignty, which were primarily legal and symbolic 
reigns, the modern state tended to establish comprehensive, eff ect-
ive and totalising forms of detailed government of populations and 
territories (Burchell  et al.  1991 ). 
 A second refl ection relates to the temporal relation implied in the 
quotation from Foucault given above between a time of ‘sovereignty’ 
understood as the ancient power of death, and a posterior time of 
the power of life, of biopolitics. Even though Foucault reserves the 
notion of sovereignty for pre- or early-modern forms of power, he 
is interested in how the seemingly contradictory powers of life and 
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death are related in modern societies where ‘thanato-politics’ – or 
necropolitics – continues to mark dynamics of political communi-
ties (Foucault  1978 ). Th us, modern techniques of government made 
possible much more exhaustive, ambitious and eff ective forms of sov-
ereignty, culminating in systematic exterminations of population in 
modern states as well as their colonies. Th is was particularly evident 
in the twentieth-century totalitarian states that were characterised 
by both a highly developed politics of disciplining and improving 
the body and the species, and an unprecedented will to extermin-
ate populations in order to defend, protect and purify the political 
community – nation, society or people – oft en defi ned in racial or 
ethnic terms (Foucault  2003 ). Th us, central concepts of the power 
of death such as blood, fatherland and nation were reinscribed in 
bio-political discourses of hygiene, eugenics, etc. (Dean  2004 ). Th e 
bodies of those who died in these systematic exterminations were 
not disposed of with the dignity that supposedly applied to citizens 
of modern states. Th e exception that they were subjected to while 
alive was extended into death, including highly industrialised meth-
ods of disposal. 
 In an attempt to develop a modern idea of sovereignty that incor-
porated Foucault’s insights into modern forms of power, Agamben 
( 1998 ) suggested that biopolitics was the original form of sover-
eignty and that political communities are constituted on the possi-
bility of reducing fully human members to purely biological beings, 
stripped of dignity and desymbolised as ‘bare life’ that can be killed 
with impunity. Less interested in the sequence of bio- and necro-
politics, Agamben focuses on cases of indistinction between bare, 
natural and moral, political life, between exclusion and inclusion, 
between law and nature, which characterise situations in which 
legal or ethical exceptions are becoming the norm such as camps 
for indeterminate detention. As expressed by Dean ( 2004 : 22), ‘[w]e 
do not need to look for a historical point of connection between the 
powers of life and death because [together] they are constitutive of 
the sacred character of political community’. Rather, Dean suggests, 
we should ‘delineate the co-ordinates of this philosophical twilight 
zone’ of indistinction. 
 Th us, whereas we in general may see the overlap, interrelation 
and even indistinction between bio-power and necro-power as lying 
at the heart of modern sovereignty, Das and Poole ( 2004 ) argue that 
this relationship is particularly visible at the margins of the state. In a 
highly disconcerting analysis of the borderland between Mexico and 
the USA, Maga ñ a (2011) gives an example of this. She shows how 
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the Mexican state, being unable to protect and nurture the life of 
its citizens as they seek to cross the border into the USA, puts great 
eff ort into rescuing and repatriating the bodies of those who die in 
the attempt to leave Mexico, a point Trans also makes in this volume. 
Fontein (this volume) shows how an exhumation in Zimbabwe gen-
erates uncertainty because of the competing interpretations regard-
ing the identity of the decomposed dead bodies: If they were killed 
by the colonial regime they would legitimate the ruling party as 
protecting and nurturing postcolonial life. If they were killed by the 
ruling party itself, the capacity and will of the party to use violence 
against its own population would not, from the party’s point of view, 
be a totally unwelcome subtext produced by the exhumation. 
 Th e overlap or indistinction of bio- and necropolitics is also 
evident at the margins of life where biomedical regimes of power 
have brought new subjects into being, such as the brain-dead organ 
donor or ‘fetal subjects’, who are subjected to decisions of life and 
death by health professionals, administrators, prospective parents, 
relatives and others (Kaufman and Morgan  2005 ). Again, the dead 
bodies provide an entry point for the analysis, for example by posing 
the question of whether the foetuses are given a proper funeral or 
just disposed of unceremoniously in a dumpster (Melhuus  2005 ). 
 Finally, Foucault’s analysis of death as the limit of modern power 
gives material for a third refl ection: Death constitutes such a limit 
to the extent that the state has been secularised. In these cases, the 
rationality of the state excludes the idea of an aft erworld – and hence 
the political nature of the passage from life to death – which other-
wise has been an important element for the construction of hegem-
ony and social order. In Latin America, for example, ideas of an 
aft erworld and in particular of purgatory were crucial for Spanish 
colonisation, when the brute, law-making force of the conquest was 
replaced by law-enforcing political governance, including the inser-
tion of the Catholic Church between life and death to help people 
to ‘die well’. 9 Th is ensured a certain power over life in the form of 
confessions and other pastoral techniques of government (Lomnitz 
 2005 ). But as the postcolonial states were consolidated towards the 
end of the nineteenth century, they oft en took over only the man-
agement of the dead bodies (and the recording of birth and death), 
whereas the fate of the soul and relations to an aft erworld were left  
to the religious communities to manage (see R. Kristensen, this 
volume). 
 As an extreme example of secularisation, the Soviet Union in 
the early years aimed at introducing cremation as an atheist funeral 
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while suppressing any commemoration of the millions of dead from 
wars and persecution (Borneman, this volume; B. M. Kristensen, 
this volume). Nevertheless, even the Soviet Union could not just 
leave the dead to themselves but had to move signifi cant dead bodies 
such as those of the imperial family around, as Borneman describes 
in his contribution. And with twentieth-century nationalism, secu-
larised states engaged in diff erent sorts of death cults in which dead 
bodies of citizens who had given their lives for the nation were cele-
brated and commemorated extensively. In this sense, the sovereignty 
of the nation seems to rest on the remains of its dead, as Lomnitz 
( 2005 ) and Taussig ( 1997 ) have shown in the cases of Mexico and 
Venezuela. Th us, whereas sovereignty no longer relies (only) on the 
power of death, dead bodies have an important role to play in the 
enchantment of politics and the sacralisation of authority, which is 
the theme of the next section. 
 Rites of separation and the sacralisation of authority 
 Since the emergence of the discipline, scholars of anthropology have 
analysed extensively the rituals associated with death, partly for the 
sake of analysing the key elements of culture that supposedly sur-
face in mortuary ritual, and partly for the sake of developing more 
general theories of ritual, culture, society and power. Th is section 
will look at ways in which anthropologists and others have inter-
preted the ritualisation of death as linked to power and sovereignty. 
Common to these interpretations is the idea that the qualities of 
the dead body – the process of its immanent decay and its ambigu-
ous being both subject and object, pure and impure, sacred and 
profane – endow the ritual with its symbolic power and political 
effi  cacy. Described in terms such as ‘alchemy’ (Bloch  1982 ), ‘sacral-
isation’ (Kaufman and Morgan  2005 ), ‘transgression’ (Taussig  2006 ) 
and ‘catharsis’ (Kristeva  1982 ), the ritualisation may be interpreted 
as being productive of a gift  of the authority in terms of fertility and 
reproduction of the polity. 
 Like Borneman in this volume, we may characterise the ritual 
performance at the threshold between life and death as a ‘rite of sep-
aration’, a ritual that separates the living and the dead and transforms 
persons into non-persons, ancestors, spirits or just corpses. 10 But the 
ritual also entails a reordering of social relations, such as positions 
in the family and in society, personal and kinship alliances, hier-
archies, etc. Th erefore the context of the ritual is characterised by 
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provisionality, indeterminacy and danger (Kaufman and Morgan 
 2005 ). Th e rituals are ‘moments of social drama’ (Jewsiewicki and 
White  2005 : 6) that bring not only interpersonal relations into the 
public domain, but also relations between the deceased and the pol-
itical/moral community in question, for example in terms of rank, 
status and membership. As Hertz noted, ‘[t]he emotion aroused by 
death varies extremely in intensity according to the social status of 
the deceased, and may even in certain cases be lacking. At the death 
of a chief, or a man of high standing a true panic sweeps over the 
group. On the contrary, the death of a stranger, a slave or a child will 
go almost unnoticed; it will arouse no emotion, occasion no ritual’ 
(Hertz  1960 : 76). 
 Capturing the sense of indeterminacy and danger, Hertz’s clas-
sical account of rituals of death and reburial depicts death as a pro-
cess of parallel transformation of the dead body, the mourners and 
society. In the vein of his teacher, Durkheim, Hertz interpreted mor-
tuary rites as a socially constructed orchestration of emotions and 
beliefs that worked to manage the dangers posed by the death of a 
member of society. Between the physical death and the much later 
reburial the person was disaggregated from the collectivity, and the 
social roles and capacities invested in the person were reallocated to 
others. Hertz saw the reburial of the remains – now in a considerably 
more ‘dry’ state – as a celebration of the incorporation of the soul 
of the deceased into the community of the dead, which coincides 
with the end of the relatives’ mourning. More importantly, he read 
the reburial as a celebration of the regenerated society that survived 
the death of a member – which he saw as ‘tantamount to sacrilege’ 
( 1960 : 77) – and the threats posed by a potentially malevolent and 
socially uncontrolled spirit. Th us, Hertz off ered a redemptive, func-
tionalist approach to grief and pain: in the end, life triumphs over 
death and harmony reigns (Taussig  2001 : 307). 
 Hertz invoked death as a passage between social orders to empha-
sise the similarities between mortuary rites, rites of initiation and 
marriages (Bloch and Parry  1982 ). Th is was soon picked up by van 
Gennep ( 1909 ) in his famous analysis of  rites de passage and later by 
Turner ( 1967 ) in his elaboration of ‘liminality’ as the transformative 
and potentially dangerous phase of being ‘betwixt and between’ social 
orders, literally at the threshold ( limen ): the dead person has been 
excluded from the order of the living but not yet included in the order 
of the dead. Turner showed how key elements of society – its rules 
and hierarchy – were put into play and negated in the liminal phase, 
which he considered an ‘anti-structure’. Th is negation gave the ritual 
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its transformative symbolic power but was also related to the dangers 
associated with decomposing dead bodies, their homeless, spiritual 
and ghostly manifestations, and the mourners, as Hertz noted. 
 From a structural-functionalist point of view, these rituals are not 
only about separating the dead from the living. Like other rites of 
passage, mortuary rites (re-)order and separate categories of funda-
mental signifi cance for the symbolic order. In Douglas’s terminology 
( 1966 : 41), they are ‘rituals of separation’ in the sense that they hold 
the total structure of ‘keystones, boundaries, margins and internal 
lines’ in relation. Th ey deal with what blurs the boundaries – and 
hence what is seen as impure, polluting and defi ling – by separating, 
demarcating and punishing transgressions. It is worth noting here 
that Douglas also inspired Kristeva in her thinking about the abject 
as a transgressive state, a ‘non-respect’ of structure and prohibitions, 
which is dealt with by means of ritualised purifi cation, a restora-
tive ‘catharsis’ either in the form of religious rituals or through art 
(Kristeva and Lotringer  1999 : 18, 25). 11 
 Building on the insights of Hertz and others, Bloch and Parry 
( 1982 ) analyse mortuary rituals as linked not only to the problem 
of  symbolic order in the face of death and decay but in particular to 
the problem of  political order. Th ey see these rituals as privileged 
occasions for negating the fi nality of the social order and confi rm-
ing the existing authority as stable and legitimate. Focusing on the 
coinciding symbolisms of death and fertility/regeneration in many 
mortuary rites, they show how the idea of an eternal, unchanging 
political order (of traditional authority) symbolically claims victory 
over the challenges posed by contingent, arbitrary and discontinu-
ous individual death. 
 Th e trick played out in the rituals consists in the juxtaposition 
of negative and positive elements: Th e rituals elaborate the negative 
aspects of death – primarily the decay, putrescence and pollution 
that underscores the fi nality of life – as something to get rid of to 
make way for the regeneration of the ideal order ( 1982 : 27). Th ese 
aspects are pre-eminently, but not always, associated with women, 
who have been given the ritual role of ‘soaking up’ the pollution 
caused by decaying fl esh, by weeping, mourning or preparing the 
dead body, a burden that otherwise have been shouldered by, for 
example, untouchables or low-grade priests ( 1982 : 25). Overall, the 
ritual represents the purifi cation of the soul/spirit and the ‘alchemy’ 
that transforms death into fertility as a ‘gift ’ of the authorities ( 1982 : 
41), which, as Kaufman and Morgan note, in the same movement 
‘sacralizes authority’ ( 2005 ). 
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 Th us, in the vein of Hertz, Bloch and Parry see the celebration of 
the soul’s incorporation into the collectivity of the dead as a celebra-
tion of society, the continuity and fertility of which is nurtured by 
this pool of ancestors. 12 Correspondingly, a ‘good death’ is a death 
that permits this kind of victory over biology and unpredictability, 
whereas a ‘bad death’ is one that does not permit control of bodily 
decay and the regeneration of fertility, for example in the case of a 
missing body (Bloch and Parry  1982 : 15–17). Th is latter situation 
makes it impossible for society to recuperate its life-essence. 
 We may not fi nd the regenerative, fertile aspect in any strong 
form in the funerary systems of Western societies. As Bloch ( 1982 : 
229–30) notes, this is because the creativity and continuity of legit-
imate power is ‘attributed to God and/or to capital’ and affi  rmed 
elsewhere. Nevertheless, in the modern states of the West immense 
eff orts are invested in the retrieval of (nationalised) dead bodies, be 
they Danish explorers who died in Greenland’s ice, tourist tsunami 
victims in Th ailand or American soldiers missing in action in wars 
overseas. In the words of American soldiers, the retrieval of dead 
bodies is ‘no less than a sacred duty’ (Samet  2005 : 624), which, of 
course, may not be universal. 
 Commonly, the structural-functionalist approaches described 
above have been criticised for being ahistoric and for their tendency 
to impose system and order on an unruly reality. In Turner’s version 
of the  rite de passage , for example, he has been accused of sanitising 
what can be an inherently untidy experience and ridding it of dis-
turbing, transgressive elements (Taussig  2006 ). In this regard Taussig 
is obsessed with the place of transgression and its relationship to 
taboo and the sacred. Here he follows Foucault ( 1998 ), who, won-
dering what becomes of the sacred and of profanation when God 
is dead, suggests that transgression points to the sacred in a secu-
larised society. Taussig sees the human body as a ‘privileged theatre 
of sacred activity’ ( 2006 : 170). Th e decaying body is an important 
site of (religious) refl ection with a unique transgressive and sacred 
potential, not being a symbol but a vehicle of transgression: ‘Pride 
of place should be given fi rst to the cadaver and then to menstrual 
blood, compared with which polluting and hence sacred power, 
other components and features of the body … are usually quite 
inferior in terms of sacred, transgressive potential’ ( 2006 : 162). In a 
later analysis, he interprets the unceremonial disposal of a chopped-
up dead body in a river in Colombia as an example of a transgres-
sion that is also sanctifying (Taussig  2012 : 513). Depriving persons 
of proper disposal – the most basic sign of being human according 
24  Finn Stepputat
to Bataille and many others – strikes at the heart of what we con-
sider as human, what separates us from the non-human, including 
the inhuman. ‘Yet, the inhuman is every bit as religious, every bit as 
sacred, as the pious rites that help move the corpse from its frighten-
ing negative state to that of hallowed ground.’ In this way, we may 
understand the disposal of a chopped up body in the river as ‘an arc 
of sanctifi cation’ ( 2012 ). 
 Whereas the classical anthropological insights suggest how 
authorities make use of the opportunity of every death to (re-)prod-
uce political community and sacralise its authority, Verdery ( 1999 ) 
analyses how rituals are orchestrated around the bodies of renowned 
dead persons to legitimise the authorities and reorient and give new 
meaning to political communities in moments of crisis. Looking at 
post-socialist states in the 1990s, she notes how restless and sym-
bolically charged dead bodies ‘enchanted’ or ‘animated’ transitional 
politics as the remains were (re-)buried in public spectacles, point-
ing to and correcting wrongdoings of the previous regime, such as 
denying people a proper burial. 
 Verdery ( 1999 : 27–33) attributes the symbolic effi  cacy of dead 
bodies to (1) ‘the aura of sanctity the corpse is presumed to bear’ 
due to the tendency of religious institutions to monopolise death 
and burial, (2) their ‘self-referentiality’, which allows people to iden-
tify with the dead persons in terms of victimhood and suff ering and 
(3) the materiality and ‘thereness’ of the corpse. Th e latter property 
is what makes abstractions – such as patriotism and civil society – 
concrete and tangible, and the concreteness that nevertheless tran-
scends time also helps make the past immediately present and mark 
particular sites, territories and boundaries with specifi c meanings. 
Th is kind of symbolic work is particularly relevant in relation to 
nations and other political communities that base claims to sover-
eignty in ideas of kinship and ancestor worship. As both Fontein and 
Myrttinen show in this volume, this is not a straightforward mech-
anism but rather a strongly contested process where diff erent fac-
tions struggle over which dead bodies should represent the nation 
and how they legitimise diff erent factions. 
 Th e latter observation furthermore underlines one of Verdery’s 
main points, namely that dead bodies are polysemic political sym-
bols that allow for an excess of meaning which is hard for authorities 
and elites to control. Th is is, however, also the point that allows recent 
approaches to the analysis of the political lives of human remains to 
critique Verdery. Whereas she regards dead bodies as political vehi-
cles that are used by political agents, the approach presented in the 
Governing the dead? Theoretical approaches  25
following section suggests that we have to think of their materiality 
as having eff ects, or even as endowing the remains with something 
that could be interpreted as material agency. 
 Dead agency 
 Th e title of this volume,  Governing the Dead , plays on the 
(Foucauldian) notion of liberal governance as the conduct of the 
free will of citizens. Th e title is of course somewhat contradictory 
since dead bodies in a modernist ontology do not have agency. As 
Verdery ( 1999 ) notes, ‘corpses don’t talk much’. Th is stands in con-
trast to much of the ethnographic literature in which the dead are 
oft en depicted as extremely powerful and talkative beings. As much 
as people assume that the community of the dead nourishes the 
community of the living (Bloch and Parry  1982 ), they also experi-
ence the dead as haunting the living and placing onerous demands 
on them in terms of respect, expenses and attention. Following these 
accounts, the dead can be a scary, capricious and even hateful crowd, 
an ‘awfully envious lot’ (Taussig  2001 : 307). 
 However, with the segregation, silencing and medicalisation of 
death in Western societies, the dead, in the shape of spirits, ghosts 
and ancestors, seem to have lost much of their power over the liv-
ing. 13 Th e dead in modern societies are assumed to let their will be 
known only indirectly, through the written will they leave behind, 
a will that they wrote while still alive and governed through social 
norms and sovereign laws. When people are dead, norms and laws 
dictate how and where the bodies can be disposed of and remem-
bered. As several chapters in this volume analyse, the dead bodies 
can also fall into the hands of people who transgress these norms 
and laws, who violate and mutilate the dead bodies, abandon them 
unburied to mark new territories or inscribe messages of sovereign 
power on them. Or the dead bodies can be exhumed and reburied 
and made symbolically and politically ‘effi  cacious’, as Verdery ( 1999 ) 
argues. But in all these cases, the dead bodies are usually depicted as 
being without agency, while the living are acting upon the dead bod-
ies as matter that can be interpreted and given meaning; they are not 
governed in Foucault’s sense of the ‘conduct of conduct’, however. 
 Against this image, recent approaches – including several of the 
chapters in this volume (Fontein, B. M. Kristensen, Kernaghan, and 
R. Kristensen) – attribute to dead bodies something that comes 
close to agency, not only because of the subjectivity in terms of their 
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biographies as (formerly) living and known persons but also because 
of the mere materiality of the bodies. Th ese approaches are related to 
theoretical debates that question Cartesian binaries (subject/object, 
mind/body, meaning/matter, person/thing, culture/biology), and in 
particular the privileging of subject–mind–meaning over object–
body–matter. In the social and human sciences this tendency leads 
to a representational and semiotic bias, meaning that, in this case, 
analysts tend to read the (living and dead) body as a text rather than 
including a complementary perspective of the body as an experien-
tial ‘being-in-the-world’ (Csordas  1994 ). 
 In this phenomenological vein, the Bones Collective (Fontein 
and Harries  2009 ) and Fontein (this volume) engage critically with 
Verdery’s analysis of the politics of dead bodies in which the living 
talk on behalf of the silent human remains. Th ey argue that human 
remains ‘speak to us but not eloquently enough’, that the remains 
provoke an ‘uncontrolled empathy’ as well as ‘eff orts to control it, or 
to speak, care or respond to the dead’ (Fontein and Harries  2009 : 7). 
Hence, dead bodies and human remains are not only symbolising 
aspects of social and political life and acting as a blank canvas for 
the inscription of political agendas. It is not politics that gives mean-
ing to bones, they argue; rather it is the bones that animate social 
and political processes such as mourning, othering, marginalisation 
and subversion. Th us, the very materiality of the human remains 
deserves analysis as a phenomenon in itself, a phenomenon that has 
the power to animate politics and produce aff ect. 
 Inspired by the recent turn in anthropology towards the material-
ity of things and substances, Fontein and his colleagues attribute the 
disturbing, animating, constraining and enabling power of human 
remains not simply to the ambiguity of dead bodies as uneasy sub-
ject/objects or persons/things, but as fl owing, transforming materi-
als that are recognisably human, thus demanding stabilisation into 
defi nable ‘objects’ and perhaps identifi able ‘subjects’ (Filippucci  et al. 
 2012 ). Yet human remains defy these contested processes by their 
excessive alterity or indeterminacy: the ‘torque of materiality’, in 
Fontein’s case, of the leaky, fl eshy and stinky remains exhumed from 
a mine shaft  in Zimbabwe. 14 Th is ‘torque of materiality’ suggests 
that human remains are more metonymic than metaphorical, that 
they signal ‘presence’ more readily than meaning, and that therefore 
processes to turn human remains into metaphors, such as ‘the dead’, 
are oft en contingent and contested (Filippucci  et al.  2012 ). 
 Here we may see a parallel between this approach and Posel and 
Gupta ( 2009 ), who interpret the ritualisation and careful preparation 
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for disposal of the dead body as attempts to stabilise the boundar-
ies and (re-)establish the dignity and human-ness of the dead body, 
and thereby reproduce the threatened distinction between humans 
and animals. Whereas Posel and Gupta (with Nussbaum  2004 ) focus 
on the human/animal distinction, Fontein and colleagues focus on 
the human/thing distinction. Using Latour’s ( 1999 ) ‘post-humanist’ 
approach, 15 we could interpret the post-mortem human interven-
tion as an attempt to stabilise and ‘purify’ the category of the human 
against the thingy-ness, the material indeterminacy and the exces-
sive potentiality of dead bodies and human remains. 
 We may also relate this discussion back to Bataille’s and Foucault’s 
understanding of sovereignty as a form of power that is being per-
formed on the body and therefore relies on the resistance and the 
resilience of the mere lifeforce of the body. Even in death, however, 
when the lifeforce of the body has been subjected, the bodily sub-
stances resist in their materialities. Dead bodies do not go away 
that easily, a fact that represents very real and practical problems 
for those responsible for mass violence. As the Nazis realised, even 
cremation is a meticulous time- and energy-consuming method of 
disposal that in no way could keep up with the daily toll of dead 
bodies in the extermination camps; this, as van Pelt ( 2002 ) has con-
vincingly documented, was the background for the development 
of new types of ovens and slackened regulations for cremation in 
Nazi Germany. And aft er attempts at hiding the dead and mutilated 
bodies in mineshaft s as in Zimbabwe or removing, transporting and 
reburying them elsewhere as in the case of ex-Yugoslavia, they may 
still show up and  qua the ‘torque of materiality’ (and DNA-tests) 
threaten to overturn political agendas and foundational narratives 
and challenge the power of those who are responsible. 
 In his psychoanalytical register, Borneman (this volume) also in 
a way attributes agency to the dead, which has implications for how 
dead bodies are related to politics and sovereignty. Polemically he 
asks how the living have become convinced that the dead are gov-
ernable. How come they believe they are governing the dead, that 
it is not the other way around? Th e living seek to govern the dead 
through rituals. Following Lévi-Strauss, these can be rituals of 
mourning that transport the present into the past promising closure 
by placing the dead irrevocably in a separate time–space as ances-
tors; or rites of commemoration that transport the past into the pre-
sent by recreating ‘the sacred and benefi cial atmosphere of mythical 
times’ in which the living can mirror their ancestors and their deeds 
(L é vi-Strauss  1966 : 314). 
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 Nevertheless, as Borneman’s and several other chapters in this vol-
ume show, the living are oft en not very successful in their attempts to 
govern the dead. Borneman argues that the dead, like the Lacanian 
real, produce aff ect. Th is may be seen as having eff ects in terms of 
displaced aggressions, repetition compulsion, the compulsive mov-
ing around of dead bodies and even the belief that the dead can, 
and indeed should, be governed. Borneman uses the case of com-
munist leaders and the Marxist ideology, which, in stark contrast 
to fascist ideologies and leaders’ obsession with death and the dead, 
sought to govern the dead away from the present. As Marx wrote in 
the introduction to  Capital , ‘the tradition of the dead generations 
weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living’, which is why we 
should ‘let the dead bury their dead’, as he famously quoted from the 
Bible (Matt. 8:22). 16 But the communist leaders were unable to gov-
ern the dead. Rather they placed themselves inside the nightmare 
of the dead generations by disappearing the dead imperial family, 
mummifying the body of Lenin and cremating and offi  cially deem-
ing as ungrievable – even in the private sphere – the millions who 
suff ered death because of the regime. 
 Conclusion 
 As the foregoing theoretical approaches suggest, each in its own 
way, we are dealing with deep layers of the constitution and change 
of political and moral communities, with phenomena that eschew 
simple rationalisations and explanations. Whether we take psycho-
analysis, phenomenology, critical theory or even (to some extent) 
structural functionalism as our theoretical frame of reference, they 
all point to an excess of meaning and aff ect, something that evokes 
the mystical, the sacred, the liminal and the transgressive, which, in 
the end, escapes control as well as explanation. In this perspective it 
seems as if states and other sovereign bodies can be associated with 
practices of controlling and appropriating for themselves the exces-
sive ‘powers of death’ or, alternatively, preventing contenders from 
appropriating these powers by disappearing, annihilating or other-
wise preventing the proper disposal of dead bodies. 
 Whereas some of the theoretical approaches set out in this 
chapter are ahistorical, there is no doubt that relations between 
sovereignty and dead bodies have to be understood in their his-
torical contexts. Th us, we may end by asking why the interest in 
dead bodies/human remains and their relation to politics has 
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been growing over the last decade. One factor could be the cur-
rent denaturalisation of state sovereignty that accompanies privat-
isation, deregulation, globalisation and the challenges posed by 
sub- and trans-national political entities. Not only are many states 
unable to control mortality and uphold the monopoly of violence, 
but they are also unable to eff ectively stabilise, contain and hold on 
to the dead bodies, as de Boeck ( 2007 ) and Maga ñ a (2011) have 
shown in the cases of Kinshasa and Mexico, and as both Robert 
and R. Kristensen document in this volume. Th ese are among the 
phenomena that suggest that the powers of death, to the degree 
that states were ever able to control them, are in the process of 
being disassociated from the state and being appropriated by other 
political and moral communities. On the basis of the material and 
arguments brought out in this volume, the fate of dead bodies and 
human remains seems to be a very appropriate fi eld to study in 
order to trace how claims and performances of sovereignty are 
developing in the contemporary world. 
 Notes 
 1  Understood as beliefs in the sacred nature of human bodies (Bernault 
 2006 : 371). 
 2  Quoted in Barbour and Pavlich  2010 : 3. 
 3  Th is is disputed by Ari è s ( 1981 ), who historicises the terror of death, 
linking it to eighteenth-century changes in the domestic sphere where 
death became less random, less mystical and less familiar than before. 
Death became a self-conscious terror instead of the tame death that 
characterised death in medieval European society (see also Borneman 
 2004 ). 
 4  See for example Ari è s  1981 ; Becker  1973 ; Freud  1959 . For an overview, 
see Seale  1998 . 
 5  Real Cedula, 27 March 1789. Archivo General de Centro America 
A.1.2.4, Leg. 2246, Exp.16218. 
 6  See for example Pinfold  1997 . 
 7  In Guatemala, for example, relatives can have dead bodies exhumed 
aft er six years and bring home the bones if they so wish. 
 8  You may of course argue that bio-power is not governing the dead but 
rather governs the living subjects by constraining and conditioning their 
access to corpses. 
 9  Th e First Provincial Council of Mexico 1555, quoted in Lomnitz 
 2005 : 83. 
 10  Rites of separation were fi rst described by van Gennep ( 1909 ), who saw 
them as a type of rites of passage that were ‘pre-liminal’, characterised by 
exclusion and symbolic death. 
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 11  ‘Th e various means of  purifying the abject [the various catharses] make 
up the history of religions, and end up with that catharsis par excellence 
called art’ (Kristeva  1982 : 17). 
 12  However, unlike Hertz, who sees society as an agent that orchestrates 
emotions, Bloch and Parry perceive society as being produced through 
ritual. 
 13  Seale ( 1998 : 52) explains this in terms of the separation of the old and 
dying, who are socially dead before death. 
 14  Pinney 2005, in Fontein, this volume. 
 15  Holbraad ( 2011 ) distinguishes between humanist (for example Gell and 
Miller) and post-humanist approaches to materiality. 
 16  From  Th e Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte . 
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 The proper funeral :  death, landscape 
and power among the Duha Tuvinians 
of northern Mongolia 
 Benedikte M ø ller  Kristensen 
 Th e traditional funeral practice of the Duha reindeer nomads of 
northern Mongolia consists in placing corpses on the open ground 
in the wild forest ( xer ) to be eaten by wild animals. Under social-
ism, the Mongolian government issued a ban on open-air ( il tavah ) 
funerals and imposed compulsory burial of the dead in cemeter-
ies (Delaplace  2006 ). Th is ban was a part of the Mongolian People’s 
Republic’s ‘dead-body politics’ (Verdery  1999 ) aimed at nationalis-
ing local subjects through the centralisation of burials. Moreover, it 
was a branch of its ‘biopolitics’ (Foucault  1982 ) as the state sought to 
govern the health of the population through their corpses. However, 
these policies were never fully acknowledged by the Duha, who 
regard burial beneath the ground as an inherently dirty, dangerous 
and thus improper activity, whereas open-air funerals are seen as 
the proper and clean way of treating the deceased. Burial may cap-
ture the souls ( s ü nc ) of the deceased underground and transform 
them into malevolent devils ( ch ö tg ö r 1 ) thus polluting the land and 
its inhabitants. In their eff ort to avoid such pollution the Duha oft en, 
and during the last years increasingly so, conduct open-air funer-
als; especially in the case of deceased shamans and ‘ordinary’ people 
suff ering a ‘non-ordinary’ death as a result of violence, drinking 
or magic. Th is chapter thus aims to explore the Duha concepts of 
proper and improper burial, including how their ‘return’ to open-air 
funerals may be conceived as an eff ort to (re)gain control over local 
bodies, lives and lands. 
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 Th e Duha are a Tuvinian minority group of reindeer herders and 
hunters, amounting to only around 400 people, living in the forested 
and mountainous regions of northern Mongolia bordering Russia. 
Th ey practise a kind of local shamanism, where they regard certain 
sacred amulets ( eren ) in the household and natural entities in the 
landscape as animated by the life and deeds of past kin. Such arte-
facts and entities continually mould the lives of the living kin. An 
amulet may for example bear the imprints of past and present kin 
members’ amoral deeds, such as murder, theft  or magic, which may 
spread misfortune among the living kin. Th e sacred artefacts of the 
Duha are thus, as Caroline Humphrey ( 2002 ) has proposed regard-
ing the possessions of the Mongolians, ‘expressive and transformative 
of persons-in-society’ ( 2002 : 83), since the relationship with pos-
sessions is ‘constituted as a matter of character or personality, as an 
ethical rather than a legal relation’ ( 2002 : 65). Th e burial sites of the 
Duha materialise the ethics of the deceased subject, his kin and the 
state. For example, if the deceased died because of the transgression 
of traditional rules ( yos ) for proper conduct, such as heavy drinking 
or fi ghting, or if the bereaved treated the corpse improperly, 2 the 
burial place may turn into one that is devilish ( ch ö tg ö rtei) and pol-
luted ( bohirdoh ), materialising the past amoral deed. Drawing on 
Robert Hertz ( 1960 ), death among the Duha may be seen not as ‘a 
mere destruction but a transition’ ( 1960 : 48), where ‘death is con-
summated only when decomposition had ended: only then does the 
deceased cease to belong to this world’ ( 1960 : 47). Among the Duha 
the advent of death marks the potentially pollutive and dangerous 
separation of the soul from the body, where the proper departure 
of the soul depends on the ‘fast’ and ‘clean’ decomposition of the 
corpse. Th e open-air funeral is thus regarded as the morally proper 
and clean way of treating the deceased. 
 Following the collapse of socialism in Mongolia the Duha have 
increasingly returned to their traditional open-air funerals. Th e 
question is, how can we interpret this ‘return’? It may be seen as a 
part of the so-called revival of shamanism in the region, which 
has been interpreted as a ‘way of making misfortunes meaningful’ 
(Buyandelgeriyn  2007 : 142), or a ‘socio-psychological’ way of dealing 
with ‘identity crisis’ by ‘reconstructing ethnic identity’ through sha-
manism (Shimamura  2004 : 197–8). Following this lead the increase 
of open-air funerals could be seen as a local version of the ‘dead-body 
politics’ discussed by Verdery ( 1999 ), making the Duha corpses ‘pol-
itical symbols’ engaged in the reordering of their ‘entire meaningful 
world’ ( 1999 : 35). Th e Duha corpses seem to work partly as ‘political 
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symbols’ as neighbouring people recognise the Duha funeral places as 
exclusively Duha territory. However, the return to open-air funerals 
cannot be seen as a ‘reordering of meaningful worlds’ as such, since 
they serve to control rather than understand the potentially danger-
ous and unstable powers of corpses. Drawing on Pedersen ( 2011 ), 
the Duha turn toward shamanism may be viewed not so much as a 
projection of the political into the religious sphere, but rather as ‘an 
ontology of transition’ actualising the labile and uncertain character 
of post-socialist northern Mongolian society ( 2011 : 35). As a result 
of the severe changes the former socialist state and the contempor-
ary Mongolian state enforced and continue to enforce upon the Duha 
traditional way of life, many Duha feel they have lost control over their 
own bodies, lives and lands, a control they seek to regain through their 
increased use of shamanic rituals and open-air funerals. 
 A socialist, moral and hygienic burial 
 Before the revolution in 1921 the open-air funeral seems to have been 
practised widely 3 by the Duha and Tuvan, as well as the Mongolians, 
which has been documented by early travellers in the region and 
ethnographers (Haslund-Christensen  1945 ; Kenin-Lopsan  1978 ; 
Pozdneyev  1971 : 95). Aft er the revolution the Mongolians started 
to replace their traditional open-air funeral with European burials 
in cemeteries. Th e revolutionary hero S ü hbator was one of the fi rst 
Mongolians to be buried in the Altan  Ö lgii cemetery in Ulaanbataar, 
which later became a resting place for numerous other socialist her-
oes and representatives of the Communist Party (Michel  2002 : 1). 
In 1955 the Mongolian government issued a decree imposing com-
pulsory burial of the dead in cemeteries and banning the traditional 
open-air funerals of the Duha and Mongolians (Delaplace  2006 : 47). 
Th e reason behind this decree was, according to Delaplace, both 
to eliminate a tradition that was considered ‘backward’ and ‘dirty’ 
and ‘to involve the dead in a socialist building project’, where the 
graves of the dead were concentrated in cemeteries near the cities 
(Delaplace  2006 : 47). 
 Although the Duha saw the decree as a violation of their sha-
manic tradition it was not implemented by the state to fi ght reli-
gious rituals and belief. Rather it was part of the socialist ‘struggle 
against the feudals’ (Baabar  1999 : 293) and their ‘amoral’ and ‘dis-
respectful’ ways of treating the lower classes. Th e state perceived the 
open-air funerals as a feudal means of suppressing the masses: the 
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feudal Lamas were granted a ‘respectful’ burial beneath the ground, 
whereas lay people were merely thrown away in the open as just 
so much rubbish (Delaplace  2008 ). According to Delaplace ( 2008 ) 
and Bill é (2010) this is refl ected in the state’s propaganda material, 
where the ‘open-air funeral was described as a lack of rites and an 
unregulated ( jurmamg ü i ) abandonment of bodies’ (Bill é  2010 : 157). 
Th e regulation thus aimed fi rst and foremost to foster a dignifi ed 
memory of the dead, whereas giving corpses away to dogs and birds 
was said ‘not to encourage one to respect one’s relatives’ and could 
‘provoke disdainful dispositions of them’ (Delaplace  2008 : 55–62). 
Moreover, the law seems to have served the socialist agenda of ‘resig-
nifying local spaces and bodies’ by saturating them with the ‘spe-
cifi c political values’ (Verdery  1999 : 39–40) of the socialist state. Th e 
socialist aspiration of the decree can be underlined by the fact that 
just a year before the new burial decree was implemented, the revo-
lutionary hero S ü hbator was removed from the Altan  Ö lgii cemetery 
to the newly built mausoleum in the central square of Ulaanbataar in 
1954. 4 Finally the decree seems to have served the bio-political aim 
of preventing the potential contagious eff ects of placing corpses in 
the wild. Health, hygiene and the fi ght against contagious diseases 
was an important part of the Mongolian People’s Republic’s policy 
throughout its history (Brown  et al.  1976 ). 5 However, the open-air 
funerals of the Duha seem not to have posed any actual contagious 
risk, as traditionally they must take place far away from human 
settlement and the corpses are usually eaten by wild predators – and 
thus quickly disposed of. 
 Between 1954 and 1956 the Duha, who had formerly lived as state-
less forest dwellers in the taiga areas of Russian Tuva and northern 
Mongolia, gained Mongolian citizenship. With their new legal status 
followed dramatic changes in their traditional livelihood; their rein-
deer were collectivised and only a limited number of people remained 
in the taiga to look aft er the reindeer, while most other Duha were 
relocated in the fi shing  negdel (collective) in the nearby village of 
Tsagaan Nuur (see Farkas  1992 ). According to some of my inform-
ants the Duha living in Tsagaan Nuur were forced to abandon their 
traditional funeral practice, as conducting an illegal open-air burial 
was punishable by a huge fi ne. Th ey reported that: ‘Nobody in the vil-
lage disobeyed the law, as they were afraid to be fi ned.’ However, the 
Duha in the taiga continued to grant the deceased open-air funer-
als, since ‘nobody in the taiga cared about the law, as nobody would 
check it’. Yet, one of my informants told me that the various burial 
practices in the village and the taiga simply derived from practical 
concerns, since ‘in Tsagaan Nuur [the village] we had the cemetery, 
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so people buried their deceased. In the taiga there was no cemetery, 
so we did, as we have always done: we left  them in the open.’ 
 Th e state’s project was thus only partly adopted by the Duha, and 
many of those who were forced to adopt it feared that their deeds 
had given rise to malevolent  ch ö tg ö rs haunting the burial places. 
However, an older Duha man who had lived most of his adult life 
in the city of Darhan, told me: ‘I am not a religious man. I do not 
believe in  Ch ö tg ö r . When I walk over a graveyard my eyes do not 
see anything and my ears do not hear anything [referring to spirits].’ 
Yet, all other Duha of my acquaintance never voiced doubts about 
the presence of  ch ö tg ö r . 
 Th e reason why the new burial practices were never fully 
embraced by the Duha may be connected to the tension between the 
socialist and local concepts of cleanness and morality. Th e Duha told 
me that they preferred to grant their deceased an open-air funeral, 
because it is ‘the clean way’ in contrast to the ‘dirty’ burial beneath 
the ground. Th is is illustrated in the following: 
 We have this tradition [open-air funeral] from the ancient times. We 
leave the body in the open, so dogs and birds can rapidly consume the 
body completely. If you visit the site seven days later, nothing is left . We 
do this to keep things clean. Th ey are left  in the open to ensure that their 
souls can leave and rise into the air. If they do, they come back and take 
care of their children and future kin [i.e. as reincarnations]. 
 Interestingly both the socialist state and the Duha perceived 
corpses as subjects and used concepts of cleanness and dirtiness to 
defi ne their diff erent perceptions of what constitutes the morally 
proper and improper treatment of corpses. Th e socialist state defi ned 
open-air funerals as amoral, because corpses were treated not as 
human subjects, but as mere waste, and as dirty since an unburied 
corpse was considered a health risk. Th e Duha perceived burial 
underground as hindering the proper departure of the deceased 
soul and as a dirty practice potentially polluting the land of the liv-
ing. Ironically, the state-enforced burials seem to have boosted the 
shamanic tradition: Th e burials produced numerous places haunted 
by  ch ö tg ö rs , which led to an increased need for shamanic rituals in 
order to appease these malevolent beings. 
 Polluted by socialism 
 Th e integration of the Duha as citizens in the Mongolian state in 1956 
marked a transition from their traditional life as hunters in the taiga, 
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with limited knowledge of and access to the surrounding nation-
states, 6 to an integration as workers in the  modern socialist state. On 
the one hand, this legal acknowledgement changed their traditional 
livelihood as nomads and hunters fi ghting for everyday survival in 
the taiga, turning them into workers in the socialist state with  free 
access to various consumption and consumer goods, medical sup-
plies and education. On the other hand, it implied a transition from a 
life structured around the fl exible rules of their shamanic tradition to 
the more fi xed laws of the Mongolian People’s Republic, where their 
shamanic beliefs and rituals and other so called feudal practices – 
such as the open-air funeral – were prohibited (see Farkas  1992 ). 
 As in other parts of Mongolia, the Duha remember socialism 
generally as a time of ‘prosperity, stability and security’ (Pedersen 
 2011 : 48), as it marked a jump from a life of severe poverty and inse-
curity 7 to a life with the material surplus and social security of the 
socialist state. However, citizenship also forced the Duha to adopt a 
new way of life, where modern/socialist ideologies, laws, practices 
and consumer goods were introduced and mixed in new ways. Th is 
slowly but consistently polluted and transformed the spirits, bodies 
and land of the Duha. For example, an elderly Duha explained that 
their blood and bodies became polluted during socialism, because: 
‘we were taught to eat a new Mongolian diet [based on fl our, rice and 
livestock meat] in the  negdel , which polluted our formerly clean and 
medical blood’. 
 Th e introduction of compulsory burials is also said to have pol-
luted and transformed the Duha land and its spirits, as one middle-
aged male informant explained: 
 During communism many  lus [water and earth spirits] were transformed 
into  ch ö tg ö r . You see, we were told to bury the dead, they burned our  eren 
[amulets], and they dug holes in the ground to search for stones and so 
the  luc were transformed into  ch ö tg ö r. Ch ö tg ö r are ferocious, they may 
steal your soul. 
 And the shaman Gompo elaborated: 
 Today the  gazriin luc [spirits of the earth] are ferocious, because people 
have polluted their homeland. Th erefore  lus are harming people. In the 
old days our homeland was clean, but today it is polluted. According to 
our traditions a dead man should not be buried in the ground. ‘Th e nat-
ural law’ [ jam ] is to place him on the open ground. 
 Th e Duha concept of  jam refers to a set of rules attached to the land 
of  Oron Hangai 8 (literally the forested land), but referring both to 
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the concrete visible landscape and beings (humans and animals) and 
its invisible inhabitants (spirits). Th e  jam consists of some kind of 
fl uid hierarchical order of living beings (spirits, humans and ani-
mals), where spirits are generally in a superior position, humans 
in a middle position and animals in an inferior position. Moreover 
each kind of being has its own ‘way of being’ ( asjigtai ) – its charac-
teristic livelihood, character and corporeal characteristics – which 
humans must not interfere with. To live according to the rules is to 
place oneself in the right position in the hierarchy of living beings 
and avoid mixing one’s own ‘way of being’ with that of others. For 
example, a bear is only in the character of prey if it is situated in a 
physically lower position than the hunter, whereas if it is placed in a 
higher position, e.g. sitting in a tree, it is forbidden to hunt it down. 
Moreover, it is forbidden to shoot it during hibernation, though it 
may be positioned underneath the ground physically lower than the 
hunter, because it would interfere with its ‘way of being’. Humans, 
animals and spirits each have their own distinct way of being, but 
humans are also divided into diff erent  beings each with their rules 
according to their ties to a or several  eren(s). 
 In contrast to the spirits of the neighbouring Darhad people, 
who according to Pedersen ( 2011 : 51) ‘were unable to move within 
the “frozen” (immutable and changeless) infrastructure of everyday 
 negdel life’, the spirits of the Duha seem to have cracked the ice of the 
 negdel life already during socialism. For example I was told several 
stories of how Duha and other locals during socialism had turned 
mad from encountering the  ch ö tg ö rs of the burial places outside of 
Tsagaan Nuur. For example an older Darhad told me how her two 
sons had turned mad – a state in which they were still held – because 
they had herded sheep close to a burial place, where they were star-
tled by a sudden encounter with a  ch ö tg ö r. Th ey lost their souls and 
became captured in a limbo of madness. 
 Th e Duha in the taiga also continued to grant their deceased ones 
open-air funerals during socialism. Inspired by Caroline Humphrey 
( 2004 ), I propose that the Duha in the taiga managed to carry on the 
illegal practice of open-air funerals through establishing a kind of 
‘localised form of sovereignty’ ( 2004 : 420) ‘nested’ within the ‘higher 
sovereignty’ of the Mongolian state. Humphrey discusses how it was 
possible for the mafi a in Buriyatia to establish a ‘localised sover-
eignty’, in the form of an illegal  marshrut system of local taxi-drivers, 
which was ‘nested’ within the Russian state. According to Humphrey 
this was achieved because a great deal of what the  marshrut system 
did ensured people’s freedom of movement in the city and thus the 
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function of the city was ‘not provided for in the law’ and hence was 
‘“invisible” to it’ ( 2004 : 423). In our case, the ‘nesting’ of the ‘local 
sovereignty’ of the taiga seems to have arisen from state offi  cials’ fear 
of the invisible ‘powers’ of the shamans and spirits inhabiting the 
taiga, which seems to have limited their enforcement of the law in 
the taiga. Obviously offi  cials’ fear of spirits was not provided for in 
the law, as from the socialist state’s point of view spirits were simply 
superstition. However, drawing on Taussig ( 1999 ) and H ø jer (2009), 
the offi  cials’ fear of spirits may have been brought about as a result of 
the socialist state’s strategic eff ort to eradicate the so called supersti-
tion, which ironically brought superstition to life precisely because 
the eff orts put into destroying it revealed it as ‘something which was 
important and powerful enough to necessitate destruction’ (H ø jer 
 2009 : 579). Th e fear of the Duha shamans and spirits was evident in 
many of the stories I overheard in the taiga. People told me that even 
though offi  cials knew of people who were secretly performing open-
air funerals and shamanic rituals in the taiga they ‘never did any-
thing to prevent the open-air funerals’ and ‘they seldom imprisoned 
the shamans’. However, in the cases where shamans were arrested 
they were always, according to the stories, ‘treated well’, because ‘the 
police feared them’. 
 Nested within the forest of dangers 
 Even today many Khalkha Mongolians and neighbouring Darhad 
people are afraid to travel into the taiga and wild forests ( xer ), which 
is the traditional homeland of the Duha, because they fear the Duha 
shamans and the invisible  spirits 9 that inhabit the area. I overheard 
numerous stories of how outsiders suff ered various misfortunes ini-
tiated by their improper engagement with the  spirits of the taiga. 
One such story was recounted by a Duha who had formerly worked 
as a border guard: 
 Our border patrols [referring to patrols of a non-Duha ethnicity] are 
struck by bad things [ muu yum ], because they don’t know how to deal 
with  lus savdags [water and earth spirits] and how to make off erings. 
But people from the taiga [Duha] know how to worship  lus savdags 
and behave well. If they pollute nature, they can clean it up again by 
themselves. 
 Th is former guard told how he once went on border patrol with a 
young Khalkha Mongolian border guard. On the patrol they shot a 
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moose close to Agi mountain. Th e moose was not killed – though it 
was hit with the bullet right in the heart – but escaped to the gorge 
on the northern side of the mountain, an area known by the Duha 
to be guarded by a tiny childlike master spirit ( eze ) named Avlin. 
Th e Mongolian border guard followed it to the gorge, a place that 
according to the Duha it is forbidden to approach. His transgression 
of this rule resulted in various misfortunes in his life: 
 Th at year the house of my friend [the young Khalkha Mongolian bor-
der guard] burned and this autumn his young wife passed away. Such a 
hardship has arisen. Also the son of our commander at the border post 
shot himself ten years ago. It happened because of our commander’s mis-
behaviour, by not following the rules [ yos ]. It happened because he did 
not worship the upper  tenger [the heavens],  lus and  Oron Hangai . 10 Such 
things happen because these people don’t know the places of  lus savdags , 
 ch ö tg ö rs ,  eren and sacrifi cial places and the mountains with  ezens . 
 Th e ‘localised sovereignty’ of the taiga does not refer to a fi xed geo-
graphical space nor to a fi xed set of rules. It revolves around the 
fl uid and labile space of  Oron Hangai , consisting of its multitude of 
‘local sovereignties’ materialised in the places and objects embodied 
by spirits, which have ‘the capacity to determine conduct within the 
territory of a polity without external legal constraint’ (Humphrey 
 2004 : 418). To travel safely in the land of  Oron Hangai one must con-
tinually try to sense the hidden rules of its places and beings. Th is 
entails a complex knowledge of the signs in nature indicating the 
presence of certain spirits and an intricate familiarity with the nature 
of various spirits and places. Moreover, the land of  Oron Hangai is 
characterised by its ‘lack of boundaries’ (see Pedersen  2009 ) and its 
intermix of ‘neutral places’ (not inhabited by spirits) and ‘power-
ful places’ (inhabited by spirits). Th ese places are continually in the 
making, as human deeds and lives give rise to new places of  power 
and thus new rules to be followed. Th e enrolment in the sovereignty 
of the Mongolian People’s Republic forced some Duhas – as we have 
seen – to violate their traditional rules and adhere to the legislation 
of the state, which gave rise to numerous places that are haunted by 
 ch ö tg ö r . 
 Th e contemporary turn toward the open-air funeral may be seen 
as a kind of ‘dead-body politics’ (Verdery  1999 ) of the ‘localised sov-
ereignty’ of  Oron Hangai . Yet, this ‘dead-body politics’ is an attempt 
to elicit the labile powers of the sovereignty of  Oron Hangai , an idea 
that contrasts with the meaning that Verdery gives to dead-body 
politics as an ordering of meaningful worlds – a sovereignty that is 
44  Benedikte Møller Kristensen
recognised by Mongols and neighbouring people who fear to trans-
gress the ‘powerful places’ of the Duha, as refl ected in the following 
story told by a young man of the neighbouring Darhad: 
 I went to the taiga last week to cut down wood and aft er a long day I took 
a rest under a tree. When I woke up I could not fi nd my axe, and I went 
to search for it. It was very strange, because I was all alone in the taiga. 
But, then I passed this place, where I saw a human skull, and I knew it 
was a Tsaatan [Mongolian name for the Duha] funeral place. So I realised 
that this man had taken my axe. I should not have cut down woods in his 
vicinity. Only Tsaatans can approach such a place. 
 The agency of the corpse 
 According to the Duha humans have three souls: the soul of bones, the 
soul of blood and the soul of the mind and heart ( canaa-cetgel ). Th e 
fi rst two are respectively tied to the bones and blood and disappear 
with the decomposition of the corpse, while the third moves freely 
around in the body. It may escape during dreams or in an instant of 
sudden fright – and following death it is fi nally detached from the 
body. Th e deceased may linger in his corpse or possession if he is not 
aware of his own death or if he does not want to give himself up to 
dying. Th e souls of the deceased are among the Duha, as among the 
Tuvans in general (Lindquist  2007 ), said to stay around the house-
hold and closest family for the fi rst seven days aft er the advent of 
death, unwilling and unable to leave. Only aft er the seventh day is the 
soul capable of leaving this world, which it must ideally leave between 
the seventh and forty-ninth day aft er death. In order to ensure this 
departure it is of the utmost importance that the living kin follow the 
rules for a proper funeral. Th ese rules are not fi xed but diff er from 
family to family; however most people seemed to agree on the fol-
lowing rules: the deceased must be undressed and wrapped from top 
to toe in white cotton cloth; the corpse must be placed on the sunny 
slope of a mountain, at a far distance from human settlement; the 
oldest relative must give a farewell speech to the deceased, persuad-
ing it to leave this world; sometimes belongings will be burned and a 
shaman or Buddhist Lama may conduct a ritual in order to guide the 
soul of the deceased to its proper resting place. Th e living kin under-
take these practices in order to ensure the proper departure of the 
soul to – in the case of a lay person – some kind of aft erworld or – in 
the case of a shaman – its embodiment in a certain spirit vessel/amu-
let ( eren ) or a sacrifi cial tree ( tahih shutdeg mod ). 
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 Th e soul of a lay person should ideally leave this world and travel 
to the heavens ( tenger ) and/or the land of  Erlegin , which is said to be a 
forested world like this world, but characterised by darkness and ‘only 
lit up by the rays [ tuja ] of dead people’s souls’. Some people told me 
that the land of  Erlegin is a kind of transitory place, where the souls of 
the dead wait to be reincarnated in the foetuses of future kin; others 
said that it is the eternal resting place of the dead. Th e soul of shamans 
is, however, bound to stay in this world. As one older female inform-
ant put it, ‘they do not have the right to die and live in peace’. Th ree 
or four years aft er the advent of death the soul of a shaman will take 
up abode in her  eren , shamanic dress and sacrifi cial tree, from where 
they empower and disempower their living kin. I perceive the sha-
manic paraphernalia of the Duha as ‘agents’ (Gell  1998 ), since they are 
the material form through which the powers of deceased shamans are 
passed on to present kin groups. Th e corpses and bones are also poten-
tial ‘agents’ materialising the moral rules and ethics of the Duha. If 
corpses have not been decomposed and in particular if the bones have 
not been cracked within the fi rst seven days of the advent of death, the 
souls may linger in the bones and transform them into the ‘agents’ of 
devilish things ( ch ö tg ö rtei yum ). Such devilish things arise from the 
improper embodiment of human souls in their material remains, pol-
luting and transforming the souls of the deceased ones, their corpses/
bones and their resting places into devilish beings, entities and places. 
Th e oft en violent agency of corpses thus seems to be the materialisa-
tion of the broken rules and ethics of ‘the local sovereignty’ of  Oron 
Hangai , which continue to haunt the living. 
 According to the Duha the agency of the corpse normally ceases 
to exist when its fl esh has been completely consumed and its bones 
fully broken by predators, which might also be the reason why 
people – according to one older shaman – in the old days used to 
smash the bones of the corpse during the open-air funeral. Still the 
deceased may retain its agency, though its material remains have 
disappeared, if it manages to stay within another object, such as 
a natural entity or an artefact. Yet, when the soul realises that its 
former body has gone it is likely to depart for the aft erworld. Th is 
may explain why the Duha show great relief when they realise that a 
deceased was consumed fast, as one middle-aged Duha woman told 
me: ‘My father’s younger sibling left  Ulaan Huu’s grandfather at the 
entry way to Darkan. At fi rst one crow came and left . Th en fi ve crows 
came and then another four crows and aft er that one eagle. We had 
left  him there and went away and when we came back everything 
had disappeared. It was a very good sign.’ 
46  Benedikte Møller Kristensen
 Th e subjectivity and agency of the object of the corpse thus 
rests in its materiality, where the corpse is considered a potential 
subject until a predator has recognised it as food and starts eat-
ing it. 11 Recalling Hertz ( 1960 ), the proper departure of the soul is 
thus dependent upon the fast and complete decomposition of the 
corpse. 
 In the case of the death of a shaman her ritual paraphernalia 
should be hung at a sacrifi cial tree, ensuring that the soul of the sha-
man will fi nd her way back to her belongings and stay in this world, 
lingering in them. Sooner or later the material form of an  eren as 
concrete amulet will decay and disappear, but the agency of the 
deceased shaman will remain, since it is also embodied in a sacrifi -
cial tree and the whole area around the tree. Th e very material per-
manence of places ensures the continued agency of shamans, since 
their powers are encapsulated not only in the sacrifi cial trees, which 
may die and decay, but also in the very place surrounding such trees. 
Th e  eren of the Duha are both kinds of ‘living memories’ and sorts 
of ‘living sovereignties’. Th e history of each kin group is materialised 
and remembered through their  erens and sacrifi cial places, where 
each embodies a specifi c part of history, whereas their entirety 
materialises the totality of the group’s history. Th e  erens and sacri-
fi cial places of kin groups also embody certain sets of rules to be 
followed by their kin and spread illness and death among those who 
do not adhere to these rules. 
 However, socialism led to the pollution of numerous places and 
beings, which continues to leave its mark on contemporary lives. For 
example, a place in the taiga called Morlig is said to be inhabited by 
especially malevolent  ch ö tg ö rs originating in the souls of an entire 
camp of Buriad herders (men, women and children) who were exe-
cuted as counter-revolutionaries by Russian Soviet soldiers in the 
1940s. 
 Lawless lives in the forest of laws 
 Th e collapse of socialism marked the end of the state law on funer-
als, but also the end of social security, which the Mongolian People’s 
Republic had provided for its citizens. As one informant explained, 
‘before the state at least cared about us, today it does not care’ and 
‘because of the hunting laws, we are forced to live illegally’. In 1990, 
the fi shing  negde l in Tsagaan Nuur closed, leaving its former workers 
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unemployed. With limited chances of gaining new employment 
many Duhas decided to return to their traditional lives as reindeer 
nomads and hunters in the taiga (Farkas  1992 : 17). Today the main 
subsistence of the Duha is hunting, which thanks to strict contem-
porary regulations is illegal. Yet, though the border guards in prin-
ciple are tasked to enforce the hunting legislation in the taiga, and 
though the border guards oft en visit the taiga, no Duha has to my 
knowledge been fi ned for illegal hunting in the last ten years, though 
hunting is happening on a regular basis. 
 Today the Duha perceive the transgression of their traditional 
rules during socialism, and in the present, as one of the reasons 
behind the contemporary escalation of violent deaths among them. 
A matter of great concern for my informants was a series of unnat-
ural deaths in a group of relatives, which were all simultaneously 
attributed to the decline of social security in the Mongolian state, 
the rise of alcohol abuse and crime and the transgression of trad-
itional rules. Th e fi rst deaths were two young Duhas, who had been 
killed in the village of Tsagaan Nuur apparently by a gang of drunken 
people; a third Duha was robbed and killed in a gold mine. Th e 
local police refused to investigate these crimes, because, according 
to one of my informants, ‘they were just Tsaatans’. Th e fourth death 
was a middle-aged man, who, according to my informants, died as 
a result of the medical malpractice of a local doctor, as my inform-
ants explained: ‘Nobody cares about us. In our region we only have 
drunk doctors.’ 
 Th ough there was a shared consensus that these deaths were 
linked to wider social problems in the region, such as alcohol abuse, 
crime and the lack of proper medical care, many relatives of the 
deceased thought that the  real reason behind these deaths was some-
how linked to the transgression of the rules connected to the  eren of 
their kin. Some thought that these unnatural deaths were all con-
nected to a visiting shaman’s improper off ering gift , of raw mutton, 
to an  eren in the family. A gift  off ering deemed improper in this 
family, particularly raw meat, is against the rules of their  eren and 
among the Duha in general, since it has a history in the former state’s 
introduction of a new  pollutive diet. Moreover, this shaman was con-
sidered ignorant because she had left  her homeland of the taiga to 
live and work as a shaman in Ulaanbataar and become part of the 
so-called market shamans certifi ed by the state. 12 Later the family 
tried to appease their  eren by off ering it the appropriate ‘white food’ 
and by having a ritual performed for it by a local kindred shaman. 
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Some thought that these deaths were initiated by other new  erens 
kept in the households of the deceased, as they all recently had  erens 
made by the same shaman. Others thought that all the deceased had 
been infected by a  ch ö tg ö r roaming at a former burial site. Yet others 
proclaimed that the deaths had been caused by an  eren inherited by 
a female shaman of this kin, as the rule of this  eren was that it had to 
be inherited by a male. Finally, one non-kin member confi ded to me 
that she thought the deceased themselves, except one of them who 
‘was indeed a good man’, were to blame, as they were ‘always fi ghting 
and drinking’. 
 During my stay in the camp, no consensus on the reason behind 
these deaths was reached, but various steps were taken to avoid 
future deaths: some families removed their  erens from their house-
hold and placed them in the wild forest ( xer ) and the elder sisters of 
the female shaman tried to convince her to grant her  eren to a male 
member of the lineage. Also, the most recent deceased was given an 
open-air funeral, though it had been very diffi  cult, as he had died in 
the village. From there they had carried his corpse for two days on 
horseback to a distant mountain in the taiga. But as they explained: 
‘We had to do it this way, because Baatar [an older Duha] told us, 
that he should have a Tuvinian funeral. A funeral according to the 
rules, so we thought it was proper to do it this way.’ However, the fi rst 
three men were not granted open-air funerals, but simply buried in 
the village for practical reasons. 
 Th e families’ ‘lack of knowledge’ about how spirits were engaged 
in the series of deaths can – drawing on H ø jer ( 2009 : 578) – be 
viewed as ‘knowledge of lack’, as most of them agreed that the deaths 
somehow derived from the kin’s transgression of traditional rules 
for proper conduct with the spirits, whose content was however 
unknown. Th e family’s eff orts to circumvent future deaths by giv-
ing up their  eren , off ering them ‘white food’ and granting the last of 
the deceased an open-air funeral can be seen as attempts to prevent 
further misfortune. Confronted with their own ‘knowledge of lack’ 
of the spiritual causes behind these deaths the acts of giving up  erens 
seem to be some kind of a  gamble with ‘unknown spiritual powers’, 
where the only certain thing is that it  will cause a reaction, which 
might – if lucky – turn out to be fortunate. 
 Th e Duha feel both abandoned and obstructed in their very 
livelihood by the post-socialist state and simultaneously haunted 
by the  powers of the former state. Th eir lands and bodies have been 
polluted and their basic subsistence as hunters is deemed illegal by 
the state, leaving them in a marginalised and unprotected position, 
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where they are forced to lead an illegal – in the eyes of the post-
socialist state – life in order to survive. Th e contemporary turn 
towards the open-air funeral – and the shamanic tradition in gen-
eral – among the Duha may be seen as an eff ort to elicit the  powers 
of their spirits and (re)gain agency in their own lives and lands. By 
turning toward the rules of  Oron Hangai rather than the laws of the 
Mongolian state they seem to evoke ‘a localised form of sovereignty’ 
that is ‘nested’ within ‘the higher sovereignty’ of the Mongolian 
state ‘but nevertheless retain a domain within which control over 
life and death is operational’ (Humphrey  2004 : 420). Th is ‘local-
ised form of sovereignty’ diff ers substantially from Humphrey’s 
case, as the ‘localised sovereignty’ of the Duha encompasses the 
realm of both humans and spirits. I suggest that in their eff ort to 
(re) gain agency in their lives, the Duha engage in a gamble with 
the ‘localised sovereignty’ of  Oron Hangai in general and the  eren 
in particular. Th ese powers continually set out the rules to be fol-
lowed, granting merit to those who conform to the right rule and 
punishing those who do not. 
 Among the Duha the rules of the sovereignty of  Oron Hangai as 
well as the Mongolian state have become blurred. Th us, the law of 
the state seems to have obtained the labile nature of the rules of  Oron 
Hangai , since nobody is quite sure of its composition and whether 
and how it may be enforced. Although hunting is seldom penalised, 
the fear of being caught is refl ected in various practices, such as the 
cutting up of meat outside the camp. Such practices are developed to 
hide illegal activities, and the associated shamanic actions serve to 
evoke the protection of the spirits. Today, the Duha turn to their sha-
manic tradition in order to elicit the powers of the spirits and avoid 
the characteristic misfortunes of the post-socialist era, such as mur-
der, alcoholism, poverty, imprisonment or fi nes. In conclusion we may 
perceive the open-air funeral as a political gamble with dead bodies 
engaged to elicit local powers and navigate between sovereignties. 
 Notes 
 1  In this chapter I use Mongolian terms to elaborate on relevant local ter-
minology. Th e language of the Duha was originally Tuvan, but since 
only elders speak Tuvan today and most others only speak Mongolian 
I have chosen to use Mongolian terms. However, I have retained the 
Tuvan term  eren in my translation of Duha spirit vessel/amulet, rather 
than the Mongolian term  ongod , as the Duha usually engage the Tuvan 
term  eren . 
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 2  An example of such improper treatment of a corpse was the death of 
a middle-aged Duha, who was wrapped in silk cloth instead of cotton 
cloth, which delayed the decomposition of the corpse. An instance 
which frightened his kin, who feared that his soul had not been able to 
leave this world, as they had heard – through a passing sheep-herder – 
that his corpse still lay fully wrapped and untouched by predators four 
month aft er his open-air funeral. Another example of improper treat-
ment is the state-enforced burial beneath the ground. 
 3  However, among the Mongols the open-air funeral seems to have existed 
among other mortuary customs. As documented by Crub é zy  et al. 
(2006), four diff erent burial customs were already practised before the 
time of Genghis Khan: ‘bodies could be buried, cremated, left  exposed 
to wild beasts or in trees, whereas exposure could be followed by the 
collection of bones and their subsequent burial’. 
 4  In 2005 the mausoleum was dismantled and the remains of S ü hbator 
were cremated and his ashes placed back in the Altan  Ö lgii cemetery. 
 5  Before the revolution the health system was confi ned to traditional 
Buddhist doctors and shamans, whereas in 1923 the new state started to 
develop the health sector according to Soviet/European standards with 
the assistance of Soviet/Russian medical professionals (Baabar  1999 ; 
Brown  et al.  1976 ). 
 6  One older Duha explained: ‘When I was a boy, I did not know about 
Russia or Mongolia. I only knew that I was a boy of the taiga.’ Still, the 
surrounding states seemed to have been very present in the lives of the 
Duha, as the Mongolian government attempted to force them out of 
Mongolia and back to Tuva several times in the years between 1920 and 
1950 (Wheeler  2000 : 41–2). 
 7  Th e insecurity of being caught between the wider Soviet Union and 
Russia, where the Mongols repeatedly drove them out of their trad-
itional pastures in Mongolia and back to their southern pastures in Tuva 
in the Soviet Union. Moreover, they feared brutal collectivisation and 
enforced military service in the Second World War, which many tried to 
escape in the 1940s. In this period several Duha families fl ed from Tuva 
to Mongolia, where they stayed illegally until they gained citizenship in 
the mid-1950s (Wheeler  2000 : 41–4). 
 8  Th e concept of  Oron Hangai refers both to the concrete, visible, local 
landscape and to its invisible spirits. 
 9  Such spirits include:  ch ö tg ö rs haunting places of bad ( muu ) deaths; the 
master spirits ( eze ) guarding specifi c places; the water and earth spirits 
( lus ) connected to the waters and earth; and the  erens left  at the sacrifi -
cial trees ( tahih shutdeg modnuud ) of the Duha. 
 10  Literally the forested land, a concept referring both to the local land-
scape and its spirits. 
 11  It is only a potential subject, as the soul may have left  to attach itself to 
some other object and may have properly left  for the aft erworld, leaving 
the corpse desubjected as an object. 
 12  Today many local Duha perceive shamans from the city as market 
shamans, whom they do not consider as ‘true’ shamans, but as ‘fake’ 
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shamans primarily interested in making money from their rituals. In 
Ulaanbataar many shamans are taught to shamanise in the so-called 
shamanic schools, where they also take shamanic exams and receive 
certifi cates confi rming them as ‘true’ shamans. However, many Duha 
perceive this schooling as both ‘fake’ and also inherently dangerous, as 
they are not taught the ‘true’ rules of shamanism, but ‘fake’ ones, which 
may pollute, rather than heal people. 
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 Dead zone :  pollution, contamination and 
the neglected dead in post-war Saigon 
 Christophe  Robert 
 Thresholds and water margins: Binh Hung 
Hoa cemeteries 
 Th e entrance gates of the Binh Hung Hoa cemeteries are falling 
apart. Th e faded, mouldy yellow paint peels off . Some of the gates 
date back from the time of the American War. One of them displays 
a date, 1964, the year President Johnson decided to escalate the war 
in Vietnam. Th ese are the largest cemeteries in Saigon/Ho Chi Minh 
City, located in one of the poorest areas in the city. Th e cemeter-
ies are full and overfl owing: Buddhist graves and Christian graves; 
graves of Vietnamese and ethnic Chinese; graves of poor people; 
graves of soldiers of the old regime, who died in vain for the defunct 
Republic of Vietnam, which disappeared when Saigon was liberated 
in April 1975 (or fell, according to American terminology). 
 Many dead rest here, but their spirits are restless and disturbed 
these days. People say that the Binh Hung Hoa cemeteries are the 
oldest in the city. On late nineteenth-century French colonial maps 
these graveyard sites were recorded on the far northwestern mar-
gins of the new colonial city of Saigon then under construction. At 
the end of colonial rule in Vietnam in the mid-1950s, the city had 
moved closer to the cemeteries that now lay on the other side of the 
airport. Th ese days the graveyards are full and in complete disarray. 
No one is quite sure of the actual number, but they are said to hold 
several thousand graves. Many more graves have been swallowed 
up by encroaching slums and new streets and neighbourhoods, a 
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process that has accelerated since the American War. On the north-
ern side, near the crematorium, fi elds of bright green vines blanket 
the cemeteries. Th e presence of tombs can only be divined by large 
ripples in the folds of green. Names and photographs of the dead on 
the tombstones peer from under the vines. 
 Abandoned tombs haven fallen over. Some graves have been 
removed and are fi lled with weeds. Others have been renovated, and 
refurbished with enamelled green or blue tiles. Th e area is insalubri-
ous. Th e streams that cross these marshy lands erode gravesites. Local 
inhabitants complain of the run-off  from the cemeteries. Dead bod-
ies are leaching bodily fl uids in the waterways. Th ere is no running 
water in these poor neighbourhoods, and people draw water from 
wells they dug themselves. Th ey complain of government inaction, 
of the lack of social services and help to deal with unsanitary condi-
tions and an emerging health crisis. Newspaper articles report high 
rates of cancer in the area. Here, in addition to economic hardship 
and the lack of educational and job opportunities, living in a poor 
area is marked by high incidence of disease and widespread anxiety 
about health hazards from adjoining cemeteries and factories. 
 In 2008, the People’s Committee of Ho Chi Minh City decided to 
remove these cemeteries, and turn the area into an urban park. And 
since then? Th e removal of the cemeteries stalled, and turned into a 
 Figure 4.1  Refuse on the side of the road through Binh Hung Hoa cemeteries. 
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story of offi  cial incompetence and callousness that became big news 
in Saigon in 2009 and 2010 until the government reined in the press 
on this specifi c issue. Rumours continue to circulate about the future 
of the area. In summer 2011 construction began for a luxury gated 
community and golf course on a large, adjacent marshy plot that 
belongs to the Airport Authority. 
 Th e cemeteries are located in swamp lands next to Tan Son Nhat 
airport, which became the largest American air base during the 
Vietnam War. Th e marsh is bright green. Th e almost unnatural hues 
of tall grasses seem oddly out of place. Th e swamp is surrounded by 
tight rows of narrow houses, carpentry workshops and street-seller 
stalls. Th e marshy landscape looks tentative, in movement. Th e land 
is fl at, but the eye cannot see very far; the horizon is short. It is one 
area of the city where you fi nd huge trees, dark untrimmed wild can-
opies. Scrawny ponies graze along the canals and cattle waddle in 
graveyard ponds. Th e narrow streets are packed with dirty traffi  c 
and dust. Th e air stings with exhaust fumes from motorbikes and 
trucks carrying construction materials. Houses are being demol-
ished on the edges of the marsh. Landfi ll has been brought in to cre-
ate stone, gravel and concrete platforms sunk into the mud on which 
roads and new houses will be built. Th e whole thing feels tentative, 
crowded, unstable. 
 Th e cemeteries are large, uneven rectangles covering several 
square kilometres, fi lled with tight rows of graves in barren sandy 
soil. But the resting places of the dead have been encircled. Adjoining 
streets have fi lled up with new houses and apartment buildings. 
Along the marshy eastern edge of the cemeteries the golf course and 
luxury resort under construction next to the airport fuel renewed 
pressure to remove and relocate derelict graveyards, and the inhabit-
ants of this poor neighbourhood. Beyond the cemeteries a few iso-
lated graves are still found among warehouses. Th ere is a sense of 
violation here: locals say that many abandoned graves were moved 
surreptitiously, dug up or simply covered over. 
 I fi rst heard of this place inadvertently from a Vietnamese woman 
I will call Lam, during a conversation about her mother’s death. Lam 
is a busy, forty-year-old banking manager. Her face tenses up and 
she nervously scratches at her left  cheek with a fi ngernail as she 
describes an anxious episode that occurred in these cemeteries. ‘I 
went out there to meet a supplier. At the time I was in charge of 
marketing. We needed to have quality advertising signage made. 
I made an appointment with this factory manager, to meet him at 
the factory site. I took a taxi one rainy evening to go meet him and 
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check on the quality of the work.’ She gets agitated as she recalls the 
story: ‘Th e taxi stopped. It was completely dark. I was scared. I asked 
the young taxi driver, “Where are we?” We were lost. He said, “Th is 
is the address, sister. It’s here.” I could not see anything in the rain 
and the darkness.’ She calls the factory manager, and waits in the 
taxi. He fi nally comes out to meet her. ‘I get out of the car, and I 
almost fainted. We’re surrounded by graves. I could see the tomb-
stones everywhere in the darkness.’ She asks the factory manager, 
‘What is this place?’ Th e factory manager tells her that his company 
rented this space cheaply, ‘Because it was right next to the cemeter-
ies.’ Lam’s face is distorted by the memory of this terrifying moment. 
Her mother had recently passed away. She was grieving. 
 Lam’s unexpected encounter with graves and the dead moment-
arily terrify her. A year later, she still recalled this episode with great 
anxiety and sadness. ‘I’ll never forget that moment. I was so scared. 
It was so sad. I kept thinking about the fate of the people who were 
buried there, and about my mother.’ Lam was working, her mind 
focused on projects and checklists. And then something scary and 
seemingly impossible unexpectedly came into view, and jolted her. 
 Grieving and mourning are painful, patient attempts to let go of 
the departed. When Lam stepped out of the taxi into the rain and 
the darkness the departed returned with unexpected violence. What 
is it exactly that returned then? In Vietnamese notions of death, the 
dead are not kept at bay. 1 Spirits of the dead are present in funer-
ary altars found in all Vietnamese households, however modest. Th e 
spirit world is nearby, not remote, and ordered by means of funerary 
rituals and daily off erings to the spirits of deceased ancestors on the 
family altar at home. 2 Spirits live among people, or rather the living 
inhabit a realm made up largely of the tactile and soothing presence 
of deceased ancestors, and occasionally the less benevolent presence 
of errant ghost souls. 
 But at that terrifying moment, Lam’s brutal encounter with aban-
doned graves and disorder raised the spectre of chaos, of violation 
of the ordered relationship between the world of the living and that 
of the dead. Georges Bataille long ago refl ected on the fear of viola-
tion and contamination resulting from encounters with corpses, and 
humans’ eff orts to institute rituals to domesticate the pollution from 
encounters with dead bodies (Bataille  1962 : 46–7;  1991 : 79–81). In 
Lam’s case, something brutally came into view. But it was more than 
a diffi  cult or unexpected encounter with death. It was an utter jum-
bling of categories and mix-up of expectations concerning death. 
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 I refl ect here on one specifi c instance of this jumbling of ritual, 
social and political categories. On the surface this looks like a case 
of reclaiming fallow, marshy land for urban redevelopment and road 
building. Th e removal of cemeteries from city centres or urban areas 
is not a new or unexpected phenomenon. In nineteenth-century 
Paris or London, for instance, dozens of  intra-muros cemeteries were 
removed and converted to parks (Th orsheim  2011 ). Similarly, in the 
last few decades governments in Hong Kong, China and Singapore 
have been promoting cremation and the removal of cemeteries 
from city centres (Teather  2001 ). But in this case, as evidenced by 
Lam’s unexpected encounter with abject death, in addition to sim-
ply neutral ‘urban development’ we are dealing with lingering anxie-
ties stemming from ethical violations surrounding the treatment of 
corpses and the deceased. 
 Th e southern threshold of this area is a marsh crossed by a stink-
ing, polluted stream called Black Water Creek. Its dark, slow waters 
meander through the fl at landscape. Th e terrain is being prepared 
for development. Some of it has been developed and built up already. 
But it is still a puzzle of land plots under construction. It is being 
bulldozed, drained, fi lled out with sand and landfi ll, fl attened and 
tamped down. In spite of the large red billboards from the district’s 
People’s Committee asking people not to litter, wild and illegal 
dumping is rampant. Th e marsh is uninhabited, but not abandoned. 
You detect human presence by the trash that is dumped everywhere 
and that sinks slowly into the black mud. It is land in transition. 
Most of it has not been claimed by anyone yet. Hence, as is oft en the 
case in Vietnam, it is used for dumping. 
 Th is zone is about death, pollution, refuse and purifi cation. Th e 
impulses to purify come from below, from locals’ calls for better 
social and health services, for an end to the contaminated run-off  
through the graveyards. Impulses to purify, clean up and evacuate 
also come from above, more brutally and visibly, through demoli-
tion and construction in attempts to civilise, pacify and reorder these 
complex, irregular social and natural environments. On the north 
bank of Black Water Creek a squat, white building hosts a newly 
built government memorial to the war dead. Th ese dead are safe, 
properly named, recognised and honoured during state commem-
orative ceremonies. In autumn 2011 a newly built middle school 
opened, not far from the war memorial. Development proceeds 
piecemeal, plot by plot, with large areas of marshland, wild grasses 
and reeds in between. 
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 Dead zones: anxieties over matter out of place 
 Water animates this landscape. In Vietnam as elsewhere, marshes 
are drained to build houses and channel water fl ows for agriculture. 
But run-off  and pollution, and deep movements of water below the 
surface, evoke other forces. Th e swampy ground is alive and forces 
people to take notice. It brings about erosion and erasure, forces 
that push things to the surface. Th e dead resurface as well – both 
symbolically and in real terms, when erosion shift s the soil around 
tombs and collapses graves, when water gnaws at the sandy loam 
and digs gullies through the cemeteries. In these gullies, people 
say they imagine the veins of the dead, and the fl uid movement of 
the corpses now liquefi ed, now alive in new abject and polluting 
forms. 3 
 Th e land is alive with forces through the movement of water. 
Th ere is no real way of knowing where water comes from and where 
it fl ows to. It erodes and seeps through sand and sediments. Here, 
in the marshy, sandy soils on the margins of the Mekong Delta, the 
annual seasonal cycle of the rainy and dry seasons drives time – 
water or its absence is the key element. Abundant, regular rains and 
drained lands turned into rice fi elds and orchards have created the 
wealth of the Mekong Delta. But in these threshold lands and water 
margins where the city expands on the outskirts of dense urban 
cores, run-off  and interactions of land and water in marshlands 
create unstable and shift ing landscapes. Th ese are domains of real 
estate speculation, wild zones of power 4 where people dump garbage 
and build without permits, where state offi  cials clear the land and 
residents for massive profi ts – indeterminate zones where, in earlier 
times, cemeteries were built on the far margins of the city. 
 Th ese cemetery spaces are disorderly. Death spills over into the 
realm of the living. ‘I’ll never forget that moment’, says a terrifi ed and 
sorrowful Lam. Th e dead suddenly peered out from their graves, 
unannounced, when she stepped out of the taxi. Th e boundaries of 
the cemeteries are soft ; their margins creep outward. Entrance gates 
have no fences and no locks. Th ey mark a threshold, not the edge of 
a border. Th ese thresholds are open and welcoming, since the world 
of the dead is not remote from that of the living. In rural areas, in 
less populated zones, graves are built according to geomantic prin-
ciples in propitious locations, next to houses, in rice fi elds, in hills, 
both inside and in the margins of inhabited territory, so that ben-
evolent ancestors can feel they rest peacefully near and among their 
descendants. 5 
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 Here in the city, according to local offi  cials and their attempts to 
rezone neighbourhoods, there is no longer enough room to bury the 
dead. Th e dead are crowded in their decrepit spaces: graveyards are 
full. People reclaim every small space on the cemeteries’ margins. 
Street sellers set up portable awnings and fl at tables along the dusty 
roadsides and paths that cross the graveyards. Th ey push abandoned 
tombstones out of the way to display their wares: plastic wallets, hel-
mets or sunglasses. 
 Middle-class urbanites object to the presence of street sellers 
and ‘uncivilised’ ( khong van minh ) selling among places of repose 
of the dead. Th e poverty in neighbourhoods around the cemeter-
ies displays itself in recognisable ways, as with itinerant hawkers 
waiting for the occasional client. Th is is a familiar scene, replicated 
day and night everywhere in Vietnam. But the ways in which these 
street vendors operate near cemeteries cause disquiet and repulsion 
among the  nouveau-riche bourgeoisie. Graveyards are not supposed 
to be places where people ply their trades. And yet a bit of careful 
observation of daily life in these neighbourhoods reveals a diff erent 
picture: the graveyards are zones of intense social activity, and most 
of it has little to do with death or burial. Th e Binh Hung Hoa ceme-
teries are zones of passage. Th ey form large ‘open’ plots in an other-
wise incredibly dense urban fabric. Th eir lesser density, the massive 
tree canopies, the streams that crisscross them, their location next 
to large marshlands and industrial zones surrounding the airport 
render them anomalous. Locals use muddy trails as shortcuts: 
motorbike and foot traffi  c is incessant in the cemeteries. People visit 
relatives’ graves by motorbike, and ask street sellers and passersby 
for directions into the maze of tombs. 
 Th e educated middle classes deplore the lack of civilised behav-
iour – the lack of civility – of the poor. Why do discourses about pov-
erty collide with those about death, moralised and displaced into the 
realm of culture and civilised behaviour? In marginal areas where 
occupancy is less dense, where land rights are not clearly established, 
and in transitional zones between city and countryside, neat binary 
demarcations and roles waver. Th is has to do in part with diffi  cul-
ties in local administration and management of city services. Th ese 
are ambiguous zones, where the unclear attribution of tasks and the 
lack of accountability of the city government give rise to the types 
of environments we encountered around the cemeteries. Discourses 
on the ‘uncivilised’ behaviours of the poor should perhaps be recon-
ceptualised as symptoms of dispossession and mismanagement. In 
public areas where ownership is not private, there are few eff orts at 
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maintenance. It is in part because no money can be made directly 
or visibly in these processes, where tasks and responsibilities cannot 
easily be parcelled out for immediate or signifi cant profi t. 
 Th ese cemeteries fall into zones of unclear sovereignty ruled by 
customary arrangements. Th ey are run by local crews of graveyard 
workers who pay off  local offi  cials for a free run of the facilities and 
services. Decay is visible: the graveyards are patches of sandy soil 
with dried-up clumps of weeds, strewn with litter, garbage bags, 
construction materials, piles of ashes and half-burned trash. I ask 
Lam, who lives nearby, why the area is littered with refuse. She 
replies matter-of-factly, ‘Because it’s a poor area.’ Th e idea is that the 
poor live in their garbage. But the reality is more complex, more sub-
tle: the poor live among garbage because the city and government 
services that handle waste removal do not operate there. Why not? 
Because this is a poor neighbourhood, says Lam. Th e logic is neatly 
circular, yet inescapable as far as most Vietnamese are concerned. 
 Because of the disquiet caused by cemeteries, these zones are 
further left  to abandonment. Th ey are on the other side of the 
threshold. Th e neat boundaries between civilised and uncivilised 
behaviour that are hallmarks of middle-class speech and attitudes 
toward the poor crumble. Cemeteries are places where the presence 
of garbage adds another layer of discomfort and disquiet to facts of 
death. Death here is linked directly with garbage, refuse, pollution 
and contamination. 6 
 ‘Dead zone’ ( khu vuc chet ), says Lam. ‘Th e area is really “compli-
cated” [ phuc tap ]. A lot of poor people live there. Th ey have no jobs, 
no income, no place to live. So they do small jobs: they dig graves, 
they build tombstones, they help clean and restore the graves. It’s 
very expensive: they charge high prices for these services. But if the 
relatives of the deceased don’t agree with the price, these people – 
you know, many are from “black society” [criminal groups] – they 
will destroy the grave.’ 
 She adds that she reads about this in newspapers, in addition to 
her daily conversations in the neighbourhood. She continues on the 
same themes, prodded on by growing anxiety: ‘Th is area at night 
is very “complicated” [ phuc tap ] because it’s not lit. It’s very dark 
at night. People enter the cemeteries to play cards and gamble, to 
smoke [heroin], and when they’re high they simply lie on the graves 
and fall asleep there. Prostitutes go into the area as well. Very “com-
plicated” area!’ She pauses briefl y, and rounds up her description 
by focusing on the forlorn lives of youths in the area: ‘Th e ponds 
gather rain water. People fi sh there. Th e children in the area have no 
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community centres or parks. Th ey have nowhere to meet and play. 
It’s a very poor area. So in the evenings children and youth go to the 
cemeteries to play. Th ey play in the tombs.’ 
 Here, the combination of poverty, destitution, death and crim-
inality gives rises to an imaginary landscape superimposed on the 
actual topography. Th e sense of violation, the presence of the dead 
and ghosts that roam the poorly lit cemeteries at night is relayed 
by popular, imaginative constructs of outcasts and a criminal 
 Lumpenproletariat . Th e living who occupy and inhabit these ceme-
teries violate the peaceful rest of the dead. Th eir callous handling of 
the deceased – of people unrelated to them – when combined with 
the real pressures of destitution creates powerfully negative images 
of violation. Yet violation of taboos surrounding death is displaced 
into the realm of criminality and lack of accountability, more than 
simply violation  per se . Vietnamese are used to the presence of the 
dead, but as a properly domesticated presence, channelled by respect 
for the deceased inscribed in daily ritual practices of ancestor wor-
ship. Here the callousness of the poor and destitute who live among 
the tombs shocks middle-class sensibilities. What is perhaps most 
shocking, as in the cases Lam describes, is the spectre of abandon-
ment of the dead and the abject callousness of the living toward the 
anonymous dead. 
 Identifying the dead: names and images of 
the deceased 
 In the far northern reaches of the cemeteries, along dusty roadsides, 
vines blanket graves in layers of bright green. Vines are reminders 
of oblivion, slowly advancing waves of forgetting and abandonment. 
Th e graves are not all subjected to this in the same way: in some 
plots, graves are better kept and locked in metal cages to protect 
them from desecration. 
 Regardless of their current state, all graves display names of the 
dead, and the briefest of biographies summed up simply by dates of 
birth and death. Photographs of the face of the deceased enamelled 
or engraved on some headstones embody the words and give depth 
and substance to absent biographies. Th e images of the dead give a 
sense of presence and militate silently against forgetting. Th e eff ect 
is uncanny, since this mirrors the display of the photographs of the 
dead found on family altars in all Vietnamese homes. Th e city of the 
dead mirrors that of the living. 
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 Similarly, in ceremonies in Buddhist temples during the seventh 
lunar month, Buddhist monks and nuns read long lists of names of 
people who have died in previous years and whose names relatives 
want read publicly for merit-making. Reading the names of the dead 
is a long ceremony. Th e gathered worshippers pray for the souls of 
those who are named and whose ashes rest in urns on long rows of 
shelves in carefully tended funerary halls. Here, as opposed to the 
cemeteries, Buddhist pagodas concentrate the power of dead souls 
in their demarcated enclosures. Th ey domesticate and sublimate it 
in ritual. 
 I ask Lam and other people who have placed their parents’ urns 
in Buddhist temples why they did so. Echoing what others said, Lam 
replies: ‘I travel a lot for work. I worry that I may miss important 
dates in the ritual calendar.’ She means that monks’ prayers and the 
supernaturally potent milieu of the Buddhist temple provide ritual 
protection to her mother’s remains, even if she is absent. Her recently 
widowed father joins in the conversation and adds, ‘I worry about the 
neglect and abandonment of these cemeteries. Such terrible places.’ 
Here again, the question concerns the demands of remembering the 
dead, as opposed simply to the threat of oblivion and anxieties of 
decay and abandonment. During the Buddhist name-reading cere-
monies worshippers line up in long rows in a packed hall, all wear-
ing the light grey robes of the lay follower, a moment of gathering 
and display of society to itself, as Durkheim would have it. 
 Image: faces of the deceased on tombstones 
 In cemeteries newer tombstones display a photograph of the 
deceased. Th e face of the deceased is represented by a photograph 
taken close to the time of death, for instance as an elderly person for 
those who died in old age. 
 For North Vietnamese Army soldiers and National Liberation 
Front guerrillas a name and the national crest of the Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam peer outward from the grave. In military ceme-
teries in southern Vietnam, the process of naming and display is 
oft en abbreviated: many of the dead were only known through nick-
names or fi rst names, their dates of birth unknown. In some cases, 
they are identifi ed only as ‘woman’, ‘man’ or ‘anonymous’ – piercing 
reminders of the chaos of war, although provincial governments 
since the 1990s have invested heavily in the refurbishing and upkeep 
of military cemeteries. In some cases, a photograph is displayed on 
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a military grave, invariably showing the face of a very young man or 
woman next to the date of his or her ‘sacrifi ce’ ( hy sinh ). Th e con-
cept of sacrifi ce anchors this display of anonymous or abbreviated 
biographies. In Vietnamese military and war martyrs’ cemeteries, 
individual identity of the dead is always already subsumed in the 
national discourse of sacrifi ce, a sacrifi ce of blood for the eternal life 
of the nation. 
 Th is poses a problem for the dead of the ‘old regime’ ( che do 
cu ). I put this term in quotation marks because most older south-
ern Vietnamese loathe this phrase, which disdainfully implies that 
their dead were on the losing side of history. Th e display of images 
of the dead from the ‘old regime’ and its soldiers cannot be offi  cially 
recognised. Th ey may be honoured privately, but not recognised 
as such, in the public sphere or in cemeteries. As soldiers of the 
defunct Republic of Vietnam (1955–75, with Saigon as the capital) 
they are the ignominious dead, the ghost soldiers who cannot be 
named, and whose memory cannot be honoured publicly. Offi  cial 
narratives of the victorious Communist Party skirt the death and 
continuous, if spectral, presence of these soldiers. It is rendered as 
absence, subsumed under narratives of a heroic People’s War, of the 
People-as-One 7 rising to fi ght foreign aggression. Graves of soldiers 
of the US-backed Republic of Vietnam are forgotten, ignored, their 
memory privatised and held to be the responsibility of families of 
the deceased soldiers, provided they keep quiet about their mem-
ories of violent death. Th e neglect and abandonment of graves in 
southern Vietnamese cemeteries is oft en linked to the presence of 
these unclaimed dead: many families of dead soldiers of the ‘old 
regime’ fl ed repression and ‘re-education’ in the 1970s and 1980s. 
Th ey left  as ‘boat people’ ( vuot bien ), leaving behind graves that are 
now at the centre of contention over the presence of large numbers 
of unclaimed tombs in Saigon’s cemeteries. 
 Th e face of the deceased on a headstone locates a tomb in rela-
tion to several places and sites, and symbolically in several direc-
tions at once and along diff erent axes. Th ese images materialise the 
deceased who peer out from their graves, inhabiting them. But they 
also call and make a demand on the living, on relatives, descendants 
and passersby. Th e dead interpellate the living. Unlike in Western 
European or American cemeteries, Vietnamese graves do not dis-
play epitaphs recalling career, familial belonging or important bio-
graphical facts (writer, artist, etc.) that contextualise the life of the 
deceased. Here the dead are located by means of a name, birthplace, 
a date (and, sometimes, a time) and place of death, accompanied by 
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a photographic portrait reproduced on enamelled ceramic. Neutral 
formulas, such as ‘peaceful rest’ sometimes fi gure above or under-
neath the name. Th ese words and symbols identify the deceased pri-
marily as belonging to a family and a religion, by means of two series 
of Buddhist and Christian symbols: the swastika, Buddhist symbol 
of the wheel of the law ( Dharma ) and karmic laws of birth, death, 
reincarnation and rebirth ( samsara ), as well as the lotus fl ower, 
Buddhist symbol of purity; and wheat garlands and the cross for 
Catholics. 
 Practices vary and photographs are not uniformly affi  xed to 
headstones, though most recent graves include a medallion portrait 
of the deceased. One eff ect is that the dead are preserved as alive, by 
means of a portrait that becomes an image of them in death. Th is 
is not a death mask, an image of the corpse, but rather an image 
from when they were alive. 8 Descendants choose photographs of the 
dead carefully. Th ese portraits are not exuberant. Smiles are thin and 
subtle. Th e face, photographed head-on, fi lls the oval medallion or 
rectangular frame: a biography condensed in the portrait and the 
image of a face. Th is type of portraiture and the eff ect of repetition 
from grave to grave helps identify (with) the dead by recognising 
them as ancestors – an endless indebtedness by means of which liv-
ing descendants can recognise themselves as such and locate them-
selves in kinship and social terms in relation to the deceased. Th is 
recognition is an ethical demand (Hegel  1977 : 270; Levinas  2000 : 
82, 105; Mbembe  2003 : 14). Here the demand of the other, displayed 
and conveyed by a photographic image of the face, is the demand of 
the deceased, dead and yet still alive and able to place demands on 
others from the realm of death. It is in part a demand for immor-
tality, a wish. But it is also a debt that must be enforced and that the 
dead enforce on their descendants. To refuse that debt, by improp-
erly paying respects to the dead, by not tending to the graves and the 
needs of the dead would run the risk of having the deceased turn 
into ghosts and malevolent spirits. 
 When graves are abandoned or untended, when cemeteries 
become dumping grounds overgrown with vines and weeds as a 
result of administrative neglect, these demands fail. Th is is not an 
ethical breach  per se in the case of families who left  or disappeared 
in the wake of war and the chaos of emigration. People bemoan the 
fact that graves were abandoned, but do not blame directly those 
who left  as refugees: it is considered part of the violent aft ermath 
and harsh sorrow of war, a sorrow that is best left  unvoiced. But it 
is an ethical failure, and people see it as such, when authorities and 
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local offi  cials neglect their duties of caregiving and keeping the dead 
properly sheltered when cemeteries are not properly managed. Th en 
these fractured memories and threats of abandonment and oblivion 
index the violent return of something heavily repressed but active 
within the recent history of Vietnam. 
 Naming the dead 
 Naming the dead, the display of names and photographs of the 
deceased, establishes claims over the land and inscribes it with social 
norms and an ethical mark. In the name of the deceased and the 
ancestors, families disavow death – not the unavoidable facticity of 
death  per se , but the decaying presence of the corpse. In the wake 
of funeral rituals, by means of names and photographs etched into 
headstones, the corpse is transformed into an ancestor, a principle 
of ideally unending fi liation and descent (Hertz  1960 : 77–9; Watson 
 1982 ). Oblivion, symbolised vividly by the growth of vines and vege-
tation over the tombs, is the return of something threatening, best 
forgotten, the materiality of decomposition – something that rituals, 
 Figure 4.2  Th e face of the dead, peering out from an abandoned grave. 
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funerals and naming claims over a small rectangle of earth for the 
corpse below do their best to occult. In the abandonment and obliv-
ion of these cemeteries images of decay resurface. Th ese images of 
decomposition sneak in and seep into consciousness. Th e threat in 
this something that resurfaces stems from the ways it imposes itself. 
One cannot evade and forget it, or easily put it out of mind (Bataille 
 1991 : 80; Siegel  1983 : 9). 
 Ideally, cemeteries provide a mirror image – cities of the dead 
mirroring those of the living. Th e mirror image here, however dis-
torted, is threatening and uncanny. Th ese places become ‘dead zones’ 
because they don’t seem to stand up to ethical norms of proper 
behaviour toward corpses of the dead (Posel and Gupta  2009 : 301). 
Here something reasserts itself, something that is best kept at bay, 
tentatively but successfully in funeral rituals and ancestor worship. 
Th e neat demarcation between the worlds of the living and the dead 
is not a principle in Vietnam: quite the opposite. Th ese two ‘worlds’ 
are best understood as the contact zone between the visible world of 
social relations and the invisible but effi  cacious world of spirits and 
the dead (L é vi-Strauss  1992 : 246). 
 Th e process of naming is extensive. Its deep ritual and famil-
ial ramifi cations extend to political and administrative realms. Th e 
problem in part is that administrative failure is almost complete: 
failure to name, register, count and administer, and govern the 
dead, who are not cared for properly. Th e problem of governing the 
dead mirrors that of governing the living. Offi  cial calls for law and 
order, for cleanliness and public hygiene when the government is 
eager to blame the criminality of these areas, are undermined by 
the brute facts of poverty and offi  cial neglect in rapidly urbanising 
contexts. 
 Dead zone: contamination and symbolic pollution 
 Th e territory occupied by these cemeteries is an actual place, wedged 
between Saigon’s airport and industrial zones, and surrounded by 
marshlands and dense residential areas. But this geographical ter-
ritory also maps (or is mapped on to) and masks another reality. 
Th e territory is both real and imaginary. Th rough the intervention 
of an ‘outside’, of something else that terrifi es and escapes language, 
it becomes imaginary, the territory of fears and anxieties, including 
social anxieties about ‘social evils’ because of the poverty and chaos 
in the area. 
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 ‘Dead zone’ for Vietnamese here means derelict and vague spaces, 
on the outside, in areas under construction and in thresholds where 
the city is expanding: liminal areas, unmarked, unclear, unregistered, 
out of direct municipal and state control, unclean spaces where all 
sorts of crimes are imagined to take place. Th ese are also spaces of 
the imagination, anxious spaces where criminality and threatening 
perpetrators are imagined to reside and roam. 9 
 As opposed to the notion of cemeteries as resting places aft er a 
long and eventful life, this ‘dead zone’ threatens and undermines the 
very image of ‘good death’ and peaceful eternity (Bloch and Parry 
 1982 : 15; Kwon  2006 : 12–16). Other images and other thoughts 
come to mind anxiously. As we saw with Lam and her father, one 
witnesses and, on the basis of media representations, one imagines 
crime, gambling and prostitution taking place in these graveyards – 
forms of excessive social behaviours and transgressive exchange that 
shock, because they have no place here. Th ey destabilise the fragile 
scaff olding of ritual exchange with the dead in this place of repose. Yet 
the point is that this place is active: the territory is crowded, this is a 
place of labour peopled by workers who are imagined to be loud and 
coarse, drink too much, use drugs, have sex with prostitutes, etc. 
 Contamination (imaginary, symbolic or real) disturbs the ‘good 
death’ of people buried here. Something that should have remained 
out of sight comes to the fore and becomes visible. Contamination, 
juxtaposition and mixing create anxiety, and perhaps terrify in some 
cases. Pollution is no longer a fi gure of speech. Anxiety about the 
return of the dead, of death that returns, including in the fi gure of 
ghosts, is not fi gurative in this case, but the real event of the reappear-
ance of decay and abjection, the anxious contiguity of threatening fi g-
ures of prostitutes and junkies roaming at night with polluted run-off  
from the graves into waterways and water tables in the area. Pollution 
in this dead zone seeps in and becomes unbearably real and anxiety-
producing when its source is identifi ed as ‘death itself ’ (which is an 
impossible thought, supposedly, but not here). Th e ritual scaff olding 
and apotropaic justifi cations of funerary rites are compromised. 
 Th e symbolic pollution of death rooted in decomposition of the 
corpse is domesticated in ritual (Siegel  1983 ; Watson  1982 ). Th e idea 
of cemeteries as resting places, too, aims to domesticate this threat: it 
delineates proper spaces for death, territories supposed to be marked 
off  and domesticated. In these ‘dead zones’, on the other hand, some-
thing escapes. Th ere is run-off . Bodily fl uids from corpses ooze and 
seep into the ground, polluting drinking sources of the living. Hygiene 
is threatened, and ‘social hygiene’ problems begin to fester and seep 
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into view as well, especially when relayed by mass media. Th ere is 
something unclean and transgressive in this area, and this something 
‘unclean’ extends to sources of lawlessness imagined to be located in 
poverty – in lack of education, poverty and criminality associated with 
‘social ills’ and people living outside the confi nes of the law. 
 Th is brings into view more complex demands of organisation and 
less easily located questions connected to governing spaces of death. 
Th e problems of governing these large, complex spaces seem intract-
able: indeed, the ‘solution’ of the People’s Committee of Ho Chi Minh 
City, which sits in a distant, imposing colonial building in the city 
centre, has been to decide to raze and relocate the Binh Hung Hoa 
cemeteries, in eff ect to eliminate them. Th is answers demands of a 
past that will not sit still with more of the same aggressive policies 
which pretend that the violent wartime past simply no longer exists. 
Oblivion here is clearly an attempt to forget in order not to face the 
complexities of that past and the moral claims that some Vietnamese 
may be able to make in its name. 
 Th e city government wants to remove graves and raze these ceme-
teries because they are a chaotic mess, symbols of disorder, pollu-
tion and contamination. But the underlying causes for the apparent 
chaos in these fallow zones of decay and half-abandoned cemeteries 
can be traced to precise causes, namely war itself. In order to avoid 
confrontations over this past that will not sit still, the authorities, 
instead of addressing it politically, decide to continue to skirt it and 
pretend it simply never happened. Th ere is something peculiar to 
this temporality and the political discourses about the past displayed 
in this removal of cemeteries. As in Hong Kong or Singapore, places 
where pressure on land for building and infrastructure is intense, 
the removal of cemeteries is framed fi rst and foremost as a necessary 
aspect of economic development and growth (Kong and Yeoh  2003 ; 
Teather  1999 ,  2001 ). 
 Pressures on land in the city core led workshop and textile factory 
owners to establish themselves in these poor, outlying districts where 
real estate and rents are cheap. Th e personal ties and arrangements 
that helped create these industrial zones now undermine offi  cial 
attempts at registration and control. Over time, the murky proc-
esses by which lands were purchased and leased out make it nearly 
impossible to clearly ascertain who controls which lands and on what 
terms. Parts of the cemetery lands themselves have been leased out to 
state-owned factories, and graveyards have shrunk over time. 
 Today the city government – with its fragmented jurisdictions 
and unclear lines of authority – tries  ad hoc to re-establish control 
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over these areas and over processes by which public and private 
lands are apportioned, sold and leased. Th is reveals anew a strange 
temporality, in which the past fi gures as a great chaotic ‘before’ ( ngay 
xua ) – which may be further cut off  and classifi ed as ‘before liber-
ation’ (before the end of the war on 30 April 1975) or ‘before market 
economy reforms’ (late 1980s), etc. But in the meantime, ‘develop-
ment’, ‘modernisation’ and economic growth have also meant the 
establishment of entirely new land laws and regimes of property 
rights, as well as a rapid and massive expansion of private property 
and speculation on real estate in Vietnam. Cadres from Ho Chi Minh 
City’s People’s Committee and district-level municipal agencies 
placed themselves in a position to apportion real estate projects and 
enrich themselves in the process. Urban planning and questions of 
sovereignty have been undermined by government offi  cials in city- 
and district-level People’s Committees, the Planning and Investment 
Offi  ce and the City Architect Offi  ce of the municipal government 
acting as ‘intermediaries’ in large real estate transactions. 
 Th is goes hand in hand with a sort of folk ‘common sense’ in 
which the city is classifi ed into good and bad zones and, accord-
ingly, neighbourhoods and populations themselves as either ‘good’ 
or ‘bad’ – popularised by the phrases ‘bad people’ ( nguoi xau ) to 
refer to criminals and ‘complicated areas’ ( phuc tap ) for neighbour-
hoods with supposedly intractable social problems. In other words, 
a moralistic middle-class map of urban zones and society arose over 
time, based on anxieties about criminality and on blaming the poor 
for their poverty and lack of access to education and social services. 
Th is moralisation extends to discourses on cleanliness and contam-
ination in poor urban areas and graveyard zones. On the other hand, 
the term ‘dead zone’ is also used by people who live in these areas 
to point out that they have been abandoned by callous authorities 
and left  behind without any support. In the wake of scandals aft er 
journalists unearthed the problem of cancer caused by industrial 
pollution and water contamination in Binh Hung Hoa graveyards, 
the offi  cial solution has been large-scale removal of cemeteries and 
people from these ‘problematic’ areas. 
 Zones of neglect and abjection 
 Th e municipal government of Saigon/Ho Chi Minh City has tried 
without much conviction or success to close down the textile and 
plastics factories that dump waste directly into the marshes around 
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Binh Hung Hoa cemeteries. Factory owners and managers bribe 
local cadres in order to stay in business and continue to pollute. 
Th e government has also tried to regulate illegal dumping of trash 
and close down illegal garbage dumps that sprouted in the marshes 
(People’s Committee of Ho Chi Minh City  2008 ). Levels of water 
contamination have also been tested. But with pressure from the 
municipal government not to admit to large-scale and widespread 
contamination problems, tests came back negative and inconclu-
sive (Government of Vietnam, Ministry of Natural Resources and 
Environment  2008 ). Local residents have a ready answer: tests 
results were manipulated and the problems hushed up. To them, it 
is yet again the same pattern of exploitation and abuse of the poor. 
For residents corruption is the root cause of the widespread pollu-
tion and contamination, the abuse of locals and neglect of the ceme-
teries. Lam notes plaintively, ‘Th e whole society is corrupt. Th is is 
what you have to do in order to make a living and survive.’ Lam’s 
father, a former journalist, is more direct: ‘Th is entire society is rot-
ten’, he says. 
 Care for the dead in cemeteries and the management of death as 
a question of public administration have become a scandal because 
the problem is broader than simply families paying for the care of 
their dead. Cemeteries are managed by local administrations, yet 
personal networks of patronage undermine management and stra-
tegic planning. For local residents, the abandonment and neglect 
of these cemeteries are symptoms of the government’s neglect for 
the people. Local offi  cials base their governing practices on fees and 
profi t. For Lam, ‘If they cannot make money from something per-
sonally, it will never happen.’ Th ere is no visible way to profi t from 
the care and maintenance of cemeteries. ‘You see, this is why we have 
these problems. Th ey don’t care about the poor people who live here’, 
she adds. 
 Th e ‘solution’ of the municipal authorities to deal with pollution, 
overcrowding and abandoned graves is to remove the cemeteries. 
Th is apparent solution only displaces problems temporarily, by tear-
ing out the local social fabric and carving out new zones for land 
development and speculation. Th is ‘solution’ is also an attempt to 
erase and forget the past. Th e problems in these ‘dead zones’ stem 
from at least one generation of neglect and offi  cial incompetence 
and impunity, since the end of the war in 1975. 
 Cities are rezoned by excluding and removing the poor. Th is is 
in spite of the fact that workers, the poor and people engaged in the 
informal economy have got by and built these neighbourhoods from 
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scratch without offi  cial help and support in areas where the gov-
ernment provided none of the basic environmental and social ser-
vices: no drinking water, no sewers, patchy electrical power and bad 
schools. More recent discourses about ‘modernising’ urban infra-
structure are intimately linked with speculation on land, and land 
deals fi nanced by domestic and foreign capital. Th e poor and the 
neighbourhoods they have built become impediments (Davis  2004 : 
15–16). And so are the dead. Both need to be removed and pushed 
further out into marginal lands on urban peripheries. 
 As we have seen, for Hegel the ethical nature of the family is 
revealed in the act of burial and of caring for the dead ( 1977 : 270–
2). In Vietnam these are also essential principles, relayed by ances-
tor worship and Buddhist rituals of care for souls of the deceased, 
including those of the anonymous and abandoned dead. But, as 
we saw here, because of contrary forces of poverty, mobility of the 
poor and the abjection of pollution and contamination, the poor are 
placed outside of the social. Th e diffi  culties these neighbourhoods 
experience in terms of livelihoods and lack of support from the gov-
ernment have rendered them ‘complicated’, as the local colloquial 
idiom has it – and this is now held against residents of these poor 
districts. Th e cemeteries are indeed ‘dead zones’ and ‘complicated’ 
areas where the world of the dead and the living intermingle in 
problematic ways. Th e informal economies of the  Lumpenproletariat 
in these neighbourhoods interact with and feed on addiction, gam-
bling and prostitution. Th is mostly stems from the inability of the 
government to regulate the burial of the dead and maintain cemeter-
ies, and provide adequate social services, education and ultimately 
jobs to local residents. 
 In the context of the impossibility of concerted popular political 
action – in the absence of political structures and mechanisms for the 
accountability of elected offi  cials, and without a vigorous and inde-
pendent press with investigative journalism – moral claims based 
on weak ethical principles of shaming are one of the few avenues 
for comment if not contestation about the unfolding environmental 
problems and social struggles in these dead zones. 
 Notes 
 1  In ‘Th e Living and the Dead’ (ch. 23 of  Tristes Tropiques ), C. L é vi-Strauss 
discusses the range of attitudes toward the dead across human societies, 
which are always rooted in respect. He opposes two ends of a spectrum, 
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with many intermediary attitudes across diff erent cultures: from a ‘con-
tract with the dead’, where if properly engaged ritually the dead return 
only at propitious intervals, to societies where the living put constant 
demands on the dead and ‘press them into service’ (L é vi-Strauss  1992 : 
233). He notes that in all societies ‘a form of sharing cannot be avoided’ 
between the living and the deceased (233). 
 2  For Hegel in the  Phenomenology of Spirit (paragraphs 452 and 453) the 
ethical nature of the family is revealed in the act of burial and of caring 
for the dead ( 1977 : 270–2). I work through this insight by focusing on 
violations of what Hegel analyses as fundamental ethical norms revealed 
in the care for the dead. 
 3  In ‘Miasma’, Taussig ( 2004 ) refl ects on the interactions between marshes, 
mud, decay and death. He builds on Bataille’s discussion of the fear of 
corpses and decomposition in ch. 3 of  Th e Accursed Share (Bataille  1991 ). 
My discussion builds on both of these theoretical approaches to death, 
decay and violation. 
 4  I borrow the expression from Buck-Morss’s discussion of ‘wild zones of 
state violence’ in the fi rst chapter of her  Dreamworld and Catastrophe 
( 2000 : 21). 
 5  In  Aft er the Massacre anthropologist H. Kwon discusses the centrality of 
the notion of ‘house’ ( nh à ) to Vietnamese moral classifi cations of death 
and to two interrelated form of dwelling: ‘the tomb is a house for the dead 
that shelters the body and demonstrates the deceased’s social identity’ 
(Kwon  2006 : 13). 
 6  In these passages, I am elaborating on the notions of pollution and dan-
gers of death as discussed by Mary Douglas, especially in ch. 1 of  Purity 
and Danger (1966). 
 7  C. Lefort articulated the concept of the People-as-One ( le Peuple-Un ) 
as an essential component of twentieth-century totalitarian thought, in 
both Nazism and Stalinism. See ch. 8, ‘Th e Logic of Totalitarianism’, and 
ch. 9, ‘Th e Image of the Body in Totalitarianism’, in his  1986 book. 
 8  For a contrasting view of the role of photographs in funerary practices, 
and analyses of Javanese understandings of corpses and fears of con-
tagious death, see Siegel  1983 . My own interpretation of practices sur-
rounding images and names of the dead in Vietnam is heavily indebted 
to Siegel’s ongoing ethnographic analyses of death, naming and uncanny 
encounters (Siegel  1969 ,  2006 ,  2011 ). 
 9  Th e theme of living in graveyards recurs in Vietnamese literature, to 
stress the abjection of extreme poverty and destitution. For a contempor-
ary example in the form of a short story fi rst published in Hanoi in 1995, 
see Nguyen Manh Tuan  2003 . 
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 Travelling corpses :  negotiating  sovereign 
claims in Oaxacan post-mortem 
repatriation 
 Lars Ove  Trans 
 Th is chapter explores the process of death and repatriation of 
a Mexican migrant, Jacinto, from his home in Los Angeles to his 
native village of San Pedro Yalehua, a Zapotec Indian community 
located in the Sierra Juárez mountain range in the southern state of 
Oaxaca. 1 In this process, Jacinto’s close relatives suddenly fi nd them-
selves in a situation where they have to navigate the claims of various 
diff erent authorities representing states (local and federal) as well as 
local, national and transnational communities who each seek to gov-
ern not only the whereabouts of the corpse but also the meaning of 
notions such as belonging, membership and obligation. 
 In the case of Jacinto, the number of authorities involved had 
multiplied as in 1976, at the age of twenty-fi ve, he decided to leave 
his home town of San Pedro Yalehua in search of more promising 
economic opportunities north of the US–Mexico border, thereby fol-
lowing in the footsteps of many of his fellow villagers and Oaxacans 
more generally. During the years in the United States, Jacinto had 
together with his wife, Norma, who also came from Yalehua, saved 
up enough money to buy a two-storey house in Oaxaca City, where 
they had for a long time dreamed of returning to live. However, at 
fi ft y-one, Jacinto had been diagnosed with diabetes and, despite 
the warnings of the doctors, continued to enjoy alcohol in large 
amounts. Four years later, his kidneys failed as a result of the dia-
betes and alcohol consumption, and he had to undergo dialysis 
treatment twice a week while on a strict diet. Because of Jacinto’s 
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need for regular dialysis treatment, their dream of retiring in Oaxaca 
was complicated. On 15 April 2011, any hope of ever returning to 
live in Oaxaca disappeared as Jacinto suff ered from a stroke and fell 
to the fl oor in the bathroom of their apartment in Los Angeles. 
 Jacinto was quickly brought to a hospital, where he was placed in 
the intensive care unit and put on a respirator. During the following 
days, Norma and many other relatives made daily visits to see him and 
pray for his recovery. About a week later, the doctor told the family 
that it was unlikely that Jacinto would recover because his brain had 
suff ered from a lack of oxygen caused by the stroke. As he explained 
to Norma, there was no point in keeping Jacinto alive on the respirator 
at this time, and once it was turned off  his heart would eventually fail. 
Although some of the relatives found it diffi  cult to accept this message, 
and were convinced that Jacinto had made signs to them by moving 
his eyes during their visits, Norma reluctantly began to reconcile her-
self to the doctor’s verdict. However, she asked the doctor if it would 
be possible to wait a few days before shutting down the respirator so 
she would have time to organise the transportation of the body back 
to Mexico, a request to which the doctor was sympathetic. 
 Later that day, Norma began, together with her sister-in-law, 
Rosa, to investigate what they should do to have Jacinto’s body trans-
ported back to their native village in Oaxaca. Th eir fi rst stop was at 
the Mexican consulate, where a consular staff  member explained the 
services provided by the consulate to help with the repatriation of a 
dead migrant. Among these services, as the staff  member told the 
relatives, the consulate off ers fi nancial assistance that, depending on 
Norma’s economic situation, would most likely be in the range of 
USD300 to USD500. To qualify for this support, Norma would have 
to use a special programme set up by the consulate together with 
a handful of funeral companies that provide only the most basic 
funeral services and transportation of the corpse to an international 
airport in Mexico. On the other hand, the programme guaranteed 
that the total cost of these services would not exceed USD1,763 – 
less the fi nancial support obtained from the consulate. Norma then 
contacted one of the funeral companies from the consulate’s list 
and agreed to have them take care of the preparation of the body, 
necessary paperwork and transportation. Th e following day, on 26 
April, the family returned to the hospital where Norma gave the staff  
permission to turn off  Jacinto’s respirator. Four hours later Jacinto’s 
heart beat for the last time and he drew his fi nal breath. 
 Th e situation confronted by Jacinto’s relatives is not unique but 
something that many migrants and their families ultimately need 
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to deal with. For instance, as migrants grow old, they oft en eventu-
ally face the choice of selecting a burial site, specifi cally whether to 
be buried in their place of origin or in their new place of residence. 
In the case of Mexican migration and in particular Oaxacan migra-
tion, which began in signifi cant numbers in the late 1970s and then 
accelerated during the 1980s, an increasing number of migrants 
have today reached old age, and they are therefore likely to encoun-
ter decisions related to death and burial. However, seen in relation 
to the vast body of literature dealing with the movement of Mexican 
migrants to and from the United States, the subject of repatriation of 
dead migrants in the US–Mexican context has so far received slight 
academic attention. Two notable exceptions are Lestage ( 2008 ), 
which details the increase in repatriations and attributes it to the 
involvement of the Mexican government and the emergence of a 
repatriation industry, and F é lix (2011), which similarly discusses the 
institutionalisation of the practice of repatriation along with how the 
desire for a posthumous return and burial is popularly expressed 
in the diasporic imagination. Nevertheless, the numbers of posthu-
mous repatriations are signifi cant with an estimated annual average 
of 8,000–9,000 cadavers in recent years (Lestage  2008 : 210). 2 
 Not only do the high rates of post-mortem repatriations in them-
selves merit attention, the contention of this chapter is that the 
subject also provides a unique prism for studying the politics of 
identity, membership and obligation in relation to political commu-
nities. Taking my cue from Foucault’s description of the body as ‘the 
inscribed surface of events’ ( 1977b : 148), my aim here is to examine 
the engravings that the diff erent authorities involved in the repat-
riation attempt to carve onto the dead migrant body. According to 
Foucault, these inscriptions result from the fact that ‘the body is … 
directly involved in a political fi eld; power relations have an imme-
diate hold upon it, they invest it, mark it, [and] train it’ ( 1977a : 25). 
An important eff ect of the inscriptions, which take place through the 
powers of discourse, is ‘to individuate, to invent subjects, which are 
attached, so to speak, to bodies’ (Lash  1984 : 14). However, whereas 
Foucault’s concern is primarily with the living body, the idea here 
is that much the same argument applies to the dead body, although 
the objective of these power relations might ultimately be aimed at 
living bodies. 
 Th us, similarly to the living body, the corpse is also a site upon 
which the state and other actors can wield their infl uence and seek to 
construct meaning. In this sense, as Posel and Gupta ( 2009 : 299) argue, 
the corpse has a dualistic life as a material object, a decaying body, 
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and as ‘a signifi er of wider political, cultural, ideological and theo-
logical endeavours’. Accordingly, the corpse can serve as a ‘vehicle’ 
for furthering political projects, as a marker of inclusion or exclu-
sion in the political sphere and with the intention to invent subjects, 
living and dead (e.g. Anderson  1983 ; Lomnitz  2005 ; Verdery  1999 ). 
By following the corpse of Jacinto on its journey from Los Angeles 
to its fi nal resting place in Oaxaca and documenting the practices, 
discourses and negotiations surrounding his transportation – and 
Mexican post-mortem repatriations more generally – I intend to 
illustrate how various authorities seek to exert their sovereignty by 
inscribing their claims on the deceased migrant body. 
 A death in the migrant community 
 For most immigrant groups who struggle in the lower echelons of 
the US economy death can be a serious economic challenge. Th e 
funeral expenses usually involve the costs of a coffi  n, burial plot, 
funeral home and mass, as well as expenditures related to housing 
and feeding family and guests (see Moore  1970 ). In the case that the 
body is being sent back to the place of origin, the costs will increase 
manifold. Historically, in order to meet the fi nancial burdens associ-
ated with a death, immigrants with shared backgrounds have oft en 
formed burial societies where all members support one another in 
cases of death. Th ese associations, which have been documented in 
many parts of the world, are among the earliest ethnic voluntary 
associations in the United States (Soyer  1997 ). Besides the imme-
diate economic costs, the death of an individual is also, as Lomnitz 
points out, ‘a crisis for his or her immediate social group, a time in 
which legacies and debts are revealed and communitarian ideals are 
enacted’ ( 2005 : 58). Th e enactment and confi rmation of such com-
munitarian ideals would seem to be even more important among 
immigrants, who oft en fi nd themselves in an unfamiliar and antag-
onistic new setting with limited access to resources. 
 In the case of Jacinto, his death left  Norma and their closest fam-
ily in disarray regarding fi nancial matters and all the formalities they 
needed to deal with. However, relatives, friends and  paisanos (fellow 
migrant villagers) quickly responded to off er both emotional and 
economic support. At eight o’clock in the evening on the day that 
Jacinto was declared dead, about forty-fi ve relatives and fellow villag-
ers showed up in the apartment of Jacinto and Norma for the fi rst 
of nine consecutive evenings of rosaries ( novenario ) – a sequence of 
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prayers – for the deceased. Normally, the  novenario would begin on 
the day of the burial, but since the interment would be postponed a 
considerable time because of the transportation, it was decided that 
the saying of the rosary should begin that evening. Two days aft er 
the last rosary, the family held a wake ( velorio ) in the mortuary of 
the funeral company attended by almost 150 relatives and  paisanos . 
During the ceremony, a priest celebrated mass and the migrant com-
munity wind orchestra played a number of funeral marches, as is cus-
tomary at wakes in Yalehua. Th e event concluded with the relatives 
who would be unable to travel back to Oaxaca for the burial taking 
turns to pass by the open casket to say their fi nal goodbyes to Jacinto. 
 Not only do the rosaries and the wake provide a ritualised scheme 
for mourning the loss of a relative, friend and member of the com-
munity; this is also a period where a large number of the fellow 
migrant villagers show their solidarity by giving aid to the family of 
the deceased. As Hertz ( 2004 : 197) pointed out, ‘with the occurrence 
of death a dismal period begins for the living during which special 
duties are imposed on them’. In addition to the monetary donations, 
this aid also takes the form of donations in kind, for example by 
bringing food and drinks to be served to the attendants at the ros-
aries or simply by helping out with all the practical preparations in 
the apartment. 
 Most of the community members gave their monetary donations 
to Jacinto’s family at the wake by dropping money-fi lled envelopes 
into a box placed in front of the casket. In total, Norma received 
about USD2,400 in voluntary, individual donations and an add-
itional USD100 from the wind orchestra. In addition, the Yalehua 
migrant organisation in Los Angeles, which has close to 300 mem-
bers, donated USD600, an agreed standard amount given in case 
of accidents or the death of someone who originates from the vil-
lage. Such collections are common among migrants from the same 
Oaxacan village communities, and the total amount collected can 
vary from USD1,000 to in some cases USD8,000–10,000, depending 
on the size of the village community, the reputation of the deceased 
within the community and whether he or she cooperated with the 
migrant organisation. 
 Generally, these acts of reciprocity, which among indigenous 
Oaxacans commonly go by the name of  guelaguetza , or  gozona in 
Zapotec, serve to reinforce the importance of the village commu-
nity and create strong bonds of solidarity and goodwill. From a 
Durkheimian perspective, one can argue that rituals such as rosaries 
and wakes for the dead serve to strengthen ties between the living 
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community members by providing occasions for a ‘renewal of com-
mon values, a reaffi  rmation of communal conceptions and a strength-
ening of social bonds’ and solidarity (Metcalf and Huntington  1991 : 
50; see also Hertz  2004 ). Th us, adherence to the proper mortuary 
rituals not only serves to mark the separation of the living from the 
dead and to provide the deceased with a proper destiny in the aft er-
life (see Robben  2004 ) but also as a confi rmation and demarcation of 
the social collective among the living – for instance, by demonstrat-
ing who is considered to be a member of the migrant community 
and who is considered to be outside of it. 
 The Mexican state’s programme for repatriation of 
human remains 
 Although the community plays an important role in helping the 
family in the event of a death, the Mexican federal state has since 
2004 also off ered consistent support to the relatives to help them 
repatriate a body to Mexico. In fact, Lestage ( 2008 ) argues that a 
major factor behind the general increase in the number of bodies 
being repatriated has to do with the involvement of the Mexican 
federal state ( 2008 : 213; see also F é lix 2011). However, aft er an ini-
tial increase in the families receiving fi nancial assistance through 
the consulates from 1,831 cases in 2004 to 2,755 in 2005 (Lestage 
 2008 : 214), this number has since levelled off . Th us, over a three-
year period from 2009 to 2011, the Secretariat of Exterior Relations 
( Secretar í a de Relaciones Exteriores , SRE) helped to pay for the 
repatriation of 9,297 bodies of Mexicans who had died abroad with 
a budget of USD13,015,800. Th at is, more than 3,000 bodies annu-
ally, with an average of USD1,400 paid by the Mexican consulates 
per transfer of human remains. 3 In the case of the repatriations 
that do not receive fi nancial assistance from the SRE, the expenses 
of returning them are typically covered by relatives and the com-
munity, but also sometimes by the Church or private insurance 
companies. 
 One notable eff ect of the intervention of the SRE in the repat-
riation of human cadavers to Mexico is that prices have fallen sig-
nifi cantly over the last decade. As the director for protection for the 
United States at the SRE explained to me in an interview, the SRE 
has made agreements with a number of funeral homes in order to 
ensure that they have a basic service package available at a reduced 
price for the repatriation of Mexican migrants. Th us, whereas the 
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shipment of human remains to Mexico would typically cost between 
USD5,000 and USD8,000, the SRE has managed to reduce the price 
to USD2,000–3,000. Th e agreement, on the other hand, supplies 
the companies involved with a steady fl ow of customers referred to 
them by the Mexican consular offi  ces. Th e basic package negotiated 
with the funeral companies includes the issuance of a death certifi -
cate, embalming of the body, a very basic coffi  n made from wooden 
boards, a simple wake ceremony held at the funeral home and the 
transportation of the body to an international airport in Mexico. 
Th us, there are certain limitations to the programme, as Jacinto’s 
relatives would come to experience. 
 Th e SRE has not only played an active role in lowering the price. 
Th ey also in many cases support repatriation based on the needs of 
the closest relatives. As the SRE director pointed out: ‘If people do 
not have the amount of money, we can pay 1,000 dollars, 2,000 dol-
lars … the contribution can be as high as 100 percent or as little as 
10 percent … it depends on every case, on the economic situation 
[of the family].’ In the case of Jacinto, in the meeting with the con-
sular staff  member Norma explained that she had not been working 
for two years because she had been taking care of her husband dur-
ing his illness, and that their only income had been the disability 
benefi ts that Jacinto had received during this period. Th e staff  mem-
ber then asked Norma to sign a declaration of truth and provide 
identifi cation that Jacinto came from Mexico. Norma had brought 
all Jacinto’s documents, among them his US passport, to which the 
woman replied: ‘Don’t show me that he was a US citizen, or other-
wise we will not help you. Just show me his draft  card [ cartilla mili-
tar ] and his birth certifi cate.’ In the end, Norma received USD1,200, 
which she was told is the maximum amount provided by the consul-
ate in Los Angeles, because of her fi nancial situation and the fact that 
they did not have any children who would be able to help with the 
costs of the repatriation and funeral. 
 Although most countries seek to provide consular services to 
their emigrants, particularly in cases of personal crisis, the extent 
and scope of the services provided by Mexico to its diaspora is 
unique (e.g. Laglagaron  2010 ). When asked about the reasons 
behind the Mexican government’s provision of these types of ser-
vices to Mexican emigrants, the SRE director put it in this way: 
 We have a responsibility to our nationals who are overseas. Because they 
are in a very distressed situation [to begin with]. I mean, they leave with 
no food, no money. Th ey go out to seek for a better opportunity and 
we recognise that, and we recognise the contribution that they make in 
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their hometowns. So, the government of Mexico takes this very seriously, 
and provides for assistance to their nationals in distress when they are 
abroad. 
 In this view, the services provided by the SRE refl ect a sense of moral 
obligation arising from the fact that the Mexican state was unable to 
provide the migrants with a livelihood to begin with, as well as rec-
ognition of the economic contribution that they make to their places 
of origin once they have left . Similarly, a consul from the Mexican 
consulate in Los Angeles pointed to the fi nancial contributions made 
by migrants to their families in Mexico in order to explain why the 
Mexican state provides this type of service to its emigrants: 
 Because they come over to work very hard, but a great part of their 
income is sent to Mexico, to their families to live, for them to go to 
school, to buy clothes, food, to build a home and all of that. So a great 
part of that money goes into Mexico and when they [the families] get the 
money and buy things, then they pay tax [IVA]. So, in one way or the 
other, they [the migrants] pay tax in Mexico. Maybe it is not [through] 
the salary but because of the goods that they [their relatives] buy. 
 As pointed out by the consul, even though the migrants only indir-
ectly pay taxes in Mexico – in the form of value-added tax (IVA) – the 
large amount in remittances sent by Mexican migrants nevertheless 
entitles them to demand certain services from the Mexican gov-
ernment. Th e quotations from the SRE director and the consul also 
refl ect a general change in the perception of migrants since the 
1990s by the Mexican state, where migrants no longer constitute 
a surplus or a danger but instead are celebrated as the new heroes 
of development (Mart í nez-Salda ñ a 2003). Th is change in represen-
tation has been accompanied by a gradual extension of rights to 
migrants and various outreach programmes aimed at strengthening 
the aff ective ties and loyalty of Mexicans abroad to their  patria and 
to ensure the continued involvement of migrants in their commu-
nities of origin. 
 Moreover, the direct intervention of the Mexican state in an 
intimate aspect of migrant existence makes the state concretely vis-
ible in the eyes of the migrants and comes to signify the ubiquity 
and translocality of the state (see Tenekoon  1988 ). In this way, the 
employment of state programmes can be a way to legitimate its rule 
and establish political authority, even if the presence and attention 
of the Mexican state outside of its territory can seem to be somewhat 
in contrast to its absence and neglect within, particularly in the case 
of indigenous communities. 
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 The body and the nation 
 Although there may be an important, implicit fi nancial motive 
behind the various programmes created by the Mexican state to pro-
tect and connect with Mexican nationals residing abroad, the pro-
gramme for repatriation of human remains primarily sends a strong 
message of belonging. Th us, an important function of the interven-
tion of the Mexican state in the lives (and deaths) of migrants is not 
only to promote material eff ects in their place of origin but also to 
create symbolical eff ects and in the process reinforce the emigrants’ 
sense of enduring membership. Th e Mexican consul in Los Angeles 
reinforced this aspect when I asked him why Mexican migrants 
wanted to go back to Mexico to be buried: 
 In many ways our people are here, you know, to work and to provide a 
better life for their families and all that, but they always request when 
they die to go back. It is a belief. It is a love for the country. It is a love 
they have for the place of birth. It is something natural. It doesn’t matter 
if they get the US citizenship … Th ey may be the best and most loving 
people of the US, but they never forget that they are Mexicans, and their 
dreams are to go back in one way or the other. 
 Th e relation between national identity and death, underscored by the 
consul, has been explored by Anderson ( 2006 : 13), who points out 
that with the ebbing of religious modes of thought, the idea of nation 
provided a ‘secular transformation of fatality into continuity, con-
tingency into meaning’. Th e meaning provided by the idea of nation 
to fatality is, as Anderson argues, captured in the public ceremonial 
reverence accorded to cenotaphs and tombs of Unknown Soldiers 
( 2006 : 9), which serves to reinforce the idea of heroic death and 
produce national heroes who gave their lives for the greater national 
good (Posel and Gupta  2009 : 304). However, it is not only fatality 
that is given meaning in a national frame of reference; the idea of 
nation similarly acquires its signifi cance in a symbiotic relationship 
through the people who have given up their lives for the  patria . In 
this sense, the place of death and the corpse in particular is, as Posel 
and Gupta ( 2009 : 301) note, ‘a pre-eminent site for the identifi cation 
of symbolic boundaries between a nation and its other’. In the case 
of the Mexican state’s programme to repatriate human remains, one 
can therefore argue that the deaths of the Mexican ‘migrant heroes’ 
are incorporated into a certain political (national) narrative where 
their fi nal allegiance to the nation is demonstrated by the choice of 
burial site. 
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 Th e importance of death and the corpse as a site for identifi ca-
tion of symbolic, national boundaries arises as it not only reinforces 
the idea of Mexico as a nation but also stresses the importance of 
Mexico in the lives of the migrants. In this sense, it serves as an 
ideal site for the cultivation of a diasporic consciousness among the 
migrant population in which, following the words of the consul, 
‘they never forget that they are Mexicans and their dreams are to 
go back in one way or the other’. Th e message conveyed is that their 
identity and fi nal loyalty remain unchanged even as the migrants 
integrate and assimilate themselves into US society – a view also 
refl ected in the changes made to the Mexican Constitution to allow 
Mexican expatriates to retain their Mexican citizenship even as they 
gain a new citizenship in their country of residence. In practice, 
however, such sentiments and ideas about national belonging are 
not necessarily stable or eternal. Th ey have to be continually con-
structed – or, sometimes, enforced administratively through prac-
tices such as ignoring the fact that the deceased had also become a 
US citizen, as in the case of Jacinto. In this context, it is also worth 
noting, as Lestage points out, that with a population of 9 to 10 mil-
lion Mexicans living in the United States and an annual mortality 
rate of almost 6 out of every 1,000 Mexicans in the year 2000, it 
means that only one in every fi ve or six Mexicans who die in the 
United States are transported back to Mexico (Lestage  2008 : 211). 
Nevertheless, burial in the ‘homeland’ is a strong symbol of belong-
ing that feeds into the attempts of the Mexican state to nurture rela-
tions and encourage the involvement of expatriates in their place 
of origin. Th us, it is not only life processes that politics are pro-
jected into with the intention to shape processes of subjectivation 
and promote certain moral forms of existence, as Foucault’s concept 
of biopower denotes (Lemke  2011 : 42). In the case of the Mexican 
state’s programme for the repatriation of human remains the same 
argument can be made with processes of death. 
 As Jacinto had never mentioned anything about where he wanted 
to be buried, Norma took it for granted that his wish was to be bur-
ied in the village where he was born. Furthermore, since music had 
been a central part of Jacinto’s life, and because he had received his 
musical formation in the village, Norma thought that it was fi t-
ting that the village wind orchestra could in this way pay their fi nal 
respects to him. Th us, similarly to the consul, Norma emphasises 
the special attachment to the place of birth as the primary motiv-
ation for selecting the site of burial. Compared to Norma, however, 
the consul puts this attachment explicitly in terms of the Mexican 
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nation-state, and, in his interpretation, the place of birth comes to 
metonymically signify the nation-state. 
 Bureaucratic dead ends – from LA to Oaxaca 
 Th e transnational process not only extends the period between death 
and burial, a period that is in itself oft en associated with uncertainty 
and danger (e.g. Kaufman and Morgan  2005 ), but also multiplies 
the number of encounters with authorities who must be dealt with, 
where things in principle can go wrong. Although the Mexican pro-
gramme for the repatriation of human remains seeks to simplify the 
process of repatriating a cadaver by off ering a full service package, it 
nevertheless only pays for the transportation to an international air-
port in Mexico. If the relatives are unable to fi nd the resources to pay 
for the remaining transportation, it is therefore necessary to con-
tact institutions and agencies inside Mexico to obtain support, such 
as the Oaxacan Institute for Migrant Aff airs ( Instituto Oaxaque ñ o 
de Atenci ó n al Migrante , IOAM) if the dead body is destined for 
Oaxaca. 
 In the case of Jacinto, the funeral company in Los Angeles had 
assured the relatives that they would make the necessary calls to 
obtain the fi nancial assistance needed to pay a funeral company in 
Mexico City to pick up the casket at the airport and drive it to the 
village. However, when Jacinto’s relatives showed up at the funeral 
company on the day before the wake with the clothes that Jacinto’s 
body should be dressed in an employee told them that he had been 
unable to fi nd any agencies that could help them with paying the 
remaining transportation and they would therefore have to pay 
another USD500. Th e relatives acted with surprise and disbelief to 
this news. Rosa then took matters into her own hands and borrowed 
a phone to call the IOAM in Oaxaca, where she was put through to 
the head of the Department of Legal Assistance. He told Rosa that 
the IOAM would help if they could visit their offi  ce on Monday and 
bring a document from the village authorities in Yalehua stating that 
Jacinto was born in the village and the age at which he had migrated 
from the village. Aft er the phone call, the employee congratulated 
Rosa for having been able to arrange the fi nal part of the trans-
portation. However, Rosa was unimpressed and complained to the 
employee that he had tried to charge them the additional amount. 
 On Saturday 7 May, the day aft er the wake, Norma travelled 
from Los Angeles to Oaxaca City together with Jacinto’s sister, 
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Zulma, and a brother to help arrange the remaining transportation 
of the body and to take part in the funeral in the village. Early on 
Monday morning, they met with two other close relatives, Laura and 
Reynaldo, who live in Oaxaca City, and went to the IOAM offi  ce. 
Rosa had aft er her conversation with the IOAM called Laura and 
instructed her to obtain the document from the village authorities. 
Laura, who incidentally happened to be staying in the village at the 
time, asked the authorities to prepare the document and then jour-
neyed back to Oaxaca City on the once-a-day public bus, a six-hour 
bus-ride through winding mountain roads. With the document in 
their hands, the small group thought it would be a straightforward 
matter to obtain help from IOAM, as Zulma later recounted in an 
interview: 
 When we came to the Institute, we thought it was just a matter of giving 
them the document, and that they would then reply, ‘Yes, everything is 
fi ne. We will arrange things with the funeral company from here.’ Instead, 
they were giving us a thousand excuses, ‘Th is is not the right document. 
We need another document stamped and signed by the village author-
ity, and without it we can’t do anything.’ Gosh, we were looking at each 
other in amazement, because we were already there [in Oaxaca City] and 
we had already bought the return tickets [to Los Angeles]. What are we 
going to do if the body does not arrive? What is going to happen then? 
Th ey are already waiting for him in the village! Th en, Reynaldo inter-
vened and told them that it was a very long way to go all the way back to 
the village to get another document. Time was running out, we soon had 
to bury the body because it had now been several days that it had been 
like that [in transit]. 
 Th e additional document requested by the IOAM was a statement 
by the municipal authorities declaring that Jacinto was a person of 
limited fi nancial means. However, as Zulma pointed out, there was 
urgency not only because they had bought their return tickets, but 
also because many villagers were already busy preparing the food to 
be served to all the attendees at the rosaries and wakes. Th e small 
group was therefore getting desperate because if they had to go back 
to the village to get the second document it would set the process 
back by at least two days. For that reason, the group decided to wait 
in the IOAM to see if they could talk to someone in charge who could 
grant them an exception from the normal requirements. Nothing 
happened, however, and they were waiting for hours until Norma 
accidentally had a chance to talk to the secretary of the director of 
IOAM. During their conversation, Norma, who knew the director 
was away on a visit to California, told the secretary that her sister-in-
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law, Rosa, and her family were personal acquaintances of the director 
and that Rosa had already talked to him, although this was not the 
case. Th e secretary acted with surprise and asked, ‘Do they know the 
director? OK, let me talk to the vice-director.’ When the vice-direc-
tor came, he asked, ‘Who talked to the director?’ Norma responded 
that her sister-in-law had talked to him, to which he replied, ‘Why 
didn’t you say that from the beginning? If you wait a moment we will 
arrange everything, don’t worry.’ Th us, the strategic use of a white 
lie by Norma to circumvent the bureaucratic procedures demon-
strates, as Gupta argues, that a practical knowledge of the hierarch-
ical nature of state institutions can be used to further one’s own ends 
( 1995 : 384). Indeed, as Zulma explained in her account of the events, 
‘You see. In this way they got moving, because otherwise they would 
have made it diffi  cult for us.’ It also illustrates that, as Nuijten ( 2004 : 
226) notes, although the Mexican state apparatus ‘propagates the 
idea that it operates in a modern, technocratic, professional man-
ner’, based on uniform procedures and standardised, administrative 
techniques, this image coexists alongside another seemingly contra-
dictory image of the state: the belief in ‘the right connection’, where 
power relations determine the fi nal outcome. 
 With all the formalities in order, the IOAM arranged with a 
funeral company to pick up the casket at Mexico City airport. From 
there the hearse drove to Oaxaca, where Reynaldo joined the chauf-
feur to help guide him the remaining way up to the village. A few 
minutes before midnight, on Tuesday 10 May, Jacinto’s body fi nally 
arrived in his native village of Yalehua and the church bells were 
tolled in a particular way that announced his arrival. Many villag-
ers soon came to help the relatives carry the casket to the house of 
Jacinto’s parents, where it was placed on a large table in the porch 
in front of the house. Th e porch quickly fi lled up with family and 
villagers who came to pay their respects and the casket was opened 
so they could all see Jacinto’s body. Th e rosary was then recited and, 
following that, a small group of family members remained to watch 
over the body during the night. 
 The corpse and the village of origin 
 Although the process of repatriation of a migrant corpse in itself 
can pose a great number of challenges and obstacles, in the event 
that the deceased originated from an indigenous village community 
in Oaxaca and the relatives intend to have the cadaver buried in the 
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village cemetery, they might face yet another set of challenges. Th us, 
before a dead migrant can be buried in the village of origin permission 
is required from the village authorities. In some indigenous Oaxacan 
communities this permission is dependent upon whether the migrant 
has been cooperating with the migrant hometown association by pay-
ing a fi xed monthly or annual membership fee. Usually, this is imposed 
on the migrant to make up for the  tequios (collective community work 
for the maintenance and construction of village infrastructure) that 
they have missed while being away. Th e village migrant association 
typically maintains a list of migrants who have cooperated with the 
association, which is sent back to the village authorities so that they 
can keep track of who remains in good standing. In the event that 
a migrant who has failed to cooperate with the migrant association 
returns to the village of origin, he or she faces possible sanctions ran-
ging from mockery to fi nes and sometimes imprisonment by the vil-
lage authorities (Cohen  2000 ; VanWey  et al.  2005 ). 
 Th e village of origin not only in many instances puts certain eco-
nomic obligations on the migrants. Some villages have also extended 
the local system of governance, known as  usos y costumbres , to include 
migrants (Kearney and Besserer  2004 ; Trans  2009 ). Th is system con-
sists of a hierarchy of village offi  ces ( cargos ), which are rotated annu-
ally among members of the community, and all male citizens are 
expected to serve in various municipal  cargos in their lifetime with-
out pay (Wolf  1957 ). Th e village communities governed by  usos y cos-
tumbres have a large degree of autonomy, and it is for example up to 
the village assembly to decide who should fulfi l which  cargos as well 
as to determine the sanctions for not complying with these demands. 
However, when the authorities assign  cargos to migrants they place 
on them a tremendous burden, as they may have to leave jobs and 
families behind in the United States in order to return to their village 
of origin to fulfi l their duties. If a migrant is unable or unwilling to 
assume the task of the  cargo , he risks being met with severe sanctions. 
For instance, in a village neighbouring Yalehua, a very strict enforce-
ment of the rules follows when migrants fail to comply with  cargo 
duties, as the village president explained in an interview: 
 Th e sanction is that they lose the right to return and they lose their prop-
erties according to the rules. If they do not return the second time they 
are nominated, then no more [ pues ya no ]. Th en they lose the right to live 
here. For example, if they have a house, if they have properties, then they 
do not have the right to sell them. Th at is what they lose. However, those 
who return, who show respect, they continue to be citizens [ ciudadanos ] 
with all their rights. Th at is the way it is here. 
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 In this village, the right of the migrant to return is also extended to 
the corpse. Th at is, as the president asserts, the deceased migrant 
is only allowed to be buried in the village if he cooperated with the 
migrant organisation while away and fulfi lled the  cargos that were 
given to him: 
 If they did not cooperate, they know that they will not be allowed to 
enter. Because he [the dead] is going to waste the time of the community 
police offi  cers [ topiles ] to dig the grave, to waste the time of the orchestra, 
the authorities and the church. 
 Th ere are, however, great diff erences among the villages in the region 
in the degree to which they require migrants to cooperate with the 
hometown association and participate in the  cargo system. For 
instance, in another nearby village, which also nominates migrants 
for  cargos , the authorities are less strict about enforcing the rules in 
the event that the relatives of a deceased migrant wish to have the 
corpse buried in the village cemetery even though the deceased did 
not comply with the  cargos he was nominated for while away. Th us, 
as Pedro, a migrant from this village, explained about the practices 
of his hometown: 
 Th ere have been cases where people are not in good standing, where 
if it is the dead or the family, they [the village authorities] give them a 
hard time and say: ‘No, you can’t bury this person here.’ So then, they 
have to go through kind of like a little legal process where they have to 
go and get permission and, you know, go back to the city and they make 
them go back and forth, and then they fi nally do let them get buried 
there. I don’t think that there has ever been an instance where they sent 
the body back … Once the body is in the village, they eventually let 
them bury their dead. But they do give them a hard time if they didn’t 
pitch in and they didn’t contribute. So, when it comes to that situation, 
if they [the family] know that the deceased or they themselves haven’t 
contributed, then they don’t want to go through the hardship of arguing 
with the authorities when they are already suff ering their loss. So, then 
they just prefer to leave the person in the city, whether it is here in LA, 
in Mexico City or in Oaxaca City. 
 In this way the village authorities can, through the corpse, seek to 
shape an understanding of what is expected of a migrant villager 
during his or her absence. As Pedro added: ‘Th ere is a little scare-
tactic in it also. It is not as bad as it looks but they use it as a way to 
manipulate you, you know, to contribute more.’ Although this vil-
lage compared to the former seems to off er a bit more lenience, in 
one case, however, when a migrant villager who for long periods 
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had failed to cooperate died in Los Angeles, the former village presi-
dent refused to have the village church bell rung, as it is customary, 
thereby symbolically excluding the deceased migrant from the com-
munity. Th us, in the case of both villages, one can argue that it is not 
only the banished life,  homo sacer , as Agamben ( 1998 ) writes, that 
acts as the included outside upon which the community constitutes 
itself and its moral order. As the above cases illustrate, this argument 
can equally be extended to the deceased migrant who posthumously 
risks being excluded from the community. 
 In the case of Jacinto, throughout his years in Los Angeles he was 
a member of the migrant organisation and paid his dues, while also 
being a member of the village wind orchestra, therefore remaining 
in good standing with the authorities in the organisation as well as 
in the village. Moreover, as the president of Yalehua explained in an 
interview, the village authorities were aware of the fact that most of 
the migrants also face hardships in their new places of settlement, 
and they therefore sought to avoid putting as many burdens on them 
as some of the neighbouring villages. Th erefore, when Rosa phoned 
the village authorities to inform them of Jacinto’s death, she did not 
have any diffi  culty obtaining permission to have Jacinto’s corpse 
buried in the small village cemetery. 
 Before the burial of Jacinto’s corpse could proceed, however, the 
mourning rituals continued for another day with two more rosaries, 
this time accompanied by the village wind orchestra. For the second 
night of wake, a small group of relatives stayed with the body and 
helped one another to place the belongings of Jacinto that should 
accompany him in the casket as well as a small bag of food for him to 
take on his fi nal journey to the other side. Early on Th ursday morn-
ing, 12 May, the day of the burial, a group of male family members 
had gone to the cemetery to dig out the grave. Before they com-
menced on their arduous task they had poured mezcal on the sur-
rounding graves of relatives, as an off ering, and on the site of Jacinto’s 
grave to ask permission from a fi nal claim-making sovereign entity, 
namely mother earth, to make the grave and receive Jacinto’s body. 
 In the aft ernoon, relatives from Oaxaca City and friends of 
Jacinto from some of the neighbouring villages came to pay their 
fi nal respects and take part in the mass held in the village church. 
Aft er the mass, all the attendants went in a procession led by the 
orchestra playing funeral marches, followed by the casket carried by 
a group of men, while fi reworks ( cuetes ) were ignited to signal that 
the body was now going to the cemetery. When they had covered 
about 100 metres along the small road leading up to the cemetery, 
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the casket suddenly began shaking from side to side. As Zulma later 
recounted the event: 
 He [Jacinto] did not do this when he left  the house, he was calm, but 
when he left  for the cemetery the coffi  n turned as if it wanted to go [down 
the road] to the house of his sister instead. It was so heavy that the guys 
[carrying it] screamed when the casket turned. Th e poor guys looked as 
if they were drunk. 
 A young man, however, came to the rescue by getting down under 
the casket and helped to lift  it with his back. With his help, the men 
managed to carry the coffi  n the remaining distance to the ceme-
tery, although they were struggling and suff ering. While a number 
of circumstances such as the weight of the casket, the bumpy dirt 
road and even alcohol might also possibly account for the zig-zag 
movements, several villagers explained to me that this phenomenon, 
which in Zapotec is known as  chbegade , happens when the dead 
dies with things pending, if it was not the right time to die, or the 
deceased is refusing to leave his family and his pueblo. Finally, at the 
cemetery, while one of the village elders made a short prayer and the 
orchestra was playing, Jacinto’s casket was lowered into the grave. As 
Zulma added on her return to Los Angeles: ‘Now, at last, he is resting 
in peace, because, poor him, he was sent from one place to the next 
without the body arriving, but fi nally he made it.’ 
 Concluding remarks 
 With the death of Jacinto a process begins where a number of diff er-
ent authorities representing diverse political communities each seeks 
to exert their infl uence and govern the handling of the corpse as well 
as its spiritual aft erlife, whether carried out through laws, regula-
tions, policies, rituals or social norms. For Jacinto, having migrated 
to the United States from his native village in Oaxaca, the process 
of death extended across a national boundary, which together with 
his indigenous background multiplied the number of authorities 
involved in managing his death. 
 A central contention of the chapter is that the involved author-
ities in the process of making sovereign claims over Jacinto’s dead 
body concomitantly seek to shape meanings related to member-
ship, belonging and obligation. Th e meanings that these author-
ities, metaphorically speaking, try to inscribe on Jacinto’s body, and 
the migrant body more generally, are sometimes overlapping and 
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complementary, as for example displayed by both the Mexican state 
and the local village encouraging the migrant’s continued member-
ship of the community, along with the sending of remittances. In 
other cases, however, the claims may be confl icting, as, for instance, 
when village authorities oblige migrants to return to perform  cargo 
duties in order to maintain their membership, and sometimes even 
decide posthumously to exclude a migrant from the community for 
failure to meet these obligations while alive. 
 Although the existence of multiple and, sometimes, overlapping 
authorities increase the number of demands and potential obsta-
cles that the relatives of the dead have to deal with, it nevertheless 
also allows room for negotiation and manoeuvring between them. 
In addition even if the corpse may seem like a privileged site for 
authorities to inscribe their various sovereign claims – as a subject 
that cannot resist or speak back – the cadaver does not always lend 
itself easily to such engravings. For instance, in the case of Jacinto, 
his soul – as it was perceived by his close relatives and many fellow 
villagers – continued to make claims on the body aft er his death in 
order to avoid being put into its fi nal resting ground. 
 Accordingly, not all authorities succeed equally well in making 
their sovereign claims. In the case of the Mexican state’s programme 
for the repatriation of human remains, although the numbers are sig-
nifi cant it is, as Lestage notes, less than 20 per cent of the Mexicans 
who die in the United States whose remains are transported back to 
Mexico. Th us, not all migrants necessarily share the identities and 
meaning of belonging promoted by the Mexican government. In 
some of these cases, mundane reasons such as the economic costs, 
ignorance of the repatriation programme or simply the location of 
close relatives – particularly the children – guide the choice of burial 
site. In other cases, however, the eff orts of the Mexican state to pro-
mote sentiments of belonging and inclusion among the migrants are 
perceived to stand in contrast with the failure of the state to provide 
them with a livelihood to begin with. As a result, some migrants 
out of resentment towards the conditions that they had to endure 
before their migration make a deliberate decision not to return to 
their place of origin, whether alive or dead. 
 Notes 
 1  In order to respect the privacy of my informants, the names of people and 
the village appearing in the ethnography have been changed. 
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 2  Th is number does not include the repatriation of human remains 
in urns. 
 3  Th e numbers are based on personal communication with the SRE, 27 
January 2012. Th e year 2011 covers the period from January to October. 
Interestingly, the number of certifi cates issued for embalming (form 160), 
which is required for the shipment of a cadaver internationally, have gone 
down over the period from 9,049 in 2009 to 8,395 in 2010 and to 6,625 in 
2011 (January to October). 
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 Claiming the dead, defi ning the nation : 
 contested narratives of the independence 
struggle in post-confl ict Timor-Leste 1 
 Henri  Myrttinen 
 Introduction 
 Timor-Leste’s struggle for independence (1975–99) cost the lives of 
more than 108,000 people, the majority of them unarmed civilians. 
Th roughout the period of the Indonesian occupation, a small armed 
resistance movement, the Falintil ( For ç as Armadas de Liberta çã o 
Nacional de Timor-Leste ) fought militarily against the occupation 
forces, supported by a civilian resistance network. 
 With independence, a new national narrative has emerged in 
which the ‘valorisation’ of the resistance takes a central place and is 
anchored in the constitution. Among the living, this has meant the 
payment of pensions and compensation to veterans, public recogni-
tion, medals, public holidays and ceremonies. For the dead heroes 
of the Falintil, national monuments have been erected and a central 
heroes’ cemetery built. Th e offi  cial narratives stress heroism, sacri-
fi ce and above all unity, a term that resonates strongly in a society 
where various fault lines came violently to the fore in 2006 in a crisis 
that shook the foundations of the new nation-state. 
 Th e supposedly unifying narrative of the nation struggling as one 
for independence, of which the claim of the nation over the remains 
of the dead heroes is one manifestation, is however not uncontested. 
Th e chapter will focus on three aspects of this socially, culturally and 
politically complex debate. Following a brief historical outline, it will 
look at (1) the role of the dead in narratives of the state, (2) the role 
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of narratives of continued struggle and (3) competing eff orts of state 
and non-state actors to collect the remains of the fallen and demand 
recognition. While none of the groups questions neither the narra-
tive of the struggle nor the state  per se , they see them as imperfect 
and demand revisions, in part with the help of the spirits and bodies 
of the dead. 
 Politics of the dead and the independence of 
Timor-Leste 
 Th e village-level confl ict resolution workshop had been running for well 
over an hour, consisting mainly of the mandatory long-winded offi  cial 
speeches by dignitaries, when the villager raised his question to the East 
Timorese workshop facilitators with a note of worried urgency in his 
voice: ‘Sir, since you come from Dili [the capital city of Timor-Leste] 
and are more educated than we are, can you please tell us – is it true that 
Nicolau Lobato is still in the mountains and that he will return to save 
us in this situation?’ 2 
 Th e question jolted me, as Nicolau Lobato, the fi rst prime minister 
and later president of Timor-Leste and the guerrilla commander 
who was being referred to, had at the time (in early 2007) been 
dead for close to thirty years. Th e whereabouts of his remains 
are however unknown, and the East Timorese government has 
repeatedly demanded that Indonesia release relevant information 
(Murdoch  2009 ). 
 Th ough I was aware that the spirits of the dead are more present 
in the lives of the living in Timor-Leste than my Northern European 
experience allowed, this was the fi rst time that I was confronted with 
the complex politics of the dead and their implications for defi n-
ing the newly independent nation. Th e question posed gained add-
itional poignancy from the fact that the small village in question 
lay in the foothills of Mount Matebian, which was not only one of 
the major battlegrounds during the initial years of the independ-
ence struggle but is also – as the meaning of its name (‘All Souls’) 
in Tetum indicates – the spiritual home of the souls of the East 
Timorese deceased. 
 Over the years I would encounter this belief in the return of 
Nicolau Lobato and other ‘un-dead’ fi gures, especially from the 
early years of the independence struggle time and again. 3 Kammen 
( 2009 : 400–5) for example notes the adherence of one of the spir-
itual leaders of Colimau 2000, a ritual/martial arts group, to this 
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belief. On New Year’s Day 2005, several members of the group 
had announced the reappearances of Lobato and of another dead, 
legendary independence fi ghter, Vicente ‘Sahe’ dos Reis, in the 
Central Manatuto District, leading to public unrest and their sub-
sequent arrest (UNMISET  2005 ). 
 Th e dead and their spirits play a central role in Timor-Leste cos-
mologies, with some regional diff erences between various ethno-
linguistic groups (see for example Hicks  2004 ; Th erik  2004 ; Traube 
 1986 ). Invariably, however, in all of the various cultural groups, the 
dead remain present in the lives of the living as spirits. 4 As such, they 
demand attention and compensation and can have either a malevo-
lent or benevolent role in the lives of the living. Improperly buried 
dead and/or those who have not been properly ritually compensated 
remain restless and potentially dangerous, causing loss of livestock, 
illness or death among the living (Sakti  2012 ; Schlicher and Tschanz 
 2011 ). Th is spiritual dimension has in the past not always been fully 
recognised in dealing with the dead of the long independence strug-
gle, especially in international transitional justice eff orts. 5 
 Th e independence struggle began aft er the Carnation Revolution 
in Portugal in 1974, when the territory which had been Portuguese 
Timor for around four centuries was thrust into a series of cataclys-
mic events. Th e brief period of rapid decolonisation led to a brief but 
bitter civil war in 1975, followed by the proclamation of independ-
ence. Th is proclamation was made under the shadow of a looming 
Indonesian invasion, and nine days later the morning calm over the 
capital city Dili was shattered by the growl of Indonesian air force 
planes dropping paratroopers into the city. 
 Th e invading forces met with the stiff  resistance of the Falintil. 
Supported by a network of civilian supporters, the guerrillas were 
able to continue their armed struggle, albeit to a very limited scale, 
until a political solution was found in the form of a United Nations-
organised referendum on independence in 1999. When the refer-
endum results heavily in favour of independence were announced, 
pro-Indonesian militias and Indonesian security forces went on one 
last rampage, killing upwards of 1,500 civilians. Th e international 
outcry over the violence led to the deployment of an international 
peacekeeping force and the establishment of a temporary UN 
administration, the United Nations Transitional Administration in 
East Timor (UNTAET). Aft er two and a half years under UN tutel-
age, Timor-Leste regained its independence on 20 May 2002. 
 According to the estimates of the Commission for Reception, 
Truth and Reconciliation of Timor-Leste ( Comiss ã o de Acolhimento, 
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Verdade e Reconciliac ã o de Timor-Leste – CAVR), the confl ict 
between 1975 and 1999 had cost the lives of upwards of 108,000 
people, the majority of them unarmed civilians (CAVR  2005 ). 
 Th e complex politics of remembrance has led to competing read-
ings of the nation and the struggle. Whereas others have done an 
excellent job exploring complexities between national, NGO and 
personal-level narratives (Harris-Rimmer  2010 ; Kent  2011 ; Sakti 
 2012 ) I will focus on alternative narratives of the nation and the 
independence struggle as articulated through the dead by the state, 
non-state actors and individuals. Th e three processes I will focus on 
are the ways in which the nation is narrated by the state by valoris-
ing certain dead; how the dead are summoned as part of narratives 
contesting the end of the struggle; and how exhuming the dead is 
used as a contestation of state narratives. 
 The nation and the dead 
 As noted in the introduction above, the link between nationalism, 
the nation, the dead and their sacrifi ce is oft en a very intimate one, 
especially if the independence and sovereignty of the nation was 
achieved and/or defended through violent struggle. 6 As outlined by 
Anderson ( 1991 ), Hobsbawm ( 1990 ) and others, the concept of the 
Westphalian nation-state has been adopted globally as a blueprint, 
especially following the post-Second World War wave of decolonisa-
tion in Africa, Asia and Oceania as well as the post-cold war break-up 
of Czechoslovakia, the USSR and Yugoslavia. Although some elem-
ents of the languages of stateness, as Hansen and Stepputat ( 2001 ) 
name it, are easily recognisable in all nation-states (e.g. national 
symbols such as fl ags, coats of arms, anthems; the rituals of protocol; 
presence of a state bureaucracy), the local variants of the languages 
and their understandings, as it were, may diff er greatly. Th ese are 
in part contingent upon the local historical, social, economic and 
cultural contexts. Although, for example, mourning and honouring 
those who fought and died for the nation plays a central role in reaf-
fi rming the nation-state both in Timor-Leste and my native Finland, 
the meaning given to the dead is diff erent. While in Finland the dead 
live on either as the abstract dead of monuments and historical nar-
ratives or in personal memories and fading photographs, in Timor-
Leste they can additionally be active agents aff ecting the everyday 
lives of the living through their presence as spirits. 
 Governing the dead thus also needs to be seen in the context of 
the local understandings of statehood. Verdery ( 1999 ) points to the 
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symbolic power of memorials and reburials, to show how these can be 
used to legitimise or delegitimise certain narratives, political struc-
tures and processes, and how the ‘aura of sanctity’ of the dead can 
be used to sacralise the otherwise mundane (or even ‘dirty’) world 
of politics. Similar processes are undoubtedly at play in Timor-Leste 
as well, as I will discuss below. However, the local understanding 
of the dead as, in a sense, ‘un-dead’, means that they are not merely 
symbols but also agents in their own right. Here, Fontein’s ( 2006 ) 
examination of spirits and war veterans in Zimbabwe, despite the 
very diff erent political, historical and social settings, bears in many 
ways on Timor-Leste. In addition to being mobilised on a symbolic 
level, the spirits of the dead can be actors in their own right and be 
invoked to legitimise either state authority or resistance to it. Also, 
in Timor-Leste as in Zimbabwe, summoning these spirits allows the 
living to connect their struggles to seemingly nobler struggles of 
the past. 
 Valorising the dead, narrating the nation 
 I wish to greet the relatives, widows, orphans of our dear brothers and 
comrades in arms killed during the struggle for independence, our 
Heroes. We all shared a dream: to achieve the independence of our 
country. Th ey shed their blood, sacrifi ced their lives so that today, we 
could live the independence we all yearned for. We will never forget your 
husbands, brothers and fathers.  (Brigadier-General Taur Matan Ruak, 
Commander of the F-FDTL: farewell speech, 6 October 2011) 
 Like the leaders of other postcolonial nations that fought for their 
independence, the political leadership of Timor-Leste has been 
heavily dominated by fi gures who played key roles in the struggle. 
Th e Constitution of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste makes 
explicit reference to the resistance and its martyrs, both in the pre-
amble and in Article 11, calling for the ‘valorisation’ of those who 
participated in the independence struggle, including ‘rendering of 
tribute to the national heroes’ (Leach  2002 ; RDTL  2002 ). 
 In practice, this ‘rendering of tribute to the national heroes’ has 
taken various forms for the living and for the dead. For the living, 
the main forms of recognition have been medals, offi  cial com-
memorations and pensions as well as in 2011 a special uniform. 
Th e process has, however, been highly politicised and fraught with 
controversy (Fundasaun Mahein  2011 ; International Crisis Group 
 2011 ; Roll  2011 ). Several commissions have looked into the veter-
ans’ issue and currently there are around 200,000 people claiming 
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veteran status, an unlikely number given the fact that the nation has 
a population of around 1 million, more than half of them too young 
to have participated in the struggle. Powerful lobby organisations of 
the veterans have blocked legislation in parliament that would have 
led to compensation being paid to victims of political violence dur-
ing the occupation or to their kin before the veterans’ demands have 
been met. 
 While the living heroes of the struggle have, in part, been com-
pensated, the valorisation of the dead has taken on other forms. A 
central ‘heroes’ cemetery’ has been established at Metinaro, a few 
kilometres east of the main army base of the country. Th is ‘heroes’ 
cemetery’ is to become the centralised fi nal resting place of dead 
Falintil, whose remains have been brought there from across the 
country (for a discussion of offi  cial memorials in Timor-Leste, see 
for example Leach  2008 ). 
 Th e proximity of the cemetery to the main army base is no coinci-
dence, for the new armed forces (F-FDTL –  Falintil-For ç as de Defesa 
de Timor-Leste ) explicitly draw their legitimacy from the narrative 
of the struggle, including the deaths of the martyrs (Rees  2004 ). It is 
not only in their name that the new armed forces see themselves as 
the mantle-bearers of the guerrilla force. Political slogans from the 
struggle are taken up by the F-FDTL and the lines between Falintil 
and F-FDTL are oft en deliberately blurred (International Crisis 
Group  2011 ). 
 Th e ‘martyrs of the fatherland’ ( m á rtires da Patria ) 7 or martyrs 
of the national liberation ( m á rtires da liberta çã o nacional ) are also 
regularly evoked in offi  cial speeches and commemorations by the 
civilian leadership. Although the Constitution explicitly mentions 
the various arms of the resistance movement (i.e. the armed strug-
gle, the clandestine civilian front and the ‘diplomatic front’ in exile), 
it is above all the members of the armed struggle – living and dead – 
who are at the centre of the narrative. Prominent living and dead 
fi gures of the armed struggle and their kin have been the fi rst to 
receive government support, while fi nancial and political recogni-
tion of members of the unarmed resistance movement or civilian 
victims has not gone much beyond lip service. 
 Th ough non-combatant deaths formed the vast majority of cas-
ualties during the independence struggle, their memorialisation 
has received less offi  cial attention than that of the members of the 
Falintil force. Of the civilian dead, the ones who receive the most 
attention in the offi  cial calendar are the more than 200 killed in the 
Santa Cruz cemetery massacre on 12 November 1991. As they were 
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mostly young members of the civilian clandestine front, the anniver-
sary of the massacre is commemorated as ‘Youth Day’ in the country 
and candles are lit not only for those killed in the massacre but for 
the confl ict dead in general. On occasion, government fi gures have 
made public appeals to the Indonesian government to make infor-
mation available on the whereabouts specifi cally of the Santa Cruz 
dead, but these calls have not been pursued very forcefully (Suara 
Timor Loro Sa’e  2010 ). Further offi  cial memorials have been built 
at the sites of other massacres, such as the church in Suai and in the 
village of Kraras (Kent  2011 ; Leach  2008 ). 
 Remembering the civilian dead has also, however, been prob-
lematic for post-independence East Timorese governments. As the 
UN and civil society organisations, among others, have repeatedly 
pointed out, the Indonesian government has not lived up to its own 
national or international obligations to persecute those allegedly 
responsible for serious crimes, war crimes and crimes against 
humanity during the occupation. In the interests of maintaining 
good neighbourly relations with Indonesia, successive Timor-Leste 
governments have not only stopped short of demanding justice but 
have at times actively undermined eff orts to bring perpetrators to 
justice. 8 Th e memory of the civilian dead implicitly raises questions 
of how and why they died, questions that are troublesome to the ‘for-
give and forget’  realpolitik of the living. 
 Demands by East Timorese and international civil society organ-
isations for a change of policy have been met with increasing irri-
tation by the government of Xanana Gusm ã o. While in offi  ce, the 
former president, Jos é Ramos-Horta, also repeatedly expressed his 
dissatisfaction that the United Nations Serious Crimes Investigation 
Team (SCIT) continued to be active in the country (author’s inter-
views, Dili 2011; Ottend ö rfer  2011 ). In spite of occasional calls, 
the Timor-Leste authorities have also not actively pressed the 
Indonesian side to be more forthcoming with information on the 
whereabouts of the remains of the missing dead and forcibly disap-
peared (author’s interviews, Dili 2010; Magalh ã es  2011 ; UN Human 
Rights Council  2011 ). 
 Ottend ö rfer (2011) points to another possible reason for a reluc-
tance to deal with the civilian dead, and that is the fear of being 
made accountable for one’s own killings. Among the most sensitive 
topics in the country are the brief 1975 civil war and killings within 
Falintil during purges, as well as other killings of East Timorese by 
the guerrilla force. While the bitter civil war was discussed publicly 
in the CAVR process, internal purges and killings have not been 
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broached (CAVR  2009 ). Internal splits in the guerrilla movement 
also led to the creation of organisations of disaff ected ex-combatants, 
such as the CPD-RDTL ( Comit é Popular pela Defesa –  Rep ú blica 
Democr á tica do Timor-Leste – Popular Committee for Defence – 
Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste) and  Sagrada Familia , to 
whom I shall return later. 9 
 Th e valorisation of the resistance struggle has  de facto meant a 
glorifi cation of the living and the dead Falintil fi ghters (especially 
those close to the current national leadership) at the expense of 
all other sections of society – the civilian resistance, those who 
remained neutral, those purged for being deemed ideologically 
unreliable, those who collaborated with the Indonesian occupation 
or supported integration, the victims of the violence and their kin as 
well as those who fl ed into exile. Th ough this preferential treatment 
of the dead Falintil over other sections of society is not spelled out 
directly, and as such would contradict the offi  cial mantra of national 
unity ( Timor Ida Deit – Th ere is only one Timor), it is occasionally 
unoffi  cially admitted (Ottend ö rfer 2011). 10 It is those who fought, 
prominently, gun in hand, for an independent Timor-Leste who are 
valorised, be they living or dead (Roll  2011 ). 
 Th e central place given to the ‘martyrs’ in the state narrative 
serves multiple purposes. As Klaus Schreiner ( 2002 : 203) notes for 
the case of Indonesia, ‘hero worship as a means of politics is rooted 
in the fi elds of historical consciousness, religious practices and polit-
ical legitimisation … Hero worship is a means to create and to main-
tain national cohesion.’ In Timor-Leste, the state narratives valorise 
the dead fi ghters and select civilian victims (especially of the 1991 
Santa Cruz massacre) but draw the line when dealing with the civil-
ian dead becomes politically inexpedient. Th e sacrifi ce of the mar-
tyrs is seen as the foundation upon which the nation was built and in 
whose memory central state institutions, above all the armed forces, 
legitimise themselves. While remembering the sacrifi ces of the past, 
however, the state narrative is a forward-looking one: the struggle is 
now over; it is time to build a unifi ed, developed state. Not all, how-
ever, agree. 
 Summoning the dead, continuing the struggle 
 ‘Be careful. It is not necessary to do anything about them, we must love 
them, it is not necessary for us to be angry with them, because oft en 
people dream of Jesus who will also return to save the world, even 
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though they do not know when Jesus will reappear. Th erefore, if in this 
group they dream that Vicente Reis will reappear, then it is because they 
only want the best for this country. Th erefore it is not necessary to be 
angry with them,’ warned [President] Ramos-Horta. 11  ( Jornal Nacional 
Seman á rio , 27 October 2007) 
 Th e interplay between the dead, their spirits and the East Timorese 
body politic is a complex one, which needs to be seen in the cultural 
context of the region. In Timor-Leste, as in many neighbouring soci-
eties, there is a strong tradition of venerating ancestral spirits, who 
can play a benevolent or malevolent role in the lives of the living. 
Th e delineation between dead and living is thus not as categorical as 
in Western thought, and the dead are seen to have a very real degree 
of agency from beyond the grave. Hierarchies also exist among the 
dead with some ancestral spirits being more powerful than others, a 
potency that the living may tap into. 
 Aside from looming large in the historical narratives of liber-
ation and the offi  cial commemoration politics, the fallen heroes 
of the resistance, both against the Portuguese colonisers and the 
Indonesian occupation, are both politically and spiritually ‘potent 
dead’, to borrow a phrase from Chambert-Loir and Reid ( 2002 ). Th e 
potent dead are ancestors, the veneration of whom confers power 
and potency to the living, either in an abstract sense (e.g. political 
legitimatisation by conjuring up the memory of the deceased) or a 
very ‘real’ sense of passing on mystical powers to the living. 
 A well-publicised example of this was the daring escape of rene-
gade Major Alfredo Reinado, leader of a group of armed mutineers, 
which also took place in 2007. When surrounded by the Australian 
Special Air Service (SAS) troops close to Same who were seeking to 
arrest him, he summoned the spirit of Dom Boaventura, leader of 
the 1912 Manufahi uprising against the Portuguese colonial power. 
With the aid of the spirit, Reinado gained invisibility and escaped 
past the SAS (Agence France-Presse  2007 ; Nygaard-Christensen 
 2011 : 220–1). Various other groups, such as the martial arts groups 
(MAGs) and ritual arts groups (RAGs) that have mushroomed in 
the country but also allegedly the  Sagrada Familia , regularly use 
ancestral worship in rituals to give them supernatural strengths and 
skills (Myrttinen  2010 ; Scambary  et al.  2006 ). 
 Th e powerful spirits of Dom Boaventura, Nicolau Lobato, Vicente 
‘Sahe’ dos Reis and other prominent, dead fi ghters of the initial years 
of the independence struggle share an aura of purity unsullied by 
what is oft en seen as the ‘dirty’ politics of the post-confl ict years. 12 
By summoning their spirits, a link can be established between the 
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struggles of today and past, seemingly purer and nobler anti-colo-
nial struggles, thus adding to the legitimacy of the contemporary 
cause. Similar dynamics can also be seen in Fontein’s ( 2006 ) narra-
tives from Zimbabwe, and in Southeast Asia as in southern Africa 
the spirits can not only legitimise (or delegitimise) what is occurring 
today; summoning the spirits and memory of the dead also brings 
the inherent obligation to remain pure and true to the cause. In all 
three cases, however, the intervention of the spirits can also be of a 
very practical nature, ensuring escape from near-death situations or 
occasionally even victory. 
 Returning to the opening scene of this chapter and the agitated 
expectation of a return of resistance heroes from the realm of the 
dead, another form of the agency of the deceased becomes visible. 
Beyond merely interacting with the present spirits of the heroes, 
there are also messianic expectations of their reappearance to save 
the nation in times of need and usher in a radical, new transform-
ation of the social order. 13 Th e question raised by the villager for 
example was made in the midst of the most severe political crisis 
of the newly independent nation. Messianic saviour fi gures are not 
uncommon in the country or in the greater Southeast Asian and 
Melanesian regions which Timor-Leste straddles (see for example 
Kammen  2009 ; Traube  2007 ). Timor-Leste’s former colonial power 
Portugal and occupying power Indonesia also have long political 
histories of messianism, with Sebastianism in the former and leg-
ends of  ratu adil in the latter. Messianic beliefs in which fi gures pre-
sumed dead or lost in the mists of time return bring with them, as 
is also the case when summoning un-dead spirits, an understanding 
of time that is radically diff erent from mainstream Western concep-
tualisations. Th e past is present in the now, not only in the form 
of vestiges and memories; rather, the boundary between a past and 
present time has been lift ed. Th e messianic moment itself not only 
ushers in a new era, but can further lift  the boundaries between past, 
present and future, marking the end of time. 
 Th e summoning of the anti-colonial hero Dom Boaventura or 
the messianic wait for a return of fallen independence fi ghters has 
potential political dimensions. Th e sub-text implicit in both is one of 
 a luta continua – that the struggle is not over, that the promised ‘real’ 
independence has not yet been achieved and that the spirits of dead 
resistance fi ghters are needed to help in the struggle, to help fulfi l 
this promise. Th e past, present and expectations of the future fl ow 
together. Th e notion of the struggle not being over was articulated 
time and again in my interviews with members of martial and ritual 
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arts groups and veterans’ organisations, and this notion was inter-
twined with deep-felt disappointment with the post-independence 
settlement from which they had not received what they felt was their 
due (Myrttinen  2011a ,  2011b ; Traube  2007 ). 14 Th ese sentiments are 
further strengthened by the silent but heavy shadow of obligation 
seemingly cast upon the living by the fallen resistance heroes and 
victims of the occupation to make their sacrifi ces worthwhile. 
 Th e feelings of frustration with the unfulfi lled promises of the 
post-confl ict settlement and of continued struggle also fl ow into the 
various disaff ected MAGs and RAGs (such as the above-mentioned 
Colimau 2000) and veterans’ organisations such as the CPD-RDTL 
and  Sagrada Familia . Th ough in part very diff erent in their respect-
ive outlooks, forms of organisation and age of membership, these 
groups all share a strong sense of disaff ection, demands for ‘real 
independence’, for recognition, and have an ambivalent relation-
ship with the political elites of the country (Myrttinen  2010 ,  2011a ; 
Scambary  et al.  2006 ; Shoesmith  2011 ). Among these groups, the 
 Sagrada Familia , however, has most focused on the dead. 
 Collecting the dead, demanding recognition 
 In our culture it is obligatory for us to honour the dead and to remain in 
contact with them. If this is not possible, it will have concrete ramifi ca-
tions on the lives of the living. In order for us to be able to live, we must 
bury our dead properly.  (Januario de Jesus of the victims’ organisation, 
12 November (quoted in Schlicher and Tschanz  2011 : 112)) 
 Th e East Timorese state, as discussed above, has an ambivalent 
attitude towards the dead – on the one hand ‘valorising’ the dead 
and celebrating the fallen independence fi ghters at Metinaro, but 
on the other refraining from pushing the former occupying power 
Indonesia to be more forthcoming with information on the remains 
of the fallen and disappeared. Th e state also has a very limited cap-
acity in terms of exhuming and identifying remains. While some 
NGOs have carried out searches and exhumations of remains 
(Schlicher and Tschanz  2011 ), it is a veterans’ organisation, the 
 Sagrada Familia , which has been the most active. 
 Th e  Sagrada Familia was founded around its charismatic leader 
Cornelio ‘L-7’ Gama (alias  Eli Foho Rai Bo’ot ) towards the end of 
the independence struggle. Following disputes between L-7 and 
the Falintil leadership in the Aileu cantonment area, the group 
split off  (Fundasaun Mahein  2011 : 7). Th e group grew in size in 
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the post-independence years, drawing especially upon those ex-
combatants who felt sidelined by the offi  cial veterans’ compen-
sation programmes. It has taken on a semi-religious character, 
mixing animism and Catholicism under the spiritual leadership 
of L-7, though it also has business interests. Th e movement is 
also partially congruent with the  Uni ã o Nacional Democr á tica de 
Resist ê ncia Timorense (UNDERTIM) party, for whom Mr Gama 
sat in the National Parliament from 2007 to 2012. Th e party 
has made veterans’ issues one of its main concerns (Shoesmith 
 2011 : 72). 
 Th e  Sagrada Familia and UNDERTIM have repeatedly called for 
more government attention to be paid to the living and dead heroes 
of the struggle (Timornewsline  2010 ). Out of a sense of frustration 
at a perceived lack of interest by the government,  Sagrada Familia 
has begun collecting the remains of fallen Falintil on its own, which 
is illegal under Timorese law. Over 400 sets of remains are now 
held in temporary storage in the eastern village of Laga, their future 
uncertain. L-7 has demanded that the government compensate him 
fi nancially for the eff orts and pay due respect to the fallen by giv-
ing them an appropriate burial in the central heroes’ cemetery in 
Metinaro, but this had allegedly been blocked. 15 Th e possibility of 
an alternate heroes’ cemetery in the eastern part of the country has 
been raised as well and the  Sagrada Familia plans on continuing 
its eff orts. A possible compromise solution is to inter the remains 
within ossuaries which the state is currently constructing in all dis-
trict capitals, thus, in a sense, leading to a public–private partner-
ship of sorts (author’s interviews, 2011–12). As a faction which split 
from the mainstream Falintil, the  Sagrada Familia has maintained 
an ambivalent stance vis- à -vis the state and its institutions, and its 
exhumation and reburial eff orts can be seen as a challenge to the 
state on numerous levels. 
 In addition to the symbolic political meaning ascribed to reburi-
als by Verdery ( 1999 ) in which the reburiers stand to benefi t directly, 
the dead themselves can also be seen as benefi ting, a benefi t that 
then also refl ects well upon the reburiers. As Klaus Schreiner ( 2002 : 
193) notes for Indonesia, ‘reburials aim at strengthening the ritual 
position of the deceased by transferring his or her remains to a site 
of higher and more appropriate dignity’. While the collecting of the 
remains of fallen comrades by  Sagrada Familia can be seen in part as 
an understandable humanitarian gesture and as part of fulfi lling cul-
tural and spiritual duties, it is thus not without its political agenda. 
On the one hand, it is an indictment of the state, which is seen as not 
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doing enough for the dead. On the other hand, it is also a concrete 
attempt to physically gain control over a key part of the narrative of 
the struggle and thereby the nation, especially if plans for an alter-
nate memorial or memorials go ahead. 
 For the veterans’ organisations such as  Sagrada Familia , a digni-
fi ed reburial of the fallen Falintil at a centralised location is also part 
of their demands for more societal recognition for their contribu-
tion to the nation. Th e issue of recognition and compensation has 
become constitutive of the identity of the various disaff ected groups 
and their members (Myrttinen  2011b ). Attempts by political par-
ties such as Fretilin or UNDERTIM to use reburials as platforms for 
highlighting their particular role in the independence struggle also 
go in this direction. What would require more research, though, is in 
how far groups such as  Sagrada Familia seek to harness the spiritual 
power of the dead in addition to seeking control over the narrative 
of the dead. 
 Other disaff ected organisations such as the CPD-RDTL or RAGs 
have been less extravagant in their claims on the dead but demand 
that the government both press Indonesia for more information 
on the missing dead and pay suitable respect to the dead comrades 
(author’s interviews, Dili 2010). Th e issue of collecting the remains 
of the dead has also been politicised in the sphere of party polit-
ics. Presidential candidate Taur Matan Ruak took up the topic as 
part of his 2012 electoral campaign (TVTL  2011 ), while the oppos-
ition Fretilin party has sought to link reburials of the remains of 
those who died in combat to its role in the independence movement 
( Diario Nacional  2011b ). 
 While the various groups – be they MAGs, RAGs, veterans’ 
organisations or political parties – present a challenge to the state 
narrative and the manner in which the dead are memorialised, it 
is important to note that none of the groups challenge the legit-
imacy of the notion of the state or the national narrative  per se . It 
is rather that they challenge their current forms, which they see as 
insuffi  cient. 
 Th e attention given to the fallen Falintil is, in a sense, a replica-
tion in the realm of the dead of what is happening among the living. 
In both cases, powerful veterans’ organisations dominate the debate, 
be it over the reburial of remains or over compensations to the liv-
ing. Seeing their contribution to the struggle as legitimising their 
claims, these organisations have been successful at prioritising the 
remains of the fallen Falintil over those of civilian victims and the 
demands of veterans over those of survivors of violence. 
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 Discussion 
 It is a Mambai [ethnolinguistic group in central Timor-Leste] common-
place that the nation was won through suff ering and sacrifi ce; it was ‘pur-
chased’, the saying goes, ‘not with silver or gold, but with the blood of the 
people’ ( ba los nor os-butin nor os-meran fe al, mas nor povu ni laran ). 
 (Traube  2007 : 10) 
 Th e offi  cial narrative of Timor-Leste, as enshrined in the Constitution, 
reifi es the role of the independence struggle as being constitutive of 
the nation. Although the narrative makes note of the contributions 
of the civilian clandestine front, the so-called ‘diplomatic front’ and 
the Catholic Church, in practice it has been the fi ghting men – and 
to a far lesser degree, women – who have been most valorised. 16 Th e 
sacrifi ces of the martyrs, which the offi  cial narratives exhort the 
people to remember, legitimise the state, its independence and its 
institutions. Th e narrative of joint national sacrifi ce and ultimate 
victory in gaining independence are meant to create and preserve 
national unity –  Timor Ida Deit . 
 Th is offi  cial narrative of the struggle and the nation, manifested 
in monuments, pension payments, memorial days and speeches, is, 
however, not uncontested. In fact, ironically, the supposedly unity-
building narrative leads to increased disunity. Many of the young 
state’s citizens and well-organised pressure groups consider the 
struggle as not being over and ‘real’ independence as not having 
been achieved. As outlined above, these narratives of the continued 
struggle can fi nd an outlet in messianic expectations of the return-
ing (un)dead. Th e potency of the heroic dead can also be harnessed 
directly for the continuing struggle against current political elites 
and foreign interference, as was the case for Major Alfredo Reinado 
when he summoned the spirit of Dom Boaventura, and is the case 
on a smaller but more quotidian scale with the MAGs and RAGs. 
 Th e end of the struggle and the ‘realness’ of independence is 
questioned not only through the dead, however, but also through the 
state’s politics of recognition. As I have argued elsewhere (Myrttinen 
 2011b ), for the disaff ected groups, and for example Traube ( 2007 ), 
who has argued for the community she researched in central Timor-
Leste, the national narrative that the blood, sacrifi ce and deaths 
redeemed the nation is not questioned. Rather, what the various 
groups demand is recognition and compensation for their par-
ticular role in the struggle. Sacrifi ces were made, and now dues are 
demanded. For the dead, this has on the one hand meant calls for 
the compensation of their descendants and on the other the proper 
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reburial of the remains. As discussed above, the reburial serves both 
a political and spiritual function. Politically, it bestows the reburied 
dignity and recognition, while spiritually the proper reburial of the 
body places the restless spirit at ease, lest they cause mayhem in the 
lives of the living. For now, however, the spirits and remains of the 
dead continue to be restless, playing their part in numerous ways in 
the ongoing debates over defi ning the nation. 
 Notes 
 1  I am heavily indebted to Victoria Kumala Sakti of the Languages of 
Emotion cluster, Free University Berlin, for her invaluable insights and 
comments without which this chapter would not have been possible. Th e 
chapter is based on the author’s fi eldwork and interviews conducted dur-
ing numerous visits to in Timor-Leste between 1999 and 2012. 
 2  ‘Th e situation’ ( situasaun ) was a common euphemism for the political 
and military crisis that gripped Timor-Leste from April/May 2006 until 
April 2008. 
 3  It should be noted here that the semantic categories of ‘alive’ and ‘dead’ 
are not as strictly delineated in the Timor-Leste context as in the Western 
context. 
 4  While Timor-Leste is predominantly Catholic, local Catholicism is heav-
ily imbued with animist traditions and ancestral worship. 
 5  Th ese eff orts have included the work CAVR and the joint Indonesian–
East Timorese Commission of Truth and Friendship, an Indonesian ‘ ad 
hoc ’ tribunal, investigations by the UN Serious Crimes Unit, individual 
court cases against perpetrators of serious crimes during the occupation 
as well as local-level reconciliation proceedings (see for example Harris-
Rimmer  2010 ; Kent  2011 ). With the exception of local-level proceedings 
and, to an extent, the work of the CAVR, the procedures remained very 
much within the limits of Western-style formal justice with little room 
for local belief systems. 
 6  In interviews, some veterans would contrast East Timorese independence 
and nationhood with that of other neighbouring nations, for example in 
the South Pacifi c, who, as they disdainfully put it, ‘were handed inde-
pendence on a gold plate’, i.e. were decolonised in a peaceful manner. Th e 
fact that Timor-Leste had fought and suff ered for its independence thus 
made it ‘worthier’ in a sense. 
 7  Th is is also the name of one of the main avenues in Dili. 
 8  Th e most blatant case of this was the arrest of Maternus Bere in 2009, 
suspected of having played a key role in the Suai massacre ten years previ-
ously. Mr Bere was arrested by East Timorese and UN police in Suai aft er 
crossing from Indonesian West Timor on family business. Aft er being 
transferred to prison in Dili, President Ramos-Horta and Prime Minister 
Xanana Gusm ã o intervened, allegedly at the behest of the Indonesian 
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foreign minister. Mr Bere was then transferred to the Indonesian 
embassy, which got him out of the country. 
 9  A leading member of  Sagrada Familia , whom I interviewed in Dili in 
August 2012, called the prospect of raising questions over civilian deaths 
caused by the resistance ‘dangerous … very dangerous’ for society. 
 10  Th e slogan, which came into use aft er the outbreak of the severe political 
and military crisis of 2006, relates only to Timor-Leste, however. Th ere 
are no aspirations on either side of the border to unify Timor-Leste and 
Indonesian West Timor. 
 11  Author’s translation. 
 12  Although the offi  cial narrative of the independence struggle tends to 
stress this ‘purity’, the reality was more complex, with bitter internal 
feuding in which Nicolau Lobato was also centrally involved. See 
Walsh  2012 . 
 13  Th e cult of personality surrounding Major Alfredo Reinado during 
the crisis years also took on messianic dimensions. He was, somewhat 
paradoxically, expected to save the nation from the crisis that he had 
done much to bring about in the fi rst place (Myrttinen  2008 ; Nygaard-
Christensen  2011 ). 
 14  Th e notion that the struggle is not over was apparent also in the threat by 
CPD-RDTL and  Sagrada Familia to take action against a demobilisation 
ceremony for F-FDTL and Falintil members in August 2011 (although 
the Falintil had actually been demobilised a decade earlier). As Cornelio 
‘L-7’ Gama of the  Sagrada Familia stated: ‘We [are] totally against this 
demobilisation program, because it is not the time to demobilise veter-
ans or FALINTIL’ ( Diario Nacional  2011a ). 
 15  Given the widespread importance of maintaining contact with ancestral 
spirits in Timor-Leste society through grave sites, it remains far from 
clear whether family and kin members are as enthusiastic as the state or 
 Sagrada Familia about having the remains of loved ones transferred to 
centralised resting places, which tend to be far beyond the geographical 
horizon of most Timor-Leste citizens, especially in rural areas. 
 16  While the predominance of male narratives in Timor-Leste seemingly 
confi rms Cynthia Enloe’s ( 2000 : 44) observation that ‘nationalism typ-
ically has sprung from masculinised memory, masculinised humiliation 
and masculinised hope’, it should not be forgotten that East Timorese 
women’s organisations have very consciously and with partial success 
brought women’s narratives into the public debate (Cristalis and Scott 
 2005 ; Harris-Rimmer  2010 ). 
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 Remaking the dead, uncertainty and 
the torque of human materials in 
northern Zimbabwe 
 Joost  Fontein 
 Introduction 
 In Zimbabwe the politics of heritage, memory and commemoration 
has been the subject of considerable academic and public debate for 
a long time. In March 2011, however, this took a decidedly macabre 
twist when reports, accompanied with graphic photographs and 
video footage, emerged of massive war veteran-led exhumations tak-
ing place at the disused Monkey William mine at Bembera Village 
in Chibondo in Mount Darwin (northern Zimbabwe), where the 
remains of hundreds, if not thousands of people apparently killed by 
the Smith regime during the liberation war of the 1970s, had been 
(re)‘discovered’. Th ese events attracted enormous media attention 
and an unprecedented furore of angry responses from diff erent pol-
itical parties, civil society organisations, human rights groups and 
public commentators within Zimbabwe. Th e criticisms that these 
grisly exhumations provoked off er key insight into the topography 
of Zimbabwe’s complex ‘politics of the dead’, and the diffi  cult ques-
tions that can arise about who has sovereignty over human remains. 
But apart from the grotesque displays of human remains involved, 
and the crude politicking taking place around them by the war vet-
eran group, the Fallen Heroes Trust (FHT), which is closely linked 
to the ruling party, ZANU-PF (Zimbabwe African National Union – 
Patriotic Front), and which used the exhumations to reinforce its 
anti-colonialist rhetoric of ‘patriotic history’ (Ranger  2004 ; Tendi 
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 2010 ), perhaps the most striking aspect of these events was the way 
in which the forms and qualities of the human materials themselves 
animated the heated debates that ensued. 
 Many objections stressed the ‘unscientifi c’, ‘chaotic’ and ‘destruc-
tive’ nature of the exhumations. Th ey were decidedly ‘unforensic’, 
and led by war veterans and spirit mediums who stressed ‘African’ 
ways of dealing with the dead, as they paraded villagers, report-
ers and TV crews through the mine, and past tangled piles of 
indistinct human remains materials laid out on plastic sheets, to 
illustrate the horrors infl icted by Rhodesians. But the nature of the 
materials themselves caused many to question the true identity of 
the people whose remains were re-emerging from the abandoned 
mine. Did they really date from the late 1970s? If so, why were some 
of the remains still apparently fl eshy, leaky and stinking? Might they 
include more recent human remains – from the  gukurahundi massa-
cres of the 1980s; or ZANLA (Zimbabwe National Liberation Army) 
purges of ZIPRA (Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army) com-
rades around independence; or from more recent political violence 
against MDC (Movement for Democratic Change) supporters since 
1999; 1 or even the missing bodies of military purges at the Chiadzwa 
diamond fi elds in 2008/9? 
 In this chapter I explore how these questions about the identity 
of the dead, the manner of their deaths and who has sovereignty 
over them – i.e. by whom and how they should be exhumed and 
reburied – were provoked by the excessive potentialities of the prop-
erties of the human substances being exhumed; by their profoundly 
evocative and aff ective, yet unstable, uncertain and ultimately inde-
terminate materialities. It focuses on how the mass of stinking, inter-
mingling, leaky, half-decaying bodies and bodily substances being 
disinterred and separated – being remade imperfectly and con-
tingently into particular kinds of ‘political bodies/subjects’ – both 
demand and enable, and yet ultimately defy the very reconstitution 
of the dead and past lives, and the complex politics of commemor-
ation in which they are entangled. 
 It is likely that some in ZANU-PF saw the political usefulness 
of the uncertainties provoked by the excessive potentiality of the 
human materials being exhumed from the Mount Darwin mines. 
Th ey could both celebrate their ‘liberation heroes’ and reinforce the 
anti-colonialist rhetoric through which they have very eff ectively 
polarised Zimbabwean politics and marginalised opposition polit-
ical parties, NGOs and human rights organisations in the last dec-
ade and, at the same time, demonstrate and remind Zimbabweans of 
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their own capacities for violence. In this way the exhumations can 
be understood as part and parcel of ZANU-PF’s performative sty-
listics of power. Yet ultimately the uncontained uncertainties about 
the identities of the dead, and the manner of their deaths, in part 
provoked by the indeterminate nature of the human materials, were 
unsustainable. By August 2011 the exhumations had been stopped, 
the mines sealed and exhumed remains reburied at the site, and the 
issue largely disappeared from the new agenda, as the government 
became increasingly concerned that the matter had got ‘out of hand’, 
and sought to physically and discursively contain the issue and any 
political ramifi cations that may ensue. 
 If the huge resurgence of scholarly interest in the politics of death 
and ‘the dead’ over the last decade, in Africa (Lee and Vaughan 
 2008 ) and elsewhere (Verdery  1999 ), has increasingly recognised 
that beyond both biopolitics and necropolitics (Mbembe  2003 ) the 
transforming materialities of bodies and lives matter (see Jindra and 
Noret  2011 ; Krmpotich, Fontein and Harries  2010 ; Posel and Gupta 
 2009 ), then the Mount Darwin exhumations and the responses they 
provoked illustrate how human remains can exemplify the exces-
sive potentialities of stuff  – what Chris Pinney has called ‘the torque 
of materiality’ – and how the ‘alterity of an enfl eshed world’ defi es 
any easy reading and therefore makes possible the very politics of 
uncertainty and (un)becoming in which they are entwined (Pinney 
 2005 : 270). 
 Context: the politics of the dead in Zimbabwe 
 As the complex entanglement of the politics of the past, and of 
the dead, with that of its material remains, performative prac-
tices and monumentalised forms (funerals, state commemoration, 
monuments, ruins, artefacts, graves, bodies, bones and so on) have 
received renewed scholarly attention in recent years, the signifi -
cance of human corporeality, or ‘carnal fetishism’ as Bernault ( 2010 ) 
calls it, has increasingly come into focus (Jindra and Noret  2011 ; 
Krmpotich, Fontein and Harries  2010 ; Lee and Vaughan  2008 ; 
Mbembe  2003 ; Posel and Gupta  2009 ). In Zimbabwe, where the pol-
itics of heritage, memory and commemoration has been the subject 
of much academic and public debate for some time, this emergent 
conjunction of meaning and matter has followed a broadly simi-
lar trajectory. Aft er independence in 1980, the historiography and 
commemoration of the liberation struggle became the subject of 
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profound (and continuing) contestation. Since 2000, this politicisa-
tion of the historiography of the liberation struggle has intensifi ed 
through the emergence of what Ranger ( 2004 ) has called ‘patriotic 
history’. ZANU-PF has increasingly arrogated exclusively to itself 
the liberation credentials and ‘languages of suff ering’ through which 
it has polarised political debates, and eff ectively marginalised the 
various factions of the opposition MDC, with which it was forced to 
share power in Zimbabwe’s hugely problematic ‘unity government’ 
from 2009, until its recent ‘landslide’ win in the elections of July 2013 
enabled it to once again become the sole ruling party. 
 While this ‘patriotic history’ has manifest itself in many guises, 
a central dynamic has circulated around what Muchemwa calls 
ZANU-PF’s ‘necropolitan imagination’ and ‘an aesthetics of hero-
ism’ ( 2010 ). Th is is apparent both through the ever heightening con-
testations surrounding the highly partisan ZANU-PF-dominated 
selection of National Heroes (Fontein  2009a ; Kriger  1995 ; Werbner 
 1998 ), but also by a host of new state-driven oral history and heri-
tage projects focusing on the legacy of the struggle; in particular 
the enthusiastic adoption of the SADC-wide, UNESCO-sponsored 
‘liberation heritage’ project by National Museums and Monuments 
of Zimbabwe (NMMZ), through which this parastatal has become 
increasingly involved in state commemoration and has carried out 
excavations, exhumations and reburials at former guerrilla camps in 
Mozambique, Zambia and other former frontline states. 
 Elsewhere (Fontein  2009a ) I have argued that this ‘liberation heri-
tage’ project not only matched ZANU-PF’s rhetoric of ‘patriotic his-
tory’ with NMMZ’s need for state funding. It was also a response to 
long-standing demands from the war veterans, spirit mediums and 
relatives of the war dead, and even the unsettled, troubling spirits 
of the dead themselves, for the return of human remains buried in 
anonymous, shallow and sometimes mass graves across Zimbabwe’s 
rural areas, and in former guerrilla camps in neighbouring coun-
tries. Indeed in the last decade there has been a proliferation of such 
demands, refl ecting both the changing salience of human corporeal-
ity across the region and beyond, and a complexity of diverse local 
interests and agendas that do not always perfectly match the political 
imperatives and rhetoric of ‘patriotic history’ espoused by ZANU-
PF’s ideologues; from war veterans and families haunted by the 
unsettled spirits of their dead, to spirit mediums concerned about 
the failure of the rains, ancestral anger and the state of the nation 
as a whole, to land settlers seeking to re-establish ‘autochthony’ on 
resettled ancestral lands (Fontein  2011 ). 
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 In many cases exhumations have already been taking place, oft en 
without offi  cial permission, or beyond the supervision of trained 
archaeologists from NMMZ or forensic scientists. In January 2008, 
for example, long before the dramatic events at Chibondo exploded 
into the public arena in March 2011, the FHT and a related war 
veteran-led group  Taurai Zvehondo [lit. ‘Talk about the war’] were 
already involved in identifying mass graves in Mount Darwin, and 
were ‘awaiting assistance from the Government which should lead 
the exhumation process’. 2 Th ere are also many cases of unidentifi ed 
human remains resurfacing from  unknown graves and abandoned 
mineshaft s dating back to the 1970s. Numerous newspaper reports 
over recent years attest to this fairly common occurrence, which 
long predates the recent (re)discovery of the human remains in the 
mineshaft s at Chibondo. 3 In a sense, such activities and discoveries 
have obliged government institutions to act, and in this context 
NMMZ’s adoption of its ‘liberation heritage’ portfolio in the late 
1990s can, in part, be understood as a response to the demands of 
relatives and living comrades, and even the resurfacing bones and 
unsettled spirits themselves (Fontein  2009a ). Certainly NMMZ’s 
‘liberation heritage’ activities have oft en appeared reactive to events 
already taking place, as indeed was the case with the Chibondo 
exhumations that I discuss below. 
 Th e issue of the return of the war dead has animated highly politi-
cised debates about state commemoration in Zimbabwe since inde-
pendence (Daneel  1995 ; Kriger  1995 ; Werbner  1998 ). Although some 
limited offi  cial reburials were carried out in the 1980s and 1990s (see 
Daneel  1995 ; Kriger  1995 ), demands for such events intensifi ed as 
Zimbabwe’s political and economic situation worsened dramatically 
aft er the end of the 1990s. In 2001 Ambuya VaZarira, an infl uential 
spirit medium in Masvingo district, explained how war veterans fre-
quently ‘come to me here, telling me that … their fellow comrades who 
died in Mozambique are continuously giving them problems, harass-
ing them, saying that they should be collected from Mozambique … 
so the  masvikiro [spirit mediums] … agreed that we … will see how 
they can collect these dead from Mozambique’. 4 Th ese comments 
echoed common concerns shared by many war veterans and families 
haunted by the spirits of the unsettled war dead, yearning to return to 
the soil of their ancestors to become ancestors themselves, so that they 
in turn can look aft er their living descendants. 
 Such concerns refl ect the importance of ‘bringing home’ rit-
uals, held a year or more aft er death and a funeral, to return the 
spirits of the deceased home from a liminal period in ‘the bush’ to 
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become benevolent ancestors –  kugadzira in Shona or  umbuyiso in 
siNdebele – which is well known across Zimbabwe. Failure to per-
form these rites leaves the deceased unsettled and incomplete in 
their transformation into ancestors. Where the location of graves 
is unknown or where proper funeral rites have not taken place the 
deceased can become dangerous and frightening spirits known as 
 ngozi [Shona and Ndebele], who haunt the people responsible for 
their deaths, but also their living relatives and friends (Bourdillon 
 1987 : 233–5; Werbner  1991 : 151–6, 188–90). Th ese unhappy spirits 
also haunt the ‘nation’ as a whole, as indeed spirit mediums told war 
veteran leader Andrew Ndlovu in 2001. 5 Spirit mediums oft en com-
plain that droughts, economic crises, and even the AIDS pandemic, 
are all the result of these unhappy spirits demanding to be returned 
home. Th eir troubling presence equally intertwines with the politics 
of regionalism, ‘traditional authority’ and factional disputes between 
rival war veteran groups. 
 However, Zimbabwe’s social and political milieu is also haunted 
by the victims of  postcolonial violence. Th is primarily takes two 
forms. Firstly, and most recently, the escalating political violence 
by ZANU-PF against opposition MDC supporters and civil soci-
ety activists since 2000, and particularly during the 2008 elections 
(see for example Masunungure  2009 ; Solidarity Peace Trust  2008a ), 
has manifested its own ‘politics of the dead’ in the form of tortured, 
dismembered bodies, disappearances, disrupted funerals, avenging 
spirits and alternative MDC registers of ‘heroes’, which I have dis-
cussed in greater detail elsewhere ( 2010 ). Secondly, perhaps even 
more contentious than the tortured bodies of political violence in 
the last decade, there have been the unsettled spirits and resur-
facing bones of the  gukurahundi massacres in Matabeleland and 
the Midlands in the 1980s, when an estimated 20,000 civilians were 
killed by the notorious fi ft h brigade during a reign of terror directed 
by the ruling ZANU-PF against its minority rival ZAPU, under the 
guise of rooting out ZAPU ‘dissidents’ (Alexander  et al.  2000 ; Eppel 
 2001 ,  2004 ,  2009 ; Ranger  1999 ; Werbner  1991 ). Th is lasted from 
1982 until 1987, when ZAPU was ‘swallowed’ into the unity pact 
with ZANU-PF, and remains a massive scar on Zimbabwe’s post-
colonial milieu and a hugely sensitive topic. Community eff orts to 
commemorate, rehabilitate, exhume and rebury  gukurahundi vic-
tims in order to resolve deep legacies of violence among the living 
and the dead were long obstructed by ZANU-PF. 
 Th e profound and deepening salience of the unresolved leg-
acies of the  gukurahundi terror are refl ected by the rapidly growing 
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number of calls in recent years for the issue to be addressed. Yet the 
legacies of the  gukurahundi continue to fester, perhaps more so than 
ever. 6 Although some  gukurahundi sites are known, many families 
and communities in Matabeleland continue to complain that their 
lives are deeply impaired and haunted by the unsettled spirits of the 
 gukurahundi dead and the unresolved violence of the 1980s (Eppel 
 2001 ; Werbner  1991 ), and, as with the mass graves of the liberation 
struggle,  gukurahundi bones and graves are still being discovered. 7 
 Clearly then, the politics of the dead in Zimbabwe long predates 
the grisly events at Chibondo that burst into the public arena in 
March 2011. It is deeply animated both by the bones of past mas-
sacres resurfacing from shallow mass graves around the country and 
across international borders, and by the tortured bodies of recent pol-
itical violence. Moreover this politics of the dead is deeply animated 
by the spirits of the dead themselves, as deeply frightening  ngozi 
spirits, whose presence is intimately intertwined with the ‘aff ective 
presence’ and ‘emotive materiality’ of bones, bodies and human sub-
stances (Fontein  2010 ). Th ese are linked through the simultaneously 
symbolic and material processes whereby people, living and dead, 
are properly constituted, and the proper ritual and material proc-
esses through which people are made safely dead. In this respect the 
resurfacing bones of people killed in the war or during the 1980s, the 
leaky, tortured bodies and disrupted funerals of people killed much 
more recently and the frightening presence of the unsettled dead as 
 ngozi spirits, all reveal the transgression of normal and normalising 
processes whereby people (living and dead) are constituted, and the 
living transformed into benevolent ancestors, and sometimes aven-
ging spirits. And it is in this context that exhumations and reburials 
are oft en understood, across very diff erent registers of meaning and 
practice (e.g. Crossland  2009 ; Eppel  2001 ; Renshaw  2010 ), as forms 
of healing or commemoration – a way to make people safely dead, or 
in other words, to ‘feed’ (Rowlands  1999 : 144), ‘atone for’ or ‘fi nish 
the work of ’ the dead (Kuchler  1999 : 55). 
 Yet even where there is general agreement about the socially 
cathartic potential of exhumations, these are processes that can be 
unusually problematic (see Renshaw  2010 ) and enormously con-
tested, as was illustrated by the Chibondo events, which I turn to 
below. Th is is particularly the case where the identity of the dead and 
the manner of their deaths are uncertain. In the exhumations of mass 
graves at Chimoio, Nyadzonia, Freedom camp and other former 
guerrilla camps in Zambia and Mozambique, the political identity of 
the dead and the manner of their deaths were hardly in dispute, even 
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if old and new rivalries and tensions inevitably sometimes emerged 
between diff erent actors involved. Th e Chibondo exhumations were 
very diff erent in this respect. Th ere the ambivalent materialities of 
the human remains being disinterred, and shown widely in televi-
sion and newspaper reports, provoked profound uncertainties and 
controversy about the identity of the dead and the manner of their 
deaths, and this meant that tensions between diff erent ways of recon-
stituting the past and remaking the dead came to fore. 
 The Chibondo exhumations 
 Almost as soon as the discovery and exhumations of human remains 
at Chibondo were announced in March 2011, they became mired 
in controversies that refl ected the politics of the dead I have been 
describing. Like state commemoration in the 1980s and 1990s, ini-
tial concerns circulated around the highly politicised and partisan 
nature of the exhumations. Th e enormous attention the exhumations 
received from the state-controlled, ZANU-PF-aligned print and 
broadcast media fed claims that this was an exercise in ZANU-PF 
propaganda, in the face of waning popularity, worsening internal 
factionalism and possible forthcoming elections. 8 As ZANU-PF 
politicians publicly visited the site, many such criticisms focused on 
the deeply disturbing images and video clips of disassembled, decay-
ing bodies, bones and undefi ned human remains being crudely dis-
interred and chaotically laid out on plastic sheets, broadcast several 
times a day, like ZANU-PF election jingles, on televisions across the 
country. 
 Yet even as such critiques of ZANU-PF’s ‘gross politicisation’ of 
the exhumations were appearing in independent newspapers and 
websites, the ZANU-PF-aligned media was describing in detail, and 
extolling the virtues of, the war veteran- and spirit medium-led tours 
being conducted at the site for people, including school children, 
bussed to Chibondo from all over the country. Claims were made 
in April that they were receiving ‘between 1,500 and 3,000 visitors a 
day’, 9 and recent fi eldwork in Masvingo suggests that ZANU-PF offi  -
cials across Zimbabwe’s diff erent regions were mobilising high- profi le 
visits to Chibondo for local chiefs, war veterans, spirit mediums and 
other ‘traditional’ rural leaders. It is also clear that such visits were 
carefully choreographed, and that ‘the war veterans … wanted jour-
nalists to interview people they had selected themselves so that they 
wouldn’t “give out the wrong information”’. 10 Journalists visiting the 
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site reported that ‘Zanu PF slogans and songs were the order of the 
day’ and that ‘school children, teachers and villagers were forced to 
go underground and view the bodies so that they would appreciate 
the extent of the brutalities of the Rhodesian Army’. 
 Many commentators recognised that the politicisation of these 
human remains by ZANU-PF fi tted a long-established pattern of 
using a narrow and exclusivist legacy of the liberation struggle to 
buttress its own legitimacy. Th is includes undermining that of oppos-
ition parties, including ‘old’ (and ‘new’) ZAPU, the fractious factions 
of the MDC with whom it was then sharing a ‘unity government’, 
and, more recently, a host of emergent Ndebele pressure groups such 
as the Mwthazi Liberation Front (MLF), a radical group agitating 
for secession for Matabeleland. It is not surprising therefore that the 
crude politicking at Chibondo provoked the anger of those linked to 
ZAPU and ZIPRA, who have long felt that their contributions to the 
liberation of Zimbabwe have been deliberately ignored. 
 Th e spectacle of the Chibondo exhumations also quickly pro-
voked wider sensibilities about the unresolved legacies of the 
 gukurahundi , and very soon ZAPU and other Matabeleland-based 
pressure groups were calling for other mass graves from the  guku-
rahundi period to be similarly excavated and their human remains 
exhumed and ‘given a decent burial’. 
 Apart from the still unresolved  gukurahundi legacies, the 
Chibondo exhumations also raised questions about the fate of much 
more recent victims of postcolonial violence. Th e political commen-
tator John Makumbe asked, rhetorically, ‘when will the group that 
is doing this work visit Domboshava to exhume the bodies of sev-
eral soldiers that that were “buried” there by night only a few years 
ago?’. 11 Similarly in a press statement on 24 March, the largest MDC 
party (MDC T) stated that: 
 Th e MDC … welcomes the exhumation, identifi cation and proper docu-
mentation of any Zimbabwean whose fate was determined by the lib-
eration struggle – a national project in which we all took part. For the 
exercise that is above party and sectional selfi shness, a national budget 
administered by the relevant state institutions, led by the Ministry of 
Home Aff airs, is imperative to cover the necessary costs of tracking down 
the genealogy and family trees of the victims through forensic science, 
carbon dating and indisputable DNA sampling. Such a process would 
reveal death details and murder methods. Zimbabweans have endured 
violence since colonialism and yearn for the day when the truth about the 
liberation war, Gukurahundi, Operation Murambatsvina, the 2008 atro-
cities –among others – is brought onto the surface for informed debate 
and refl ection. Without such a concerted, nationally sensitive process, 
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national healing and reconciliation shall be impossible. Th e MDC calls 
on ZANU PF to stop what it is doing and leave it to the nation to work 
out an appropriate way forward, beyond amateur propaganda antics and 
political carelessness. 12 
 Th is statement illustrates how quickly concerns were raised about 
the  manner of the exhumations themselves. Th ese kinds of critiques 
focused on the crude, unsophisticated way in which the exhuma-
tions appeared to be handled, and the absence of any trained ‘archae-
ologists, pathologists or other specialists’ supervising the events. 13 
Th e widely circulated images of war veteran exhumers in overalls 
and gum boots pilling up unsorted human remains on plastic sheets 
caused huge consternation about the lack of forensic expertise at 
the site. 
 In their defence FHT emphasised their use of spirit mediums 
and diviners to enable them to identify the dead and return their 
remains to their families. For them this was not a new practice. 14 
Given the long salience of the haunting, unsettled dead that I have 
discussed, it is not surprising that FHT spokesmen placed a great 
deal of emphasis upon the resolution of suff ering for communities 
and families and especially the dead themselves, which their exhu-
mations at Chibondo off ered. Offi  cial reports emphasised the evi-
dence of Rhodesian atrocities that was being unearthed with the 
human remains, including accounts of people being buried alive, the 
use of acid to destroy corpses and live grenades being found amidst 
the mangled human materials. 15 Such accounts linked evidence of 
Rhodesian atrocities being revealed to the resolution off ered by 
‘traditional’ ‘African’ approaches to the identifi cation of the dead 
that were being applied, which some argued meant that forensic 
approaches would not be necessary. Saviour Kasukuwere, ZANU-PF 
‘minister for black empowerment’, stated ‘Forensic tests and DNA 
analysis of the remains won’t be carried out … Instead, traditional 
African religious fi gures will perform rites to invoke spirits that will 
identify the dead.’ ‘Spirits of the dead had long “possessed” villagers 
and children in the district’, he added; they have ‘refused to lie still. 
Th ey want the world to see what Smith did to our people. Th ese 
spirits will show the way it’s to be done.’ 16 
 Nevertheless, the crude and decidedly unforensic nature of the exhu-
mations did raise wider disquiet about ‘disrespecting the dead’. Such 
concerns fed into a high court application made in Bulawayo at the 
beginning of April 2011 by lawyers acting for ZIPRA veterans to ‘stop 
the government from going ahead with its controversial programme of 
exhuming mass graves’. 17 Th e high court order was successful and by 
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7 April Justice Nicholas Mathonsi had ‘granted an interdict sought by 
the Zimbabwe People’s Liberation Army (ZIPRA) war heroes who are 
demanding that any exhumations in Mt Darwin … should be carried 
out in a government-led “legal process”’. 18 
 Despite the claims of people involved with the FHT exhumations, 
about there being no need for forensic expertise, it seems that others 
in ZANU-PF and government did quickly recognise the need to legit-
imise the exhumations by bringing in professional archaeologists from 
NMMZ. If early on NMMZ had denied any involvement, on 27 March 
(before the high court’s decision), ZANU-PF’s co-minister of home 
aff airs, Kembo Mohadi, announced that ‘the government was taking 
over the exhumations from the Fallen Heroes Trust’. 19 Media politick-
ing around the site continued however, but by May it was clear that 
no new exhumations were taking place at Chibondo, and as security 
around the site was increased, eff orts were now focused on what to do 
with the 848 sets of remains that had already been disinterred. 
 By this stage NMMZ was already involved in eff orts to rebury 
the remains in a new, memorialised grave at the site. On 13 August 
 Th e Herald reported that the ‘reburial of over 700 former liberation 
fi ghters that were buried at the disused mine shaft s at Chibondo’ had 
begun. Minister Kasukuwere said he hoped the area ‘would become 
a national shrine’ and that ‘the process should remind Zimbabweans 
of the cruelty of the Ian Smith regime’, and noted, ‘over 24,000 people 
[had] visited the site since the exhumations started’. 20 
 In many ways, then, the highly visible but crudely performed 
politics of the dead taking place at Chibondo mirrored and exacer-
bated the long-existing tensions of commemoration in Zimbabwe: 
the narrow celebration of ZANU-PF heroes, the marginalisation of 
other nationalist contributions, and the belated eff orts to legitimise 
the operations through NMMZ’s liberation heritage portfolio, as well 
as of course ZANU-PF’s continuing reticence about confronting its 
terrible  gukurahundi legacy, or dealing with the dead of other peri-
ods of postcolonial violence in which it is implicated. Importantly, 
however, these kinds of criticisms did not really question the need 
for the exhumations  per se , nor initially the identity of the remains 
being exhumed. But this would change. 
 Too ‘fresh’, ‘intact’, fl eshy, leaky and stinky? 
 As ZANU-PF’s publicity machine went into overdrive, using the 
exhumations to infl ate its anti-colonialist rhetoric, controversies 
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surrounding the events quickly took on a much more sensitive dimen-
sion, which turned on the nature of the human materials themselves. 
Amid the proliferation of TV and press coverage, serious questions 
were raised about the true age and identity of the remains, and the 
cause of their deaths. Many reports suggested that the distorted bod-
ies and disassembled remains, being chaotically disinterred, laid out 
on plastic and broadcast on television, were simply too ‘intact’, leaky, 
fl eshy and too smelly to date back over thirty years to the liberation 
struggle.  Th e Standard reported that suspicions were ‘aroused’ aft er 
‘journalists … were shocked to see bodies that were still intact’. ‘One 
of the bodies still had visible hair, while others had their clothes 
intact’, the report continued, and another ‘had fl uids dripping from 
it’, and a ‘strong stench still permeates the 15-metre-deep mine 
shaft ’. 21 An unidentifi ed pathologist claimed that ‘there was no way 
there could still be a stench … three decades aft er the bodies were 
allegedly dumped … ordinarily by this time there should only be 
bone-remains’, and numerous other news reports too carried articles 
citing pathologists claiming that the visual evidence of the Chibondo 
remains suggested they included ‘fresh bodies’. 22 
 It was not just the human remains that provoked this profound 
uncertainty but also the objects and artefacts associated with them: 
particularly the clothes, shoes and uniforms that were found entan-
gled with the remains. Even Ambuya VaZarira and her son Peter 
Manyuki (who were bussed there from Masvingo by ZANU-PF 
offi  cials) were shocked that ‘some of these bodies were still wear-
ing their clothes’. ‘Is it possible that bodies would still be wearing 
clothes aft er 30 years?’, Peter asked me rhetorically (Fieldnotes, 13 
December 2011). Some reports even suggested that cell phones, coins 
and (recent) plastic ID cards had been found among the remains, 
and in Bulawayo I heard rumours that Mafela Trust offi  cials visit-
ing the mine found Zimbabwe National Army ID tags among the 
remains (Fieldnotes, 6 December 2011). Of course the FHT dis-
missed as ‘mischievous’ and ‘sad indeed’ such claims that the bodies 
were ‘too fresh’ to date to the liberation struggle. 23 But interestingly 
they too pointed to the clothes, uniforms and other artefacts found 
in the mine to support their argument that these were victims of 
Rhodesian atrocities. In particular, a great emphasis was placed on 
the ‘Super-pro’ canvas shoes found among the remains, which were 
very commonly worn by guerrilla fi ghters during the struggle. For 
people on both sides of the controversies that the exhumations pro-
voked, the artefacts around them seemed sometimes to off er more 
stability of meaning than the remains themselves. 
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 For her part, Shari Eppel of the Solidarity Peace Trust was very 
careful to point out that what may appear like ‘fresh’, still decompos-
ing fl esh may actually be ‘mummifi ed’ remains dating back to the 
1970s. Th is is an eff ect that is, apparently, not uncommon in mass 
graves, where many bodies have been densely buried on top of one 
another. Nevertheless she also acknowledged that ‘it is not impos-
sible that these graves contained victims from the 1980s’. 24 But her 
main argument emphasised that the uncertainty surrounding the 
material qualities of the remains could be resolved and determined 
only by professional forensic anthropologists. 
 Th ese uncertainties about the age and identity of the Chibondo 
dead and the manner of their deaths raised highly emotive concerns 
about whether these Chibondo remains themselves might include 
not only victims of Rhodesian violence, but also victims of more 
recent ZANU-PF violence. Were these ZANU-PF heroes or victims? 
Peter Manyuki, who was bussed to Chibondo to witness the exhum-
ation, expressed a common opinion when he said that ‘probably 
there are bodies from the liberation struggle there, but maybe also 
bodies from other periods of violence, like from the  gukurahundi , 
and maybe the elections of recent years, and even from Chaidzwa … 
there are many periods in Zimbabwe’s recent past when parents lost 
their children and don’t know where they are buried’ (Fieldnotes, 13 
December 2011). 
 Very quickly all the diff erent constituencies of Zimbabwe’s ‘pol-
itics of the dead’ began suggesting that the Chibondo remains 
included ‘their dead’, including the MDC parties, ZAPU and ZIPRA 
veterans, Mafela Trust and the radical new Ndebele groups such as 
the MLF. Indeed the MLF were fi rst to suggest that the Chibondo 
remains included  gukurahundi victims, stressing that ‘thousands 
mysteriously “disappeared” in Harare, Chitungwisa and other parts 
of Mashonaland at the hands of the tribalistic Zimbabwe regime’, 
and adding that ‘the “discovery” of the said skeletons could as well 
provide a clue as to the fate of the said ethnic Ndebele people and 
ex-ZIPRA force troops who disappeared during the same period’. 25 
Soon ZAPU, ex-ZIPRA veterans and others followed suit. 26 Th e then 
prime minster and MDC president, Morgan Tsvangirai, ‘slammed’ 
the exhumations, and MDC deputy spokesman Chihwayi claimed 
‘these bodies look fresh; ZANU-PF should come clean on the issue 
of these exhumations … those remains are of MDC who were killed 
by ZANU-PF [since] 2000 and especially during the run-off  elec-
tions of 2008’. 27 Amid all these suggestions about who the remains 
might include, some even suggested that the Mount Darwin mines 
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contained very recent victims of the army’s violent take-over of 
the Chiadzwa diamond fi elds in late 2008 and early 2009, when 
it is alleged hundreds of illegal diamond miners and traders were 
machine-gunned from helicopters. 28 
 No longer just deeply ‘disrespectful to the dead’, the exhumations 
were now criticised as being a deliberate attempt to destroy or ‘cover 
up’ crucial evidence of violence and murder. Certainly people ques-
tioned whether Chibondo was a ‘war grave’ or a ‘crime scene’, and 
for many using divination and spirit possession was no longer an 
acceptable means of identifying and settling the dead, but a delib-
erate obfuscation of the ‘truth’ about the dead; a way as Eppel put 
it of ‘silencing the bones’. 29 In response the FHT complained that 
Tsvangirai’s criticism of the exhumations was not ‘in defence of 
African culture’ and that he was ‘talking cheap politics’. 30 Nevertheless 
the uncertain nature of the human materials being exhumed had 
changed the focus of the controversies, from the crude politicisa-
tion and ‘disrespectful’ nature of FHT practices, to much more sen-
sitive questions about the ‘true’ identity of the Chibondo remains, 
and the ‘real’ purpose of the decidedly ‘unforensic’ exhumations. 
Having initially argued that similar exhumations should take place 
at other mass graves around the country, ZIPRA veterans, the MDC 
and other critics quickly changed their focus towards the prevention 
of any exhumations without proper forensic expertise. 
 Clearly the exhumations at Chibondo had indeed raised far ‘more 
questions than answers’, 31 and perhaps this off ers the best explan-
ation for why, aft er initially supporting the war veteran eff orts with 
enormous media coverage and aplomb, ZANU-PF ministers in 
the ‘unity government’ quickly moved in to ‘take over’ and then to 
rapidly close them down. It also explains why, as the controversies 
deepened, the FHT became increasingly concerned to ‘choreograph’ 
visits to and reporting at the site, and why once the government and 
NMMZ had taken over, security at the site was intensifi ed and pub-
lic visits stopped. It also explains why the question of professional, 
forensic involvement came to dominate the debates that ensued, even 
though both those involved with FHT at Chibondo and those who 
were opposed to them espoused the potentially cathartic, ‘healing’ 
nature of exhumations and reburials. Suddenly questions about  how 
human remains are remade into dead (political) subjects, how the 
dead are made present and how the past is reconstituted – how the 
cause and manner of these deaths was to become known – became of 
central concern. And these sensitive and diffi  cult questions turned, 
ultimately, on the indeterminate nature of the materials, substances, 
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things – human and non-human – being reconstituted into par-
ticular kinds of subjects and objects. Th ese are questions that were 
raised, in part, by the indeterminate yet demanding and excessive 
potentiality of human materials themselves. 
 The torque of materiality and the excessive 
potentiality of human remains 
 Elsewhere I have begun to examine Zimbabwe’s politics of the dead 
(Fontein  2009a ,  2010 ,  2011 ) through analytical lenses emergent 
from recent theoretical debates about materiality (Miller  2005 ), 
aff ect (Navaro-Yashin  2009 ), the ‘agency of objects’ (Gell  1998 ; 
Latour  1999 ; Leach  2007 ) and the ‘imbrication of the semiotic and 
the material’ (Deleuze and Guattari  1987 : 337); what Doma ń ska has 
called a ‘return to things’ ( 2006 ). What bones do in Zimbabwe is  not 
confi ned to questions about contested representations of the past, or 
the ‘symbolic effi  cacy’ of bodies (Verdery  1999 ), but also relates their 
‘emotive materiality’ as human substances, and their ‘aff ective pres-
ence’ as dead persons who continue to make demands upon society. 
So bones and indeed bodies in Zimbabwe have an ambivalent agency 
as uneasy subject/objects, both as extensions of the dead themselves 
(Gell  1998 ), as restless and demanding spirit subjects/persons, but 
also as unconscious ‘objects’/‘things’ (Latour  1999 ) that retort to and 
provoke responses from the living. Th e two are oft en intertwined, 
so that the emotive materiality of human corporeality is oft en fi nely 
entangled with the aff ective presence of the dead as spirits demand-
ing recognition, atonement, ‘feeding’ (Rowlands  1999 ) and proper 
‘ritual’, symbolic and material transformation into ancestors. 32 
 Th e signifi cance of the simultaneously material and symbolic 
transformations and transferences involved in funeral processes 
exemplifi es the importance of Ingold’s critique of ‘materiality’ and 
‘object agency’, in favour of thorough investigation into the prop-
erties, fl ows and transformations of materials ( 2007 : 1–2). Th is is 
pertinent to understanding how the political effi  cacy of recently tor-
tured bodies relates to that of older resurfacing bones in Zimbabwe, 
by suggesting that what matters is not necessarily objects like bones, 
‘the body’, ‘graves’ or indeed the soil, but rather the properties and 
fl ows of materials between them. It illustrates how ritual and mater-
ial transformations (and transgressions thereof) of fl eshy, leaky 
bodies into dry bones, and people into ancestors, through the mer-
ging of bodily substances into soil – how the living become (safely) 
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dead – can animate the politics of the burial and belonging in 
Zimbabwe (Fontein  2011 ). It also shows how violence against living 
people (which interferes with bodily boundaries and the material 
‘containment’ and constitution of persons) is fi nely related to disrup-
tions of funerals, the dumping of corpses and the subsequent resur-
facing and return of their remains and avenging spirits, illustrating 
how Zimbabwe’s politics of the dead involves not only contested 
commemorations of people killed in the past, but also continuing 
violence against the living (Fontein  2010 ). 
 Th e determination to focus on materials and substances also 
reverts attention back to how materials become, or are stabilised (or 
for Latour are ‘purifi ed’) into ‘objects’ and indeed ‘subjects’, phys-
ically but also conceptually, historically and politically. How do 
bones – or fragments of bone sift ed from the merged substances 
of decayed bodies, sand and soil – become recognised, ‘articu-
lated’ (Hallam  2010 ), or (re)constituted as uneasy human/things 
or ambivalent subject/objects, through archaeological excavation, 
forensic exhumation or indeed divination? And how, in turn, are 
these processes turned into commemorative rituals or funerals, not 
only responding to the demands of the (reconstituted) dead, but 
actually ‘remaking’ them? Ingold’s focus on materials ( 2007 ), and 
‘things’ ( 2009 ) commands us to consider how exhumations are, in 
part, about remaking or reconstituting ‘the dead’ as particular kinds 
of ‘objects’ or ‘political subjects’, ‘aff orded’ or enabled by the materi-
als excavated from mass graves, an issue that others have explored in 
greater depth (Crossland  2009 ; Filippucci  et al.  2012 ; Hallam  2010 ; 
Renshaw  2010 ). Th us, Filippucci  et al. ( 2012 : 199) have described 
‘unearthing’ human remains as: 
 [A] transformative and relational process of becoming, involving soil, 
hands, towels and brushes, and bones … through which the fl ow of 
human materials with other substances is arrested and channelled, so 
that human remains are temporarily stabilized into recognizable objects 
and the work of cultural elaboration can begin. … it is a process of 
becoming by which traces of past lives are reconstituted and come to 
assert an ambivalent quality of felt presence, which has the capacity to 
unsettle the here and now, with an indeterminate alterity. 
 Importantly this emphasis on becoming or ‘remaking of the dead’ 
points to the ‘otherness of human remains’ (Renshaw  2010 : 460); 
how ‘things, materials and stuff  are always both more and less than 
the objects and subjects that they constitute, substantive qualities 
that are in excess of, yet imbricated in their own becomings and 
unbecomings’ (Filippucci  et al.  2012 : 11; Fontein  2011 : 718). Pinney 
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calls this the ‘alterity (or torque) of materiality that can never be 
assimilated to a disembodied “linguistic-philosophical closure”’ 
( 2005 : 270). If scholars of ‘materiality’ have oft en stressed the ‘dialec-
tics of objectifi cation’ (Miller  2005 : 38), then for Pinney ‘the dialectic 
of “subjects making objects making subjects” … is not smooth but 
instead rife with disjunctures and fractures’ (Filippucci  et al.  2012 : 
204) exactly because stuff , substances and things always maintain 
an excessive potentiality to exceed their constitution, ‘stabilisation’ 
or ‘purifi cation’ into recognisable objects or identifi able subjects. 
Pinney’s insistence upon the ‘enfl eshed alterity’ of the material world 
means that processes of becoming, stabilisation or (re)constitution 
are fraught, incomplete, uncertain and ultimately indeterminate. It 
is this indeterminacy that can make them so contested. 
 Th is ‘indeterminate alterity’ of things or ‘torque of materiality’ 
indicates that the uncertainty that surrounds how and what human 
remains do in Zimbabwe’s politics of the dead pre-exists or is imma-
nent to questions about the ambivalent agency of bones and bodies 
as uneasy subject/objects. Furthermore it raises important questions 
about what, then, is specifi c or unique about human substances that 
sets them apart from other kinds of things or materials. Filippucci 
 et al. ( 2012 ) suggest that the distinction between metaphor and meto-
nym might be useful here: ‘if initially human remains appear poign-
ant because they seem more obviously “human” than other material 
objects and artifacts, then at second glance this poignancy does not 
easily or clearly make them more communicative as metaphors or 
objectifi cations of human beings or past lives lived’ (Filippucci  et al. 
 2012 : 211; see also Renshaw  2010 ). Rather human remains oft en 
‘signal presence more than meaning’ and these ‘excessive metonymic 
qualities defy, perhaps much more than other things, eff orts to turn 
them into meaningful metaphors’. ‘As a result’, they continue: ‘they 
can be subject to huge and oft en highly specialised eff orts and dra-
matic over determinations into particular types of subjects/objects, 
such as ancestors, victims, heroes or specimens – processes that are 
oft en unusually problematic, politicized and contested’ (Filippucci 
 et al.  2012 : 211). 
 Th is reveals  how the controversies surrounding the Chibondo 
exhumations were provoked by the excessive potentialities of the 
human substances being exhumed – by their profoundly evocative 
and aff ective yet unstable, uncertain and ultimately indeterminate 
materialities. It also explains why the objects and artefacts – the 
clothes, uniforms, shoes, coins, grenades and so on – found with the 
tangled mass of stinking human substances took on such importance 
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for the diff erent sides of the debates that ensued: because they 
off ered more stability of meaning (see Renshaw  2010 ). Furthermore 
it explains why many of the debates turned on the  manner of the 
exhumations, particularly between demands for ‘proper’ forensic 
expertise and FHT’s emphasis on ‘African’ ways of dealing with the 
dead, even as everyone agreed that exhumations and reburials can 
be cathartic, and off er resolution and ‘healing’. 
 Indeed this ‘torque of materiality’ and the ‘excessive metonymic 
qualities’ of human remains suggest that neither of these approaches 
is necessarily very good at ‘remaking the dead’, in the absence of 
extensive contextual work by which human substances can be 
meaningfully reconstituted as specifi c kinds of political subjects, 
and even particular named individuals (whether through oral his-
tory, DNA analysis, the archaeology of material context or perform-
ances of social relatedness by which divination and spirit possession 
achieve moral authority). Ultimately, then, the excessive potential-
ity of human materials makes the ‘remaking of the dead’, however 
approached, a profoundly uncertain and indeterminate process, 
and it is this quality that oft en leads to highly ‘specialized eff orts 
and dramatic over determinations’, which, as the Chibondo exhu-
mations exemplifi ed, can be ‘unusually problematic, politicized and 
contested’. 
 The politics of uncertainty 
 Th is argument about the ‘indeterminate alterity’ and ‘excessive 
potentiality’ of human remains provides explanation for the fi erce 
controversies that surrounded the Chibondo exhumations. One 
issue remains to be explored, however. Although the uncertainties 
about the identity of Chibondo dead provoked by the indetermin-
acy of the human remains animated the most eff ective critiques of 
ZANU-PF eff orts to ‘remake the dead’ into their liberation heroes, 
there is also a sense that these profound uncertainties may have had 
(at least for a short time) some recognised political utility. 
 If politics is oft en assumed to turn upon the (contested) work of 
determination, and the elimination of doubt, then recent work in 
political anthropology suggests that uncertainty can also be part of 
a performative stylistics of power. ‘Uncertainty’ has become some-
thing of a new ‘buzz word’ in anthropology of late; it is, if you like, 
the new ‘ambiguity’. Analytical uses of the term have been diverse 
(see Buyandelgeriyn  2008 ), but my usage here is very specifi c. Can 
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we relate the uncertainties and indeterminacies of stuff  and material 
substance to the productive duplicities and uncertainties that oft en 
surround rumours, gossip and political satire, which, as Mbembe 
has so eff ectively illustrated ( 2001 ), are oft en part and parcel of the 
‘stylistics of power’ in African postcolonies? 
 For Mbembe, the satirical cartoons that attempt to ridicule and 
thus debase the vulgar excesses of the political elite in Cameroon are 
‘an integral part of the stylistics of power’ ( 2001 : 115), which do not 
check the power of the ‘elite’ so much as reinforce their omnipotent 
presence. Mbembe’s argument points the way towards ‘recontextu-
alising’ rumour ‘as a quasi-material substance, as a hinge between 
the world of concepts and the world of bodily experience’ (Weate 
 2003 : 40). In a sense Mbembe does for political anthropology what 
recent theorising about ‘materiality’ has done for studies of material 
culture – exploring the ‘mutual imbrication of the semiotic and the 
material’ (Deleuze and Guattari  1987 :37). 
 Rumours, then, like cartoons – and I would argue like bones, bod-
ies and human substances – not only carry or reveal a complexity of 
meanings; they can have duplicitous political aff ects. In the same 
way, we could suggest that the controversies which surrounded the 
Chibondo exhumations, and challenged ZANU-PF’s crude eff orts to 
‘remake’ the dead into its own ‘liberation heroes’, actually also served 
its interests in another way: by reminding people everywhere of its 
profound capacity for violence. Th e signifi cance of this point was 
recognised by some MDC critics at the time who ‘accused its rival of 
trying to plant fear in the population that those who don’t vote for it 
will end up dead’. 33 
 If political authority must always depend upon a combination 
of legitimacy and sovereignty, then perhaps the ‘gross politicking’ 
that surrounded the Chibondo exhumations was not just about 
reinforcing ZANU-PF’s anti-colonialist ideology and legitimacy, 
but was also a performative exercise in demonstrating (again) that 
‘the ultimate expression of sovereignty resides … in the power … to 
exercise control over mortality’; what Mbembe calls ‘necropolitics’ 
( 2003 : 11–12). Th is argument gains strength if we bear in the mind 
the increasingly troubled politics of the unity government (2009–
13), and particularly the debates already emergent in 2011 about the 
timing and conduct of future elections. It also provides explanation 
for the cruder, grotesque dimensions of the politicking taking place 
at Chibondo – the school visits into the mine and people bussed in 
from rural areas around the country, broadcast like election jingles 
on national television. 
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 Similarly in this perspective the  ad hoc , chaotic and decidedly 
unforensic conduct of the exhumations may have been less about 
deploying ‘African’ methods of identifying the dead, or about 
destroying evidence of ZANU-PF atrocities, than about performa-
tive and demonstrative stylistics of power and sovereignty. Th is view 
was expressed by some commentators at the time. For example, in 
responding to reports that the FHT had ‘forced school children, 
teachers and villagers from the surrounding area to view the decom-
posing remains so that they could “appreciate how evil whites are”’, 
the MDC deputy spokesman Chihwayi suggested ‘those villagers 
know that many of those remains are of MDC activists but they are 
too scared to say it … that’s why ZANU-PF is now instilling fear by 
showing them those remains. Th is shows that we are again not going 
to have free and fair elections.’ 34 
 Perhaps, then, ZANU-PF’s interests in the FHT exhumations at 
Chibondo may have lain not only in reinforcing its message of ‘pat-
riotic history’. Importantly, this argument does not rely on the exist-
ence of any Machiavellian political intentions to provoke rumours 
and uncertainty; such political aff ects can operate regardless of any 
design. Yet ZANU-PF, or at least some among its turbulent ranks, 
may have recognised the political purchase of the indeterminate 
nature of human remains – the torque of human materialities – 
which makes them diffi  cult to read, identify and recognise, and 
indeed defi es such determination even as their emotive and aff ective 
qualities demand or insist upon it. It is likely that some in ZANU-PF 
saw the political usefulness of such uncertainties because it allowed 
them to have it both ways – to celebrate their ‘liberation heroes’ 
and reinforce their anti-colonialist rhetoric, and at the same time, 
demonstrate and remind Zimbabweans of their own capacities for 
violence. Furthermore this kind of politics of uncertainty does have 
some historical purchase in Zimbabwe, and fi ts an emerging pattern 
that circulates around the political effi  cacy of rumours (see Fontein 
 2009b ). Th is dimension of ZANU-PF politics may be less about con-
trolling narratives of the past than about channelling the indeter-
minacies of meaning and matter to suit its political purposes. 
 Yet there is, in the fi nal count, a limit to this argument. If the 
uncertainties of rumours and material remains are sometimes the 
site of the reinforcement of a particular mechanism or perform-
ance of ‘state power’, and if rumours that seek to subvert or ‘reveal 
the truth’ behind offi  cial representations can duplicitously reify 
the omnipotent presence they seek to undermine, then surely this 
can work both ways. Th ere always remains the possibility that the 
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politics of uncertainty provoked by rumours, and at Chibondo by 
the indeterminate alterity of human remains, can subvert the other, 
‘productive aspect of power’. Th is aspect appeals to moral and his-
torical legitimacy, and resonates with people’s aspirations to good 
governance, a functioning state and, in this case, the need to rebury 
the unsettled dead of the liberation struggle. In 2011, ultimately the 
uncontained uncertainties about the identities of the dead and the 
manner of their deaths were not sustainable or easily containable. By 
August the exhumations had been stopped, the exhumed remains 
had been reburied and the mineshaft  was apparently sealed, amid 
proclamations that a new national shrine was to be built at the site. 
Th e issue disappeared from the news. Perhaps the possibility that 
some of the remains from the mineshaft  at Chibondo might be vic-
tims of ZANU-PF’s postcolonial atrocities were just too threatening 
to the legitimacy of its ‘patriotic history’ project, outweighing any 
benefi ts that might have accrued from the grotesque displays of the 
ability to ‘exercise control over mortality’ (Mbembe  2003 : 11–12). 
Perhaps, as several people in Harare and Bulawayo suggested, people 
in the higher echelons of ZANU-PF became concerned that matters 
at Chibondo had ‘got out of hand’. Perhaps, at its simplest, biopolitics 
outweighed necropolitics. Or as Shari Eppel put it, ‘they shut down 
those exhumations in Mt Darwin … because their dead scare them’ 
(Fieldnotes, December 2011). In the end, the uncertainties provoked 
by the torque of human materiality exceeded or overwhelmed its 
own political utility. 
 Conclusion 
 In 2004 Judith Butler wrote that ‘the question that preoccupies me in 
the light of recent global violence is: Who counts as human? Whose 
lives count as lives? And fi nally, what makes for a grievable life?’ 
(Butler  2004 : 20). In Zimbabwe these are familiar questions which 
demand answers that stretch beyond conventional analyses of how 
postcolonial commemoration is necessarily infl ected with the politics 
of recognition, ‘visibility’ (Casper and Moore  2009 ) and the dynam-
ics of inclusion and exclusion. Events at Chibondo illustrate how 
what Pinney calls the ‘alterity of an enfl eshed world’  (2005 : 270) is 
fundamentally imbricated in the ‘disjunctures and fractures’ of all 
human becomings (and unbecomings), in which the politics of com-
memoration (of ‘what makes for a grievable life’) are but one dimen-
sion. Th e grisly exhumations at Chibondo in 2011 illustrate how the 
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excessive potentiality of human substances demands yet defi es any 
easy ‘reading’, ‘metaphorisation’ or stabilisation, and therefore ani-
mates, aff ords and makes possible the kind of politics of commemor-
ation that Butler refers to. It was, aft er all, the fl eshy, leaky, stinking, 
maybe still decomposing or otherwise mummifi ed qualities of the 
many remains being disinterred and reassembled from the Mount 
Darwin mine that provoked much of the intense debate and criti-
cism the exhumations became enveloped in. Questions about the 
performative stylistics of power, the politics of uncertainty and con-
testations over diff erent techniques of determination – of remaking 
the dead – turn in part on these indeterminate material properties 
and transformations. And it is the excessive qualities of this human 
stuff , demanding yet defying easy determination or stabilisation into 
meaning, which both enabled and exceeded ZANU-PF politicking 
around the dead, and the multiple, diverse responses that were pro-
voked by it. 
 Notes 
 1  ZANLA was the military wing of ZANU during the liberation war, 
and ZIPRA the military wing of the older but smaller rival nationalist 
party, ZAPU. Despite various attempts to combine their eff orts, during 
the war these rivalries sometimes led to fi ghting between diff erent guer-
rilla groups, both in Zimbabwe and in guerrilla camps in Mozambique, 
Zambia and elsewhere. 
 2  ‘Mt Darwin’s killing fi elds’,  Sunday Mail , 13 January 2008; ‘Eff orts to locate 
2nd Chimurenga mass graves continuing’,  ZBC News , 12 January 2008. 
 3  A potent example came in January 2008, when, aft er particularly heavy 
rains, farmers in Mount Darwin, northern Zimbabwe, reported human 
bones re-emerging from the soil as they ploughed their fi elds (‘Mt 
Darwin’s killing fi elds’,  Sunday Mail , 13 January 2008). 
 4  Interview, Ambuya VaZarira and VaMoyondizvo, 16 August 2001. 
 5  ‘56 war vets reburied’,  Daily News , 25 October 2001; ‘Mysterious deaths 
rock Kanyemba’,  Sunday Mail , 3 June 2008. 
 6  If, as one human rights activist recently explained, during the 1990s 
many people who directly experienced the terrors of the 1980s were too 
frightened to ‘break the silence’ and acquiesced (reluctantly) to govern-
ment obstruction of any kind of commemoration – so much so, even, 
that ZANU-PF became ‘complacent’ – then in the last decade a new 
generation of ‘angry young Ndebele men’ has become increasingly vocal 
(Fieldnotes, 6 December 2011). 
 7  ‘We want to know where our loved ones are buried’, Letters,  Daily News , 3 
September 2001; ‘Give us money not treatment: Gukurahundi survivors’, 
 www.radiovop.com , 23 May 2011; ‘Mass graves from Gukurahundi era 
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located in Matabeleland’,  SW Radio Africa , 19 October 2005; ‘Evidence 
of “dirty war” lies far below’,  Zimbabwe Independent , 29 September 2000; 
‘Film reveals horror details of Ndebele massacre’,  Nation (Kenya) , 11 
November 2007; ‘Tracking down a massacre’,  BBC News , 7 May 2008. 
 8  According to  Th e Standard , ZANU-PF was ‘whipping up people’s emo-
tions ahead of an election it dearly wishes to force through this year’ 
(‘Sunday Comment: Unearth truth on human remains’,  Th e Standard , 
26 March 2011). Th ese elections eventually came in July 2013, which 
ZANU-PF won decisively, amid much controversy and allegations of 
rigging. 
 9  See ‘848 fi ghters exhumed from Chibondo mineshaft  to date’, in 
‘Remember: Chibondo liberation war mass grave exhumations’,  Th e 
Patriot , 30 April 2011 [Supplement]. 
 10  See ‘Row over fresh Mt Darwin human remains’,  Th e Standard , 20 
March 2011. 
 11  ‘Skeletons to the rescue’,  www.thezimbabwemail.com , 23 March 2011. 
 12  ‘MDC calls for care, sensitivity in exhumations’,  www.swradioafrica.
com , 24 March 2011. 
 13  See ‘No respect’,  www.cathybuckle.com , 26 March 2011; ‘Sunday 
Comment: Unearth truth on human remains’,  Th e Standard , 26 
March 2011. 
 14  Cox ( 2005 , also Shoko  2006 ) has discussed the 2004 discovery of 19 
mass graves and abandoned mines containing an estimated 5,000 people 
killed by Rhodesian forces during the 1970s. 
 15  See for example ‘Th e untold story of Chibondo’, in ‘Remember: 
Chibondo liberation war mass grave exhumations’,  Th e Patriot , 30 April 
2011 [Supplement]. 
 16  ‘Zimbabwe mass grave becomes political propaganda’, Associated Press, 
31 March 2011. 
 17  ‘ZIPRA veterans challenge chaotic exhumations’,  www.radiovop.com , 3 
April 2011. 
 18  ‘Judge halts Mt Darwin exhumations’,  www.newzimbabwe.com , 7 
April 2011. 
 19  See ‘Amnesty: Zim mass grave bodies must be exhumed by experts’, 
Amnesty International Press release, 6 April 2011. 
 20  ‘Zimbabwe: Chibondo reburials in progress’,  Th e Herald , 13 
August 2011. 
 21  ‘Row over fresh Mt Darwin human remains’,  Th e Standard , 20 
March 2011. 
 22  ‘Mt Darwin mass graves contain fresh bodies: Pathologist’,  www.zimdi-
aspora.com , 27 March 2011; ‘Chibondo mass grave cover-up’,  Zimbabwe 
Legal Aff airs , 4 April 2011. 
 23  See ‘Th e pain of a historic village’, p. 3, in ‘Remember: Chibondo liberation 
war mass grave exhumations’,  Th e Patriot , 30 April 2011 [Supplement]. 
 24  Solidarity Peace Trust, ‘Hard road to reform’, 13 April 2011, p. 48. 
 25  ‘ZAPU, MDC demand Gukurahundi exhumations’,  www.newzimba-
bwe.com , 19 March 2011; ‘Discovered 280 remains not of victims of 
Rhodesian war: MLF’,  www.zimdiaspora.com , 19 March 2011. 
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 26  ‘ZIPRA veterans challenge exhumations’,  www.radiovop.com , 3 April 
2011; ‘Sunday Comment: Unearth truth on human remains’,  Th e 
Standard , 26 March 2011. 
 27  ‘Hundred of bodies removed from Zimbabwe mass grave’,  www.ipsnews.
net , 25 March 2011. 
 28  ‘Mass graves raise more questions than answers’,  www.swradio.com , 23 
March 2011. 
 29  Solidarity Peace Trust. Update no. 2, March 2011, ‘Th e silencing of the 
bones’,  www.solidaritypeacetrust.org/1015/spt-zimbabwe-update-no-2 . 
 30  See ‘Th eir bones shall rise’, in ‘Remember: Chibondo liberation war 
mass grave exhumations’,  Th e Patriot , 30 April 2011 [Supplement]. 
 31  www.swradio.com , 23 March 2011. 
 32  So, for example, the material qualities of corpses at the inherently dan-
gerous, liminal moment of funerals, such as the ‘tears’ of a corpse or its 
mouth dropping open, can be ‘read’ as indicating the frightening tem-
perament of the dead person being buried (Fontein  2010 : 437–8). 
 33  See ‘Hundreds of bodies removed from Zimbabwe Mass grave’,  www.
ipsnews.net/ , 25 March 2011. 
 34  See ‘Mt Darwin mass graves contain fresh bodies: Pathologist’,  www.
zimdiaspora.com , 27 March 2011. 
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 Governing the disappeared-living and 
the disappeared-dead :  the violent 
pursuit of cultural sovereignty during 
authoritarian rule in Argentina 
 Antonius C. G. M.  Robben 
 Graciela Beatriz Daleo was abducted on 18 October 1977, at the age 
of twenty-eight. She had been active in the  Juventud Peronista since 
1966, a Peronist youth organisation whose incessant street demon-
strations during the early 1970s had been instrumental in the return 
of the exiled former president Juan Domingo Per ó n to Argentina. 
Th e Peronist Montoneros, the Marxist People’s Revolutionary Army 
or ERP ( Ej é rcito Revolucionario del Pueblo ) and a host of other 
guerrilla organisations had equally contributed to Per ó n’s political 
rebirth through armed operations against the reigning military dic-
tatorship of Lieutenant-General Lanusse. Free elections were held in 
March 1973, and Per ó n became president of Argentina in July 1973. 
Soon, a violent factionalism developed between left -wing and right-
wing Peronists about the administrative control of national, provin-
cial and local governments, while the ERP continued to attack the 
armed forces and dreamt of a Cuban Revolution on Argentine soil. 
Th e left -wing Montoneros resumed their political violence by late 
1973, in part as a response to right-wing death squads. Per ó n died in 
July 1974. His widow Mar í a Estela Mart í nez de Per ó n assumed his 
place in a worsening political and economic climate. Th e ERP and 
Montoneros were persecuted relentlessly, especially aft er the mili-
tary coup of March 1976 (Robben  2005 : 134–42). 
 Graciela Daleo had joined the Montoneros in 1975. She organ-
ised logistic support by providing weapons, safe houses, money and 
documents, and went into hiding when the military took charge of 
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the country. On the morning of 18 October 1977, she was at the 
Acoyte subway station in Buenos Aires, and about to board the train 
when a man crossed in front of her and said: ‘Federal Police, you 
have to accompany me.’ She threw herself on the platform, began to 
scream and tried to bring the cyanide capsule she had taken from 
her shirt pocket to her mouth when three men belonging to a naval 
task group launched themselves at her. Th e cyanide capsule fell from 
her hand, and she was unable to reach the other capsules hidden in 
her bra and handbag. Th ey beat her, and grabbed her by the wrists 
to be handcuff ed. ‘I’m called Graciela Daleo!’, she screamed, ‘Th ey’re 
abducting me. Th ey’re going to kill me! Call my father at 592780!’ 
Th e men choked her and shouted: ‘It’s for drugs, she’s a drug dealer’, 
and dragged her up the stairs of the subway station. Th ey hooded 
her, threw her into a beige Ford Falcon passenger car and took her 
to the clandestine detention centre at the Navy Mechanics’ School or 
ESMA (Escuela de Mec á nica de la Armada). Th ree witnesses to the 
abduction called her father anonymously later that day (Anguita and 
Caparr ó s  1998 : 345–46; Daleo and Castillo  1982 : 1–5). 
 At the ESMA, Graciela Daleo was tortured and interrogated for 
hours by Navy Lieutenant Pern í as about her friends, contacts and 
political militancy, and fi nally subjected to multiple mock execu-
tions while kneeling on the grass outside the detention centre. She 
was penned up for months in a tiny cubicle and eventually forced to 
do typing work as part of a rehabilitation programme. Aft er more 
than fi ft een months in captivity, she spent February and March of 
1979 in Bolivia as a test of her ideological recovery. She was told 
that her relatives and fellow captives at the ESMA would suff er the 
consequences if she tried something foolish, and was obliged to 
report periodically to the embassy’s naval attach é . Upon her return 
to Buenos Aires, the disappeared Graciela Daleo was allowed to visit 
her parents, accompanied by naval personnel. On 20 April 1979, 
she was send into exile to Venezuela. She was considered unsuit-
able for Argentine society but still fi t to live abroad. She returned to 
Argentina in May 1984 (Camara Nacional  1987 2: 327–30;  El Diario 
del Juicio 1985 22: 422–5; interviews with Graciela Daleo on 4 and 
24 October 1990). 
 Daleo’s multiple political transformations from street protester 
and guerrilla insurgent to torture victim, disappeared, forced 
labourer, exilee and free citizen reveal the authoritarian state’s necro- 
and biopolitical hold over its citizens. If state sovereignty is defi ned 
as the power to rule about life or death in exceptional situations, as 
Agamben ( 1998 : 8) and Foucault ( 1998 : 135) have argued, then this 
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dominion was manifested in Argentina during the 1976–83 dictator-
ship. Anthropology has demonstrated how everyday acts and local 
practices at society’s fringes shape the state and its multiple imagin-
ations (e.g. Biehl  2005 ; Das  2007 ; Das and Poole  2004 ; Hansen and 
Stepputat  2001 ; Skidmore  2004 ), while studies about state terror have 
analysed the state’s repressive, regulatory and disciplinary infl uences 
on people’s agency (e.g. Aretxaga  2003 ; Sluka  2005 ). Th is bound-
less ‘ability to kill, punish, and discipline with impunity’ (Hansen 
and Stepputat  2006 : 295) was exercised by the Argentine authori-
tarian regime to enforce cultural sovereignty through a devastating 
assault on Argentine society. Th e term cultural sovereignty refers to 
the state’s power to regulate society’s cultural practices, and ultim-
ately to impose a particular cultural project on its citizens. Th e vio-
lent confl ict between the Argentine revolutionaries and the military 
was therefore not just about political power but was a cultural war 
about the vested authority to determine the cultural confi nes and 
social conditions of the Argentine people. Graciela Daleo’s predica-
ment illustrates this contest. Rather than being assassinated together 
with thousands of other disappeared citizens, she was forced into 
a rehabilitation programme to dispel her revolutionary ideas and 
instil notions of order, hierarchy, discipline and morality. 
 Based on in-depth interviews with key actors during the dicta-
torship and the analysis of newspapers, secret army documents and 
offi  cial reports, this chapter examines the governing of the disap-
peared-living and the disappeared-dead in Argentina between 1976 
and 1983 by an authoritarian regime which was convinced that the 
nation’s cultural tradition was besieged by a guerrilla insurgency 
and a revolutionary ideology, thus challenging its political and cul-
tural sovereignty with arms and ideas. According to the military, 
the Argentine state was endangered by infi ltration and armed vio-
lence supported by foreign communist regimes, while the nation’s 
Western, Christian heritage was being corroded by revolutionary 
beliefs that did away with the nuclear family and paternal authority 
as bourgeois, private property as the exploitation of the proletariat, 
religion as an alienating ideology and the divine social hierarchy 
as maintaining an unjust social inequality. Th e Argentine dictator-
ship was determined to cleanse the national body and spirit of such 
forces and ideas, described as cancers and viruses. Tens of thousands 
of people were disappeared through state terrorism, at least 10,000 
of them were assassinated, others were forced into exile, while 
only an estimated 100 captives passed through a few rehabilitation 
programmes. 
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 Th e chapter’s main argument is that necropower and biopower 
were under military rule no longer the baleful and benign faces of 
a sovereign state, exercised with due process and regard for people’s 
common welfare, but became intertwined in an authoritarian gov-
ernmentality that comprised a ‘complex form of power, which has 
as its target [the] population’ (censorship, intelligence gathering, 
disappearance), ‘a whole series of specifi c governmental appara-
tuses’ (media surveillance, tasks forces, secret detention centres, 
rehabilitation programmes), and the ‘governmentalisation of the 
state’ (state terrorism) to guarantee the survival of Argentina’s cul-
tural sovereignty (Foucault  1991 : 102–3). Th is unbounded state 
power organised forced disappearances to assess citizens suspected 
of endangering the Argentine state and the nation’s Christian cul-
ture. Th e disappeared were kept in a condition of social indefi nition 
as living-dead whose ideological transformation and social con-
duct under captivity were monitored to determine their fate. Th is 
undefi ned status continued for the assassinated captives when the 
military junta lost power in 1983: the disappeared changed from 
being alive yet missing into dead yet unaccounted for. Th e demo-
cratic government tried to purge the fallen regime’s necropolitical 
control from Argentine society through a truth commission, crim-
inal trials, exhumations and the rule of law but was held hostage by 
the military’s refusal to resolve the liminal condition of the living-
dead; even thirty years later when nearly a thousand perpetrators 
were convicted or indicted for human rights violations. 
 Cultural war and the process of national 
reorganisation 
 Th e Argentine armed forces did not stage a coup d’ é tat in March 
1976 to fi ght the insurgency more eff ectively, because they had 
already acquired extensive powers in October 1975 and the guer-
rilla organisations had incurred signifi cant losses by late December 
1975. Th e military installed a dictatorship to give the military junta 
a free hand to reconstruct Argentine society and restore ‘the essen-
tial values that serve as the foundation to the comprehensive rule 
of the State’ (Record of Basic Objectives, cited in Verbitsky  1988 : 
145). Th is ambitious programme was called the Process of National 
Reorganisation. Th e name harked back to the National Organisation 
of 1852–62 that began with the ouster of the nationalist dictator 
Juan Manuel de Rosas in 1852 and ended with the formation of 
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the state in the classic sense of the term as a sovereign power and a 
national territory with an organic whole of institutions. A National 
Constitution was written, the Republic formed, Congress instated 
and a national education system developed. In addition, Argentina’s 
national territory was enlarged in the 1870s, when the Patagonian 
pampas were occupied through a genocidal military campaign 
against the indigenous population. Th is expansion made the econ-
omy take fl ight with the export of salted beef, hides, wool and wheat. 
Th e three Argentine presidents – Mitre, Sarmiento and Roca – most 
responsible for the territorial conquest, political stability, economic 
prosperity and state sovereignty were all retired generals. Th e 1976 
military junta believed they were following in their footsteps: Videla, 
Massera and Agosti were convinced that they could repeat the feats 
of their illustrious predecessors. Th ey were determined to wipe out 
the revolutionary insurgency, and restore the nation’s cultural sover-
eignty by banning foreign ideologies and forbidding subversive cul-
tural expressions and practices. 
 Cultural sovereignty was to be achieved through a cultural war 
against the so-called subversion. ‘We understand by subversion the 
attempt to alter our essential values inspired by our historical trad-
ition and Christian conception of the world and of man. Th is man 
who inherited from God his freedom and dignity as a person as his 
most precious good’ (Lieutenant-General Videla, cited in  La Naci ó n , 
14 December 1976). Or, in the words of General Leopoldo Galtieri: 
‘Th e subversive war … is the clash of two civilisations, ours and the 
Marxist, to determine which one will be dominant and thus inspire 
or direct the future organisation of the world. More concretely, it is 
about discovering which scale of values will serve as the foundation 
of such organisation’ ( Somos , 11 April 1980). General D í az Bessone 
had already declared in 1976 that ‘the coexistence of two value sys-
tems within one national society is impossible. Th is is why we com-
bat the subversion that wants to impose another value system: a 
system without God, without religion; a system that builds walls to 
drown freedom; a system without private property’ ( La Naci ó n , 24 
November 1976). 
 Th e Argentine military classifi ed certain citizens as subversives 
unfi t to live in Argentina for not embodying Argentine culture and 
traditional values, and therefore subject to annihilation. Th e words 
of junta leader Lieutenant-General Videla are revealing: ‘I want to 
point out that the Argentine citizenry is not the victim of repres-
sion. Th e repression is against a minority which we do not con-
sider Argentine’ ( La Naci ó n , 18 December 1977). Non-Argentine 
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Argentines were thus placed beyond the constitutional provisions 
of the state of siege and beyond international war conventions by 
turning them into outlawed, exterminable subversives rather than 
irregular combatants. Th e Argentine citizenry did not escape the 
military’s strategic classifi cation, either. Th e 1975 battle plan sub-
divided them into friendly forces, neutral forces and proper forces 
that each required diff erent forms of psychological warfare (CGE 
 1975 ). Nobody was beyond suspicion, and life could not be taken for 
granted because the boundaries with death were permeable polit-
ical constructions. As the cultural war progressed, some forces were 
reclassifi ed as hostile to the Argentine state, such as labour unions, 
progressive parishes, neighbourhood associations and cultural cen-
tres. Norberto Liwsky suff ered this fate for being involved with a 
community housing estate that vied for legal recognition. An offi  cer 
told him that he knew that Liwsky was not involved with the insur-
gency but that he was going to be tortured for not understanding 
that ‘there was no room for any opposition to the Process of National 
Reorganization’ (CONADEP  1986 : 22). 
 Guerrillas, revolutionaries and activists were threatened with 
annihilation. Many targeted Argentines, like Graciela Daleo, coped 
by living in illegality while continuing with the armed resistance, 
whereas others refrained from politics entirely and chose an internal 
exile in the countryside. At least 10,000 Argentines did not fi t in 
with the military’s grand design for Argentina, as was documented 
by the CONADEP truth commission and forensic investigations. 
Th ey were forced to undergo a terrifying passage between life and 
death through torture and disappearance to end up on the wrong 
side of the verdict. 
 Th e violent confrontation between the Argentine military and a 
revolutionary segment of Argentine society was a dispute about cul-
tural sovereignty between enemies that adhered to two fundamen-
tally diff erent cultural projects. Th e revolutionaries believed in the 
naturalness of social equality, the blessings of Marxism and the his-
torical inevitability of a class struggle ending in the proletariat’s vic-
tory and a world without exploitation and alienation. Th e military 
believed in the existence of a divine natural order with an intrinsic 
social hierarchy. Th ey emphasised Argentina’s traditional Christian 
culture that respected private property, paternal authority and the 
nuclear family (Robben  2005 : 172–80). Lieutenant-General Videla 
explained that the confl ict between armed forces and revolutionaries 
was therefore not purely military but cultural: ‘Th e fi ght against sub-
version is not only a military problem: it is a worldwide phenomenon 
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which has a political, economic, social, cultural, psychological and 
also a military dimension’ ( La Naci ó n , 8 September 1976). 
 Th e Argentine military oft en spoke of society as a social body, 
and employed etiological terms to describe the ills and cures of the 
diseased Argentina. Th e guerrilla organisations were for General 
D í az Bessone ‘strange bodies’ that had to be extirpated, ‘however 
hard the surgery may be’ ( La Naci ó n , 23 October 1976). Th e state 
of siege of 1974 and the mandate given in 1975 by the democratic 
government to annihilate the subversion had provided the military 
with the scalpel to heal the nation once and for all, according to 
General Galtieri: ‘We all wish to be cured with medicines, but if the 
Nation’s authorities so desire, the Armed Forces will operate, and in 
that case, let nobody have any doubt that all evil will be extirpated; 
and to extirpate all evil, all cells will have to be extirpated, even those 
about which we are in doubt’ ( La Naci ó n , 5 December 1979). Th e 
word ‘cell’ bridged metaphor and object because guerrilla combat-
ants were organised in cell-like structures. Th e military employed 
organograms to unravel these social networks through the torture of 
captives, and then root out the combatants systematically through-
out the country. 
 Conquering bodies and minds 
 Blindfolded, humiliated, disoriented, stripped naked and already 
beaten during the abduction and transportation to the clandestine 
detention centre, captives were immediately subjected to torture. 
Th e overt rationalisation was to obtain information about immi-
nent threats, such as assassination attempts and bombs in crowded 
places, but there is not one known case of such urgency. In fact, 
most captives were extensively abused before even one question was 
asked. Coercive interrogation was believed to reveal the captive’s 
social relations, and served to identify new human targets, secret 
meeting places and safe houses, despite the unreliability of informa-
tion extracted through pain infl iction. Th e military, however, were 
convinced that such information helped destroy the contaminating 
subversion, dyad by dyad. 
 Elaine Scarry ( 1985 : 61) has drawn an analogy between war and 
torture by arguing: ‘Whereas the object of war is to kill people, tor-
ture usually mimes the killing of people by infl icting pain, the sen-
sory equivalent of death, substituting prolonged mock execution 
for execution.’ Torture was extended into the selves and minds of 
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the captives to break their fi ghting spirit and erase subversive ideas 
because, according to General Alcides L ó pez Aufranc ( 1975 : 644), 
the political violence in Argentina ‘concerns an infection of the 
minds, a gangrene that runs the risk of killing the free, democratic 
and plural Argentine social body if it is not attacked decisively and 
energetically’. Lieutenant-Colonel Minicucci concluded in 1977: 
‘Th e population is essential in this war. Because they want to capture 
man in body and mind. Th e struggle of ideas is therefore fundamen-
tal in this war’ ( La Naci ó n , 29 October 1977). Th e military’s dual 
use of bio- and necropower is manifested in the daily practices of 
state repression. Th ey tried to infl uence the minds of the Argentine 
people through a strict control over school and university curric-
ula; the censorship of books, fi lms and music; the fostering of reli-
gious faith – especially Roman Catholicism – and the inculcation of 
patriotism and respect for authority. Torture was reserved for the 
most subversive minds, namely those of abducted guerrilla insur-
gents and political activists. Interrogators explored captives as if they 
were surveyors, mapping life histories, political beliefs and thoughts 
about family life. Body and mind were dominated through torture 
with the objective to desocialise and traumatise the victims so that 
their political agency was crippled and their trust in fellow human 
beings for ever damaged. 
 Th e simulation of death in torture demonstrated the authoritar-
ian state’s omnipotence through a theatrical display of the power 
to assassinate captives at will and make their bodies disappear 
through a network of clandestine detention centres. Th ese centres 
were called black holes ( chupaderos ) into which captives vanished 
to never emerge again unharmed. Life was held in abeyance because 
of the ambiguous status of the disappeared as missing yet alive. Th e 
disappeared were in fact structurally and socially dead when they 
arrived at the clandestine detention centres, and might develop 
compulsive thoughts about death and even about being dead. Th e 
ex-disappeared Norberto Liwsky has remarked: ‘I began to feel that 
I was living alongside death. When I wasn’t being tortured I had 
hallucinations about death – sometimes when I was awake, at other 
times while sleeping … I desperately tried to summon up a thought 
in order to convince myself I wasn’t dead. Th at I wasn’t mad. At the 
same time, I wished with all my heart that they would kill me as 
soon as possible’ (CONADEP  1986 : 23). One disappeared survivor 
observed how captives feared death in liminality: ‘that particular 
death which is dying without disappearing, or disappearing without 
dying. A death in which the person dying had no part whatever: like 
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dying without a struggle, as though dying being already dead, or like 
never dying at all’ (CONADEP  1986 : 167). Th is fear of death was the 
fear of falling for ever in the social interstices as neither dead nor 
alive, as neither mourned nor mournable. 
 Th e military dimension of the cultural war was principally focused 
on intelligence. Th e strategy was to dismantle the cellular guerrilla 
networks, their outlawed front organisations, and a heterogeneous 
array of militant labour unions, progressive parishes and radical stu-
dent associations. Aside from the mass arrest of striking workers, 
the most common tactical procedure was abduction. Lieutenant-
General Videla stated that the counterinsurgency ‘Implied attack-
ing en masse, with everything, throughout the entire terrain, taking 
them from their hide-outs’ (Seoane and Muleiro  2001 : 52). A tar-
geted location would be sealed off  with regular uniformed troops, 
and then a task group of military and policemen dressed as civilians 
carried out the raid. A brief but rough interrogation was conducted 
upon capture, and then the hooded captive was taken to one of over 
650 clandestine places of detention. 
 Most clandestine detention centres were small, with one or two 
rooms or a cellar at a police station, and functioned mainly between 
1976 and 1978. Th ere were also half a dozen large centres with doz-
ens of cells and several sizeable enclosed spaces that functioned into 
the early 1980s. Captives were registered upon arrival on a detention 
card with their name, age, gender and degree of danger, the area 
of detention and the security force in charge. Th is administration 
served a repressive infrastructure that implemented the national 
reorganisation through secret guidelines and operating procedures. 
Clandestine detention centres served to achieve the cultural sov-
ereignty of a revitalised Argentina through the triage of so-called 
subversives. 
 Passage through the clandestine detention centres proceeded by 
way of consecutive transformations of body and mind, at which death 
might appear at every threshold. Captives in small detention cen-
tres traversed these stages within the same confi ned space but large 
centres like the Navy Mechanics School accorded a proper place to 
each social phase. Diff erent places signifi ed diff erent phase-specifi c 
relations to death, and implied other captor–captive interactions. In 
this sense, the large clandestine detention centres were a microcosm 
of the desired New Republic. Although magnifi ed by the absolut-
ist dependency relations between captors and captives, these centres 
represented the quintessence of a society structured along strictly 
authoritarian and hierarchical relations. Th ey were manifestations 
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of the natural hierarchy, where some were on a higher rung than 
others, with disappeared subversives at the very bottom and military 
offi  cers at the top. 
 Th e Navy Mechanics’ School or ESMA in Buenos Aires was one 
of Argentina’s largest clandestine torture and detention centres 
through which an estimated 4,000 inmates passed during the dic-
tatorship. Located in the three-storey Naval Offi  cers’ Mess, it oper-
ated between March 1976 and November 1983, and can be regarded 
as the most elaborate of all centres, with torture rooms, cabins and 
cubicles for shackled, hooded captives, a maternity ward for preg-
nant captives, an infi rmary, a television room, an offi  ce for forging 
documents, a documentation centre for captives forced to do offi  ce 
work, a photo lab, a recording room, a storage room for booty, living 
quarters of naval offi  cers and a war room where organograms were 
kept up to date, raids were planned and the fi nal fate of the disap-
peared was decided (Robben  2005 : 250–3). Th e various routes of 
captives through this complex universe expressed diff erent relations 
to their captors, their degree of recovery and their fi nal destination; 
yet they all began in the basement’s torture cells. 
 The predicament of the disappeared-living 
 Th e ESMA Basement ( el S ó tano ) housed the interrogation and tor-
ture rooms. Here, the ground rules between torturers and tortured 
were set by changing the subject–subject relation into a subject–
object relation of absolute dependency. Th e captive transformed 
from being a person with a complex social status into a nonperson 
identifi ed by a number and completely isolated from society: naked, 
hooded, immobilised, hungry and oft en terrifi ed. Th e blindfold or 
hood made the disoriented captive unable to anticipate the cap-
tor’s actions. Th e subjugated captive became the captor’s extension, 
responding to his every command, but was at the same time his neg-
ation by being entirely deprived of agency. One policeman boasted 
of having his private captive on a leash, making him walk on all fours 
and bark like a dog (Andersen  1993 : 209). Th is condition simultan-
eously dehumanised and acculturated the captive. It maintained the 
diff erence between victor and defeated, between self and other, but 
also enforced the torturer’s self and his terms of social engagement 
onto the captive. 
 Some persons died accidentally from torture. One man was so 
severely beaten at the clandestine detention centre La Escuelita in 
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Tucum á n Province that he urinated blood. Antonio Cruz, also cap-
tive, testifi ed that he mentioned this to the captors but they dismissed 
it: ‘Before the torturers went off  that night, they left  him tied to a 
pillar in the open air with strict orders not to feed him and to give 
him only water to drink. He died hanging there in the early hours of 
the morning … the interrogators were told what had happened, and 
they regretted having been unable to obtain any precise information’ 
(CONADEP  1986 : 37). In fact, the captors regarded this death as a 
defeat, according to the ex-disappeared Juan Gasparini ( 1988 : 149): 
‘One had to endure the suff ering before an enemy who didn’t give 
death away. Th e victory was to earn one’s death.’ Such death wrested 
power from the repressive state and affi  rmed the deceased’s agency 
in the eyes of the remaining captives. 
 Graciela Daleo’s failed suicide attempt, described above, demon-
strates how the Argentine military tried to rule over the lives and 
deaths of their targets. Task groups carried antidotes and substances 
that provoked intense vomiting in case a cyanide capsule had been 
swallowed. Th ey rushed the captive to the hospital to empty his or 
her stomach, and then proceeded to the secret detention centre for 
torture. Oft en emotionally deeply shaken by their narrow survival, 
the captive was told that he or she owed their life to the military 
because the Montonero commanders had ordered their combat-
ants to choose death upon capture. Th e disappeared’s death was not 
defi ned by accident or volition but by an administrative procedure 
that calculated the value of his or her life. 
 Captives who survived the fi rst stage of torture were assessed by 
senior offi  cers. Th ere are no reliable estimates available, but thou-
sands of Argentines were abducted, tortured and released again. 
Elena Alfaro was told by General Su á rez Mason: ‘You are being 
released; in fact, you shouldn’t have been abducted, but you know 
that sometimes things slip out of our hands, especially with the [task 
group] gangs’ ( El Diario del Juicio 1985 14: 319). Still, she remained 
under surveillance and could have been abducted again if the mili-
tary saw reason to do so. Furthermore, her abduction had most 
likely had the desired eff ect. Th e experience of torture would make 
her mistrustful of others and shy away from any revolutionary activ-
ity that would undermine the state’s cultural sovereignty. Decades 
aft er her release from the ESMA, Liliana Gardella still feels spiritu-
ally assassinated: ‘I have lost my naturalness and spontaneity, and 
therefore also my identity. And this is so because a [life] project is 
missing’ (Actis  et al.  2001 : 65). Mun ú Actis concurs: ‘I also felt at 
the ESMA that they were killing me. What I used to be died … I felt 
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dead. One never recovers entirely from that condition’ (Actis  et al. 
 2001 : 66). Hannah Arendt ( 1975 : 474–7) has argued that authori-
tarian states thrive on terror and loneliness. People feel isolated by 
the internalisation of fear, and experience the loss of self as a social 
death by being deprived of social contacts. 
 ESMA captives considered unfi t for release were moved from 
the Basement to the Hood ( la Capucha ), where they were held in 
windowless cabins ( camarotes ) or smaller cubicles ( cuchas ) of 2.0  × 
0.7  × 0.7 metres into which hooded captives were shoved. Captives 
who responded favourably to the ESMA regime might be considered 
recoverable for Argentine society. Recoverable captives were treated 
better than those deemed nonrecoverable, who were assassinated 
sooner or later. One prominent Montonero member spent two years 
in a cubicle before receiving a lethal injection (Actis  et al.  2001 : 58; 
Mart í , Milia and Solarz  1995 : 52). 
 Rear-Admiral Horacio Mayorga explained to me how the deci-
sion to assassinate a captive was made. ‘Th e death of any guerrilla 
was always decided by at least fi ve persons. But one thing yes, fi ve 
persons who like you and me, sitting like this, said, “Th at one can’t 
go on living”’ (interview with Rear-Admiral Horacio Mayorga, 
3 October 1990). Th e verdict entered the ESMA’s necropolitical 
administration through one capital letter on the detention card: ‘L’ or 
Liberty ( Libertad ) meant that the captive had been recuperated and 
would be freed. ‘T’ or Transfer ( Traslado ) indicated a death sentence 
( El Diario del Juicio 1985 24: 457). Th e Argentine military used the 
term ‘Transfer’ as a euphemism for death. It was the same term used 
in Argentine cemeteries to indicate the transfer of human remains 
from one grave or one cemetery to another. No date of death was 
added to the inscription, as if the condemned captive had already 
been killed administratively and the actual assassination was a mat-
ter of routine. 
 Condemned captives were taken to the Little Hood ( la Capuchita ) 
in the ESMA’s attic. Fift een to twenty cubicles were available for cap-
tives before they were taken down to the Basement for a death fl ight. 
Th e captives were given a sedative to make them drowsy, were loaded 
on a truck, driven to the airport and put on board an aircraft  bound 
for the South Atlantic Ocean. Rear-Admiral Mayorga described the 
fi nal procedure as follows: ‘they injected them and threw them in 
the sea. Th ey didn’t … He didn’t even know that he was going to die, 
I can assure you’ (interview with Rear-Admiral Horacio Mayorga, 3 
October 1990). Proof of this procedure was provided in 2005 when 
forensic anthropologists exhumed twelve individuals at General 
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Lavalle cemetery and discovered, by examining the skeletal lesions, 
that they had fallen onto a water surface from a great height before 
washing ashore (EAAF  2006 : 18). 
 Recoverable ESMA captives were enrolled in a rehabilitation 
programme. Th is programme resembled the thought-reform pro-
grammes of communist China, which Lift on described as an alter-
nation between assault and leniency, and the demand of confession 
and re-education. ‘Th e physical and emotional assaults bring about 
the symbolic death; leniency and the developing confession are the 
bridge between death and rebirth; the re-education process, along 
with the fi nal confession, create the rebirth experience’ (Lift on  1961 : 
66). Th e ESMA rehabilitation programme pursued a similar structure 
of social death and rebirth, implemented through brutality and for-
bearance, but the specifi c steps were quite diff erent from the Chinese 
practice. Th e emphasis rested on the social habitus of the captives, on 
changing their social identity, group attachments and sense of social 
order as well as an embrace of Western and Christian values. 
 Th e ESMA rehabilitation process consisted of four phases. Th e 
fi rst phase was directed at the old self. Disappearance and torture 
accomplished a social death, briefl y described above. Th e second 
phase served to assess the transitional self. Th e captive’s con-
duct revealed the eff ects of the dismantling process. Some became 
apathetic, others collaborated and still others resisted any attempt 
to destroy their social identity. Th e condition of being disappeared 
suspended captives between life and death, and their behaviour and 
thoughts determined whether they would be saved or assassinated. 
At this stage, decisions were taken about the person’s life. Recoverable 
persons were resubjectifi ed by converting the subject–object into a 
subject–subject relation between captor and captive, albeit under 
strict conditions and without reverting to the old self. Without 
shackles and blindfolds, the captives were taken to the Hood, put in 
a cell, and ordered to carry out small tasks such as sweeping fl oors 
or distributing meals. 
 Th e third phase accomplished a social rebirth through the slow 
reconstruction of a new self in harmony with the reorganised 
Argentine society. Dignity was restored by addressing captives by 
their personal names, and by providing privileges such as bathroom 
facilities, cigarettes and better food. Birthdays would be celebrated 
and captives might go out on a picnic or play a game of soccer with 
their captors. New tasks were assigned that were in accordance with 
their old professional identities. Meanwhile, supervising offi  cers held 
lengthy conversations with the captives and observed them closely. 
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Graciela Daleo felt like crying when a close fellow captive was bru-
tally tortured but she succeeded in containing herself until she was 
in her cell, because ‘crying was a sign of weakness or that one had 
not recuperated’ ( El Diario del Juicio 1985 22: 424). She observes that 
they wanted her to abandon the feelings of social solidarity nurtured 
during her decades as a revolutionary, and become an individualist. 
She was told repeatedly: ‘it’s an individual process here, you have 
nothing to do with the rest, everything has to do with you’ ( El Diario 
del Juicio 1985 22: 429). 
 Th e rehabilitation programme pursued a resocialisation that 
involved accepting the conditions set in the detention centre. 
Captives were given psychological tests to assess their progress, and 
were encouraged to write a self-critique. Whereas before they were 
punished for using refl exive forms, such as ‘I think’ and ‘I believe’, 
they were now asked to refl ect on their lives. Miriam Lewin’s life 
story was so liked by her captors that they gave her the good news: 
‘You’re reborn, kid. What you wrote fell really well, so we have 
decided to save your life’ ( El Diario del Juicio 1985 21: 413). A suc-
cessful spiritual rebirth meant that the disappeared denounced his or 
her Marxist beliefs and had acquired Western and Christian values. 
Th e release of recovered captives was a proof to the military that 
the cultural war had been won because if even confi rmed believers 
in the revolution could be resocialised, then they were living proof 
that Argentine society as a whole had been remade. Th e Process of 
National Reorganisation had been successful, in their eyes, and the 
Argentine military who had had the ungrateful task of curing the 
sick social body through more than 10,000 assassinations had acted 
in a Christian spirit of forgiveness, mercy and magnanimity by free-
ing some of their former enemies. 
 Th e rehabilitation programme’s fi nal phase was the slow reincor-
poration into society. Th e disappeared reappeared through a phone 
call to relatives, an outing to a bar or a short family visit accompanied 
by one or two offi  cers. Eventually, the person would be released but 
remained under surveillance and had to call or visit the clandestine 
detention centre periodically for assessment talks. Th e ESMA rehabili-
tation programme contained these four phases most clearly, but the 
fi rst three were common in other clandestine detention centres. 
 The return of the disappeared-dead 
 Th e assassination of abducted captives was carried out by task 
forces who possessed jurisdiction over the 117 areas that organised 
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the nation-wide repression. Each area had one or more clandes-
tine detention centres that formed part of a secret web of repressive 
institutions (Robben  2005 : 193–7). Th e armed forces, police, courts, 
hospitals, morgues, cemeteries and airports were to a greater or 
lesser extent all involved in the necropolitical shadow state. Th e dis-
appeared were cremated, buried in mass and anonymous graves or 
dumped at sea. Forensic anthropologists have documented around 
10,000 assassinated disappeared persons, but the human rights 
movement insists that 30,000 disappeared were murdered. Th e 
Argentine armed forces tried to erase every trace of their remains, 
but failed to do so. 
 Uruguayan authorities found mutilated bodies along its shores 
within weeks of the military coup of March 1976 (Dandan  2011 ). 
Th e Argentine police recovered bloated corpses from the Paran á 
river, and brought them to a local cemetery ‘blindfolded, gagged 
and with their hands tied behind their backs with wire’ (CONADEP 
 1986 : 228). Th ese remains were most oft en buried anonymously, 
even when a positive identifi cation had been made. Occasionally, 
the relatives were notifi ed. Elsa S á nchez de Oesterheld’s husband and 
four daughters were abducted in 1976 and 1977 by the Argentine 
Army. Th ey all disappeared, except her eighteen-year-old daughter 
Beatriz. Her body ‘was the only one I recovered because a police 
commissioner did not have the courage to bury her anonymously’ 
(interview with Elsa S á nchez de Oesterheld, 15 April 1991). 
 Th us, the disappeared-dead came to govern the dictatorial state, 
to paraphrase John Borneman (this volume), as they kept turning 
up and as searching relatives kept demanding attention to their 
plight. Human rights organisations, and in particular the Mothers 
of the Plaza de Mayo, reminded the Argentine people and the state 
authorities of the existence of disappeared citizens through habeas 
corpus petitions and public protests. All levels of state were obliged 
to respond to the pleas for information but they only seldom came 
through: the judiciary, the armed forces, the police, local, provincial 
and national authorities, state hospitals, morgues, military bases, 
Argentine embassies and so on. In addition, searching mothers told 
their heartrending stories abroad, and solidarity movements sprang 
up in Europe and the United States. 
 Th e fi rst cracks in the shadow state developed aft er the June 1982 
defeat of Argentine troops by a British expeditionary force during the 
Falkland/Malvinas War. Government employees tipped off  relatives 
about the whereabouts of anonymous burial places, and a few judges 
felt more at liberty to order exhumations. Th e fi rst exhumation of a 
mass grave took place in October 1982. Around 400 unidentifi ed 
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skeletons were found at the Grand Bourg cemetery (Cohen Salama 
 1992 : 60). Th e December 1983 turn to democracy, and investiga-
tions into the whereabouts of the disappeared by a truth commis-
sion, made room for many more exhumations. 
 Th e military’s grand design for a reorganised Argentina had been 
eroded by the very disappearances that were intended to accomplish 
the desired cultural sovereignty. Key military commanders were 
sentenced between 1984 and 1986 but growing unrest within the 
armed forces, and the determination of President Ra ú l Alfons í n and 
his successor Carlos Sa ú l Menem to reconcile the nation, resulted 
in an amnesty for indicted troops and former guerrillas in 1986 and 
1987, and the pardoning of convicted offi  cers, junta members and 
guerrilla commanders in 1989 and 1990. 
 Ongoing exhumations, and the creation of memorials, monu-
ments and memory sites during the 1990s, unveiled the hidden 
infrastructure of the necropolitical shadow state. Th e disappeared, 
who had been assassinated and concealed to cleanse the nation of 
so-called subversive elements, were reincorporated into Argentine 
society through ceremonial reburials as honourable deceased citi-
zens whose ideals for a more just Argentina were praised publicly. 
Meanwhile, the clamour for the resentencing of perpetrators became 
louder and louder. 
 Declarations by Army Commander Mart í n Balza that the dic-
tatorship had designed a standard operating procedure to separate 
guerrillas from their children, and hand them to childless mili-
tary couples, led in June 1998 to the arrest of the pardoned dicta-
tor Lieutenant-General Jorge Rafael Videla on kidnapping charges. 
Th e incarceration of many other high-ranking offi  cers encouraged 
human rights lawyers, judges and members of Congress to seek the 
derogation of the amnesty laws and presidential pardons. Th ese 
initiatives were accelerated when President Kirchner took offi  ce 
in 2003. Th e Supreme Court overthrew the amnesty laws in 2005 
and the presidential pardons in 2007. By August 2011, 198 persons 
had been convicted of human rights violations, and 1,061 had been 
indicted or were on trial (CELS  2011 ; Robben  2010 ). 
 Conclusion 
 Th e Argentine military embarked between 1976 and 1983 on a 
cultural war against their own people, determined to secure the 
country’s cultural sovereignty. Biopower was defi ned in cultural 
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terms, and required necropower to constitute an authoritarian gov-
ernmentality. Whereas the territorial sovereignty of the Argentine 
postcolonial state had been achieved in the late nineteenth century 
through the aggressive conquest of land and the extermination of the 
indigenous inhabitants, the dictatorial regime sought to create cul-
tural sovereignty through state terrorism, crimes against humanity 
and an authoritarian control over Argentine society. Cultural sover-
eignty became extended into the bodies and minds of the enemies 
of the state through disappearance, torture and either rehabilitation 
or assassination. Just as the political sovereignty of rulers is ultim-
ately vested in the power to decide about life and death through 
the constitutional right to punish off enders and make war against 
foreign powers, so the Argentine military felt legitimated to defi ne 
the boundaries and conditions of Argentine society and culture. 
Argentines considered unfi t for the coveted Christian nation were 
disappeared so that they could not be reincorporated into society 
as dead citizens or remembered as martyrs for what the military 
regarded as subversive causes. 
 Th e military soon realised that their grandiose plans were frus-
trated by the disappeared-living and disappeared-dead who had 
been banned from society. Relatives demanded information about 
their fate, and resisted attempts to silence them through denial, 
intimidation and the disappearance of human rights leaders. Th e 
defi ant weekly protest of searching mothers, right in front of the 
presidential palace at the Plaza de Mayo, showed that the authori-
tarian regime had been unable to stamp out the culture of street 
mobilisations that had characterised Argentine politics since the 
rise of Per ó n in 1945 and had forced the military to allow his return 
to the presidency in 1973. Increasing street protests and strikes 
by workers in 1981 and early 1982 added to the social unrest. Th e 
worsening economic crisis, rising political expectations about a 
peaceful transition to democracy, and national and international 
human rights protests moved the junta to invade the Falkland/
Malvinas Islands to detract from the domestic troubles. Th e mili-
tary defeat in the South Atlantic accelerated the fall of the dictator-
ship and resulted in free elections by October 1983. Little remained 
of the regime’s cultural sovereignty as the democratic government 
reversed the restrictions on political freedom and cultural expres-
sion to create an open society. 
 Th e sovereign democratic state was, however, unable to disen-
tangle itself from authoritarian necropolitics because the social 
indefi nition of the disappeared continued to weigh on Argentina. 
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Th e disappeared could not be incorporated into society as deceased 
members and the searching relatives could not occupy their place as 
bereaved citizens. Th is existential anguish made former Montonero 
Ernesto Jauretche wish a similar fate upon Emilio Massera, the one-
time junta member and master-mind of the ESMA secret detention 
centre, who died a convicted man in November 2010. Jauretche 
( 2010 ) wrote in his scathing obituary: 
 Th at he will never return from his decaying remains, that he will never be 
able to reproduce himself; that if God exists, he will not give him shelter 
not even in a latrine of heaven, and that neither the devil nor the third 
hell will accept him. Th at there will not even be for him the promised 
biblical resurrection. 
 Radical evil does not deserve the spiritual rest denied so cruelly to 
others, Jauretche seems to suggest, because death is not there for 
human beings to own or dispossess. 
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 Dangerous corpses in Mexico’s drug war 
 Regnar  Kristensen 
 On 16 December 2009, 400 heavily armed soldiers from the 
Mexican marine forces entered an enclosed residential zone in the 
city of Cuernavaca to arrest the drug baron Beltr á n Leyva, leader 
of the Mexican drug cartel of the same name. He was classifi ed as 
the most violent drug cartel leader on the planet by the American 
Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), and as an extremely dangerous 
enemy of the fatherland by the Mexican president, Felipe Calder ó n. 
For several hours, the marines were engaged in heavy shooting with 
the end result that Beltr á n Leyva was killed, along with three of his 
hit men and one marine. Th e Mexican press generally considered 
this incident a success story of the Mexican government’s harder 
law-enforcement measures in the current war on organised crime. 
My approach to this incident, however, is not to analyse the hyper-
complex discourse on state, law enforcement and organised crime in 
Mexico. Rather, I will take this story as a departure point for explor-
ing the governance of dead bodies, which starts where it ends for 
most scholars of political science and criminology. As the contribu-
tions to this volume show, the corpse is not always the end of the 
story. On the contrary, as we shall see, a corpse still holds the power 
to stir up more death. 
 Th e overall argument is that the brutal treatment of corpses 
transgresses the spheres of national security politics and the sim-
ple spread of terror. Corpses are instead seen as a social force that 
enchants politics and socialises religion. Th ey make the past present 
164  Regnar Kristensen
and foresee possible futures. Drawing on popular Catholic practices 
I stumbled over in my fi eldwork among criminal gangs in Mexico 
City, 1 I take the liberty in this chapter of speculating on the possible 
social and cosmological complications of the violations of Beltr á n 
Leyva’s corpse in the Mexican drug war. Th e analysis takes it depart-
ure from the way in which Beltr á n Leyva’s corpse was dealt with and 
draws on theories of the sovereign’s use of excessive force (Hansen 
and Stepputat  2005 ), the enchantment of politics (Verdery  1999 ) 
and the social lives of bones (Krmpotich  et al.  2010 ). Th e conclusion 
is that a violent death in popular Catholicism may prevent the soul 
from leaving the dead body for purgatory, and that this provides the 
ground from which ‘bone-trapped’, restless spirits can terrorise the 
living. 
 The story of Beltr á n Leyva’s corpse 
 In the days aft er the killing of Beltr á n Leyva, images of his corpse 
were broadcast in the Mexican and world media. Th e blood-covered 
corpse was shown with bullet holes and a disfi gured arm. It was, 
moreover, stripped naked and covered with pesos and dollar bills 
soaked in his blood. On his stomach, somebody had placed several 
religious amulets and a paper slip with a number three on it, perhaps 
as a reminder of the custom in the Los Zetas drug cartel of naming 
members with a number. Th is cartel was, at that time, collaborating 
with that of Beltr á n Leyva. Th e obscene photos of the disfi gured, 
ridiculed corpse had not, however, received many comments in the 
media before the next instance of bloodshed occurred one week 
later, to which I shall return aft er following the corpse of Beltr á n 
Leyva to his grave. 
 Th e burial of Beltr á n Leyva’s corpse was deferred for four days 
since there were a number of formalities to be undergone before it 
could be taken to the cemetery. Conspiracy pervades Mexico, and 
rumour had it that the corpse did not really belong to him. It was 
hence important for the Mexican government to prove that they had 
shot the right person. Beltr á n Leyva’s dead body therefore fi rst had 
to be transferred to the forensic laboratory (SEMEFO) in Morelos in 
order for its DNA to be compared with a sample from his brother, 
who had served time in gaol, and confi rm that the corpse was indeed 
Leyva’s. Th e transfer of his corpse from the place of killing to the 
forensic laboratory was followed meticulously in most newspapers, 
from which I quote  El Reforma : 
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 Elements of the marines started to mobilise inside and outside the resi-
dence before the removal of the corpse of Beltr á n Leyva. Th e presence of 
elements from the marine force increased in the zone, in addition to the 
arrival shortly before of armed vehicles from the Mexican Army, which 
had to protect the area. 2 
 To my initial surprise, it apparently required many heavily armed 
soldiers to transfer the corpse to the forensic laboratory. Equally sur-
prising was the subsequent armed protection of the corpse at the 
forensic laboratory, which was also followed closely by all national 
newspapers. Quoting from  El Universal : 
 Th e installations of SEMAFO were converted into an invincible fortress 
guarded by armoured cars, soldiers, tanks and artillery to avoid any inci-
dents. Nobody was allowed to enter until the day aft er, when the sister of 
the deceased drug cartel leader and a friend of hers arrived and identifi ed 
themselves at the entrance to SEMAFO. Immediately, the soldiers took 
positions of protection and sent a signal of alert to the police and soldiers 
surrounding the installation. 3 
 My question here is why were the newspapers so eagerly describing 
the tense, secret and apparently very dangerous atmosphere around 
the forensic laboratory, which was converted into ‘an invincible fort-
ress’? Th e corpse subsequently had to be transferred to Culiac á n, 
Beltr á n Leyva’s hometown in the state of Sinaloa. Th e media was 
again thrilled by this transfer. One newspaper stated that the corpse 
had been transferred from the Federal District to Culiac á n (approxi-
mately 1,000 kilometres) in a large car followed by two military vehi-
cles. 4 Another, that a commercial aircraft  had been hired to transfer 
it. 5 Th e funeral itself was apparently also a major security challenge 
for the military. Quoting again from  El Reforma : 
 Five army vehicles yesterday protected the convoy of ten cars which 
transferred the body of Beltr á n Leyva to the graveyard of Jardines de 
Humaya, where he was buried in the presence of family and friends, 
mostly women and children. More than 150 soldiers blocked the main 
roads to the cemetery in a strong and vigilant operation. Women and 
children were astonished and terrorised at being checked by the soldiers, 
who stood outside the graveyard for sixteen hours to avoid any possible 
attack. Additionally, some soldiers were dressed in civilian clothes to 
oversee the cemetery from the inside. 6 
 One might think this was the last we would hear of the corpse of 
Beltr á n Leyva and yet, one month later, a brief notice in the national 
newspaper,  El Universal , 7 was soon reposted on various Internet 
pages such as Twitter and Latin News. It concerned an unpleasant 
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incident of a decapitated head found on top of Beltr á n Leyva’s grave, 
apparently belonging to the corpse of a local resident who had been 
murdered and beheaded days before. Curiously enough some of 
the commentaries stated that the decapitated head might have been 
used in a satanic rite. 8 Th is disfi gured head was merely one more 
contribution to the gloomy Mexican statistic of a beheading a day 
among the fi ghting cartels in Mexico’s drug war. In this case, the 
unfortunate person’s head once again drew media attention to the 
disfi gured corpse of Beltr á n Leyva. 
 The story of the marine’s corpse 
 Two days aft er Beltr á n Leyva’s funeral, the marine who had been shot 
during the campaign was buried in the presence of both family and 
military personnel in his home state of Tabasco. Prominent soldiers 
and family accompanied his body on the last stretch of an offi  cial 
burial ceremony. Th e soldier’s coffi  n was wrapped in the Mexican 
fl ag and followed to the grave while a band played the national 
anthem in the presence of the Secretary of the Marines. 9 And yet the 
soldiers and Secretary of the Marines had barely parted with their 
dead colleague when the deceased’s family was brutally gunned 
down on their way home. Th e dead marine’s mother, brother, sister 
and aunt were all killed in a hail of bullets from the hitmen of the Los 
Zetas drug cartel. Th is bloodshed was interpreted by the media as 
revenge for the publication of the obscene photos of Beltr á n Leyva’s 
corpse. To quote one journalist: ‘Th is rage is in response to the bar-
baric treatment of the corpse of Beltr á n Leyva who, despite being 
a criminal, has the right to some dignity.’ 10 Th e discussions in the 
media following the killing and counter-killings soon took on a pol-
itical agenda. Whereas left -wing politicians and journalists attacked 
the barbarism of both the cartels and the government and depicted 
it as a clear sign of the government’s loss of control and inability 
to protect its own citizens, the government’s version was rather to 
downplay the importance of the photos, if not to attempt to apolo-
gise for their grotesque nature, saying it was a bad joke on the part of 
the forensic staff . 11 Yet, at the same time, it claimed that the barbar-
ically violent murders of the dead soldier’s family were the irrational 
behaviour of criminal groups that were being squeezed into a corner 
in the current war on crime. 
 By now, it should be clear that the desecration of Beltr á n Leyva’s 
corpse had had violent consequences. Th e desecration of his corpse 
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was clearly overstepping some moral boundary. Without doubt, 
many Mexicans fear the escalating rate of killings and disfi guration 
of corpses. Many of them welcomed this incident as an opportun-
ity to criticise the government and the cartels for engaging in ever 
more ‘uncivil warfare’, in which violence does not follow normal 
codes of honour. Regardless of the side of the political spectrum, 
the violence against Beltr á n Leyva’s corpse and the deceased mar-
ine soldier’s family was hence described as barbaric, uncivilised 
behaviour. In both cases, cultural and international practices of the 
proper conduct of ‘war’ were transgressed. However, although it 
could be seen as simple terror on the part of the Los Zetas drug car-
tel, there was no need for the forces of law and order to take those 
same means into their hands, even though they were perhaps not 
displeased with the eff ects of the published pictures. Th ey showed a 
wider audience that the state can also transgress the normal bound-
aries of ‘war’ conduct to maintain the image of a sovereign state’s 
far-reaching power. In this case, the excess of one seems to have 
triggered the excess of the other, indicating that we are currently 
witnessing a special economy of violence in Mexico analogous to 
economies of terror seen elsewhere (e.g. in Colombia; see Taussig 
 1987 ). Th e treatment of corpses is here vital for the excess to trigger 
further terror. 
 Sovereign bodies and the will to violence 
 Scholars have drawn attention to the fact that so-called ‘wars’ on 
internal enemies (e.g. criminals or terrorists) within nation-states 
take on characteristics which are diff erent from those of traditional 
‘wars’ between nations. Th ey question, in particular, the notion of 
 sovereign bodies by suggesting a shift  in ground of our understand-
ing of sovereignty from issues of territory and external recognition 
by states to issues of internal constitutions of sovereign power within 
states through the exercise of violence over bodies and populations 
(Hansen and Stepputat  2005 : 2). Drawing on Foucault and Bataille, 
Hansen and Stepputat suggest that the heart of sovereignty can be 
found in the use of irrational, excessive and arbitrary power. Surplus 
power and excess is, for them, the very mark of sovereignty ( 2005 : 
11). It is not, however, an all-consuming power. On the contrary, 
as they also argue, ‘[S]overeignty is the tension between the will to 
arbitrary violence and the existence of bodies that can be killed but 
also resist sovereign power’ ( 2005 : 13). 
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 In Beltr á n Leyva’s case, it was not only the state that had the will 
to excessive violence. Th e drug cartel also had this will, and, as such, 
the case is an example of how an organised criminal group acts as an 
informal sovereign power that has become a law unto itself and, at 
the same time, the perennial outside, an unruly and original source 
of sovereign life that is a necessary condition for any claim to defend 
a social order. As Hansen and Stepputat argue: ‘[I]n such situations 
the state is not the natural and self-evident centre and origin of sov-
ereignty, but one among several sovereign bodies that tries to assert 
itself upon the bodies of asylum seekers, “terrorist”, or mere crimi-
nals’ ( 2005 : 36). However, if the irrational, uncivil violence is the 
force of the  living sovereign powers (in this case both the cartels and 
the Mexican state), what of the apparent puzzle of the force of the 
 dead corpse? I am here referring to the rather strange presence of 
so many soldiers in the last journeys of the corpse of Beltr á n Leyva 
from his death to the cemetery in Culiac á n fi ve days later. Th e most 
violent cartel leader on the planet, to paraphrase the DEA, seemed – 
peculiarly enough – to be more dangerous dead than alive. In the 
newspapers, the presence of soldiers was explained by the desire to 
‘protect’ and ‘avoid incidents’ or ‘attacks’. It is hard to believe, how-
ever, that the relatives or neighbours considered the presence of 
armed forces as protective; aft er all, it was soldiers that killed Beltr á n 
Leyva. If anything, it was the corpse of the dead marine, or at least 
his family, that needed this protection. Th e fact that many might also 
have been tempted to take revenge on Beltr á n Leyva’s relatives for the 
violence he committed cannot be ruled out, yet the military presence 
still seems exaggerated, and, as seen with the deceased soldier, ven-
geance does not need the presence of the original corpse for it to be 
delivered. 
 It can also be argued that the state’s interest in protecting the dead 
bodies is because they wished to infl uence the recognition of the 
dead person, in this case converting the dead soldier into a national 
hero and the dead drugs baron into a national tragedy. And yet, if 
the military presence was merely symbolic, it was counterproductive 
to allow so many soldiers to walk the ‘evil’ guy to his grave, mak-
ing his funeral reminiscent of a state funeral. As Katherine Verdery 
has convincingly argued in  Th e Political Lives of Dead Bodies ( 1999 ), 
there may be more enchanted approaches towards corpses than the 
sovereign’s image strategies. She suggests here a diff erent take on the 
politics of corpses by focusing on how the reburials of revolution-
ary leaders, artists and more humble folk have  enchanted the polit-
ical life of Eastern Europe and played a fundamental part in revising 
the past and reorienting the present following the fall of the Soviet 
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Union. Her take on these complex symbolic processes is grounded 
in cultural anthropology, giving the negotiation of meaning prece-
dence over explanatory models. 
 I present the politics of corpses as being less about legitimating new 
governments (though it can be that too) than about cosmologies and 
practices relating the living and the dead. And I see the rewriting of his-
tory that is obviously central to the dead-body politics as part of a larger 
process whereby fundamental changes are occurring in conceptions of 
time itself.  (Verdery  1999 : 26) 
 By ‘changes in the conception of time’, Verdery is referring to the 
ability of dead bodies to transcend time, making past human beings 
immediately present. It should be clarifi ed that Verdery analyses 
reburials of corpses. Beltr á n Leyva was not reburied but merely bur-
ied. Not much time passed between his death and his burial. Still, 
I fi nd Verdery’s take on corpses as reference points for a cultural 
enchantment of politics to be rewarding when exploring the imme-
diate aft erlife of Beltr á n Leyva’s corpse. No matter what side we see it 
from, the burial of his corpse was part of a wider cultural context in 
which both the state and the cartel’s reactions could be viewed and 
criticised for overstepping the proper cultural treatment of corpses, 
evidencing a lack of respect for both dead and living but also creat-
ing an enchanted environment of suspense as evidenced in the news-
paper descriptions of the mystery and dangers surrounding Beltr á n 
Leyva’s last journey from Cuernavaca to the graveyard in Sinaloa. 
Th ey expected something ugly to happen but did not know from 
where it would come, nor what form it would take. Th is suspense, 
underscored by the head subsequently found on his grave, is evi-
dently embedded in cultural practices that look forwards as much as 
backwards, where time fl ows easily between past, present and future. 
Th e point of drawing on Verdery is that her view on political corpses 
underscores this ability to transgress the past and make it present, 
which in this case is a scary thought but also an ‘enchanted’ way 
of interpreting dead-body politics in Mexico. As Verdery cogently 
points out, dead bodies as a symbol have the great advantage of not 
talking much on their own, even though they did once ( 1999 : 29), 
which makes them altogether unusually protean and concrete sym-
bols ( 1999 : 52). As she states: 
 Th ey [corpses] are indisputably  there , as our senses of sight, touch, and 
smell can confi rm. As such, a body’s materiality can be critical to its 
symbolic effi  cacy: unlike notions such as ‘patriotism’ or ‘civil society’, 
for instance, a corpse can be moved around, displayed, and strategically 
located in specifi c places.  (Verdery  1999 : 27; emphasis in the original) 
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 Hence, on the one hand we have these concrete, potent symbols that 
are moved around in the national geography, contributing to the pol-
itical landscape of excessive violence. On the other, they make the 
past present and foreshadow the future in so far as they send a strong 
message to the public of what might happen. Th e word ‘enchanted’ 
captures here the ambivalent sensation of awe, thrill and being spell-
bound, and furthermore connects the dead bodies to the national 
history of violence, which could transgress to the present. Th e con-
struction of the Mexican state has been narrated as an extremely vio-
lent one (Brandes  2006 ; Lomnitz  2005 ) with several beheadings and 
disfi gurations of founding state heroes, Miguel Hidalgo, Santa Anna 
and Pancho Villa being just three of the most famous. Th e found-
ing father of Mexican independence, Miguel Hidalgo, was publicly 
decapitated in 1811. Th e revolutionary hero Pancho Villa’s skull was 
stolen from his grave in 1926 and the ‘on and off ’ President Santa 
Anna lost his leg in a battle in 1838 and buried it in a graveyard 
in Mexico City, only to have it excavated and torn to pieces by an 
angry mob years later. If the cultural practices of corpses contain, as 
Verdery argues, the ability to transgress time, making past present, 
the treatment of these famous Mexican corpses becomes a frighten-
ingly potent symbol. Seen as such, no wonder the brutal treatment 
of corpses generates such strong sensations among many Mexicans. 
Yet if the disfi gured corpses are seen as violated ‘lives’ capable of 
transgressing time, would it also be possible to imagine that they 
have a more material life to them? Are they just particularly potent 
symbols, as Verdery argues, or is there some ‘force’ related to the 
materiality of these corpses? If this is the case, would it raise another 
more supernatural reason for the Mexican state and the soldiers to 
watch over the corpse of Beltr á n Leyva? What if the forensic staff  
did desecrate his corpse for a joke and later made the military afraid 
of the cosmological consequences of their act? Or, to put it diff er-
ently, what if the symbolic ‘force’ of his corpse, which shows his and 
his rivals’ ‘will to kill and be killed’, was closely interlinked with the 
material life of the dead corpse? 
 The substance of dead bodies 
 To approach this line of investigation of the corpse’s social life, I 
draw on some of the arguments discussed in the special issue on 
the material life of bones in the  Journal of Material Culture (14(4), 
2010). Some of the authors in the network are colloquially known 
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as the ‘Bones Collective’. Th ey ground their investigations and the-
oretical approaches in distinguishing bones as things, and bones as 
substance. Quoting them: 
 In starting from this approach, we are not rendering bones as other-than-
human, but rather focus attention on the very properties, processes and 
techniques through which bones and bone are constantly negotiated as 
person or things, subjects or objects, meaning or matter … Th e approach 
we advocate here is a reading of bones (and indeed bodies) not prede-
fi ned as corpse or as symbol but as parts of other people that are sensed 
through our faculties.  (Krmpotich  et al.  2010 : 372) 
 Hence the question is not ‘what do people do with bones?’, as in 
Verdery’s more symbolic approach, but rather ‘what do bones do 
to people?’. In this approach, the scholars focus on the desire to 
fi nd the individual subject in the bones. With the naming of the 
corpses comes an increased subjectivity and an increased human-
ness which counteract those aspects of mortuary practices that are 
oft en designed to distance the living and the dead, to transform the 
dead into another social space and set of social relations (Krmpotich 
 et al.  2010 : 379), in particular if the person suff ered what Hertz long 
ago identifi ed as a ‘bad death’ ( 1960 ), as in the case of both the sol-
dier and Beltr á n Leyva. Fontein and Harries have proposed that the 
humanising eff orts might be a form of compensation for a ‘bad death’ 
( 2009 : 8). Th is compensation links otherwise qualitatively diff erent 
worlds since the bones somehow connect past life (and violent death) 
with present violent aft erlife. Th is opens up the possibility of inquir-
ies into the religious experiences of the people in question. In the 
following, I will move the analysis into the fi eld of religion, aware 
that popular Catholicism is a major player among both soldiers and 
criminals. It should be remembered that the obscene photos of the 
corpse showed religious amulets belonging to Beltr á n Leyva placed 
on his mutilated body by the soldiers. Photos released aft er his death 
also showed fi gurines of the Virgin of Guadalupe and San Juan de Los 
Lagos standing on a shelf in his fl at. My own research into criminal 
gangs in Mexico City that were associated with Beltr á n Leyva also 
clearly demonstrated a strong religious devotion to popular Catholic 
saints and virgins among so-called criminals (Kristensen  2011 ). 
 Drawing on Fontein and Harries, the question is ‘what do bones 
do to people’ when they die violently? Popular Catholic beliefs in 
Mexico at times stress the fact that the souls of those dying ‘badly’ 
have a hard time leaving their earthly relatives. Th is was the case 
among the criminals I studied in Mexico City. Th ey told me about 
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how the lost souls of relatives or friends were troubling them or 
the people living physically close to the deceased (the graveyard, 
or where he or she had died). I was told that the souls of deceased 
relatives seek them out where they used to live (their home, place 
of death, former workplace, etc.). One family had severe problems 
with a son/brother/father who was killed by bodyguards when steal-
ing to buy toys for Magic Day for his children. His soul was wan-
dering restlessly, causing accidents (stove set on fi re, things falling 
down scaring the children, etc.). Gang members also told me how 
one of them was violently attacked by a restless soul at Jubilete, a 
historical place on their pilgrimage from Mexico City to San Juan de 
Los Largos, where Catholics were killed by the Mexican Army in the 
Cristero War of 1926–9. 
 Th ese attacks were explained by the deceased soul’s incapacity to 
leave earth for a temporal purifi cation in purgatory before the fi nal 
judgement. In contrast to the souls of a ‘good death’ (Malvido  2005 : 
20–7), the souls of a ‘bad death’ stayed close to their bodily remains 
on earth and terrorised their living relatives and people passing close 
to their remains. Th e point I make here is not to explore further 
the public prayer sessions and rituals which families and pilgrims 
have ventured into to ensure that the deceased souls fi nd peace and 
stop bothering them. I do not know what the family did to secure 
Beltr á n Leyva’s soul’s peace of mind, if anything. Th e point is rather 
to speculate analytically as to whether the violent death of Beltr á n 
Leyva and the disfi guration of his corpse could also have infl uenced 
how people view the aft erlife of his soul. Before continuing with this 
analysis, I have to clarify that the idea of purgatory as a physical 
place is not part of the Roman Catholic Church’s doctrine; how-
ever, gang members (and others) oft en believe that it is a place, as 
the noun grammatically indicates. Th is adds a spatial dimension to 
the purifi cation process in purgatory, which becomes crucial to the 
‘lives’ of the ‘bone-trapped’ souls who cannot leave earth because of 
their ‘bad death’. 
 Extending the line of analysis of Fontein and Harries, I suggest 
Beltr á n Leyva’s disfi gured bones not only ‘do something to people’ 
(trigger awe and violence) but also ‘do something to his soul’. So far, 
we have seen that the soldiers followed the corpse closely for fear of 
new outbreaks of violence, and yet, given the popular Catholic beliefs 
in the roads aft erlife can take, I cannot help speculating whether the 
disfi gured bones might also contain a danger beyond this, in so far 
as they might oblige his soul to stay longer in the vicinity of his phys-
ical remains. On the one hand, the popular Roman Catholic belief 
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has it that his death allows his soul to detach from his body and 
start a purifi cation process in purgatory. Even for mortal sinners, 
there is a chance for salvation of their soul in purgatory, especially if 
the people left  behind render suffi  cient worship to God and pray for 
them. For Roman Catholics it might, however, take a good deal of 
prayer before a soul is suffi  ciently purifi ed; at least, there is no reason 
to believe that many Catholics in Mexico would not suspect this to be 
the case for this notorious violent drug baron. On the other, accord-
ing to the popular belief mentioned earlier, his violent death and 
unfi nished errands could prevent his soul from leaving earth, and 
this becomes a major cosmological problem if purgatory is some-
where other than earth. Th e result is a kind of long-term incomplete 
detachment of the soul from the dead body – which leaves the soul 
stranded in a long liminal period (see Turner  1967 ). 
 If we take popular Catholicism into consideration, Beltr á n 
Leyva’s last trip to the graveyard and beyond could thus also be seen 
as a stranded purifi cation process whereby his soul is trapped near 
his dead body, leaving it restless to terrorise people, a scary thought 
when one considers his ‘will to kill’. If we follow this line of specula-
tive analysis a little further it brings us to the graveyards, since they 
are the physical place where living humans are closest to the ‘bone-
trapped’, posthumous souls. What do these bones in the graveyards, 
then, do to people? How do living people approach and work with 
dead corpses? 
 The ‘force’ of forgotten bones 
 Work with dead bodies in Mexico is divided mainly between the 
Mexican state-owned cemeteries (there are also private cemeteries) 
and the dominant Catholic Church (there are also a number of other 
churches, e.g. Pentecostal, Methodist, Mormons, etc.). Th e Roman 
Catholic Church helps the souls in purgatory (by praying for them) 
and the state takes care of the dead bodies in the graveyards (by pro-
viding and maintaining the public burial grounds). Th ere is no uni-
form Mexican approach to corpses, though, given that the secular 
Mexican state has been opposed to the Roman Catholic Church in 
Mexico  per se ever since they were separated by President Benito 
Juarez in the middle of the nineteenth century. Still, the working 
division between state and Church has ensured that the two main 
players have had a fairly peaceful coexistence with regard to the ‘gov-
ernance of the dead’, which stands in stark contrast to their disputes 
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concerning ‘the governance of the living’ (e.g. abortion, divorce, 
etc.). Th e state does not interfere with how the Roman Catholic 
Church takes care of deceased souls at the time of death. Likewise 
the Roman Catholic Church does not interfere in the administration 
and caretaking of the bodies in the cemeteries, with the exception of 
the few church crypts that are open to new corpses. Th is does not 
mean that the one institution has no interest in the other’s domain. 
As we saw in the above case of the dead soldier, there may be a mix-
ture of national and religious symbols when burying a person. 
 Of the more than twenty cemeteries I visited in Mexico, it was 
not the presence of the living in the graveyards that caught my atten-
tion. Rather it was the oblivion of the dead bodies that came to my 
mind. Many graves were in a state of bad disrepair and, on some 
occasions, I would stumble over the bones of corpses because the 
graves had fallen apart and attracted dogs and other ‘bone robbers’. 
Th e tradition of going to the cemetery seems less strong than the 
impression the vast literature concerning the practices of the Days 
of the Dead in Mexico might suggest (see Brandes  2006 for a similar 
point). Th is does not mean that the spirits of the deceased are forgot-
ten; it just points to the fact that, in the popular Catholic faith, it is 
not necessary to visit relatives’ material remains to retain a spiritual 
contact with the deceased and, I would like to add here, if they have 
had a good death (detachment). Th e famous celebration of the Days 
of the Dead on 1 and 2 November in Mexico consists, among other 
things, of setting up a family altar with photos of the deceased inside 
people’s home, a popular tradition that is separate from the cemeter-
ies. Th ose who venture into the cemeteries on these two nights every 
year (and many do), and who do not merely go to observe the others 
(which many also do), very likely go to visit their deceased relatives, 
as the tradition has it. Th e same tradition, however, also clearly tells 
that it is the souls of the dead that come back for a visit on the days 
named All Saints’ Day and All Souls’ Day rather than the bones, 
which are in the graveyard all year round. Indeed, for 363 days of 
the year, the souls are not believed to be together with their earthly 
bones, according to this tradition. So even in the best-known case 
of going to the cemetery in Mexico, these are the ‘souls’’ days rather 
than the ‘bones’’ days. 
 Th e increasing use of cremation also illuminates this oblivion 
of the corpses. Th e Roman Catholic Church has traditionally dis-
couraged people from using cremation, arguing that the body is a 
holy object through which the sacrament is received and, further-
more, that cremation constitutes a denial of the Christian belief in 
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the resurrection of the body. During the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, cremation was hence viewed as pagan among Catholics, 
whereas the secular Mexican State had no problem with this prac-
tice. Th e Roman Catholic Church has, however, relaxed its policy 
towards dead bodies, and, in 1997, the Vatican granted an indult to 
allow for the celebration of the funeral liturgy, including mass, in 
the presence of the cremated remains, although this is still not pre-
ferred in most dioceses in Mexico. In spite of the clear diff erences 
between the state and the Catholic Church’s ‘governance of the dead’ 
in Mexico, they therefore both seem to allow the corpses to slide 
into oblivion. 
 Th is oblivion of the corpses, however, results in a particular 
magical practice with bones. During my fi eldwork in 2009–8, on 
several occasions I observed people looking for lonely, forgotten and 
unhappy corpses in the cemeteries. Th e idea was to take a lonely 
corpse home and seduce it to make it work for them (spying or kill-
ing). Th ey had to persuade the dead body to do so by treating it well, 
smoking with it, serving it drinks and food and performing certain 
rituals. If no name was available on the tombstone, they would also 
name it. Th e dead body could refuse the invitation and would thus 
subsequently be returned to his or her grave. It was important that 
the dead person was very lonely (a badly kept grave) and that all the 
bones of the dead body could be collected to be sure that the spirit 
had all the bodily functions necessary to follow their orders (could 
hear, use its arms and legs, etc.), otherwise it would be of no use 
to send spying or killing. A ‘fresh’ corpse was considered to hold 
more power but was oft en not ‘lonely’ enough, making the seduc-
tion eff orts harder. Th is may sound exotic and far removed from 
popular Catholic practices in Mexico, and so it is in many regards. 
Th e people participating in this moral economy explained the prac-
tice as drawing on aspects of Cuban  Palo Monte (see Lydia Cabrera 
 1975 ) also known as  Congo in Mexico City. Th ere is some obvious 
African-Christian syncretism at stake (e.g. the use of Christian 
images in rituals) in this dealing with posthumous spirits. Still more 
signifi cant for this analysis of the cosmological implications of what 
bones do to people and souls is the fact that those who ‘kidnapped’ 
the corpses from the cemeteries were the same people who went on 
long pilgrimages to Catholic shrines. Th ey were devout Catholics, 
carrying a heavy cross while reciting popular prayers for their lost 
friends and relatives in purgatory. Th ey feared attacks from restless 
souls, which they connected with the ‘bad’ deaths of the Cristero 
War or with people shot while stealing. Th e souls transgressed the 
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past and became present when attacking the pilgrims, and the same 
transgression in time happened when the lonely bones were taken 
home from the cemetery to work for them. Whether dead souls or 
forgotten bones, they had the potential for a scary ‘social life’ in the 
present. In all cases, the cosmological order allowed for constella-
tions with supernatural forces deriving from posthumous ‘lives’ that 
intervene violently in a present situation. 
 Concluding remarks 
 Th roughout this chapter I have argued that dead bodies are not 
death matter. On the contrary, corpses transgress natural and 
supernatural spheres and make the past present in possible futures. 
Th is makes the bodies that suff ered a ‘bad death’ in Mexico scary 
to follow and yet ‘good to think with’. But why connect the current 
excess of violence and the oblivion of some corpses at cemeteries 
with the necropolitics of Mexico today? Aft er all, there is a signifi -
cant time diff erence between a still warm, disfi gured corpse and the 
forgotten bones ‘kidnapped’ from the cemetery. How can they pos-
sibly be part of the same problem? Th e journey of Beltr á n Leyva’s 
corpse does not necessarily demonstrate that there is a social ‘life’ 
to his corpse going in that direction. Indeed, the journalists’ thrill 
at how the soldiers dealt with his corpse did not refer to any super-
natural force. Yet I suspect this says more about the journalists’ dis-
regard for popular Catholicism than about the awe felt among the 
soldiers and the cartel members involved. Considering the soldiers’ 
reaction and the ethnographic fi ndings of popular Catholicism in 
gangs associated with this cartel, I have taken the liberty to extend 
the journalists’ speculations and draw attention to what might 
also be at stake in this renowned case. I suggest that, as a result of 
Beltr á n Leyva’s violent death, his corpse is likely to be suspected 
in Mexico’s violent underground economy of confi ning a restless 
terrorising force capable of attacking people. If this force can fur-
thermore be used against others, there might be another good rea-
son for a little extra safeguarding of his corpse. Understanding the 
infl uence of popular religion gives us here another dimension to 
all the relevant and, for the author, also signifi cant non-religious 
reasons discussed at the beginning of the chapter. Vengeance and 
the strategic spread of terror are certainly also at stake, as well as 
the ‘will to kill’, which is at the heart of the force of the sovereigns 
fi ghting each other in the drug war. Yet it is when these diff erent 
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dimensions of the dead corpses are analysed together that we fi nd 
another more profound reason why the Mexican military and the 
Beltr á n Leyva and Los Zetas cartels were so preoccupied with this 
particular corpse. 12 
 Notes 
 1  From 2002 to 2005 the author worked as an international expert on drug 
and crime related issues at United Nations Regional Offi  ce on Drug and 
Crime (UNODC) in Mexico City. In 2008 he returned to Mexico City 
to conduct a full year of ethnographic fi eldwork on criminal gangs’ reli-
gious practices, which resulted in his PhD dissertation in anthropology 
in 2011. In 2013 he resumed fi eldwork in Mexico City, this time to con-
duct a family study on confl icts and religious practices. 
 2  El Reforma , 17 December 2009 (author’s translation). 
 3  El Universal , 19 December 2009 (author’s translation). 
 4  El Reforma , 19 December 2009. 
 5  ElUniversal.com, 20 December 2009. 
 6  El Reforma , 21 December 2009 (author’s translation). 
 7  El Universal , 19 January 2010 (author’s translation). 
 8  Spise.com, 17 January 2010. 
 9  El Reforma , 22 December 2009. 
 10  El Universal , 22 December 2009 (author’s translation). 
 11  SDPnoticias, 19 December 2009. 
 12  In October 2012, two months aft er I had written this chapter, Mexican 
marines killed another major drug baron, Heriberto Lazcano Lazcano, 
nicknamed Z-40. His corpse was stolen from the funeral home before 
he was buried. It appears here that Beltr á n Leyva’s corpse is not the only 
‘dangerous corpse’ in the Mexican drug war. 
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 Time as weather :  corpse-work in 
the prehistory of political boundaries 
 Richard  Kernaghan 
 Insurgent law, an afterlife 
 ‘Th ese things are the mirror’, said the Shining Path leader, who in 
Wilson’s accounts always stayed unnamed. ‘Th ey are the mirror so 
the people and masses will know not to commit such errors.’ 
 Th at , Wilson told me, was the answer one  guerrillero gave to his 
question of why the Party left  dead bodies in public places to rot … 
always with a sign tossed nearby announcing the crime of which the 
victim had in life been accused. Th e mistakes the anonymous leader 
alluded to were any defi ance of Party rules. Th ose same rules were 
what they would impress upon all who gazed at the physical remains 
of the condemned. 
 Wilson described this political pedagogy as a matter of fact, his 
voice steady and calm as we sat at a table adjacent to the kitchen 
of his home. Th ere he shared stories of his former days as a river 
canoe operator ferrying people and cargoes of raw cocaine across 
the Huallaga river. Like all boat operators of those times, now over 
twenty years ago, Wilson was ‘organised’ into the Shining Path 
( Sendero Luminoso ), 1 which is to say the Party kept him under watch 
and continually on call. At any moment he and his boat might be 
commandeered and sent on ‘commissions’. Wilson recalled working 
all night to pass people back and forth when the guerrillas staged 
armed stoppages on the Marginal Highway. He recalled too the disas-
trous 1989 attack on the Madre M í a army fort, when he transported 
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combatants towards the scene of the battle and then back to the 
other side with so many dead and wounded in tow. Wilson said the 
toll on the Party from that single fi ght – in losses of seasoned fi ghters 
and damage to morale – became a turning point in the war. Or so 
one veteran guerrilla combatant later confi ded to him. Th e soldiers, 
secure in their underground bunkers, ‘won’ without fi ring a shot, as 
various groups of  senderistas converged upon the fort from diff er-
ent locales. Confused about who was who in the dark of night the 
guerrillas opened fi re on each another into the early morning hours, 
until they had decimated their own ranks. Th is was the moment of 
historical revelation that Wilson foregrounded so as to explain how 
the storm of people’s war had hurtled off  course. 
 In our conversations on Huallaga history Wilson echoed many 
things I had heard about Shining Path rule during the heights of its 
power. He said that to reside in rural villages, which were recast as 
People’s Committees as early as 1982, was to live subjected to the 
demands of a Maoist-inspired armed struggle. Th ere, it was for-
bidden to espouse other political doctrines or to do anything that 
might betray the revolution. Mobility in and out of areas of insur-
gent control was severely curtailed. One could not enter or leave 
without permission. Power ostensibly belonged to ‘the people’, yet 
Wilson insisted that local Party delegates exercised a vertical, des-
potic control. 
 Attracted by an ascendant cocaine boom, the insurgency’s pol-
itical infrastructure and infl uence spread quickly throughout the 
countryside of the Upper Huallaga valley. Within a few years all 
farm land upon which the cocaine trade depended came under 
Party dominion. Anyone who wished to grow coca had to express 
support for the insurgency and its armed struggle. 2 
 Th e Shining Path governed through spectacular punishments 
meted out for transgressions of Party rules. Th rough a ritualised 
practice of revolutionary justice called ‘People’s Trials’ ( juicios popu-
lares ), the Party regularly sentenced to death those deemed polit-
ical or social enemies. Rural communities under  Sendero control 
served as prime locations for staging the  juicios where residents were 
expected to participate in the executions to show their loyalty and 
subjection. People’s Trials were a technique for forming a revolu-
tionary public: both in the sense of creating a political community 
and transforming the people who would populate it. Th e trial’s pub-
lic-generating eff ects did not end with the execution. Aft erwards the 
lifeless remains of the killed would be dumped along a road – gen-
erally the Marginal Highway – to send a message to any and all who 
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encountered them. Th e Shining Path not only distinguished between 
advocates and detractors of its revolution but called on everyone to 
think carefully in choosing sides. 3 
 In these pages I weigh the following question: to what extent have 
the eff ects of Shining Path techniques for craft ing an insurgent social 
contract lingered long aft er the movement’s demise? Human corpses 
served the ends of drawing insurgent territory and forging new law. 
Once upon a recent time what is now the region’s political  pre -history 
had profound impacts upon relations between people and property. 
I say  prehistory because, for Huallaga communities, that era falls on 
the distant ‘other side’ of the new legal situation founded through 
the Peruvian state’s military defeat of the Shining Path – an impos-
ition engendering its own silences and forms of oblivion through 
diff erent tactics where corpses too played a role. 4 Th e historical 
proximity of that former era is striking, however, less for what is 
publicly said about it than for how that other time crops up in ordin-
ary, seemingly unrelated, aff airs. 5 In the countryside it is especially 
around concerns about theft  where the disquieting past of Maoist 
armed struggle insists, though oft en through signals and gestures 
that evade direct commentary. Th ere, whether hovering obliquely in 
knowing glances, elliptical references or the occasional inside joke, 
murmurs of Shining Path justice resonate, becoming palpable in the 
rhythms and fl ows of rural life. 
 Th is chapter unfolds around a series of encounters with a long-
time resident of the Upper Huallaga valley whom I call ‘Wilson’. A 
trip to see him at a farm provides the narrative thread linking our 
conversations. My account of that trip also creates opportunities to 
point out vital markers through which a defeated insurgent legal 
order can be read from the valley’s ever transforming landscape. 
Th ose markers appear as material signs – a refurbished road-top; the 
visual display of rural place-names; and a harsh warning scrawled at 
a river’s edge – all of which indirectly convey an earlier era when dead 
bodies were common sights. Here my approach to writing is deliber-
ately ethnographic so as to better trace the shared atmospheric, sen-
sorial qualities of this historical place at a specifi c moment – the year 
2010 – in the aft ermath of insurgent law. I dwell on what is at once 
fl eeting and tangible in a mundane present of the Upper Huallaga 
valley in order to ask how the absent corpses of Shining Path law-
making circulate still and sometimes come to the fore – if now only 
 as image . Th e way those dead bodies circulate, I argue, accentuates 
the climatic attributes of political time – attributes that must fi rst be 
sensed before their importance may be grasped. For if the primary 
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purpose of political community is to safeguard relations between 
subjects, time becomes ‘weather’ precisely when the possibility of 
property itself is placed in doubt. 
 Questions 
 Th e blunt touch of  Sendero law-making oft en raised the ques-
tion of why? Why so violent? Why so uncompromising? Why did 
they impose such a rigid political programme? 6 Th e movement’s 
extreme secrecy, together with the terrors precipitated by its tac-
tics, tended to dissuade the posing of such questions to Shining 
Path members directly. Nevertheless, in rural areas of the Upper 
Huallaga valley, where the Party had an active political presence 
for over two decades – a far longer period than almost anywhere 
else in Peru – there were opportunities to ask. Th ose who lived 
or worked in rural communities oft en had intermittent contact 
with guerrilla leaders and on occasion would speak to them, if not 
entirely without fear then with a certain degree of frankness, about 
Party methods. It was from such moments of shared sociality that 
Wilson drew in order to explain to me the Shining Path’s motives 
and justifi cations. Wilson identifi ed his sources only indirectly as 
 el hombre (the man) or simply  un mando (a leader) as if to empha-
sise the prudent distance that one maintained even now by speak-
ing in less than explicit terms. 
 ‘Why’, he once asked, ‘do you kill like that … I mean, if it leaves 
people traumatised …’ But before Wilson could fi nish the  Sendero 
leader interjected: ‘Like it or not people must understand that every-
thing needs to change.’ Words alone, he claimed, would not engen-
der the deep social transformations the Party sought … only actions. 
And if they did not show what the Party was willing to do, the new 
society they hoped to create would be no diff erent from the corrupt, 
bourgeois state against which they waged people’s war. 
 In the brute presentation of dead bodies multiple kinds of dem-
onstration seemed to be in play. Human remains signalled the Party’s 
determination. Th ey established its laws. Th ey drew the boundaries 
of political community and defi ned, if only by negative example, the 
type of revolutionary subject they sought to craft . 
 Wilson distilled it down for me to one vital point: ‘Th at’s what the 
mirror was for, so that people would look at themselves through it.’ 
 From then on when we spoke about the routinised rituals of 
Shining Path justice I would return to the idea that the corpses of 
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 Sendero ’s victims could somehow possess refl ective powers. Th e 
notion of a mirror seemed to overfl ow with signifi cance but with-
out erasing a certain stubborn ambiguity. Th rough the display of the 
executed the Party clearly communicated its unequivocal dispos-
ition to kill. Less evident was how those lifeless bodies could serve as 
a catalyst for interrogating the personal behaviour and political alle-
giances of those who subsequently encountered them. I wondered in 
what precise sense coming upon a corpse could approximate seeing 
one’s own refl ection. For if gazing into a refl ective surface refers one 
back to oneself, that reference is only possible if the image in the mir-
ror is suffi  ciently similar to conceal its basic otherness – an otherness 
hovering in places both real and unreal. 7 How could looking upon 
the dead body of someone else produce a comparable likeness? And 
how might the production of such likeness have public-generating 
eff ects? 
 Th e Shining Path may have intended the act of looking at human 
corpses to alter subjectivities, but as a self-proclaimed revolution-
ary movement its broader goal was to modify collective attachments 
by announcing and reinforcing political boundaries. Bodily remains 
could be used to accomplish that, perhaps, since encounters with 
corpses focus attention on borders of the most basic and experien-
tially immanent kind. Th ey focus attention onto the lines separating 
one bodily self from another, and one human biological life from 
death. 8 
 A mirror in its own way establishes borders too by showing dou-
bles of physical things. Moreover, as a motif for the slain corpse the 
mirror brings together two aspects of the human dead: the fl eshy, 
decaying thing and the image of the deceased. In death, as Robert 
Hertz observed long ago, thing and image may at fi rst resemble 
each other, yet over time they increasingly diverge. And in cases of 
‘bad death’ the image may linger on as a disquieting presence once 
the corpse is no more. In that regard, whenever the remains of the 
executed are displayed the fi gure of the mirror could underscore 
how thing and image collaborate to deliver a grim warning, with the 
image extending that warning over time. 
 Th e idea of misfortunate events is what threats project into the 
mind. Upon the imagination the Shining Path strived to impress 
its rules. But the presentation of corpses served no less to highlight 
those places where one could be taken to stand accused before a 
People’s Trial. In that sense slain bodies acquired a topographical 
dimension as they intensely charged certain locales with an atmos-
phere of unbearable threat. 
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 Two weathers 
 On the river and along the main road encounters with corpses 
occurred with great frequency during the 1980s and early 1990s, 
so much so that they actively shaped not only the legal topography 
but the political climate of those years. Because such encounters 
seldom happen any more, considerable stress should be placed on 
the growing chronological distance between that violent period 
and the ethnographic present of the Huallaga today. A nuanced 
grasp of how the corpse-work eff ects of the past quietly persist in 
everyday experience requires weighing that ever increasing span in 
dateable time. 
 Diff erences between political eras of then and now are most 
strikingly expressed by the transformations said to have occurred 
through the shift  away from the inclement political conditions that 
prevailed not so long ago. In local accounts that former era is spoken 
of as having had an extreme volatility. People speak as if time itself 
acquired the mutability of a fi erce, dreadful storm … redolent of how 
Th omas Hobbes once defi ned political states of nature. For Hobbes 
foul weather described the hostile predisposition of all against all 
that he claimed necessarily prevailed in the absence of a single domi-
neering political order. 9 And indeed, a climatic language would seem 
to lend itself to describing the fl uid and turbulent circumstances of 
the Huallaga’s past, a past engendered through the commingling of 
various forms of violence: not only a Mao-inspired ‘people’s war’ or 
the Peruvian Army’s counter-insurgent response, but intermittent 
police drug busts and raids on coca farms as well as cocaine trad-
ers’ own confl icts among themselves. Perhaps there is little new in 
what I am saying here. Michael Taussig in his ethnographic diary of 
paramilitary violence in Colombia has emphasised the crucial place 
atmosphere occupies not only in the creation of war machines but in 
any rigorous attempt to portray them ethnographically. 10 
 Yet what if the apparent affi  nity of a meteorological language for 
depicting circumstances of extreme social unrest expressed some-
thing crucial about the political nature of time itself? Th at, at least, is 
what Michel Serres seems to propose in treating Hobbes’ allusion to 
weather as much more than metaphor. Weather, Serres suggests, is 
the elemental turbulence from which all more structured (human) 
temporalities emerge. It is a  meteoric or ‘basic time, close to chaos … 
made up of jolts’, which antecedes more redundant, clock-like tem-
poralities. 11 In that sense ‘basic time’ or  time as weather is primordial, 
and yet, as he explains, it never ceases to be but for ever hovers close 
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by: ‘always there … at my side or bombarding me with unexpected 
jostles … we together are, we and the world, immersed in it’. 12 
 Th e notion of a primal temporality predating the present while 
running simultaneously alongside it suggests an intriguing frame-
work for weighing how the political prehistory of the Huallaga con-
tinues to insist today. As a prior chaos that haunts and ever threatens 
to return, Serres’ concept of meteoric time off ers one way of asking 
how the corpses once fundamental to border-creating activity might 
linger on  in absentia though in a manner adjacent to the lived pre-
sent. Moreover, it off ers a way of gauging the diff erences between 
historical eras that takes a lateral (as opposed to backwards) glance 
at the past as it insists in the currents of ongoing social life. 
 Conceiving of time in a meteorological register also translates 
well to an ethnographic method of writing – a writing that not only 
trains attention on the sensorial details of current circumstances 
but does so with a conviction that what has passed will continually 
insinuate itself into the contemporary moment. Here such a mode 
of writing could attempt to grasp the palpitations of the Huallaga’s 
violent past through what jostles and jolts present day experience. 
Th is is to say: within the atmospheres of sensations and aff ects that 
give social encounters their singular texture, it could search for the 
precipitations of a basic time – understood as a political prehistory – 
that would make possible the sideways apprehension of antecedent 
events. 
 Th us, two very diff erent kinds of ‘weather’ but reaching one 
through the other. Up front: the acute pressing of sensations unfold-
ing. On an adjacent fl ank: primordial churning. Ethnography, 
however, as a recording activity must begin by jumping into the 
movements of a lived present … on a red Honda, let’s say, and the 
three of us spirited from town to country along a road become amaz-
ingly smooth. Th ere Charapa, ever at the helm, accelerates … until 
we are racing down the pristine jet asphalt. 
 Th is two-lane highway looks and feels brand new though it was 
fi rst built in the late 1960s. A road-building consortium recently fi n-
ished a year-long stint of construction in which it dug out the worn, 
broken surface and rebuilt it again. Where before there weren’t even 
shoulders, neat v-shaped, cement ditches now frame it on either 
side. Sharp yellow and white lines guide traffi  c by day while by night 
red refl ectors grab the glare of headlights to trace forward a ghostly 
ribbon of lanes. Th e roadside has transformed, too, populated with 
signs where once there were almost none. Bright yellow diamonds 
with black lettering advise of upcoming curves. White on green 
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rectangles announce remote hamlets and turn-off s onto formerly 
obscure rural trails. 
 Th e ordinariness of these details cloaks something remarkable. 
For many years one could pick up the lay of the land only gradually 
and with great eff ort, that is, by actually travelling to areas off  the 
highway or, less directly, through the versions that cycled by hushed 
word of mouth, versions that oft en warned against travelling at all. 
Many villages were hidden from the highway and one learned of 
them haphazardly and oft en without knowing exactly where they 
were. One would hear of them and know strangers were not wel-
come. But now an instant diagram unfolds, place-name by place-
name, for anyone who takes the road. Th e signs give away freely 
what before was secret and say ‘you can go there’ regardless of who 
you are. 
 On  this side of the river the fateful air that hovered over many 
Huallaga villages has waned, except perhaps in the memories of 
those still deeply marked by earlier times. On the  other side roads 
are not paved and there are few signs. 
 As we cut along the highway a light mist falls. Th e waves of tiny 
droplets feel cool on my face and coat everything: our clutching 
hands and clothes, all surfaces growing wet to the touch. ‘Just like 
Lima’, Tina says, turning her head back towards me. And instinct-
ively we look up at the sky, overcast with grey billowing clouds, for 
a sense of what is to come. ‘Will it rain?’ I ask. But Tina shakes her 
head and insists that no, not a chance. It is the confi dent voice of 
one who knows. But as we move on and minutes pass, the mist only 
thickens. Clouds darken. Tina leans towards Charapa, her voice now 
sounding concern: ‘It might rain.’ He nods but says nothing as he 
presses us forward into the wet air. 
 Th is was once the road where the Shining Path left  corpses so 
oft en that to travel along it entailed confronting the dead. Th ere was 
no way to avoid them. Using the road meant being exposed to a 
repeating presentation of putrefying remains. Th eir display became 
an idiom of violence – a visual language that craft ed anticipations of 
immediate futures and of one’s own place within them. 13 However, 
today there is nothing on or about the road that signals former his-
tories of violence, much less the specifi c work that human corpses 
once performed. Today road travel traces horizons of expectation 
that promise possibilities far less intense and threatening. 
 But back when the Shining Path placed bodies across the high-
way they did so as a challenge to the political order and orienta-
tion of the Peruvian state. Aft er all, the road was a government-built 
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and subsidised public work: a line of gravelled earth and occasional 
asphalt that was embedded into the Huallaga landscape to bring 
some places into communication while bypassing others. 
 In those days encounters with rotting corpses were not only a 
commonplace of everyday experience, they directed thought onto 
the existential limits of one’s own human life. Th ey indicated some-
thing utterly basic about the self. Of all the kinds of demonstrations 
in which dead bodies could take part, perhaps this one was the most 
elemental. Indeed, as Julia Kristeva has eloquently noted, ‘corpses 
show me what I permanently thrust aside in order to live’. 14 Th at 
thrusting – for Kristeva, the visceral repulsions elicited by decom-
posing human waste – is a force that draws strict boundaries between 
life and death. Successfully kept at a remove the corpse becomes an 
object marking that border. Th ere, as object, it would also be image. 
For image, as Blanchot once remarked, is what enables one to sustain 
a distance from things. 15 Image in this sense would be a corollary 
and even an ally of the thrusting force of bodily repulsions. Because 
as long as human remains are only image they can do no more than 
gesture across the distance manifested by the image itself. 
 Th e base materiality of putrefying things, however, presses at the 
borders of human life and threatens to overrun them. If that hap-
pens, Kristeva says, what was object for the subject becomes abject: 
an invasive presence that can no longer be held at bay. If that hap-
pens, she says, ‘It is no longer I who expel, “I” is expelled.’ 16 In other 
words, putrefaction enables corpses to ‘act’ though not as subjects 
with agency, but as the abject that disturbs the relational borders 
upon which subjectivity presumably depends. Of course, this is not 
to exclude the possibility that death may be simply a transition or to 
ignore that with the loss of life many other kinds of non-human life 
spring into action. Strictly speaking, what transitions or springs is 
rarely if ever treated as a mere continuation of the life that was. 
 Precisely because corpses indicate and place visceral accents upon 
boundaries to the human, they can be turned into tools for challen-
ging or reasserting political order. Such is one interpretation of what 
happened in the Huallaga: that the Shining Path used the abjective 
powers of corpses to unsettle subjectivities but in hopes of enact-
ing transformations at the level of political attachments. Th en again 
if the ultimate goal was to sever aff ective ties to the Peruvian state 
and rebind those aff ects into a new, emergent political collectivity, 
the corpse had to do more than simply reiterate threats of death. It 
had to inscribe those deaths within a legal-moral order. Turning the 
corpse toward those ends required over-coding it with a message, 
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which is why the Shining Path routinely left  paper signs on or beside 
the bodies. Th ose signs, professing Party authorship but always 
placing blame for the killing on the victim, expressed an intent to 
redirect the powers of the corpse. Harnessing those powers meant 
investing the person slain with responsibility for the killing event. 
It meant locating the originating cause of death in the victim’s own 
transgressions. In this way slain corpses could take on a strange self-
referentiality with regard to who and what had killed them. 
 Shifting terrains 
 At the village of Pueblo Nuevo, Charapa barely slows as he hangs a 
right onto a well-packed dirt road. Suddenly we are being bounced 
around and Tina complains, demanding he knock it off . Charapa 
just laughs, and if anything accelerates more down the straight 200-
yard stretch until the Huallaga comes into view. A murky green-grey 
expanse rippling under ashen skies. We have left  the mist and the 
immediate threat of showers behind. Charapa brakes to a halt. Tina 
and I hop off  at the top of the bank, as he coasts the bike down to one 
of two long, wooden canoes waiting at water’s edge. Th is is Puerto La 
Roca. Here we cross for Venenillo. 
 Here dirt road meets river under a thick mat of clouds. Volvo 
trucks come to carry crates of bananas off  to the highway and across 
the Andes. Farmers and farm hands arrive as they move back and 
forth from one side to the other. Beyond that little more than a 
name marks this place. Puerto La Roca is but one of many points 
of passage linking left  bank with right. It is one of many sites where 
river, trails and dirt roads come together. Here small movements 
and rhythms within moments of waiting create a sense of utter still-
ness, a stillness where the world of things sometimes takes on an 
extra charge. Within such moments a silence redoubles and there is 
a sense of air thickening, which might well be the shared, unspoken 
knowledge that illicit life-ways linger near. Or it might well be noth-
ing at all. 
 Tina and I wait our turn, taking small steps down the bank as a 
boat operator and his teenage assistant help Charapa lift  the motor-
bike up and into a canoe painted deep cobalt blue with thick bands 
of red and white. Once both wheels have been securely planted on 
the fl oor of the craft , Charapa sits atop his bike again, leaning for-
ward slightly, gripping the handlebars, looking proud. On a wooden 
plank behind him Tina fi nds a seat and motions for me to come on. 
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 Th is is Puerto La Roca in 2010: two lean-to shelters on a pale allu-
vium bank that descends abruptly into the water. On the other side 
there are no major towns, no regular police and little institutional 
presence of the state, only tiny hamlets anchoring constellations of 
scattered farms. Here and there the Peruvian Army operates small 
counter-insurgency outposts. 
 Little over a decade ago the left  bank was still the ‘red’ side of the 
Huallaga river and that made crossing not only politically signifi -
cant, but aff ectively charged. Crossing the river entailed going over 
to an other world with its own regime of rules, with its own highly 
tensed fi elds of force. Th is river, the most prominent topographic 
feature of the valley, became a political boundary unmarked yet felt, 
a threshold which gave onto another legal order. To inquire how that 
happened is to ask about the means through which moral-political 
forces fuse with natural historical landscapes to project an atmos-
phere … in this case, an atmosphere of threat that imposes lines and 
shapes movements. 
 What once made Puerto La Roca a remarkable point was its 
geographic location on the right bank roughly across the water 
from a series of sparsely populated villages collectively known as 
the  Bols ó n Cuchara . Th roughout the 1980s and into the 1990s the 
Cuchara basin was a Shining Path stronghold, and as such it became 
 Figure 10.1  Crossing over to the left  bank. 
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a regular target of incursions by the Peruvian military and police. 
But unlike the army, which slaughtered en masse to provoke a gen-
eralised fl ight of all who lived on the left  bank, the Shining Path 
practised a far more selective violence within its territorial zones. 
Th e Party killed just enough to control the contours of its civilian 
‘bases of support’. 
 And yet over the last fi ft een years there has been a widespread 
if uneven contraction of Shining Path infl uence. So much so that 
Tina and Wilson tell me there is now only one place, Magdalena, 
also on the left  back and 30 kilometres north of the Cuchara basin. 
Th ere, insurgents still control who comes and goes, and Tina and 
Wilson are able to tell me this because in Magdalena they have a 
farm. Today, however, we are headed to Venenillo, the entrance for 
the Cuchara, and where an army fort transforms the terrain as it 
guards against the unlikely return of the Shining Path. 
 A resonance in time 
 Th e boatman ferries us up river for a good ten minutes before bring-
ing the canoe alongside the shore. Tina and I step out onto the bank. 
As she waits there for Charapa I walk several yards to set the bags 
down on drier ground. I then turn around to take a few snapshots: 
of the boatman and his helper heaving the motorbike onto shore, but 
also of the lone remaining passenger – a man in an orange jersey and 
dark jeans, who sits perched on the boat’s edge, casually fl ipping the 
pages of a newspaper. 
 While I have this man in my frame, Charapa rides by and up the 
bank. Tina follows behind on foot towards a dirt trail that disappears 
from view into a grassy thicket. Aft er handing the boatman a ten-sol 
note I pick up our bags and tread quickly in pursuit. 
 Upon reaching the top of the bank I see Charapa and Tina paused 
before the high grasses. But as I start down the trail something curi-
ous catches my eye. Ahead, a compact group of fruit crates are 
standing alongside the narrow path, six columns in all, and each one 
stacked fi ve crates high. 
 In that there was nothing strange at all. What grabbed my atten-
tion was an odd inscription scrawled across one of the crates.  No 
Robar (don’t steal), followed underneath by three individual letters: 
an uppercase ‘G’ (or possibly a ‘C’) and then a ‘C’ and another ‘C’, 
and below that the words  Te Violo (I rape you). 
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 Charapa and Tina had passed right by them, seeing only empty 
crates … even though the ‘message’ appeared at eye level … counting 
… one, two, three, four crates up from the ground of the stack placed 
closest to the trail. 
 I lingered there a moment, just long enough to document my 
discovery and then I started towards my friends again, faster 
now to make up for lost time, leaving the columns standing there 
above the shore to look out towards the water. For to that extent 
the writing addressed solely those who approached from the bank, 
the crates were turned to ‘face’ the river … As if in anticipation of 
canoes that would pull up to shore and tempt someone to haul them 
swift ly away. 
 Perhaps this inscription was nothing at all. For me, though, it 
resounded within a larger political history and referenced a long-
 Figure 10.2  Th e crates. 
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time practice of posting menacing statements along routes and 
crossroads. What mattered here, I suspected, was not only the expli-
cit content of the words but the temporal resonance or echo they 
set in motion. What they invoked was not merely a general com-
mandment against stealing. Th ey seemed to allude to a well-known 
maxim that the Shining Path had frequently laid on the dead bodies 
of its victims so as to convert them into criminal types and thereby 
serve notice to all who came upon them: 
 ‘Th is is how thieves die …’ ‘ As í mueren los rateros … ’ 
 With messages like this, Maoist insurgents transformed corpses into 
a means of rural governance. 
 Th ough the warning on the crates indirectly referenced a regional 
genre of political threat, there was no corpse nearby. Nor did the 
warning explicitly appropriate that threat, speaking in the name of 
the insurgency, let’s say. Instead it acted upon that genre through 
a crude artistry of sorts. Into a well-worn logical relation of cause 
and eff ect it injected an unexpected twist: theft  no longer traced a 
straight line to death but to a humiliating and explicitly gendered 
bodily violation, one that left  the thief alive but also marked and 
transformed. 
 Th e message was coarse. However, its playful transposition of a 
common refrain not only alluded to times when another political-
legal order was still massively present. By upsetting a generic expect-
ation it produced a darkly comical eff ect. 
 For it amused Tina to no end, when we were on the bike and in 
movement again heading towards Venenillo. I told her what had held 
me up. Th e words surprised her and she immediately told Charapa, 
who turned his head enough to beam us a grin. So! Tina said, ‘ No 
Robar … Te violo, ah! ’ and later she would tell her husband Wilson 
all about it. 
 Th e words on the crates were humorous for Tina, for Charapa, 
and possibly for others who would walk that way. But I could not 
help thinking they became a joking matter only in the absence of 
 Sendero law, that is, to the extent those words off ered testimony to 
the radical waning of its force: a decisive turn of events that had 
an enormous impact on current conditions in the countryside. For 
there was a direct relation between the Shining Path’s current weak-
ness and the ability of the government to wage a continual cam-
paign of coca eradication against Huallaga farmers. For the fi rst 
time the police were no longer afraid of  Sendero . And evidence of 
the police’s new-found boldness could be seen in their freedom of 
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movement: that there was no place, no place except for Magdalena 
perhaps, where they wouldn’t escort work crews to tear up fi elds of 
coca. And there was evidence of a more superfi cial sort, too, though 
not for that any less revealing, in the freedom the police now felt it 
had to actually make fun of the insurgency, through the whimsical 
alteration of the inscriptions  Sendero painted on visible surfaces to 
reaffi  rm its presence. 
 On and along the main highway the Party’s slogans, its acronym 
and its hammer and sickle symbol appeared from time to time. 
But its painted messages no longer packed the intensely fright-
ful charge they once did. With the Shining Path’s military capacity 
largely destroyed, the territorial coverage of its law had dissipated 
almost completely. Th e inscription on the crates, therefore, spoke, 
if obliquely, to the fading of  Sendero power, and on more than one 
register: for the withdrawal of that law was now causing common 
theft  and robbery to return to the forefront of everyday anxieties 
affl  icting Huallaga farmers. 
 Escarmiento 
 We reached the farm half an hour aft er crossing the river thanks to 
Charapa, who deft ly manoeuvred us up muddy trails and over small 
streams, the largest of which came last. It was there that we had no 
choice but to traverse on foot, with Charapa insisting on pushing 
the bike alone against the current through the rocky muck that lay 
beneath. Up the other bank a path led us through an intimate forest 
of cacao and fruit trees until we reached a small clearing. To the far 
left  of what was a dirt patio, Charapa’s wood-slat cabin came into 
view, and through the doorway we could see Tina’s husband Wilson 
at the table sharpening a machete, oblivious to our approach. As we 
walked towards him Wilson looked up, welcomed us with a smirk 
and then met us at the door, machete hanging loosely at his side. 
 Forget pleasantries, Tina’s fi rst question was ‘Th e chickens?’ 
 Wilson deadpanned, ‘Th ey’re not here.’ 
 For a split second alarm fl ashed over Tina’s expression, spreading 
to her shoulders on its way down her arms … only to dissipate as 
soon as a wry smile on Wilson’s face made her realise he was pulling 
her leg. 
 Visibly reassured, Tina turned to me and explained: the eighteen 
chickens they brought to the farm a month ago had dwindled already 
to twelve. What they didn’t know for sure was what had happened. 
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Th is much they assumed: while the six chickens might have been 
plucked from the air by birds of prey, most likely they had been sto-
len by human hands. Such was the beginning of a refrain I would 
hear throughout the rest of the trip about the petty theft s and even 
armed robberies to which they and other farmers were continually 
exposed. Th ese days having property stolen was  the concern. 
 Th e most recent incident at the farm involved the disappearance 
of a large plastic tub fi lled to the brim with harvested cacao: a batch 
of white fl eshy seeds Wilson had removed from their pods and left  
outside the cabin when he returned to town. Th eft s of cacao seemed 
all the more cruel because the crop was supposed to be their future. 
Only a year before, coca was mainly what Charapa and Tina grew 
here, that is until in the month of May, when a police-escorted eradi-
cation crew arrived and razed their coca plants to the ground. From 
all sides the same worry pressed down upon area farmers: how to 
hold on to the fruits of their labour? Later that day Tina would con-
fi de that the previous month a close friend of Charapa’s had been 
gunned down by two men for several kilos of raw cocaine. 
 I could not help but wonder if any of this would have occurred 
in a  Sendero zone (if any were truly left ). And I wondered to what 
extent such threat gathered here because the guerrillas stayed far 
away. For the explicit reference I had seen on the crates to theft  and 
rape made for an odd coupling: odd and compelling. It brought to 
mind something Wilson had explained to me one morning, four 
years before, regarding the curious legal situation that prevailed at 
their other farm – the one in the zone of Magdalena. I remember 
we were sitting at a table in his home when he began to speak of 
 Sendero . I remember how he carefully prefaced his comments with 
the insistence that everything has a good side as well as a bad. 
 ‘Out there on the highway’, he said, ‘there are robberies and rapes.’ 
But in Magdalena, there is none of that. ‘It’s diff erent.’ Over there, 
other rules are in force. ‘One cannot just enter.’ 
 One can’t just walk in, Wilson said, and there was no need to 
explain.  Sendero law meant boundaries to free circulation, but also a 
space imagined as sheltered from ‘common’ robbery and at least one 
form of sexual violence. Th at is to say, through my recollections of 
our conversation four years before, the connection between  Sendero 
and the words on the crates today resounded all the more. 
 Tina and I set down our bags on the long table inside, as Charapa 
parked the red Honda across the room along a clothes-line sagging 
with old work shirts and trousers. He then headed out to inspect the 
cacao groves, leaving Tina to take charge of the kitchen. Turning 
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to stoke the fi re, Tina asked her husband to sit down and talk with 
me while she prepared breakfast. ‘Tell him about your story’, she 
said, and that was enough for Wilson to settle into something much 
broader: a long, hour and a half talk about the history of the region, 
beginning decades before the highway was built, when the valley 
was a refuge, he said, for dissidents of the political left . He told of 
the era of absentee landlords and the times of agrarian reform and 
the process of land titling that began with the construction of the 
road – a process still in its infancy when  Sendero appeared in the 
early 1980s. Wilson had much to say about the Shining Path but it is 
the point about property that bears directly upon what I have been 
exploring here. 
 Wilson recalled that when the Shining Path arrived to organise 
villages on the left  bank of the river, Party leaders announced that 
any land deeds issued by the government were no longer valid. Th ey 
promised, however, once their revolution had triumphed there would 
be plenty of land to go around. Until then,  Sendero would decide 
who could stay and harvest, and how much. In essence, the Party 
claimed the underlying title of all arable land and thereby forced all 
farmers into a relationship of subjection. Access to land depended 
on maintaining a (good) relationship with local Party leaders. 
 Four years earlier Wilson had stressed to me that the Shining 
Path should not be viewed as an utterly negative movement. Today 
at Charapa’s farm he could fi nd no redeeming virtues and spoke only 
of  Sendero ’s many fl aws. His perspective had hardened, ever since 
Party leaders in Magdalena had banned him from entering the area 
again. He could no longer go with Tina to their farm. And so exiled 
from that property, Wilson divided his time between Charapa’s farm 
in Venenillo, where he tended the chickens and pigs, and the house 
he shared with Tina in the town of Aucayacu. 
 Stung by this most recent of harms at Shining Path hands, Wilson 
was now thoroughly dismissive of everything the insurgency had 
ever been. Nonetheless, he liked to talk about the conversations he 
had shared with Party leaders – about their ways and the reasons 
why their revolution had failed. Th is time, though, when our dis-
cussion turned once more to the practice of displaying dead bod-
ies, Wilson claimed, ‘Th at was for teaching a lesson.’ Th e exact term 
he used was ‘ escarmiento ’, which spoke not merely to pedagogical 
intent but to a specifi c act: an exacting punishment or correction 
that served to warn of a danger. 
 Escarmiento described making an example of someone but in a 
manner that assaulted the senses, off ended sensibilities and, in so 
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doing, gave visceral defi nition to a fault or error. But to the extent 
that both  escarmiento and  espejo (mirror) presupposed an experien-
tial encounter that demands contemplation, the conceptual distance 
between them was not far. Yet  escarmiento was also etymologically 
related to  escarnio – a tenacious form of taunting with the intent to 
aff ront and humiliate 17 – which was precisely the gist of what I had 
earlier seen written near the river bank. 
 Like the corpse-work of  Sendero justice, the letters and phrases 
written on the crates presented a refl ective proposition though with-
out any material guarantee. Whoever stood before them would receive 
a command as well as a threat calling on the viewer to ‘see yourself ’ 
placed in a dreadful condition. No corpse accompanied the inscrip-
tion. Nonetheless, the history of a former political use of dead bodies 
hovered nearby to create a murmur-like eff ect. Th at murmur pointed 
to a force seemingly past but lingering as a co-presence from another 
time. And so by alluding in part to that other work the inscription 
elicited a laugh in the absence of the corpse, which was enough to 
imagine that the coupling of theft  and rape could return precisely in 
the withdrawal of  Sendero law, perhaps even to mock its fall. 18 
 Yet maybe that murmur of co-presence happened less through a 
generic resemblance than through the notable diff erences that dis-
tinguished these statements of threat. Th at much occurred to me 
when I later looked over the photograph, scanning for what else 
the crates’ message might convey for local matters of law and prop-
erty. Here was a composite fi gure formed by three lines of text that 
acquired a humble poignancy when viewed within the current rural 
concerns about theft . 
 On the middle line between the inscription’s proposition 
appeared three letters. Were these letters initials claiming the crates 
as someone’s own? Assuming they marked a personal identity, then 
the ‘author’ did not speak in the name of a collective – much less of 
an insurgent movement. As such, the warning was at once limited 
in range and weak in force. Tina and Charapa, who travelled that 
way several times a week, had no idea who the author might be. 
And without such knowledge the message took on a levity that ran 
counter to the seriousness of its threat. 
 Th e potential intensity of this speech act, thus, owed much to 
the author’s identity. A lot depended as well on the disposition of 
those who actually saw and read the inscription. What gestured 
to  Sendero justice was the harshness of the proposition combined 
with  its public expression , even though the exact wording diverged 
from admonishments oft en accompanying bodies of Shining Path 
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victims. Th at  public aspect seemed pivotal and was largely why I did 
not read from the message any reference to the state security forces. 
For while regionally the Peruvian Police and Armed Forces had a far 
greater reputation for sexual violence than the Shining Path, they 
did not brazenly admit it, much less frame such acts as public state-
ments of law. 19 
 TE VIOLO ( I rape you ) spoke to the violent intimacy of a ‘pri-
vate’ justice. Following the impersonal commandment NO ROBAR 
( Don’t steal ) it was fi lled with the personality of a conjugated act, 
located in some present future encounter between unknown and 
still undetermined subjects … Th is third line delivered the threat 
but as if in waiting and still in store. 
 Th e full proposition said: you violate these objects, which as my 
material property are the extension of ‘me’, I violate your person in 
its most contracted state, namely, in your body, and of that body, the 
most ‘private’ of parts. Th e proposition expressed a simple exchange, 
bringing into rough equivalence two forms of personal property, but 
here there was no attempt to ‘make a people’. 
 No robar, te violo directed ‘sight’ towards oneself not as physically 
dead but as violated in life. Shift ing the promised outcome from a 
lethal to a sexual violence was, therefore, a strategic displacement 
that in these specifi c circumstances made the message crudely 
 Figure 10.3  Th e warning. 
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witty – as opposed to merely nonsensical. However, a more revealing 
diff erence from the  Sendero maxims of old was how this proposition 
implicitly traced an imaginary barrier beyond which all propriety 
could threaten to fall apart. For the statement  no robar, te violo con-
jured an image of unconstrained right where ‘ I ’ could do anything 
to ‘ You ’, but in a manner that if taken to extremes would unsettle the 
very distinction between the two. Much as Hobbes described the 
state of nature where lines demarcating  mine from  thine fall away. 
 Right without limits suggests an endless spiral of uninvited appro-
priations: a raucous state of aff airs seemingly outside law, where rela-
tions of hospitality and extended sympathy no longer obtain. Real 
or unreal, such a situation invokes a Hobbesian fantasy of all against 
all where time itself becomes a weather most foul. Real or unreal or 
precisely because somewhere in between, ‘time as weather’ names 
a circumstance where titles to property (understood as durable, 
enduring possession) become neither secure nor presently possible. 
While a fi ctional condition, it is a fi ction with suffi  cient force to cap-
tivate imaginations and haunt social relations. 
 ‘Time as weather’ haunts because property itself presupposes 
temporality, or rather a particular manner in which duration comes 
to be fused with things. As David Hume once observed, property 
is engendered through time. Th ough he was also careful to add 
that time is ‘not any thing real in the objects, but is the off spring of 
our sentiments’ – which is to say how our sentiments are directed 
towards objects. 20 Stabilising possession, Hume speculated, was the 
critical step not only in creating property but more broadly in making 
possible the relations of hospitality upon which collective existence 
depends. In other words, not only property but peaceful cohabit-
ation required injecting duration into the possession of things. 
 An echo of Hume’s theory of property can be heard in Michel 
Serres’ depictions of meteoric time: ‘Our relationships, social bonds, 
would be airy as clouds were they only contracts between subjects … 
[T]he object … stabilises our relationships, it slows down the time 
of our revolutions.’ 21 Objects, for Serres, are what allow social bonds 
to become substantial enough to withstand the tumultuous vicissi-
tudes of life and of the world. But, if that turbulence is, as he insists, 
a mode of temporality – and Serres says it is the most primary and 
free-fl owing of all – then objects would play an vital role in how 
social groups segment, divide and apportion time. Objects would 
enable contracting subjects to corral and partition the unruly fl ows 
of ‘basic time’, while pushing most of the turbulence  out , as it were, 
to the margins of collective life. 
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 Out in the margins basic time would still persist to hover before 
and beside the segmented temporalities or steady durations that 
make property possible. ‘Out there’ basic time would become a noise 
disturbing enduring possession and the social bonds that enduring 
possession objectifi es. It would be that all against all fi ctitious state 
of aff airs where furious winds or fl oods could at any time sweep 
through and carry everything away. 
 ‘You’ steal. ‘I’ rape. Time goes meteoric … property vanishes. 
 And, of course, this is fi ction. Or perhaps an ur-mode of social 
time is something quite real that only becomes tangible and thus 
available for refl ection by embracing the powers of the imagination. 
Did not Hobbes and Hume say as much, each in his own way? Hume’s 
remarks about time and property seem worth pursuing, because 
instability of possession is oft en considered a prevailing character-
istic of both war and illicit economies. Certainly the Peruvian state 
drives home that point every time its agents rip up coca fi elds or set 
rustic drug labs afl ame. Th ose remarks also bring to mind something 
I heard in the Huallaga valley when I fi rst began going there in the 
mid-1990s. People had this to say then about the early era of coca/
cocaine prosperity. I refer to the late 1970s, when the drug trade fi rst 
animated the regional economy. Back then making money, lots of it, 
was suddenly no longer diffi  cult. And that made an impression on 
local farmers, who were seeped in the wisdom and common sense 
that simply getting by invariably demanded back-breaking labour. 
Th e burgeoning drug economy sparked migration from all corners 
and walks of life. Among those who arrived, from Lima some say, 
was a clever, ruthless criminal class – professional con artists, petty 
thieves and violent thugs – keen to use their skills to cash in on the 
new-found wealth. For the boom was a time of easy money: easy to 
make, frustratingly hard to hold on to. Make a fortune today. Have it 
stolen at gunpoint tomorrow. 
 Th e boom was a period of spiralling transgressions, but oft en of 
a tragic sort, even for the professional criminal set. For they, like 
most people, did not anticipate the sudden rise of the Shining Path, 
which was a criminal racket of a wholly other order – much like the 
state, you could say – but with the winds of revolution infusing its 
actions with a sort of legitimate title. At the forefront of its Maoist 
political programme was ‘cleansing’ the Huallaga valley of all man-
ner of human folk deemed scandalous and crooked: corrupt politi-
cians, abusive landlords, adulterers, rapists, drug addicts,  travesties , 
thieves. Th e Shining Path sought to discipline the social life of the 
boom while using the cocaine economy to raise funds for its armed 
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struggle. So serious and eff ective was the programme of ‘ limpieza 
social ’ that in some Huallaga towns it was said not even a pickpocket 
could be found for years to come. 
 Crucial to the communicative work of  Sendero law-making was the 
use of dead bodies, freshly killed and displayed on paths and roadways 
in order to send a shudder into all who found them. Th is is to say, they 
operated fi rst and foremost at the level of aff ect: by delivering a blow to 
the sentiments in order to turn them in a diff erent direction. 
 Now jump two and three decades forward. Th at former corpse-
work is part of the political prehistory that in the Huallaga presses 
at the edges of the lived present. Even when people do not speak 
of those earlier times directly, traces of how dead bodies were once 
politically displayed resonate in the movements and soft  noise of 
ordinary life, sending ripples into humble encounters and prosaic 
non-events. Th ose ripples unsettle, but sometimes barely enough to 
notice … such as when a threat appears scribbled on a stack of crates 
overlooking the river. 
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 16  Kristeva  1982 : 3–4. 
 17  Coromines and Pascual  1980 . 
 18  And no doubt one should be attentive here to the at times intimate prox-
imity that violence has to humour, a point Taussig ( 2003a ) foregrounds 
in a brilliant essay on the ‘language’ of mutilated corpses and the ver-
tiginous forces dead bodies may bring into play. 
 19  But see Th eidon  2012. 
 20  Hume  1978 : 509. 
 21  Serres  1999 : 87. 
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 Governing through the mutilated 
female body :  corpse, bodypolitics and 
 contestation in contemporary Guatemala 1 
 Ninna Nyberg  S ø rensen 
 Introduction 
 Th is chapter examines the brutal killing of women in post-war 
Guatemala, the interpretations that these murders engender and the 
place of the dead bodies in the country’s contestations over sover-
eignty. It grows out of having lived and worked (with other issues) in 
the country 2005–9 and by being horror-struck by Guatemala’s ever 
present perverse blend of beauty and terror: Th e breath-taking range 
of landscapes, architectural wealth and colourful clothing displayed 
against a nagging background of genocide and unresolved problems 
of poverty, abuse and generalised violence. Like other newcomers to 
the country, I was struck by homicide rates resembling the most vio-
lent years of the armed confl ict, by rising incidents involving the kill-
ing of women and girls, and by the shocking brutality with which the 
killings oft en were carried out. Today violence and horror continue 
to haunt Guatemala as does a generalised climate of fear and impun-
ity. Despite the tireless peace-work of thousands of Guatemalans and 
considerable sums pumped in by international donors, the violence 
that ravaged the country during the thirty-six-year-long armed con-
fl ict (1960–96) is not over. Why is it that the years following the 
peace accords may turn out to be the most violent in Guatemala’s 
recent history? What explains that the atrocities ‘pile up like pages in 
a book’, that ‘everything goes unpunished’ 2 and that state authorities 
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seems unable or unwilling to stop the killings? And what explains 
the gendered forms the ‘eternal tyranny’ 3 in Guatemala take? 
 During Guatemala’s armed confl ict state sponsored campaigns 
of terror and mass killings left  a death toll of approximately 200,000 
and an additional 40,000 forced disappearances. Some 440 vil-
lages were razed to the ground and over a million refugees were 
displaced (Sanford  2003 ; Schirmer  1998 ). Peace agreements were 
signed in 1996. Th ese agreements were meant to trigger democra-
tisation and to end extreme violence and killings. However, while 
political violence decreased, social and criminal violence rose to 
the extent that Guatemala today is among the most violent coun-
tries in the world. 4 Homicide rates are higher than during the most 
violent civil war years and rates are rising. So are violent killings 
of women. Teenagers, college students, housewives and  maquila 
workers have disappeared and later been found naked, disembow-
elled, sexually mutilated, strangled, beheaded and dumped like 
garbage in abandoned lots. Sometimes insults are carved into their 
fl esh. Th e extreme level of violence, in turn, is fed by a weak or 
overwhelmed judicial system, inadequate institutional structures 
and a general lack of state capacity or will to manage these mul-
tiple, complex and interconnected challenges. A law condemning 
femicide was passed in 2008, but the killings continued aft er the 
introduction of the law. All the while Guatemalans keep talking of 
their nation as a ‘wounded body’ and of failed attempts to reconcile 
the country’s extreme social and ethnic inequalities as ‘a fi nger in 
the wound’ (Nelson  1999 ), I argue that the politics involved in the 
interpretation of contemporary violence, in particular the incom-
prehensibly cruel violence directed towards women and girls, must 
be understood in relation to a patriarchal ideology that governs 
through gendered violence. 
 Various national NGOs and commissions have put the issue of 
violent killings of women on the agenda and begun to search for 
explanations as to why, and why with such brutality, as well as what 
can be done to prevent these killings in the future. Th is is important 
and relevant work to which I will be referring throughout the chap-
ter. What concerns me here, however, are not so much the killings 
in themselves as how societies like Guatemala are governed through 
the violated and mutilated female body. 
 Th roughout the chapter I use the Guatemalan culture of silence 
(Wilkinson  2002 ) and its extension to the silencing of feminicide as 
a metaphor for Guatemala’s failure to confront the disaster of every-
day violence. I do not take my point of departure in the atrocities 
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carried out during the prolonged armed confl ict. I write about the 
present. Th e forms of governance developed prior to and during 
the civil war, as well as the struggle to commemorate the victims 
and reinstall dignity in the survivors through exhumations of mass 
graves and legal persecution of the perpetrators, are important his-
torical contexts, while small arms proliferation, organised criminal 
networks, drug traffi  cking, human traffi  cking and the infi ltration 
of the state by parallel, clandestine structures are highly signifi cant 
contemporary contextual factors. For this reason, the analysis here 
relies on the signifi cance and gendered meanings of mutilated female 
bodies in the present process of state formation in Guatemala, on 
the role they play in the making and territorialisation of political 
communities and on how struggles and contestations over sover-
eignty and state formation are represented in particular inscriptions 
on female bodies. 
 Th e chapter is divided into fi ve sections. In the fi rst I introduce 
the terms and defi nitions utilised in debates over violence towards 
and mass killings of women. In the second I present the state of 
aff airs in Guatemala through numbers and statistics. I then turn to 
descriptions of the brutality with which the murders are commit-
ted and the body(parts) displayed. In the fourth section the killing 
of Guatemalan women is placed in historical context, including the 
legacy of the armed confl ict. Th e fi ft h section discusses what Nelson 
( 1999 ) has termed ‘the splattered body politics’ in processes of state 
formation in Guatemala. 
 Gendering the corpse: homicide, femicide 
and feminicide 
 Sexual violence against women is known in almost all corners of 
the world, but systematic violent killings of women seem to be con-
centrated in specifi c areas. Th e border town of Ciudad Juarez in 
northern Mexico is perhaps the best-known case, but other areas 
in the world also show high incidence of violent killings of women 
(Guatemala Human Rights Commission/USA  2009 ). Th e systematic 
and violent killing of women is generally termed ‘femicide’, when 
distinguishing the victim of the homicide as female, or ‘feminicide’, 
when stressing that these women are killed because of their sex, and 
that not only the male perpetrators but also the state and its judicial 
structures are responsible for the insecurity of female citizens and 
the impunity following acts of violence against them. 
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 Th e concept of femicide is attributed to Diane Russell, who ini-
tially defi ned femicide as ‘the killing of women because they are 
women’. She later sharpened the defi nition to ‘the murder of women 
by men motivated by hatred, contempt, pleasure, or a sense of own-
ership over women’ ( 1990 : 34). In order to recognise that girls and 
female babies are also among the victims, ‘women’ was replaced by 
‘females’, resulting in a defi nition of femicide as ‘the killing of females 
by males because they are females’ (Russell and Harmes  2001 ). In 
Russell’s view, femicide is on the extreme end of a continuum of 
misogynist or anti-female terror that includes a wide variety of ver-
bal and physical abuse. Whenever these forms of terrorism result in 
death, they become femicides (Russell  2008 ). 
 Th e case of Mexico’s Ciudad Ju á rez, where close to 500 murders 
of women took place between 1993 and 2009, led Marcela Lagarde 
( 2006 ) to introduce the term ‘feminicide’ to emphasise government 
impunity and negligence in investigating the murder of women. 5 
Other distinctive marks related to feminicide are initial reactions of 
denial, particularly at the local level, lack of proper investigation and 
the lack of willingness to detain and bring to justice those respon-
sible for the murders and discriminatory and disrespectful attitudes 
towards family members of the victims, if not outright blaming of 
the victims themselves (European Parliament  2006 ). 
 Along these lines Rita Laura Segato has refi ned and developed 
the concept. She defi nes feminicide as the assassination of a gen-
eric woman, just because she is a woman and belongs to this type of 
human beings, much in the same way as genocide is a generic and 
lethal aggression directed towards all those belonging to a certain 
ethnic, racial, linguistic, religious or ideological group. Both crimes 
are directed towards a category, not a specifi c subject. Feminicides 
are  not ordinary crimes, sexually motivated gender crimes or crimes 
related to domestic violence, as oft en asserted by law enforcers, 
authorities or some activists. Like other forms of violence, femini-
cide has an expressive dimension. According to Segato, however, the 
prevalence of the expressive dimension of the violence also makes 
feminicides ‘crimes of corporation’. Th e corporative dimension is 
important to Segato’s defi nition, as ‘corporation’ is understood to 
entail the group or network that administers the resources, rights 
and duties of a parallel state (Segato  2005 ). 6 
 In Guatemala, women have been among murder victims for a 
long time. However, the violence that was previously directed at the 
internal subversive enemy has been displaced to other sectors of 
society, including women. Th e working defi nitions of femicide and 
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feminicide have facilitated an understanding of how the murder of 
Guatemalan women is tied to racism, paternalism and corruption and 
how the levels of impunity are connected to the corrupt hidden pow-
ers in the country. A law against femicide was approved by Congress 
in April 2008. Th e law was the result of lengthy negotiations between 
representatives of civil society and the state and entails preventive 
measures, defi nitions of crimes and mechanisms of punishment, 
meant to guarantee women the right to a life free from physical, psy-
chological, sexual or moral violence. Perpetrators of femicide can be 
punished with twenty-fi ve to fi ft y years’ imprisonment. 
 Most women’s and human rights organisations view the law as a 
positive gain, some fi nd it regrettable that the term adopted is femi-
cide, not feminicide, while a few fi nd the law extremely problematic 
and yet another sign of the inferior status of women in society. 7 How 
come, they ask, that Guatemala needs a law against femicide when 
it is already against the law to kill any human being? And how can 
a law that limits the penalty for femicide to fi ft y years be considered 
a victory, if the penalty for assassination (§162 penal law) can be a 
life sentence or even death? A few organisations even point to the 
danger of augmenting the number of violent killings of women as a 
result of the law. Non-deathly violence against women can be pun-
ished with fi ve to twelve years in prison. Will Guatemala see more 
violent killings of women if released perpetrators of violence look for 
vengeance upon leaving prison? Th e most severe critiques point to 
the fact that Guatemala does not lack laws or penal codes but rather 
compliance with them. 8 And as for the knowledge of the law, a sur-
vey carried out by the Center for Women’s Research, Training and 
Support (CICAM) among justice operators, health workers and civil 
society in September 2008 found that not one (of 220) respondents 
could come up with correct answers as to what the law is all about. 
 ‘Femicide’ and ‘feminicide’ have entered the vocabulary of 
Guatemalan women’s and human rights organisations and progres-
sive feminist parliamentarians. Outside these circles, the violent kill-
ings of women are oft en silenced. During and right aft er the violent 
confl ict Guatemalans – for very good reasons – were struck by what 
Wilkinson ( 2002 ) has termed a culture of silence. I prefer to call this 
culture of silence a conversational art form of selective forgetting 
or collective amnesia since violence as such no longer is silenced. 
Guatemalans, of all social strata, talk a lot and at length about it. 
Lunch conversations oft en revolve around the issue of who has been 
mugged when and where, where the most violent killings have taken 
place over the last twenty-four hours, whether or not  los narcos , the 
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police or the government are involved, how the government is doing 
absolute nothing about it, and how corruption and impunity have 
become so widespread that nobody is left  with any expectations that 
anyone will actually do something about it. Strangely enough – and 
even if the newspapers spread out on the lunch tables will have their 
fair share of press photos showing half-naked female corpses found 
and photographed the previous day – state responsibility towards 
violent killings of women and mutilated female bodies are seldom 
part of the daily ‘blame-it-all-on-the-state-game’. Why is this? Even 
if rape and sexual violence are silenced in most societies, why is 
it that the violent killings of women are not included in everyday 
conversations on generalised violence but relegated to the realms 
of justice or feminist NGOs? Paraphrasing Uribe ( 2004 ) one may 
speculate that the fear of contagion in feminicised spaces – of being 
‘rapable’, ‘mutilable’ and ‘body partable’ – has become so extreme 
that any type of exchange is dangerous. It may even be argued that 
fear of contagion becomes more important in situations of contested 
sovereignty, i.e. when the state no longer has monopoly on violence, 
or when state discourse of feminicide rests on a blame-the-victim 
strategy that relies on a gendering of the public sphere. 
 Quantifying the corpses: homicide and feminicide 
rates in Guatemala 
 Although political violence in Guatemala has decreased with the 
peace accords, human rights defenders, union leaders, environ-
mentalists, corruption fi ghters, judges and indigenous community 
leaders continue to carry out their work under threats and at risk 
of getting killed. It is not uncommon that police investigations con-
clude that the killing of a trade union leader turned out to be a crime 
of passion, committed by an ex-partner or  la otra mujer , hereby 
resisting the idea that the violence represents a political problem. 
But violence has also become generalised. Ordinary citizens, espe-
cially those who cannot aff ord private cars and secure housing and 
who work odd hours far away from home, risk getting robbed and 
killed on public busses or on the streets. Th e rich and the middle 
classes may be targeted in their cars on in public places such as res-
taurants or super markets. Generalised crime and violence aff ects 
everyone. As statistics are poor and contradictory, a ‘war of inter-
pretation’ revolves around the story told by governing elites ver-
sus the one told by human and civil rights activists critical of the 
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government’s interpretation of the violence, the corpses it produces 
and their political signifi cance (Wright  2011 : 719). 
 Diff erent government bodies and NGOs present contradictory 
numbers. Underreporting results from the existence of barriers to 
reporting, not from a lack of will on the part of the victims and their 
families. Apart from the obstacles presented by a misogynous regime, 
lack of confi dence in an eff ective response from state institutions, fear 
of additional violence, concerns regarding stigmatisation and the 
prospect of loss of economic support, have been pointed out as an 
explanation for contradictory reports (Musalo  et al.  2010 : 175). Most 
agree that even the statistics that report higher numbers suff er from 
severe underreporting. Th e fi gures presented are those frequently 
referred to by national and international observers. Th ey generally 
exclude persons who die later of their wounds in hospitals. 
 Underreported or not, the fi gures in  Table 11.1 clearly show that 
on a national basis there is a higher risk of getting killed in Honduras 
and El Salvador than in Guatemala. Women are slightly more at risk 
in El Salvador and Costa Rica, but both homi- and feminicide rates 
in Guatemala are above those of Mexico, which have made inter-
national headlines. Disaggregated data from Guatemala ( Table 11.2 ) 
additionally show that certain areas of the country, in particular 
the departments of Guatemala City, Escuintla, Izabal, Santa Rosa, 
Pet é n, Zacapa, Chiquimula and Jalapa, present homicide statistics 
above the national average and the average of the neighbouring 
countries. Departmental statistics do not diff erentiate between male 
and female murder victims. Th e Presidential Secretariat of Women 
(SEPREM) only keeps records of reported (not all committed) 
feminicide. Th e human rights organisation  Grupo de Apoyo Mutuo 
 Table 11.1  Homicide rates per 100,000 inhabitants and by sex of 
victim. Central America 
 Country  Count  Rate  Male %  Female %  Year 
 Belize  130  41.7  92.5  7.5  2010 
 Costa Rica  527  11.3  88.2  11.8  2008 
 El Salvador  4,085  66.0  87.4  12.6  2008 
 Guatemala  5,960  41.4  88.9  11.1  2009 
 Honduras  6,239  82.1  93.1  6.9  2009 
 Nicaragua  766  13.2  92.1  7.9  2008 
 Panama  759  21.6  91.3  8.7  2009 
 Mexico  20,585  18.1  89.8  10.2  2008 
 Source: UNODC  2011 . 
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(GAM) provides statistics of violent deaths of women based on 
newspaper monitoring. Even if severely underreported, the fi gures 
provided by SEPREM and GAM suggest an interesting connection: 
Th e departments with the highest homicide rates are predominantly 
ladino; 9 the predominantly indigenous departments (e.g. El Quich é , 
Suchitep é quez and Totonicap á n) have considerably lower homicide 
rates, but women also remain targets of gendered violence in indi-
genous communities. 
 Table 11.2  Homicide rates in Guatemalan departments, 2009 









 Alta Verapaz  1,078,942  160  14.82  2  5 
 Baja Verapaz  264,019  72  27.27  0  9 
 Chimaltenango  595,769  110  18.46  0  7 
 Chiquimula  362,826  223  61.46  4  4 
 El Progreso  155,596  87  55.91  0  – 
 Escuintla  685,830  516  75.24  0  17 
 Guatemala  3,103,685  2,644  85.19  29  175 
 Huehuetenango  1,114,389  189  16.96  4  4 
 Izabal  403,256  291  72.16  3  16 
 Jalapa  309,908  187  60.34  2  3 
 Juitiapa  428,462  220  51.35  2  0 
 Pet é n  613,693  420  68.44  4  13 
 Quetzaltenango  771,674  162  20.99  4  5 
 Quich é  921,390  76  8.25  7  1 
 Retalhuleu  297,385  83  27.96  1  2 
 Sacatep é quez  310,037  73  23.54  0  13 
 San Marcos  995,742  236  23.70  5  19 
 Santa Rosa  340,381  239  70.21  8  3 
 Solol á  424,068  52  12.26  1  2 
 Suchitep é quez  504,267  196  19.04  8  13 
 Totonicap á n  461,838  18  3.4  4  5 
 Zacapa  218,510  144  65.90  2  8 
 TOTAL  14,361,666  6,398  44.55  95  332 
 Sources: population statistics, Instituto Nacional de Estad í stica; homicides, Policia 
Nacional Civil (PNC); homicide rate calculated by author; reported femicide, SEPREM 
2010; violent death of women, GAM 2010. 
 Table 11.3  Violent deaths in Guatemala, 2001–2012  a  
 2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  2012 
 Total  3,230  3,630  4,236  4,507  5,338  5,885  5,781  6,292  6,498  5,960  5,681  5,174 
 Men  2,927  3,313  3,849  4,010  4,820  5,282  5,191  5,605  5,778  5,265  5,050  4,614 
 Women  303  317  387  497  518  608  590  687  720  695  631  560 
 % women  9.3  8.7  9.1  11.0  9.7  10.3  10.2  10.9  11.1  11.7  11.1  10.8 
 Note:  a Homicide and femicide rates reported by PNC are slightly lower than rates recorded by local and regional human rights organisations. I use PNC 
fi gures as they allow for comparison over an eleven-year period. Source: homicide rates according to the Guatemalan National Civilian Police (PNC). 
See  http://centralamericanpolitics.blogspot.com/2012/02/femicide-in-guatemala-2001-2011.html . 
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 Th e homicide and feminicide fi gures provided in  Table 11.3 show 
that murder rates have risen between 2001 and 2009 and fallen 
slightly over the last two years of this period. Th e number of femi-
cides doubled in the period 2001–7 and has remained around 11 per 
cent of the total murder rate ever since. 
 Th e numbers reveal the magnitude and rise in murders during the 
2000s. Th ey confi rm what UN special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial 
Executions, Philip Alston, concluded aft er his visit to Guatemala in 
2006: ‘Guatemala is a good place to commit a murder, because you 
almost certainly get away with it.’ Th ey tell little, however, about the 
extreme cruelty, total lack of respect for life and the human body and 
the at times ritualistic form of performing the killings and staging 
the corpses. 
 Mutilating the female body in acts and discourse 
 Only three weeks into 2013 the government tallied 33 feminicides. Six 
women and girls were killed in one day alone. Two of the girls were 
strangled to death in a street in the capital Guatemala City wearing their 
pyjamas. 10 
 Gender-based violence is manifesting itself all over Latin America, 
but most alarmingly in Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador. 
Torture and bodily mutilation are oft en perpetrated as ‘seman-
tic operations permeated with enormous metaphorical force that 
dehumanises the victims and their bodies’, as Uribe writes in the 
case of violence in Colombia (Uribe  2004 ). In Guatemala, where on 
average two women are killed each day, the killings are committed 
with extreme brutality, including sexual violence, torture and muti-
lations, before the bodies are left  or dumped in public places. Th e 
injured bodies and shattered body parts provide insights into what 
Achille Mbembe (2003) has defi ned as necropolitics and Melissa 
Wright (2011) has shown to unfold through the gendering of space, 
violence and subjectivity. 
 Manuela Sachaz was a babysitter, newly arrived from the coun-
tryside to Guatemala City to take care of a ten-month-old baby. 
Returning from work her employers found Manuela in their apart-
ment in a pool of blood. Th e baby son was propped up in a high 
chair, his breakfast before him. Both had been decapitated, Manuela 
further raped and mutilated, her breasts and lips had been cut off , 
her legs slashed. Th e crime remains unsolved. 11 Th e body of sixteen-
year-old Mar í a Isabel Franco, raped, stabbed and strangled, was 
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completely coiled with barbed wire, when she was found in 2001. 
She died of an axe blow to her head. Nancy Peralta, a thirty-year-
old accountancy student kidnapped in 2002, died from forty-eight 
stab wounds and a broken neck. Her killers had tried to cut off  her 
head. Th e crimes remain unsolved. 12 Other victims killed over the 
previous years include Astrid Maril ú Villagr á n Estrada, whose body 
appeared in three diff erent parts of the city (head, extremities and 
torso); Lesley Eugenia del Valle, killed in front of her children by 
several punches; Lourdez Johana Villalta Pineda, assassinated with a 
bullet in her head, also in front of her children; Yiar Arqueta L ó pez, 
choked by ski-masked men; and Yelsmi Lilibeth Lara Miranda, who 
was beheaded. As a warning, the head was later sent to another 
woman, the ears to a local store owner in Zona 11 of Guatemala City. 
Mar í a Ester Soto Ru í z was found strangled and decapitated within a 
vehicle. Cindy Marlene Hern á ndez was violated, tortured and stran-
gled. Th e crimes remain unsolved. 13 
 More recent atrocities include the 2008 rape and murder of three-
year-old Sof í a Juarez: her body remained missing for two days. Th e 
dismembered bodies of six women found scattered throughout 
Guatemala City in March 2009: one of the murdered women, Ingrid 
Cruz, was videotaped as her body was being mutilated. Her murder-
ers uploaded the video to YouTube, from where it was later removed 
because of its content. Th e Suruy daughters, Heidi, Diana and Wendy, 
aged seven, eight and twelve, were killed with extreme brutality on 
their way to school in a smaller village of San Lucas Sacatepéquez, 
their throats cut and their school uniforms messed up. Th eir kill-
ers turned out to be intimately related to the murdered girls. At the 
time of writing no fi nal verdict has been given. 14 Another little girl, 
only three years old, was raped and killed by three men hoping to 
rise in the ranks of their gang. Her father found her dead, naked 
and beaten aft er searching for her for hours. Two of her killers were 
later stoned to death by the community and then set on fi re. Afraid 
of revenge, the girl’s family had to fl ee the community. Th e crime 
remains unsolved. 
 Th ree 2010 cases, committed on the same day (21 September), 
share a similar and widespread characteristic. All cases were pre-
ceded by death threats that were reported to the police. In none of 
the cases did the police taken any protective measures: Veronica 
Ofelinda Jim é nez, a thirty-three-year-old street fruit-juice vendor, 
was killed by several shots early in the morning. Her killers left  a 
note saying ‘this is what happens to informers and dirty bitches’. 
Her husband suspected a fellow street vendor to be behind the 
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earlier death threat. At 10.30 a.m. Rosa Bernab é Bautista, a poor 
forty-fi ve-year-old woman, was killed by seven bullets to the head 
when she left  a social organisation distributing food aid to the 
poor. In Se ñ ora Bautista’s case, a member of the infamous Mara 
18 was behind the earlier death threats. Finally, sixteen-year old 
Sonia Karina Estrada L ó pez was shot two corners away from her 
school. Her family was told that fi ft een days prior to the murder 
she had been assaulted by a gang member, who threatened to kill 
her because she refused to give him her cell phone. 15 
 A few studies have examined the profi le of the perpetrators. 
Although based on rather small available samples, these studies 
indicate that many perpetrators are known, most oft en intimately, 
to the victims. Around a quarter of the perpetrators may be partners 
(husbands, boyfriends and ex-partners), another 11 per cent fathers 
of the victims, 5 per cent other family members, and 36 per cent 
neighbours or male acquaintances (Svendsen  2007 ). In such cases, 
the violation and/or killing of women and girls are oft en explained by 
authorities as caused by ‘aff ect’, ‘love problems’ or jealousy; too much 
alcohol, too little personal dignity and over-exaggerated machismo. 
Other studies point to the involvement of ‘narco-cults’ or killings 
related to the drug wars permeating the region (Bunker  et al.  2010 ). 
In these cases the killings are not explained as ‘crimes of passion’ but 
rather as carefully planned, staged and executed in struggles over 
territorial control. As in regular war, violence against women serves 
a highly symbolic purpose in the war on drug traffi  cking: it creates 
cohesion within armed groups, reaffi  rms masculinity and is a form 
of attacking ‘the enemy’s morale’ (Toledo  2011 ). 
 Th e BBC documentary  Killer’s Paradise , based on several of the 
cases mentioned above, was broadcast worldwide in May 2006. 16 
What shocked the world most was the matter-of-fact and trophy-like 
explanations given by the young male assassins interviewed. In the 
words of one of them, ‘It is the fashion in Guatemala to kill women.’ 
‘Many of them we killed for fun, it felt good seeing the blood fl ow.’ 
‘Others with whom I had had relations, I killed because I feared they 
would leave me. One of the worst I cut up in pieces with a machete, 
it involved a lot of violence.’ When asked why, he answered: ‘I partly 
did it because I had to, because of the hatred I felt towards them, 
their life, their mind, their heart. I did it because it excited me, the 
blood; it attracted me to see the blood fl ow on the fl oor, to me that 
was something beautiful.’ 
 Th e documentary also takes issue with the way state offi  cials deal 
with the victims. In the case of the victim Claudina Velasquex Paiz, 
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a young law student, the police report mentioned that she had a 
belly ring and was wearing sandals, meant to indicate that she was 
a gang member or a prostitute and that killing her did not therefore 
deserve investigation. Former president Oscar Berger also linked 
the killing of women to their involvement in youth gangs and 
organised crime. By doing so he resisted the idea that Guatemalan 
feminicide represented a political problem while simultaneously 
insinuating that the victims were not worthy of too much attention, 
that they must have been criminals in the fi rst place, and that their 
death therefore could be seen as a form of public cleansing by ‘the 
removal of troublesome women restor[ing] the moral and political 
balance of society’ (Wright  2011 : 713). 
 Local media portrayal generally relies on blood, gore, nudity and 
torture. When not involving minor children, accompanying news-
paper photos oft en bear resemblance to pornography, and headlines 
and reporting oft en indicate some sort of victim responsibility for 
the killings, either because they wore improper dress or makeup or 
simply for being in public places without proper escort, without per-
mission. Th e reporting of female corpses found in the streets, in the 
rivers or in the garbage dumps is oft en relegated to short paragraphs 
of the inside pages of the national newspapers. Th ey are considered 
insignifi cant. And to the justice system impunity is the order of the 
day. Less than 10 per cent of the murders of women are investigated. 
In addition to severe underreporting, around 98 per cent of the 
reported killings are never solved. 17 
 Governing through necropolitics and narcopolitics 
 In a recent article, Melissa Wright ( 2011 ) compares Mexican dis-
courses on femicide to discourses on drug violence in Ciudad Juarez 
and argues that the politics over meaning in both cases must be under-
stood in relation to gendered violence and its use as a tool for securing 
the state. By gendering Mbembe’s concept of necropolitics, she high-
lights how the politics of gender and the politics of death go hand in 
hand: Offi  cial state discourses on the violent killings of women have 
maintained that these women have been out of their proper place 
(the domestic sphere), have been contaminated by their activities in 
the public sphere and ultimately constituted a contamination risk for 
their families, communities and nation. Hereby state discourse has 
positioned the young murdered women in the political order, as a 
‘pillar of the necropolitics demonstrating that the publicness of the 
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victims, as evidenced by the corpses’ location in public places and 
the mutilation of their raped bodies’, disrupting the social order and 
political peace of northern Mexico (Wright  2011 : 715). 
 Th e discourse on drug violence, on the other hand, while refl ect-
ing the same blame-the-victim strategy, has represented violence as 
aimed at targets within the drug industry rather than innocent civil-
ians. Drug violence is seen as the outcome of disputes internal to 
the drug trade, in response to competition over markets, resources, 
alliances and political protection. It is perpetrated by men who are 
more ‘business-like’ than typical homicidal maniacs, with logical 
mindsets reminiscent of rational-choice actors (Wright  2011 : 719). 
In sum, offi  cial state discourse has portrayed femicide and drug kill-
ings around a binary femininity–masculinity rationality, spatially 
organised around women’s proper domestic activities and men’s vio-
lent business on the streets. 
 From another vantage point, Posel and Gupta ( 2009 ) suggest 
that the place of death and the corpse – which at the same time may 
repulse and lure, disgust and fascinate – is a pre-eminent site for the 
identifi cation of symbolic boundaries between a nation and its other 
or between the sovereign and the governed. Th ey foreground what 
they call ‘the dualistic life of the corpse’: on the one hand the corpse 
is a material object, while on the other hand it is a signifi er of wider 
political, economic, cultural, ideological and theological endeavours. 
Whereas sovereign practice establishes who is disposable and who 
is not, the power to dehumanise the disposable lies in the power to 
reduce bodies to undignifi ed trunks of fl esh (Posel and Gupta  2009 ). 
Th is conceptual set-up provides a powerful means of exploring 
corpses, bodypolitics and contestation in contemporary Guatemala. 
 In Guatemala violence against women is habitually explained 
as a contemporary eff ect of conquest and colonial ills; of civil war; 
or lately of violent competition between drug cartels and gangs for 
control over narcotics, territory and traffi  cking routes. Much in the 
same way as the civil war left  the Mayan culture broken, mutilated 
and atomised – a culture in pieces, a wounded body politic (Nelson 
 1999 : 131) – the practices of destruction inherent in the present 
moment are leaving their deadly mark on Guatemalan society. But 
what is it that makes the mutilated female body such an eff ective 
form of governing, what is the eff ect of the mark and what does it tell 
us about sovereignty and state formation in Guatemala? 
 Th e Guatemalan civil war was marked by pervasive state-spon-
sored violence including physical, psychological and sexual tor-
ture, disappearances and massacres of entire communities. Th e 
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Guatemalan Army used an extremely eff ective campaign of terror 
that consisted in killing not only guerrillas, but also their potential 
or perceived supporters within the civil population, and ‘by doing 
so in such an arbitrary and vicious fashion that people in the region 
came to feel an intense and overwhelming fear, not merely of sup-
porting the guerrillas, but of doing anything that might suggest they 
sympathised with the guerrillas’ cause – such as denouncing the 
army’s methods or giving voice to their own fear’ (Wilkinson  2002 : 
351). During incursion, sexual violence was used as a tool of warfare. 
Soldiers would oft en rape any lone woman they stumbled across, 
murder them aft erwards and dump the body (Manz  2004 ). Women 
suff ered 99 per cent of reported sexual attacks (CGRS  2006 ). 
 Many of those who took part in the counter-insurgency cam-
paigns were trained in sadistic methods of utterly destroying the 
enemy. During the most violent years of the armed confl ict sol-
diers oft en cut open the wombs of pregnant women and hung the 
foetuses up in trees or smashed them against rocks. In addition, 
thousands of indigenous women were the victims of mutilations 
and sexual violence. Upon the signing of the peace accords, many 
former members of the security forces joined the police or were 
hired by private security companies. Corrupt police offi  cers and 
private security forces are thus well equipped to commit attacks on 
women by use of former counter-insurgency tactics. In 2006 the 
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights stated that the lack of 
prosecutions of atrocities committed by high-level offi  cials had 
‘encouraged the current crime wave sweeping Guatemala’ (CGRS 
 2006 ). Th e demobilisation of former members of the security forces 
without any programme for their reinsertion into society along 
with the fact that an estimated 2 million fi rearms are in the hands 
of the civilian population, may be factors that play a role in the wave 
of brutal murders of women. 18 However, another important factor 
is the explosive cocktail in which soaring crime rates, drug traf-
fi cking and the proliferation of narco-violence and  maras (youth 
gangs) combine with a  machista male-dominated society, domestic 
violence and a patriarchal state. 
 Th e fact that sexual violence was used as a weapon of dom-
ination and social power over the female body during the war 
(CALDH  2005 ), and that contemporary femi[ni]cides have much 
in common with the methods applied against women during the 
armed confl ict (Svendsen  2007 ), easily lead to the conclusion that 
feminicide is a legacy of the armed confl ict and hence a question 
of continuity in terms of deeply rooted misogyny and a dominant 
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patriarchal ideology expressed in family values politically sanc-
tioned by the state. However, we may also interpret today’s femi-
nicide as pertaining to a diff erent context in which the attempts 
of the state to relegate feminicide to domestic violence, crimes 
of passion or youth gang feuds can be read as a sign of contested 
sovereignty. As Sagato observes in the emblematic case of Ciudad 
Ju á rez, there is ‘a direct relation between capital and death, between 
accumulation and unregulated concentration and the sacrifi ce of 
poor, dark-skinned mestiza women, swallowed up by the cracks in 
which monetary economy, symbolic economy, control of resources 
and power of death articulate’ (Segato  2005 : 265–6). I suggest that 
in Guatemala, as in Ciudad Juarez, the mutilated female body has 
become central to the making and territorialisation of overlapping, 
partially sovereign bodies – or political communities – at the local, 
regional or national level. 
 Th e extreme impunity surrounding the killing and mutilation of 
women as well as the smokescreens put out by authorities and others 
involved in shaping public opinion in Guatemala indicate that drug 
cartels (including the Zetas and their Guatemalan counterparts 
involving former elite soldiers, the Kaibiles), law enforcement offi  -
cials and economic and political elites are somehow involved in 
feminicide. Impunity and the involvement of state as well as paral-
lel corporate powers should warn us against accepting oft en heard 
individualised explanation for the killings as grounded in sexual or 
emotional motives. According to Segato’s investigations in Ciudad 
Juarez, violent killings of women are not the work of deviant indi-
viduals, the mentally ill or other social anomalies. Oft en the perpe-
trators act collectively. Th ey share the same gender imaginary, speak 
the same language and thus understand one another perfectly. Th e 
violation is directed towards the annihilation of the victim’s will with 
the purpose of denying her control over her body, and is as such an 
allegorical example of a sovereign practice, in this case the pointing 
to the sovereignty of the perpetrator. 
 But sovereign power is never only physical. Without the psy-
chological and moral subordination of ‘the other’, the only power 
left  is the power of death, which according to Segato can never be 
sovereign. A war leading to total extermination cannot constitute 
a victory. Th e victory lies in the power to colonise, to exhibit the 
dead corpses to those destined to stay alive. And if sovereignty and 
control only can be performed in front of a living community, femi-
nicide has more in common with the idea of colonisation than that 
of extermination. Th erefore, feminicide is not about an utilitarian 
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end – the extermination of women – but must be understood in its 
expressive (and, I would add, performative) dimension. Like any 
other act of violence, feminicide is a discursive gesture with a par-
ticular signature, and violence read as a text will lead us not only to 
the perpetrator, but to the perpetrator as author, as an author with a 
message (Segato  2005 ). 
 Some crimes, Segato continues, are not only communicated ver-
tically between perpetrator and victim (e.g. through a punitive fi st 
meant to contain, reduce and install discipline and censorship in, 
the victim). Th ey are also communicated horizontally. Horizontal 
(and spectacular) communication is directed towards the surround-
ing community and is oft en expressing an attempt at seeking per-
mission to enter into this community. Seen from this perspective, 
the violated and mutilated female body can be read as a sacrifi ce 
or as an initiation ritual: in competition with other men, the per-
petrator shows that he deserves to become a member of the virile 
brotherhood because of his aggressiveness and power of death. As 
masculinity is a status conditioned on being earned, it needs regu-
lar (re)confi rmation throughout life (Segato  2005 ). It is in the ten-
sion between Segato’s two coordinates – a vertical axis constructing 
the victim and a horizontal axis conditioned by the status earned by 
paying tribute to a brotherhood or criminal organisation – that the 
more fundamental and societal aspects of feminicide can be found. 
Th us, it may be reductionist to interpret the killing and mutilation of 
female bodies as crimes based in hatred to women if those dominat-
ing the scene are not the victims but rather men who are bonding in 
a patriarchal regime of a Mafi oso order. 
 In the Guatemalan case, struggles over sovereignty simultan-
eously lead to alliances and contestation between the state and crim-
inal state and non-state actors. Alliances are formed when organised 
criminal networks infi ltrate the state apparatus and (some) state 
representatives join forces with criminal networks (illegal groups 
and clandestine security organisations) to further their politics 
or to enrich themselves. Competition takes place in the instances 
in which (some) state authorities attempt to keep or regain con-
trol over territories and bodies. Th e simultaneous enactment of 
alliance-making and competition testify to a divided state appar-
atus. Meanwhile, local drug cartels lose territory to Mexican busi-
ness competitors who fi nd the Guatemalan levels of impunity and 
state fragility an attractive business environment for their opera-
tions. Returning to the Central American homicide and femicide 
rates of  Tables 11.1 – 11.3 it may even be argued that diff erent rates 
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pertain to diff erent realities. Violence associated with the drug war 
and organised crime – including state corruption – appears to have 
specifi c eff ects for women. Mutilating the female body creates cohe-
sion within armed groups, reaffi  rms distorted forms of masculinity, 
becomes a form of attacking ‘the enemy’s’ morale and establishes 
sovereignty over territories. It even restores the traditional  machista 
spatial order of a male public space ( la calle ) by relegating women to 
the domestic sphere ( la casa ). 
 Conclusion 
 In October 2011, President Otto P é rez Molina, a retired general, pre-
sented his plan to reduce violence against women and improve the 
investigation of feminicide in Guatemala. During the same meeting, 
his vice-presidential candidate, Roxana Baldeti, promised to provide 
more resources for and institutionalise the Presidential Secretariat 
for Women (SEPREM) and the Coordinator for the Prevention of 
Domestic Violence and Violence against Women (CONAPREVI). 19 
In November 2012, the Molina government introduced several new 
measures to address violence against women, including a special tri-
bunal to process feminicide, while simultaneously, however, disband-
ing the national coordination body CONAPREVI, thus limiting the 
participation of NGOs in the process. Given that P é rez Molina was 
elected on strong  mano dura (hard-handed) principles, including a 
remilitarisation of policing and governance, one could ask whether 
institutionalised policies would lead to a decrease in perpetrations of 
feminicide and whether state practices of impunity could end? 
 Sceptics would maintain that post-war Guatemala has become a 
dehumanised social space, similar to what Lowe ( 2008 ) with refer-
ence to the US–Mexican border has called a gendered necrospace 
of complex and pervasively gendered violence. In this social space 
both the state and the illicit drug cartels have (and use) the capacity 
to dictate who matters and who is dispensable. Claiming ultimate 
authority to govern the dead – either by perpetrating feminicide or 
by tacitly embracing ‘the new judicial category of life devoid of value’ 
by maintaining extremely high rates of impunity (Agamben  1998 ) – 
remains in contest. On the one hand the penetration of organised 
transnational drug cartels means that several regions of Guatemala 
have become  de facto governed by criminal networks that both hold 
entire communities in thrall to their extreme violence and fuel the 
culture of silence by their dehumanising practices of decapitation 
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and the cutting off  of gendered body parts such as breasts and lips. By 
using feminicide and other violent killings as messages to de(a)mon-
strate their potency (Bunker and Sullivan  2010 ), the cartels carefully 
craft  the myth of being vigilantes standing up to competitors and a 
corrupt state. On the other hand the ‘insuffi  cient eff orts to conduct 
thorough investigation, the absence of protection measures for wit-
nesses, victims and victims’ families, and the lack of information and 
data regarding cases, causes of violence and profi les of the victims’ 
(CEDAW  2006 ) suggest state responsibility. 
 Given the extensive technical and fi nancial support the 
Guatemalan justice system has received over the past sixteen years, 
the question is, as noted by Special Rapporteur Philip Alston, 
‘less what should be done than whether Guatemala has the will 
to do so’ (Alston  2007 ). Th e fact that the state for decades failed 
to properly investigate and prosecute the pattern of feminicide 
in Guatemala cannot and should not be explained by reference 
to incompetence or shortages in human, fi nancial and technical 
resources as is oft en the case in UN reports (see e.g. Musalo  et al. 
 2010 ). A far more critical question regards the function of femi-
nicide in society. 
 Guatemalan women face systematic gender-based violence so 
prevalent that they have broken new legal frontiers to establish gen-
dered violence as grounds for asylum in the United States (Bateson 
 2010 ). Th e most salient impact of this development is that while 
state-craft ing through what we conventionally understand as polit-
ical violence has decreased, other forms of violence have entered the 
art of governing. Th at some of this violence has invaded the domes-
tic sphere should not lead us to think that it is less political; that 
some of it resembles the past should not lead us to look for explana-
tions only in the armed confl ict. Rather, as underscored by Angelina 
Godoy ( 2006 ), the perverse blend of violence and repressive author-
ity goes hand in hand to maintain class power and masculinist con-
trol through the enactment of  mano dura policies. 
 Notes 
 1  Th is chapter was written in 2010, revised in early 2013, and does there-
fore not refl ect recent positive changes introduced by Attorney General 
Claudia Paz y Paz, including the eff ects of the joint task force for crimes 
against women established in 2012. 
 2  Paraphrasing Daniel Hern á ndez-Salazar’s text from the 2000 exhibition 
‘Memoria de un angel’ (Th e Memory of an Angel). 
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 3  I borrow this phrase from North American photographer Jean-Marie 
Simon ( 2010 ). 
 4  For recent reports on the Central American/Guatemalan crime and vio-
lence levels, see: Dudley  2010 ; Finlay  2010 ; International Crisis Group 
 2011 . For reports on feminicide in Guatemala, see: Carcedo  2010 ; 
CCPDH  2006 ; Heinrich B ö ll Stift ung  2009 , Musalo  et al  2010 ; Sanford 
 2007 ,  2008 ; Shepard-Durini  2008 ; Svendsen  2007 . 
 5  Th e hitherto highest murder rate was reported for 2010, when 304 
women were killed. 
 6  Th is dimension is fi rmly established in and around Ciudad Juarez and 
with tentacles in the provincial capitals of Mexico. 
 7  During August 2010 I interviewed the following Guatemalan NGOs and 
government offi  ces on the issue of femicide: Fundaci ó n Sobrevivientes, 
Instituto de Estudios Comparados de Ciencias Penales (IECCPG), Th e 
Human Rights Ombudsman Institution (PDH), Fundaci ó n de Antropolog í a 
Forence (FAFG), La ofi cina Nacional de la Mujer (ONAM), Centro para la 
Acci ó n Legal en Derechos Humanos (CALDH), Secretaria Precidencial de la 
Mujer (SEPREM), Coordinadora Nacional para la Prevenci ó n de la Violencia 
(CONAPREVI), and Red NO a la violencia. I thank representatives for their 
time and valuable contributions, and I thank programme assistant Mar í a 
Sof í a Villatoro, the Guatemala offi  ce for Danish Development Assistance to 
Central America, for helping me set up the interviews. Because of constant 
threats against activists I do not name my informants. 
 8  A lively debate containing the many diff erent views (and the usual sus-
pects) can be seen in the internet comments following  El Periodico ’s cover-
age of the law, e.g.  www.elperiodico.com.gt/es/20080410/pais/52254/ . 
 9  ‘Ladino’ is the category used in Guatemala for ‘mestizos’, people of mixed 
descent. 
 10  Anastacia Moloney, ‘Guatemala’s feminicides show no signs of letting up’, 
22 January 2013,  www.trust.org/item/?map=guatemalas-feminicides-
show-no-signs-of-letting-up . 
 11  Th e Sunday Times , 28 August 2005. 
 12  For more information on these cases, see Sanford  2007 . 
 13  For more information on these cases, see Svendsen  2007 . 
 14  Various news clips,  La Prensa Libre and  Nuestro Diario , 2008 and 2009. 
 15  Th ese three cases were covered in  Nuestro Diario , 22 September 2010, 
pp. 4–5. 
 16  Killer’s Paradise explores the high murder rate of women that has per-
sisted unsolved in Guatemala since the end of the Guatemalan Civil 
War. Th e fi lm is a co-production of the National Film Board of Canada 
and the BBC and was directed by acclaimed Toronto-based journalist 
and fi lmmaker Giselle Portenier. Clips and trailers can be found at  www.
videosurf.com/killer’s-paradise-79593 . 
 17  Interview with CICIG representative. 
 18  See One World Net, ‘Guatemala: murders of women recall counter-
insurgency techniques’,  http://archive.oneworld.net/article/view/113856 . 
 19  See PrensaLibre.com, ‘P é rez Molina promete una fuerza de tarea contra 
el femicidio’, 21 October 2011,  www.prensalibre.com/decision_libre_-_
actualidad/Elecciones_Guatemala-pp-organizaciones_de_mujeres-
otto_perez_molina-partido_patriota_0_576542472.html . 
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 Abandonment and victory in relations 
with dead bodies 
 John  Borneman 
 Katherine Verdery was the fi rst to make some systematic obser-
vations about the accelerated movement of dead bodies in East-
Central Europe following the collapse of the Soviet Empire. She 
noted that, in this period of political transformation, the corpses of 
political leaders and cultural heroes accrued certain powers leading 
to a struggle over appropriating those powers, and to the exhum-
ation and displacement of their bodies (Verdery  1999 ). Here I wish 
to consider the modes of appropriation of the power of corpses 
and off er an explanation for their widespread movement in post-
socialist states. Th is movement, I will argue, is a manic reaction to 
the death of political regimes and to the sense of abandonment that 
accompanies this end. Although people may understand this reac-
tion as asserting sovereignty over the dead, it in fact demonstrates 
the inverse: that the dead govern the living. How and why is it that 
humans deny being governed by the dead and instead claim victory 
over their losses? What is the connection between the experience of 
regime end and the attempts to declare victory through the exhum-
ation and reburial of corpses? 
 I 
 Th e death of other humans is an omnipresent threat and experience 
in all cultural landscapes, and aft er the death, landscapes are marked 
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socially by the absence of the person to whom one was attached. 
Anthropologists have documented the various ways in which all 
societies try to deal with this absence by inventing peculiar rites 
and institutions to turn absence into a presence of sorts and a ‘good 
death’. Th e specifi cally human characteristics of relations to the dead 
entail both the individual process of mourning and collective funer-
ary rites. 
 Neither individual grief in mourning nor funerary rites are 
specifi c to humans, however. Dogs grieve for their dead owners, 
sometimes to the point of refusing to live aft er their deaths, oft en 
refusing to make new attachments – a reaction roughly correspond-
ing to our notion of melancholia. Lions are known to smell and 
lick the dead bodies of members of their own species before eat-
ing them. Dolphins appear listless and lose appetite aft er the death 
of a member of their pod. Elephants have been observed to cover 
the dead with leaves and branches, to get highly agitated upon see-
ing the bones of members of their species and also to revisit the 
bones of dead relatives. Chimpanzees show complex emotions 
towards a dead partner, although they seem to no longer care once 
the corpse begins decomposing. Given the increasingly complex 
understandings of other species, our notion of human distinctive-
ness as defi ned by individual grief and collective rites of separation 
is insuffi  cient. One must also add that, in contrast to other species, 
there is tremendous variation within the human species in relating 
to the dead. Th e ethnographic record documents endless diversity 
in modes of proper and improper separation that are sensitive to 
place and time. 
 II 
 Among humans, we can speak of two radical orientations toward 
grief and toward funerary rites. As to grief, we have the Freudian 
distinction between mourning and melancholia, the former being 
a grieving process of letting go of the lost object, the latter as a grief 
that refuses to acknowledge the loss and hence holds on to the lost 
object. As to funerary rites, we can distinguish between eviscerat-
ing traces of the dead and preserving them for eternity. Th ese two 
orientations can, as an initial heuristic, be roughly mapped onto the 
diff erence between beliefs in reincarnation or the transmigration of 
souls and the belief that death is a more absolute end. 
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 In short, there is an elective affi  nity between mourning, eviscer-
ating the dead and belief in reincarnation, on the one hand, and an 
elective affi  nity between melancholia, preserving the dead and belief 
in an absolute end, on the other. Each of these distinctions breaks 
down in any attempt to use them as the basis for a typology of types 
of societies. Cremation and preservation, for example, are oft en 
practised simultaneously in many societies. But as radical orienta-
tions and affi  nities, they are nonetheless a useful point of departure. 
 Before moving to particular cases drawn from my own ethno-
graphic work, let me begin with an unfashionable comparison of 
culture regions, and acknowledge the rough historical diff erence 
between the West and East that corresponds to the extremes of pres-
ervation versus cremation of the dead. We might isolate the crucial 
diff erence in funerary practices in the symbolism of embalming the 
body before putting it underground and burning it on a pyre above 
ground. Burning above ground, it is interesting to note, although 
regularly practised in Western countries as the burning of effi  gies, 
that is, burning substitutes for some disliked fi gure, is highly regu-
lated if not illegal when practised in the open air. 1 Th ere is some-
thing disturbing in the West, then, about the visualisation of the 
evisceration of the dead, the fear of contamination through this pro-
cess, and hence there is a need for control of its public display and 
acknowledgment. Something like the public secret of prostitution 
and homosexuality, until recently: accepted as private acts so long as 
one need not recognise them in front of others. 
 In England, for example, the Cremation Act 1902 allowed bur-
ial authorities to establish crematoria, but the act was amended in 
1932 to ban open-air pyres, a practice which in turn was legalised in 
2010 if, the court stated, it took place within a structure of some sort. 
Denmark shares with England a similar legal and popular evolution 
of the practice; they both now have one of the highest rates of crema-
tion within Europe (73 per cent). In 1892, the practice in Denmark 
was offi  cially legalised. More recently, however, the framing has 
been changing. In 2009 as a justifi cation in preparation for the UN 
Climate Change conference, the Danish association of crematoria 
 Mourning  Melancholia 
 eviscerating the dead  preserving the dead 
 belief in reincarnation  belief in an absolute end 
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revealed that fi ft een of its thirty-one crematoria proposed recycling 
waste heat from its ovens into district-heating systems, and that all 
of its crematoria already profi tably recycled scrap-metal parts sal-
vaged from the dead – specifi cally knee or hip replacements. (Artists, 
importantly, are barred from using such scrap metal.) 2 
 We see here, then, in England and Denmark, some concern with 
the aft erlife, but the concern is framed as the continued utility of 
dead bodies during and aft er cremation. Th is is certainly not to be 
equated with the strong notion of rebirth contained in the Hindu 
or Buddhist notion that life continues aft er cremation through 
reincarnation. Reincarnation is not merely life aft er death, as in the 
Christian or Muslim belief in a rematerialisation of some version of 
the person in heaven; rather each individual is reborn into another 
living being – if and until some select few reach nirvana, a state vari-
ously imagined as free of suff ering and of the desires that produce 
individual cravings and aversions. 
 Nirvana is, again, quite unlike the Christian imagination of 
individual beings reconstituted in heaven or hell, in sites of pleas-
ure and goodness or punishment and evil. Desire does not go away 
but is either fulfi lled or one is punished for it. Th e belief in reincar-
nation itself should theoretically be more comforting aft er a loss. 
Maintaining that the dead will be reborn, even, perhaps, as younger, 
healthier people, or in a higher and better status than in previous 
lives, makes it less wrenching to display the deceased above ground 
and to let the corporal remains disappear publicly. Th is is not to neg-
lect that Hindu or Buddhist cremation is part of a series of rites of 
separation, which ultimately also entail quite emotionally wrenching 
acts, such as sift ing through the remains for bone shards and crack-
ing the skull aft er the burning, and also oft en purifying the survivors 
who had been contaminated by the dead in a ritual. 
 Hindu and Buddhist funerary rites in fact work through the griev-
ing process to eff ect the type of separation from the loved object that 
Freud analysed as mourning, a more radical letting go of the loss than 
is common in Christian rites. Because the dead person has a future 
and that future is dependent largely on the accumulated karma of the 
dead as well as on the performance of the proper rituals by the living, 
an extreme melancholic attachment to what is lost appears less com-
pelling. A clear East/West mapping of culture area is confounded, of 
course, by the fact that some Christian sects and New Age groups in 
the West also believe in reincarnation, as do many Native Americans, 
for example, the Inuits and other indigenous peoples. 
Abandonment and victory  233
 Th e point here is that the absence of a strong doctrine of reincar-
nation in the Semitic monotheistic religions, and thus in the West 
generally, confronts the individual and groups there with their own 
stark and diffi  cult-to-accept view of the absolute end of life. Th ose 
societies that insist on the dead being dead have a more diffi  cult time 
with loss, and therefore try, in a melancholic gesture that subverts 
their ideology of fi nality, to preserve the dead, most frequently put-
ting their earthly bodies underground. We oft en talk of ‘burying the 
dead’, but putting them underground should be taken as a metaphor 
of fi nality rather than a literal overcoming, putting away or putting 
behind. Th e crucial point theoretically is that burial underground 
expresses a desire to preserve or arrest the natural temporal pro-
cess of decay, but also not to be witness to it. We might investigate 
the elaborate symbolic forms of modes of preservation in diff erent 
cultures, and whether these correspond to a melancholic attachment 
to loss, or in the extreme, to an occlusion of the loss by claiming the 
ability to govern it. 
 III 
 Why humans in the East and West grieve the dead is not, I suspect, 
because they are gone, but, on the contrary, because they won’t go 
away. As intersubjective beings, humans do not think their exist-
ence alone but experience it in a continuous series of attachments 
to and separations from others. We carry around within us images 
of these others, who become internal objects, images in our heads, 
and remain so even aft er their deaths or disappearances. Th e dead 
remain as memories that appear in dreams and daydreams, and they 
oft en appear as the result of projections in uncanny experiences of 
d é j à vu. Th e fact that the dead are still present confounds the sense 
of chronological time and social order in any cultural system, but it 
is especially troublesome in those societies that interpret mortality 
as the susceptibility to a fi nal death, an exit from the world of the 
living once and for all. Th e possibility of life aft er death and the signs 
of this aft erlife are ubiquitous in both the East and the West, and 
oft en take the form of imaginative representations of quasi-humans 
in liminal states – vampires, zombies, ghosts and monsters, which, 
although having forms specifi c to cultural and historical worlds, can 
nonetheless be interpreted generally as attempts to make sense of 
and contain the aft erlife, this most unknowable of things. 
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 Whatever the imaginations of death, the decay of the body con-
fronts all human groups with an empirical and inescapable reality, 
a phenomenon Maurice Bloch intensively explored in Madagascar 
(Bloch  1971 ). Th e process of decay makes dying and dead bod-
ies a particularly appealing site for projection, that is, for religious 
thought: the attribution of forces and causes to beings wholly out-
side ourselves. How does one reconcile death with the slow disin-
tegration of the body, with the rot and stink that suddenly appears 
internal to the body? And how does one deal with the fact that the 
present decomposition of a dead person is a sign of our own futures? 
Such contradictions bring forth ambivalent emotions, especially 
guilt feelings for having been unable to stop the death or arrest the 
decay, or worse, for having wished for the death at some point, in 
others words, for having failed the dead or even caused the death. 
 Such emotions are appropriately called aff ects, intense feelings 
that are diffi  cult to bring into language, to euphemise or symbolise, 
and hence to control. Th e impossibility of bringing our losses fully 
into language points to a gap in the symbolic order, something for 
which there are no words that nonetheless has structuring eff ects, 
such as the reappearance of the dead in our dreams and visions 
as if they were still alive. Th is eruption of the loss that cannot be 
symbolised is what Slavoj  Ž i ž ek ( 1989 : 162) takes as the Lacanian 
Real – ‘the hard core resisting symbolisation [that nonetheless] pro-
duces a series of structural eff ects (displacements, repetitions, and 
so on)’. Aff ect might, in other words, be the symptom of the Real, 
the only manifestation that the Real exists. Th at is, the reappearance 
of the dead despite their absence asserts itself over the living, comes 
unbidden and reveals itself in displaced aggressions and repetition 
compulsions. Th oughts of the governability of not only the emotions 
but also of corpses themselves, then, can be understood as attempts 
to contain aff ect and reverse an asymmetry in power – to insist that 
one can indeed control the dead even aft er it is they who have aban-
doned us. Th is insistence is summarised in  Ž i ž ek’s (157) pithy state-
ment, ‘In the phallus, loss as such attains a positive existence.’ 
 Th e refusal to let the dead be dead and to accept our abandon-
ment also has an affi  nity with the desire to remain young forever, 
that is, with the denial of mortality and the ageing process generally. 
Here, again, we might note an old East/West diff erence: age is valor-
ised in the East but youth is valorised in the West. In the West today 
there is an extreme reversal of the usual cross-cultural valences 
between youth and elderly: the youth want to stay that way forever 
and the elderly now want to be and act like youth. Th is prolonged 
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if not life-long experience of youth, or what we might call a youth-
wish, places new demands on the ageing and the dead, positioning 
them as spectres to be contained or denied. Th e West today seems 
permeated by a general paranoia about being watched, surveilled or 
disciplined by omniscient forces and processes external to the indi-
vidual, something the collapse of a territorially identifi able enemy 
(the USSR) and the event of 9/11 have accentuated. Ageing and death 
circle this youth-state like vultures do their prey. Some of the popu-
larity of the Foucauldian paradigm of discipline can be attributed 
to this increasingly empowered youth or youth-wish, a prelapsarian 
state of being located in a paranoid position. Also symptomatic are 
the well-funded and highly publicised life sciences that continually 
evoke promises of the extension and reinvigoration of life and feed 
fantasies of individual omnipotence. 
 In this spirit of the age, the notion that the dead are internal 
objects is less appealing to think than the assumption that they are 
merely external beings that can be embraced or discarded at will. 
Today expressive culture, especially fi lm and stage drama, routinely 
stages conversations with the dead as beings largely within ourselves, 
but art takes liberties with thought that are too dangerous for the 
popular consciousness – and, unfortunately, for much social science. 
Popular resistance to the notion of dead as internal objects comes 
in the form of avoidance of reality-testing and in an obsession with 
the idea of agency. Acknowledging the dead as internal objects, the 
alien we have implanted within us, rather than an external reality to 
be disposed of, would force a level of verifi cation of our perceptions, 
where we try, to quote Sandor Ferenczi ( 1926 : 318), to ‘verify our 
inner and outer experience by analogies taken from both points of 
view’. Th e oscillation between processes of internalisation and exter-
nalisation, or introjection and projection, might enable us to modify 
what notions and images we hold of the dead in our heads as we 
translate their presence back to ourselves and to others. Without an 
appreciation of this possibility of modifi cation of the images in our 
heads, we engage in excessive reifi cation and fetishistic thought by 
imputing to external others – to the dead, to language, to disciplinary 
regimes – ideas and imaginations that belong to ourselves alone. 
 IV 
 Let us return now to the question of why the dead reappear, and 
examine some theoretical positions in light of the empirical cases 
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of the former Soviet Union, a place and people who straddle East 
and West, and its former satellite East Germany. In the  Eighteenth 
Brumaire , Marx famously defi ned the dead as ‘nightmares’ that weigh 
on the brains of the living, consistent with his interest in liberating 
humans from all past investments in order to accelerate historical 
change and produce a more perfect world (Marx  1994 ). Communist 
leaders in the Russian Revolution interpreted Marx’s dictum to 
mean to liberate the people from the Czarist regime by eviscerat-
ing its material remnants – in addition to the physical bodies, the 
architectural and religious symbolism of its rule – and, six years aft er 
seizing power, to hedge their bets, preserving the memory of the 
Revolution by mummifying Lenin’s body and placing it in the centre 
of the Kremlin. Aft er toppling the Czar in 1918, the new rulers were 
rumoured to have killed the Romanov family, the Czar and his wife 
and children, and then to have disposed of their bodies. 3 
 Th e Bolsheviks conjoined the two metaphors that Marx evoked: 
the Czar as appearing in a nightmare, located inside our heads, and 
the Czar as an external weight, on top of the brain. As a nightmare, he 
is internal to the living, a dream that comes unbidden to the uncon-
scious in the night; as a weight on the brain, he is external and can 
be physically removed. Th e mummifi cation of Lenin in 1924 can be 
interpreted along these latter lines, as an attempt to place a material 
weight on the Revolution, to bind its future to its origin by means of 
the permanent presence of the dead leader: the Cult of Lenin. In any 
event, the Bolsheviks chose physical removal for the Czar and tried 
to erase any material trace of him and his family, and any informa-
tion about the disposal of their bodies. Perhaps their intent in phys-
ically removing one weight (the Czar) and placing another (Lenin) 
on the brain was indeed to prevent the return of the Czar as a bad 
dream, that is, to prevent his eff ects in the unconscious. Th e point is, 
they did not reject understanding of the dead as nightmare: a fan-
tasy imagined while asleep and then projected onto the world, which 
then returns to the psyche as a disturbance or horror. Th is ambiva-
lence about the presence and use of the dead was in tension with the 
presentist goal to govern in the name of a single, undivided author-
ity, the Party, that recognised no ambivalence about its past while 
itself becoming a monstrous death-producing apparatus. Working 
within the paradigm of total sovereignty over the future of the entire 
society and the state apparatus, the Party located itself as the phallus, 
the positive existence of the losses that the Party accumulated and 
denied. In other words, the Party became an image internal to the 
person, part of the nightmare. 
Abandonment and victory  237
 During the Soviet period, in the space of so many unknowns 
about the Czar and his family, rumours abounded of sightings. What 
is signifi cant here is that the masses engaged in collective fantasies 
of the missing bodies of leaders of the old regime at the same time as 
the Soviets suppressed the commemoration of the many ‘ordinary’ 
dead from the horrifi c events of early Soviet rule – between 23 and 
26 million deaths from the Civil War of 1914–23; another 10 million 
in the next decade from Stalinist collectivisation, purges and famine; 
another 26 million deaths from the Great Patriotic War, 1939–45. 
Lacking a supportive landscape of memory, a public to feed back to 
the individual the legitimacy of his or her mourning, most people 
actively collaborated in this suppression to sustain the illusion of the 
non-existence of the dead. As Katherine Merridale writes, ‘Widows 
or children of purge victims might well be obliged to denounce their 
disgraced relative, and this not once, but repeatedly in everything 
they did for the rest of their lives’; they at the same time preserved 
‘their private memories for years aft erwards’ in the form of whis-
pered family secrets (Merridale  2001 : 75, 66). 
 Th e preservation of private memories of the dead in the face 
of state suppression of private grief was true of all East European 
socialist regimes. In the early Soviet period the entire state appar-
atus aimed to replace mystical, religious, emotional burial rites with 
a ‘secular, scientifi c cremation’ (Merridale  2001 : 71) and an asep-
tic ‘atheist funeral’. While the state was relatively successful in the 
replacement of birth and marriage rituals with secular substitutes, 
the masses stubbornly hung on to their superstitions and elaborate 
death rituals well into the 1960s. Meanwhile, the state held elaborate 
yearly ceremonies on the anniversary of Lenin’s death of martyrs of 
the Revolution and rites to commemorate the military heroes of the 
Great Patriotic War. Merridale concludes, ‘commemoration of the 
war was a near-sacramental act, [and] militarism was not identifi ed 
with loss, but with triumph’ (78). 4 
 In retrospect, then, getting rid of the material remains of the 
former regime did not much liberate the Soviet regime, which took 
over the more brutal aspects of the Czar’s regime and perfected 
them. Aft er the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the recovery 
of those bodies became a new media obsession, oft en with the sug-
gestion that the unjust death which the Czar and his family had suf-
fered might now take revenge on the living and return the lineage 
to power. Marx’s theory of liberation from the dead should warn 
us that the stronger the wish for liberation from the dead the more 
tightly projections of the past may shackle our present. 
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 Th e Marxian narrative of liberation from the dead is taken up in 
anthropology by Claude L é vi-Strauss in  Tristes Tropiques . Although 
uninterested in the question of either liberation or historical change, 
his study of ideology and the displacement of truth produced some 
acute and relevant insights. Aft er refl ecting on the nature of religion 
among Amerindian tribes in Brazil, he reached the conclusion that 
religion is a ‘smokescreen, [which] on the level of religious thought, 
conceals, embellishes or justifi es the actual relationships which pre-
vail among the living’ (L é vi-Strauss  1974 : 246). His interest in get-
ting rid of the smoke to see the structure eventually led him to a 
remarkable formulation, in  Th e Savage Mind , about the diff erent 
modes of addressing the dead – of their governability through rites 
of mourning and rites of commemoration. 
 Mourning rites, he argues, transport the present into the past. By 
contrast, commemorative rites ‘transport the past into the present. 
[Th ey] recreate the sacred and benefi cent atmosphere of mythical 
times – a “dream” age … and mirror their protagonists and their 
high deeds’ (L é vi-Strauss  1966 : 314). Th e purpose of commemor-
ation in transporting the past into the present is clearly to secure 
a seamless repetition of that past (albeit in a transformed state and 
context); the revisit is a fantasy of unregistered loss and unbroken 
unity with ancestors in a mythical time. By contrast, mourning, he 
argues, goes in the opposite direction, seeking to return to the past 
rather than to bring the past into the present. Mourning rites ‘guar-
antee that men who are no longer among the living will be converted 
into ancestors’. 
 Th e implication is that, whereas commemoration keeps the past 
alive by incorporating the dead into a myth in the tragic mode, 
mourning rites – conversion of the dead into ancestors – consti-
tute an effi  cacious overcoming of the dead’s hold on us by taking 
us back to a past that is acknowledged as separate from our own 
time. In other words, the dead are an irrevocable loss that, if con-
verted into ancestors in this mourning rite, promise a type of clos-
ure. Mourning, therefore, by staging events that place the past in 
the past, diff ers from commemorative rites that secure a repetition 
of the past by bringing it into the future. 
 In  Political Crime and the Memory of Loss , I draw attention to this 
diff erence between mourning as ‘events of accountability’ and com-
memoration as ‘rites of repetition’, which is homologous to Freud’s 
distinction between mourning and melancholia (Borneman  2011 : 
3–32). Mourning, as he defi ned it, is a ‘reaction to the loss of a loved 
person, or to the loss of some abstraction which has taken the place 
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of one’ (Freud  1917 : 243), which entails letting go of the lost person, 
object or event. A proper separation allows for the development of a 
self worthy of life and new attachments. Melancholia, which grows 
out of the same loss, is a reaction of self-reproach that keeps the 
dead alive, entailing a refusal to acknowledge the loss as irrevocable 
and therefore foreclosing new attachments. While this distinction 
has proven immensely productive theoretically, there are, as many 
scholars have maintained, diff erent degrees of letting go and hold-
ing on, and therefore a large range of grieving practices partaking of 
elements of both of these poles. 
 Subsequent research has questioned the very possibility and desir-
ability of exchanging one loved object for another. Along these lines, 
Freud’s model is interpreted as assuming the health of an ego that is 
fundamentally narcissistic and intent only on overcoming loss. To be 
sure, the presence of dead spirits across cultures makes it doubtful 
that the conversion of the dead into ancestors is ever complete or per-
manent, but such fi gures also suggest that mourning work involves 
a third subject. Th at is, mourning is not a solipsistic and self-refer-
ential act but requires the mediation of another relationship with an 
imaginative fi gure. Along these lines, mourning rites could be seen 
as Sisyphean: stalling devices that attempt to prevent the fairly inev-
itable return of a mythical past in the future. If mourning rites in fact 
intend to release us from the past, they most frequently fail to eff ect 
this release, although they still may eff ect a transformation of the 
loss. Commemorative rites take into account this failure in advance, 
displacing the struggle from one over whether to commemorate to 
one over the form commemoration should take, that is, the form in 
which the past returns and maintains a presence in the present. 
 It is worth asking what more or less effi  cacious conversions of 
the dead into ancestors might look like, and if some forms of revisit-
ing the past are more transformative and more open to futures than 
others. For one, an eff ective conversion of the dead into ancestors 
does not mean that the attachments to the dead and lost objects leave 
no traces, a point that Freud himself addressed and clarifi ed in later 
work. In  Th e Ego and the Id ( 1923 : 29), for example, Freud explicitly 
insisted on the permanent traces left  by losses, a point Laplanche 
( 1999 ) has made central to his work on Otherness. Freud concep-
tualised the healthy ego not merely as an autonomous object free 
to love but as always ‘a precipitate of abandoned object-cathexes’. 
In short, our losses remain with us as accumulated internal objects, 
which, in the case of melancholia, lead to an identifi cation with the 
dead. For the melancholic, the lost person is then ‘transformed into 
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an ego-loss’ (Freud  1917 : 249), which leads either to a reaction of 
reproach directed at oneself (depression), or alternatively to mania, 
assertions of victory over the loss without, however, adequately 
understanding what it is one has lost. 
 Th e question of our relation to the dead, therefore, always turns 
around the kinds of attachment to lost objects once grieving begins. 
In mourning that eff ects a transformation of the loss, the spirit of 
the dead – the aff ect of our past attachment – is incorporated into 
our ego in a way that does not attack it but instead enables a changed 
understanding of our own temporal existence; the dead in this 
vision occupy a lost world in which we no longer live and which we 
have abandoned. Th e presence of the dead would be remembered as 
ancestral, prior in time, and not invoked as a living fetish – creating 
illusions of a determinative presence inherent in the lost objects of 
our attachment. We would not, then, attribute causality to the dead 
as spectres outside ourselves, but nonetheless admit their power 
over us, which arises solely from our necessary internal reckoning 
with the experience of loss, and the feelings of powerlessness and 
abandonment that accompany it. 
 V 
 Melanie Klein ( 1948 ) argues that at moments of signifi cant loss or 
separation we tend to return to a state of anxiety as a result of fear 
of the loss of our nurturing, loving, caring, comforting (what she 
simplifi es as ‘good’) internal objects and the threat of being over-
whelmed by our threatening, frustrating, punitive, persecutory 
(what she simplifi es as ‘bad’) ones. Our fear of persecution by the 
punitive objects in our head, while at the same time our longing 
or pining for the nurturing ones, activates in us what she calls the 
‘depressive position’. Th is position is a signifi cant achievement in 
the development of a child, and is possible only when the child 
comes to affi  rm the ambivalence of its experience. Acknowledging 
ambivalence, the child might begin to comprehend objects (per-
sons, things, ideas) in the world no longer as divided into discrete 
good and bad qualities but as containing within themselves both 
good and bad. 
 Th e balance achieved early on between the two kinds of objects 
is unstable, and this instability, oft en marked by a denial of ambiva-
lence, continues to haunt the adult subject. Freud initially explained 
that as we grow up we internalise images of those to whom we 
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develop attachments. Klein elaborates how these internalised 
images constitute a rich inner world of relations, how they are con-
stantly in interaction with the outside world and with one another. 
One way in which we verify our perceptions is to confront these 
inner objects with the outside world in order to arrive at a sense of 
reality, sometimes called ‘reality-testing’, which provides the basis 
on which we communicate with others. If the testing goes well 
enough, we mature and our anxieties do not develop into patholo-
gies, that is, into harmful obsessions and compulsive repetitions. 
Anxiety about the corpse manifested in the movement of dead bod-
ies is one such repetition. 
 In moments of the transformation of authoritarian regimes, new 
orientations must be found in the face of a loss of leaders and del-
egitimated normative conventions (Borneman  2004a ). Klein would 
argue that the extreme anxieties of this transformation make it likely 
that we regress to a ‘depressive position’ in which we fear that our 
nurturing and comforting inner objects will be overwhelmed by our 
persecutory ones. 
 One reaction to this position is indeed depression (a strong 
version of Freud’s melancholia, but where the persecutory objects 
overwhelm the comforting ones), the other is a manic defence. 
Such a defence relies on idealisation of the lost object as well as 
denial of this loss. Transformations from authoritarian regimes 
entail losses of those sets of authority fi gures and symbols to which 
one has been ambivalently attached. Mourning, as opposed to this 
manic defence, is possible only if one has suffi  ciently strong nurt-
uring and loving internal objects capable of allaying the fears of 
loss and abandonment, or of alleviating the guilt for having par-
ticipated in or even created the loss. 
 Authoritarian regimes tend to demand forms of complicity in 
the crimes of their rule. Th ey rely on fear and persecution to secure 
acquiescence and, through the arbitrariness of their persecutions, 
cultivate paranoia in the public sphere. At the individual level, evi-
dence for the dominance of threatening objects is the increased 
prevalence of what clinical psychiatrists call splitting and border-
line personalities, characterised by alternating extremes between 
idealisation and devaluation, and frantic attempts to avoid aban-
donment. My contention is that the frenzied exhumation and 
reburials following the collapse of the Soviet and East-Central 
European regimes represent a collective manic defence: an ideal-
isation of former leaders as well as a refusal to accept that they were 
in fact gone. 
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 VI 
 Is the movement of the dead bodies of the Romanov family the 
unfolding of a manic defence against loss, the fi rst loss being of the 
Czarist regime, the second of the Soviet? It was a Bolshevik exe-
cution squad of ten men that executed Czar Nicholas II, his wife, 
Alexandra, the couple’s fi ve children and four attendants on 17 July 
1918, an event that ended Russian imperial rule and presaged an 
extended period of Soviet state brutality against its own citizens. 
Subsequent discourse about the event has assumed that the commu-
nists murdered the Romanovs, though there has always been some 
disagreement about the details of their deaths. What remained most 
unresolved, however, was the status and placement of the missing 
bodies. What happened to the imperial remains? 
 Th e scientifi c story of these remains begins in 1979, sixty-one 
years aft er the event, when a small group of scientists found, secretly, 
in the Ural mountains, the disintegrating skeletons of nine people, 
including three children. Th is fi nding was kept secret until 1990, 
however, and only made public as the USSR neared its own disinte-
gration. DNA evidence subsequently seemed to match these remains 
with Romanov DNA, but many people refused to believe the evi-
dence, most prominently some Romanov descendants, who wanted 
to reinstate the monarchy, and the Russian Orthodox Church, which 
had idealised the Czar and later, in the year 2000, even canonised the 
entire family. Both the Church and the imperial family supported an 
alternative version of the story, that the Romanov remains had been 
disposed of elsewhere in the same forest but destroyed beyond recog-
nition – a very discomforting fantasy that combines a wish for anni-
hilation, a persecutory position, with an idealisation of the dead. 
 From the time of the killings, stories swirled: about moving the 
boxed evidence of remains to Venice, Italy, hiding the remains inside 
a wall at the New Martyrs Russian Orthodox Church in Brussels, 
missing evidence, newly uncovered topaz jewels, scraps of cloth-
ing and bone fragments, offi  cial denials and previously undisclosed 
fi ndings, judicial and lay investigations, uncannily specifi c details 
such as the movements of trucks and soldiers around mysterious 
dead bodies near the Ganina Yama mine during the night of their 
deaths, vehicles getting stuck in mud and dousing bodies with sul-
phuric acid and gasoline before burning them. 
 Th e details of these stories turn around a specifi c tension: the 
desire to fi nd a ‘fi nal grave’, or, alternatively, to suspend the end so 
as to preserve the lost fi gure as ideal, which amounts to an idealised 
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acknowledgment of the loss. Much the same kind of tension can be 
found in most other cases of such missing bodies when the polit-
ical body is in a moment of radical transformation: for example, in 
the insistence in the USA aft er being driven from Vietnam in 1975 
that American bodies, living and dead, were missing and had been 
left  behind, and in the bizarre movement of Eva Perón’s remains 
between Madrid, Milan and Buenos Aires. It is also the story of trans-
formation from socialism told about Hungary by Susan Gal ( 1991 ) 
in ‘Bartok’s Funeral’ and about East-Central Europe by Katherine 
Verdery ( 1999 ) in  Th e Political Lives of Dead Bodies . I myself told 
an ironic version of this story in  Death of the Father : the movement 
of the remains of King Frederick II from Baden-W ü rttemberg to 
rest surrounded by the graves of his thirteen dogs in Sanssouci in 
Potsdam, near Berlin (Borneman  2004b : 67–8). Verdery claims to 
explore how dead bodies ‘animate’ or ‘enchant’ politics. More pre-
cisely, though, her concern is not with how or why dead bodies, spe-
cifi cally, are animated; rather she examines how politics views the 
materiality of dead bodies as a site for possible enchantment. She 
asks how the material dead body can be animated and appropriated 
for more narrowly conceived political ends (e.g. mobilisation, party 
or national identifi cation, ideological positioning). 
 Th e search for meaning through death is the conundrum Walter 
Benjamin explored when he wrote, ‘Death is the sanction of every-
thing that the storyteller can tell.’ Th e end writes the beginning and 
the middle of the story to create an interpretative ordering of events 
of what had happened. Only the end can fi nally determine meaning 
and close the story as a signifying totality (cited in Brooks  1984 : 23). 
Th ere is a fear of and struggle over this closure, and hence a motiv-
ation to defer the end in an active process of continuous discursive 
reworking of the stories. 
 At another level, however, this deferral of meaning in time 
through the movement of corpses supports my contention that we 
understand it as a manic defence against loss. In the example of the 
Russian Czar, the investment in his body – both making it disappear 
and wishing for its return – is a reaction to the loss of the symbols of 
an old regime. It expressed the ambivalence about this loss, the love 
and hate for the old regime. Th e extreme attempts to hide the family’s 
remains are defences against the feelings of self-reproach and guilt 
that accompany signifi cant loss, specifi cally for also having wished 
this death. Th is mania is marked, to cite Klein ( 1948 : 351), by ‘the 
desire to control the object, the sadistic gratifi cation of overcoming 
and humiliating it, of getting the better of it, the triumph over it’. Th e 
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attempt to triumph over the lost object, the Czar, his family and his 
regime, is a reaction to fears of revenge for having been complicit in 
the murder of the ruling family; the lost object turns into a persecu-
tor and, as was evident in the development of the Soviet regime, the 
new rulers became possessed by a general paranoia about internal 
and external enemies. 
 VII 
 In this fi nal section, I remain with the Soviet and East-Central 
European socialist world and focus on the status of the body of 
Vladimir Ilich Lenin and his icon, and on the Lenin cult outside 
the Soviet regime. What was the meaning of his icon in one of the 
former Soviet satellite states, the former GDR (German Democratic 
Republic)? My own ethnographic research there began in 1982. In 
1990 the GDR dissolved and was integrated into West Germany (the 
FRG or Federal Republic of Germany). 
 First, as I mentioned, Lenin was mummifi ed aft er his death in 1924 
and put on display in a special crypt in the Kremlin. Th roughout the 
Soviet Empire, icons of Lenin proliferated aft er his death, consciously 
supported by the regime, and, aft er 1945, Soviet bloc allies in Eastern 
Europe put up public statutes of and named streets aft er him in all 
major cities. Th e mummifi cation was, then, not only about deferring 
his end but also about commemoration: proliferating images to ensure 
his continual presence. 
 Nina Tumarkin, in her excellent book on the subject, argues that 
the Soviet cult of Lenin was integral to the legitimation of the post-
revolutionary regime: ‘Th e cult served the needs of the Soviet state 
and indeed, as a standardised complex of activities and symbols, was 
a government and party enterprise concocted for the delectation of 
the untutored masses.’ Yet, she also attributes the cult’s success to the 
‘pull of the irrational in the formation of Soviet political culture … 
molded by precisely those elements of old Russian culture that Lenin 
so desperately sought to destroy’ ( 1997 : 3). Th at is, she attributes 
to ritual the power of being able to tap into the deep cultural roots 
of Russian mysticism. Lenin, in part through his mummifi cation, 
was turned into a ‘harmless icon’ ( 1997 : 87, 90, 105, 127), modelled 
aft er the Byzantine practice of the production of icons of saints for 
identifi cation and distribution, and the creation of ‘icon corners’ for 
saints in private homes. Th e icons, Tumarkin stresses, were not wor-
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shipped but served merely as vehicles through which saints (or Jesus 
or Mary) could keep in contact with this world. 
 Many Lenin statues were installed in prominent public places in 
the GDR, though authorities there were never able to create the same 
depth of identifi cation with Lenin as were Soviet leaders. I want to 
focus on the most prominent of these, the 18-metre-high Lenin icon 
that stood at Lenin Platz on Leninallee in East Berlin. Th roughout 
the 1980s I oft en walked past this statue, and never once did some-
one comment to me about it. Although overwhelming the square 
where it stood, the statue was, at least by the time I began fi eldwork, 
pretty much unnoticed. I suspect that for most people it was simply 
a background visual across from a well-visited park. 
 Aft er the opening of the Wall in November 1989, those who took 
charge of dissolving the GDR and the unifi cation process opposed 
the prominence of this monument to Lenin – proud, towering, revo-
lutionary – on an everyday street in the new centre. Th ere was at 
the time a general desire by the West Berliners and West Germans, 
and a large group of East German supporters, to eliminate signs of 
the Soviet occupation and to return the territorial-political bound-
aries of the East to their pre-1945 lines. Streets and places were 
renamed. Even the names of those that celebrated Klara Zetkin, Rosa 
Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht, German heroes who predated the 
occupation, sparked contentious debate. Th e intent was to reverse 
history in the East generally, to unwind it (called ‘ die Abwicklung ’) 
and return to the time before the East had become part of the Soviet 
Empire (Borneman  1991 ). 
 Th e East German playwright Heiner M ü ller, whose reputation 
as independent of the regime was never questioned, even aft er the 
Wall came down, seemed to capture the spirit of the times in his 
many interviews. He oft en uttered aphorisms, and one I particu-
larly liked went: ‘Lenin hat gesagt, “Vertrauen ist gut, Kontrolle ist 
besser.” [Lenin said: Trust is good, control is better.] Stalin hat ges-
agt, “Kontrolle ist gut, Verdr ä ngung ist besser.” [Stalin said: Control 
is good, repression is better.]’ And that indeed fi tted the  Zeitgeist in 
the early 1990s; in order to repress the past, one had to get rid of the 
symbols that signifi ed it, among which the Lenin icon was one of the 
most prominent. Hence this Lenin was decapitated and removed. 
Th e  Demontage (disassembly) of the icon is one of the most dramatic 
images of the end of the socialist era, as the head was separated from 
the body, and the body slowly suspended from a crane during its 
removal, hovering over socialist-realist housing blocks. 
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 Four years later, in 1995, an East German who had won a compe-
tition to make a fi lm about  Ostalgie (nostalgia for the East) contacted 
me about narrating parts of the fi lm. East Germans had at the time 
little authority to narrate their own history, so it made sense to ask 
an American who had done research there and was not really tainted 
by the regime to talk about the former East. Th e director’s vignettes 
included an automobile race with souped-up Trabbis – the small 
state-produced cars with lawnmower-like engines – and a party at 
which appeared socialist authorities – such as Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin, 
Ulbricht, Gorbachev. Th e vignette I was involved in was called ‘Lenin 
came from Warsaw’. It drew on the irony that the man who played 
Lenin at these parties was a Pole from Warsaw. I was to explain what 
had happened to the Lenin statue. Aft er asking around, the director 
determined that it must have been dumped in some remote site in 
the forest in K ö penick outside Berlin. Armed with only a three-year-
old photo of a reassembled Lenin lying fl at on his back in a forest 
behind an unmarked gate, the director, her fi lm crew and I drove to 
the K ö penicker forest. 
 Th e forest contained several large camping places. We drove into 
a few. Everybody we met was suspicious of us, and nobody was will-
ing to give us directions. We wandered around for some time before 
fi nding an unmarked gate next to a sign that said, ‘ Eintreten verbo-
ten ’ (To enter is forbidden). We took that road anyway, eventually 
running into a second unmarked gate, with a large boulder blocking 
it. Behind the gate was a huge mound of dirt that resembled unexca-
vated Aztec and Mayan temples I’d seen in Mexico and Guatemala. 
Under that mound was Lenin, now fully grown over with wild grass, 
only two small spots of his granite nose sticking out, reputedly the 
result of eff orts by another American to uncover the bust. 
 For the fi lm, I interpreted this burial as a fear of the power of the 
icon to mobilise  Ostalgie , a fear of a melancholic holding on to the 
past of which Lenin was a symbol. In Russia at the time there was a 
debate about whether to remove the Lenin mummy from Red Square 
in Moscow. Th e new Russian leaders feared that the absence of the 
real Lenin (statue) might lead to a legitimation crisis. For the coun-
try’s leaders, in Berlin the icon was too powerful to leave around, 
in Moscow the mummy was too powerful to bury. More specifi c-
ally, the fear of Lenin’s icon in East Berlin had to do with ongoing 
eff orts to correct the past in the East, to make people repent and roll 
back time. Th e demand to repent for the past foreclosed a process of 
mourning. In a similar way, Germans aft er the Second World War 
faced a demand to repent. Along with submitting to occupation by 
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four foreign powers, this demand made it diffi  cult to assume respon-
sibility for the crimes of the regime and admit complicity in them 
while at the same time mourning their own losses. A potential Lenin 
resurrection in Berlin might have mobilised some people to resist 
the eff orts of the new authorities to wind down and reverse history. 
 At the time, I did not interpret the popular wave of  Ostalgie to be 
nostalgia for a return to the past. Instead, I thought the  Ostalgie cel-
ebrations were mourning rites, attempts to say goodbye to the past, 
to give it the proper and joyous burial that had been denied these 
objects of loss in the rush to German unifi cation. 
 In retrospect, what has happened between the confl ict between 
the three modes of dealing with the past: repression, mourning and 
melancholia? On the one hand, there is a strong if small group of East 
Germans who resent and resist this erasing of history, who empow-
ered themselves through the courts (for example, suing offi  cials who 
fi red them because they worked for the Stasi), and reclaimed prop-
erty they claimed was improperly returned to former owners. Th ey 
have also pressured museums to change their representations of the 
GDR period. Th e attempt to repress the past and roll it back has 
strengthened their resolve to hold on to it. In this sense, they are in 
denial of their loss and, if not depressed, themselves engaged in a 
manic response. 
 On the other hand, however, a far larger group of East Germans 
have taken full advantage of the new opportunities that capitalism and 
West German democracy off er, remodelling their cities and apart-
ments with federal subsidies, travelling abroad to places formerly 
not allowed, not wanting to be much bothered with the albatross of a 
socialist past. Th at reaction means neither denial, repression nor for-
getting, however. Even this group has been unable to avoid that past, 
as it continues to see the dead in fi lms and museum exhibits, and all 
the political parties seem periodically beset by well-publicised scan-
dals that demand a fuller reckoning with the past leaders. 
 An increased level of trust in social relations and in the political-
economic order generally is a key condition of democratic authority. 
Th is trust seems to me characteristic for most residents of Germany 
today, which suggests that they can relate to the dead without awak-
ening great anxiety. Th ey need not declare governance or victory 
over them; their bodies are for the moment decomposing without 
any attempt to reverse the process. Th is also implies that the attempt 
to repress the past – to resort to Stalin’s dictum, control is good but 
repression is better – was unnecessary for most Germans. However, 
some of the smaller groups in the former East Germany who had 
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initially engaged in  Ostalgie seemed in fact to have repressed their 
loss. For them,  Ostalgie parties, which might have served to acknow-
ledge the loss, had the perverse eff ect of strengthening the hold on 
the past. Holding on to the past was also oft en accompanied by self-
reproach, a further attack on and weakening of an ego made vulner-
able by the dissolution of East Germany as a political-social order. In 
the future, such self-reproach makes its members susceptible, in the 
event they experience another radical transformation of authority, 
to an assumption of the ‘depressive position’ and open to another 
manic reaction to loss. In that case, the dead may again assert con-
trol over the living, as internal objects that can eliminate the ambiva-
lence that accompanies loss. 
 Notes 
 1  Burning in effi  gy is also practised in Eastern countries, and the popu-
lar associations are similar to those in the West. In India, what is oft en 
added to the fi gure that is burned is a garland of shoes placed around the 
neck: an ultimate impurity associated with leather (the hide of dead ani-
mals, touched and prepared only by untouchables) and with the feet (the 
mythical site of the origins of untouchables). I thank Kartikeya Saboo for 
this tip. 
 2  See Davies and Mates  2006 : 162–5; ‘Body heat: using corpses for greenery 
may be a step too far’,  Th e Economist , 6 August 2009 ( www.economist.
com.node/14191268 , accessed 21 November 2010). 
 3  Much of this account of the Czar’s end is taken from Massie ( 1996 ) and 
Radzinsky ( 1993 ). 
 4  How this loss is addressed in the post-Soviet period is not the subject of 
this chapter, but an important advance is made by Serguei Oushakine 
( 2009 ). 
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